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The primary goal of this thesis is to examine patent claim interpretation from a new 
perspective of interpretive legal theory. Patent claim interpretation is fundamental to 
delineating the scope of patent rights, which is central to the determination of validity 
and infringement. However, the patent law literature often overlooks the importance 
of theories of legal interpretation underpinning different claim interpretation 
approaches. The current interpretive legal rules for patent claims widely use the 
concepts of ―ordinary meaning‖, ―purpose‖ and ―content.‖ These concepts may 
provide bases for the general interpretation of meaning, but whether they are fit for 
patent claim construction is seldom assessed.  
This thesis distinguishes three contemporary claim interpretation approaches, 
namely, the ordinary meaning approach, the purposive approach and the constructive 
approach. Each approach privileges one factor that is relevant to the interpretation of 
patent claims, be it the ordinary meaning of the claim text, the patentee‘s purpose or 
the subject matter of the claim text. A theory of meaning gives an account of how 
language works. As we will see, three theories of meaning that underlie these 
approaches are, respectively, the ordinary use-based theory, the intention-based theory 
and the content-based theory.  
The meaning of a patent claim term is highly context-sensitive, that is, it is 
understood by a skilled person in the relevant art. Current theories of claim 
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interpretation have emphasized the contextual use of claim language, but still have not 
resolved the tension between preserving the certainty of claim scope and adapting the 
claim text to technological development. The thesis introduces philosophical 
hermeneutics to shed light on how interpretation works. This theory pays attention to 
the interpretive gap between the original text or author ―there and then‖ and the 
interpreter ―here and now‖. According to philosophical hermeneutics, a dynamic link 
between past and present is captured in the idea that two horizons merge into a new 
understanding. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in attempts to 
make a connection between the original meaning and the living documents in legal 
interpretation, particularly in the field of constitutional and statutory interpretation.  
By exploring the relation between a pair of crucial concepts –―meaning‖ and 
―application‖, this thesis proposes a dynamic principle for patent claim construction. 
The dynamic approach applies the connotation-denotation technique as a practical 
middle-ground solution to ascertain the meaning of claim terms. The connotation 
remains constant, but the denotation changes. This thesis further proposes 
implementation guides for dynamic claim construction in infringement cases. The 
dynamic approach has its own theoretical and practical limitations, however, it 
reflects the need for a balance between certainty and flexibility in claim construction, 
and encourages interpreters to justify the decisions they make by articulating the 
reasons for the choice of meaning.  
So far, some of the work from this thesis has been presented in academic 
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conference and published in law journal as the following articles: a) Huang Yan, 
Eclectic Approach in China: Seeking a Third Way to Patent Claim Construction, 6th 
Asian Law Institute Conference (2009), University of Hong Kong, HK; b) Huang Yan, 
A Dynamic Framework For Patent Claim Construction: Insights from a Philosophical 
Hermeneutic Study, Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal, Volume 21:1(2012-2013), 
University of Texas, U.S. 
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INTRODUCTION: PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION FROM A 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In modern patent practice, it is a fundamental notion that patent claims delimit 
the scope of patent monopoly and determine crucial issues such as patent 
validity and infringement.
1
 Each claim is in a very concise single-sentence 
format. The reason for this formality requirement is that a patent holder should 
know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not.
2
 Judges 
decide issues such as patent validity or infringement by extracting meaning 
from the patent claims. The process of construing the terms of patent claims to 
give them meaning is the process of patent claim interpretation, also known as 
patent claim construction.
 3
 Interpretation of patent claims is the very core of 
patent protection and the key to legal decisions.  
Virtually every word in a claim is important. The words of a patent claim 
                                                        
1 Patent claims are written statements located at the end of the patent document that recite and define the 
boundaries of an invention. Article 69 of the European Patents Convention 1973 (―the extent of 
protection ... shall be determined by the terms of the claim.‖); Section 125(1) of the UK Patents Act 1977 
(providing that an invention for which a patent has been granted is ―specified in a claim.‖); 35 U.S.C. § 112 
(2000) (―The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.‖) Article 59 of the Patent Law of 
the People's Republic of China (as Amended 2008) (―the scope of protection in the patent right for an 
invention or a utility model shall be determined by the terms of the patent claim.‖); Singapore Patents 
Act (Chapter 221) (―an invention for a patent …shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be taken to be 
that specified in a claim of the specification of the application or patent.‖ For the evolution of the role of 
patent claims in defining the scope of protection see, e.g. Donald S. Chisum, Patents, Vol.4, 18-78 (1993); 
Robert C. Kahrl, Patent Claim Construction 1.01(2001); David J. Brennan, The Evolution of English 
Patent Claims as Property Definers, I.P.Q. , Vol. 4, 361-399 (2005). 
2 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyokabushiki Co., Ltd., et al, 535 U.S. 122 S. Ct. 1837(2002) (―Festo 
VIII‖). 
3 To establish meaning of a claim text, courts often use the terms ―interpretation‖ and ―construction‖ 
interchangeably. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim 
Scope Paradigms, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 49 (2005). (―The question of proper interpretation 
methodology has been at the forefront since the Supreme Court held in Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc. that claim interpretation, also known as claim construction, is a matter exclusively for the courts.‖) 
This thesis will discuss the differences between claim interpretation and claim construction. For the 
convenience of reasoning, without specific mention, the term ―interpretation‖ is used broadly. 
JerzyWroblewski & Neil MacCormick, On justification and Interpretation, published in Law and Legal 
Interpretation 258 (Fernando Atria & D. Neil MacCormick ed., 2003) (―Interpretation…is the work of 
thought which consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels 
of meaning implied in the literal meaning.‖) 
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might be interpreted as having either a broad or a narrow meaning, which 
would affect the scope of legal protection and determine the outcome of the 
dispute. According to an economic survey in 2011, the average cost of a patent 
litigation in the United States for a low-stakes case (i.e., $1 million to $25 
million at stake) is about $ 3 million and for a higher-stakes case (i.e., more 
than $25 million at stake) is $6 million.
4 It is not surprising that the doctrines 
of patent claim interpretation have received enormous attention in many 
jurisdictions during the last two decades.5 There has been much debate in 
patent literature on the difficulties of patent claim interpretation, and the 
problems have become intensified in recent years. In 1990, Judge Giles Rich 
coined the famous phrase, ―the name of the game is the claim.‖6 It would not 
be an exaggeration to say that the name of the game today and tomorrow is 
claim interpretation.   
WHY DO WE NEED THEORIES IN CLAIM INTERPRETATION? 
The subject examined in this thesis is the process of claim interpretation in 
                                                        
4 American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), Report of the Economic Survey, 153 (2011). 
The relevant question in the AIPLA survey asked: ―What is your estimate of the total cost of a patent 
infringement suit (i) through the end of discovery, and (ii) inclusive of discovery, motions, pretrial, trial, 
post‐trial, and appeal?‖ 
5 See e.g. Brad Sherman, Patent Claim Interpretation: The Impact of the Protocol on Interpretation, 54 
Modern Law Review 499 (1991); Wendy Lim, Towards Developing A Natural Law Jurisprudence in the 
U.S. Patent System, 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 559 (2003); Nicholas Fox, Divided By a 
Common Language: A Comparison of Patent Claim Interpretation in the English and American Courts, 
26 E.I.P.R.528 (2004); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 49 (2005); David Sanker, Phillips v. AWH Corp.: No 
Miracles in Claim Construction, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 101 (2006); Andrew B. Dzeguze, Did Markman 
and Philips Answer the Right Question? A Review of the Fractured State of Claim Construction Law and 
the Potential Use of Equity to Unify It, 15 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 457, 487 (2007); Lee Petherbridge, The 
Claim Construction Effect, 15 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 215(2008); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction,157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 
(2009); Jonathan L. Moore, A Patent Panacea the Promise Of Corbinized Claim Construction, 9 Chi.-Kent 
J. Intell. Prop. 1 (2010); Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and. 
Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711 (2010); Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules? Patents 
and the (Uncertain) Rules of the Game,18 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev.481 (2012). 
6 Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American Perspectives, 21 Int‘l Rev. 
Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 497, 499 (1990) (―To coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claim.‖).  
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patent litigations. In patent claim interpretation, statements such as the 
following are commonly encountered: ―the ordinary and customary meaning of 
a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary 
skill in the art in question at the time of the invention‖, 7 ―the claims are to be 
construed purposively – the inventor‘s purpose being ascertained from the 
description and drawings‖,8 and ―the specification and appended drawings 
may be used to interpret the contents of the patent claim.‖9 However, several 
important questions remain poorly understood: how should the ordinary 
meaning of a key word be determined? How should the intent of the patentee 
be defined? How should the content of claims be specified?  
                                                        
7 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (―Words of the claim are generally given 
their ordinary and customary meaning‖); Innova Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 
381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004) (―The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands 
a claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation.‖) For the selection of 
the time of interpretation, see Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 Mich. 
L. Rev. 101 (2005).(―determining the meaning of claims as of the time of invention or the time of filing… 
Both are focused at or about the time the invention is made.‖) The United States used to have the 
first-to-invent rule that granted rights to the first inventor who conceived and reduced the technology or 
invention to practice. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) enacted on September 16, 2011[H.R. 
1249], takes effect March 16, 2013. The first-inventor-to-file provision in AIA converts the United States 
patent system from a ―first to invent‖ system to a ―first-inventor-to-file‖ system. Section 3 (a) (i) ―effective 
filing date‖ means the actual filing date of the patent or the application for the patent containing a claim to 
the invention. http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-44.jsp (last visited Nov 30, 2012). 
8 Mayne Pharma Pty Limited v. Pharmacia Italia SpA [2005] EWCA Civ 137. Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst 
Marion Roussel Ltd [2005] RPC 9 (Lord Hoffmann) (―And he reads the specification on the assumption 
that its purpose is to both to describe and to demarcate an invention - a practical idea which the patentee 
has had for a new product or process - and not to be a textbook in mathematics or chemistry or a shopping 
list of chemicals or hardware. It is this insight which lies at the heart of "purposive construction". ) Catnic 
Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183, 243 (Lord Diplock) (―the reader is entitled to assume 
that the patentee thought at the time of the specification that he had good reason for limiting his monopoly 
so strictly and had intended to do so, even though subsequent work by him or others in the field of the 
invention might show the limitation to have been unnecessary.‖) Cephalon Inc & Ors v. Orchid Europe Ltd 
& Ors [2011] EWHC 1591. (―The task for the court is to determine what the person skilled in the art would 
have understood the patentee to have been using the language of the claim to mean. The principles were 
summarized by Jacob LJ in Mayne Pharma v Pharmacia Italia [2005] EWCA Civ 137 and refined by 
Pumfrey J in Halliburton v Smith International [2005] EWHC 1623 (Pat) following their general approval 
by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel [2005] RPC 9.‖) 
9 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted at the Fourth Meeting of the Standing Committee 
of the Sixth National People‘s Congress and promulgated by order No. 11 of the President of the People‘s 
Republic of China on March 12, 1984, and effective as of April 1, 1985, revised Dec 27, 2008), Art. 59, 
translated in LawInfoChina (last visited July 31, 2011) (P.R.C.). According to Article 2 of the CPL, 
―inventions-creations‖ include inventions, utility models and designs. The revised Article 59 of the CPL 
specifies that specifications and drawings can be used to ―interpret the contents of the patent claim‖, 
which is different from the original provision: ―interpret the patent claim.‖ 
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As languages are by nature imprecise,
10
 and the claims of a patent are 
considered to ―constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw 
with accuracy‖,11 short-hand concepts such as ―ordinary meaning‖, ―objective 
intent‖ and ―content‖ are likely to obscure the correct analysis. A recent study 
has shown that between the ―initial understanding‖ of claim language and the 
ultimate ―proper construction‖, there is a ―black-box‖ process that lacks 
consistency and transparency.
12
 Since patent claim construction serves as the 
basis for infringement and validity decisions,
13
 such a process will give 
interpreters an overly broad discretion in determining the scope of protection.
14
 
Professor William Twining has warned in the general field of legal 
interpretation that the use of the terms like ―ordinary meaning‖ and ―purpose‖ 
should not be taken too much for granted. While they ―may be helpful in 
                                                        
10 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).  (―Unfortunately, the 
nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application… The 
language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete 
precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value 
would be greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat 
the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying.‖) 
11 Topliff v. Topliff, 145 US 156 (1892). (―The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the 
invention be at all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with 
accuracy; and, in view of the fact that valuable inventions are often placed in the hands of inexperienced 
persons to prepare such specifications and claims, it is no matter of surprise that the latter frequently fail to 
describe with requisite certainty the exact invention of the patentee, and err either in claiming that which 
the patentee had not in fact invented, or in omitting some element which was a valuable or essential part of 
his actual invention.‖) 
12 Menell et al., supra note 5 (Arriving at the proper construction requires filtering the claim language at 
issue through a number of rules of claim construction, taking into consideration the pertinent statements in 
the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. The various rules that the court must take into analysis are sometimes 
contradictory, and typically involve a balancing of considerations.) 
13 Typhoon Touch Tech. v. Dell, Lenovo, Toshiba, Fujitsu, Sand Dune Ventures, Panasonic, Apple, HTC, 
and Palm, No. 09-1589  (Fed. Cir. 2011) (―The district court construed the claim as requiring that a device, 
to be covered by the claim, actually performs, or is configured or programmed to perform, each of the 
functions stated in the claim… This aspect is the basis of the judgment of non-infringement.) Paul M. 
Janicke & Li Lan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases? 34 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 40 n.75 (2006). 
(Summary judgment or settlement occurs over 80% of the time based upon the claim construction ruling, 
suggesting claim construction is dispositive about 83% of the time.) 
14 Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 
(1990) (―After a patent has been issued, a patentee will often allege that her invention has been copied by 
competitors. In arguing the case, she will try to demonstrate that the accused infringer's product falls 
within the boundaries of her invention, as defined in her patent claims, or that any differences between 
the infringer's device and her invention are insignificant... the legal principles and objective evidence 
often leave considerable room for discretion. There has been surprisingly little theoretical discussion of 
how to exercise this discretion.‖) 
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giving a general sense of direction, they are often not very helpful in drawing 
precise boundaries.‖15  
So when judges use legal terminologies such as ―ordinary meaning,‖ 
―purpose‖ and ―content‖ in claim construction, the first logical stage is to 
understand what they mean.
16
 Interpreters give meaning to a text based on such 
factors as their interpretation of words, perception of the author‘s purpose and 
the familiarity with the subject matter.
17
 The words, the intent of the author, and 
the subject matter carry various weight in different interpretive theories, which 
makes different outcomes more or less plausible,18 particularly when one factor 




Although it has been long recognized that interpretive theory plays an 
important role in almost all areas of law, for example, legal literature is replete 
                                                        
15 William Twining & David Miers, How to Do Things with Rules: A Primer of Interpretation 206 (3d ed., 
1991)(―A good deal of confusion attends these notions both in the literature and in practice, perhaps for 
two main reasons: first, terms like ―legislative intent‖, ―the aim of the rule‖, ―the purpose of the statute‖ 
and ―the reason of/for the rule‖ are commonly used to cover a wide range of situations and factors that 
need to be differentiated. There is a tendency to use such terms too simply or too confidently or in ways 
which take too much for granted.‖) 
16 Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J. Law & Tec 2 (2000). The author 
studied the theories of claim interpretation in the United States courts. The author gave three reasons of the 
importance of studying theories of interpretation in claim interpretation: first, theories can inform our 
understanding of how the court interprets patent claims; second, claim interpretation is often dispositive 
of such crucial issues as patent validity and infringement; third, the manner in which the court interprets 
patent claims reflects the court's view of the proper scope of judicial power. 
17  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 59 (1765) (―And these signs are either the 
words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.‖) 
Subject matter is what the text is about or what is actually in the text. See Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard 
E. Palmer, Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter181, 182 (1989) (―In order to 
understand at all, a reader presuppose that the subject matter of a text has a perfected unity of meaning…It 
is the subject matter of the text and not the text itself that is the point of concern.‖).    
18 Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 
NYU L. Rev. 769 (2008). 
19 Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study. 94 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1409 
(2000) (―In a formalist world, opinions tell us that judges are faithful servants of the statutory text, whose 
actions have no legitimacy without legislative warrant. In a pragmatist world, opinions tell us that judges 
are trying to do justice and improve society within the boundaries of governing legal directives. Even if the 
results are the same, the rhetoric is very different. Perhaps the rhetoric matters for its own sake, because of 
the message it sends about our system of governance.‖) 
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with theoretical studies on the interpretation of constitutions, statutes, treaties 
and contracts, it is interesting to note that the theoretical underpinnings of 
different claim construction approaches remain underdeveloped.
20
 The lack of 
theory development may be due to the unique techno-legal nature of patent 
claims.
21
 A patent claim is a legal instrument that contains technical 
information describing new advances, discoveries and applications of 
principles.
22
 Patent law is by nature closely connected to the scientific and 
technological community.
23
  On the one hand, legal theorists regard patent law 
as highly technical in nature, ―accessible mainly to those who also have training 
in the hard sciences.‖24 On the other hand, practitioners in this field tend to 
focus on practical ideas and applications, and the notion of theory is often 
ignored as irrelevant, unimportant or impractical. 
                                                        
20 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 29 (2005) 
(―Although claim interpretation is fundamental to patent law, both the theory and doctrine of the practice 
remain astonishingly underdeveloped, limited mostly to squabbles over the proper or improper application 
of ‗ordinary meaning‘‖) Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 
Loy. L. A L. REV 1109 (2010); (―Despite the importance of claim interpretation, theoretical scholarship 
has largely neglected its methodology.‖) Cotropia, supra note 5 (―One area of patent law that has not been 
addressed in the discussion on patent scope and theories is patent claim interpretation. This omission is 
particularly noteworthy because of the substantive role patent claims and the interpretation thereof play in 
the patent system, namely the framing of questions of patent infringement and validity.‖)   
21 Timothy Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 Indiana Law Journal 779 (2011) 
(―Patents are peculiar legal instruments in that they contain both technical and legal information. This 
Janus-like nature of the document is important because they serve the legal purpose of affording the owner 
the right to exclude others from practicing the invention, and third parties need to be able to assess the 
scope of that right. At the same time, through the patent‘s disclosure, the document is intended to 
contribute to the storehouse of technical knowledge.‖) 
22 Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Copyright and Related Rights 429 (2007) 
(―An issued patent is a legal instrument. It contains technical information describing the claimed 
invention.‖); see also, Richard D. Walker, Patent as Scientific and Technical Literature 41 (1995). A patent 
is a legal document as well as a technical document. It is prepared by an attorney using legal terminology 
to lay claim to as much protection as possible for the inventor represented, while at the same time 
disclosing no more than required to describe the invention.      
23
 Id., Walker. The author stated the tight relationship between the patent documents and the 
development of science and technology: ―As pure science increases, so increases technology; as 
technology grows, so grows the amount of invention; as invention discloses an operational way of doing 
something new and discloses the ‗something new‘ in the form of a patent application leading to grant of 
a patent, the documents created in the final step record the culmination of the entire process.‖   
24 Christian Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a Form of Legal Interpretation, 12 J. Marshall Rev. 
Intell. Prop. L. 40 (2012). ―As someone who has spent significant time in both the silos of legal philosophy 
and patent law, the lack of attention on this connection strikes me as both incomprehensible and 
completely unsurprising. I believe that this intersection is fertile ground.‖ 
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In patent claim interpretation, studying interpretive theories is an 
illuminative way to know how judges justify their choice of meaning.
25
 
Literary and legal theorists have ―joined forces‖ in discussing the questions 
such as whether meaning is implanted by the authors or constructed by 
readers.
26
 In patent law, once the claim is interpreted, all subsequent 
determinations of whether the patent is infringed or whether the invention is 
patentable are governed by that meaning.
27
 Therefore, a sound basis for 
justifying the best path between competing plausible interpretations is of utmost 
importance.
28
 Theoretical studies also help us to understand what the modern 
challenges and opportunities are facing other areas of legal interpretation, and 
what lessons we can learn from them to improve the principles of patent claim 
interpretation. Legal theories perform explanatory and normative functions,
29
 
they not only explain what the law is, but also are concerned with what the law 
ought to be. Therefore, studying interpretive theories can help to explain the 
complex process of patent claim construction, and at the same time, help to 




                                                        
25 Anthony D'Amato, The Effect of Legal Theories on Judicial Decisions, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 517(1999). 
(―To persuade a judge, we should try to discover what her theories are.‖) White, James Boyd, Justice as 
Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism 214(1990) (―judicial excellence lies less in the 
choice of doctrine than in what the doctrine chosen is made to mean.‖)   
26 Dennis Patterson, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 448 (2010). 
27 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 1033(2007).   
28  Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High? Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 981 (2010) (―…cases in which 
claim constructions are both material and indeterminate—that is cases in which there are several plausible 
claim interpretations, each with substantial support in the case record, but each leading to a very different 
case result.)   
29 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory 5 (2012). 
30 Roger B. M. Cotterrell, English Conceptions of the Role of Theory in Legal Analysis, 46 Modern Law 
Review 681 (1983). In legal interpretation, ―what theory can do is to aid in showing the place of such 
rationalizations in a broader understanding of the law in modern conditions. It can and should help to alert 
  8 
 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
In the past decade, there has been scarce literature on the theories of legal 
interpretation underpinning different claim construction approaches. The 
earlier relevant works are Craig Allen Nard‘s A Theory of Claim 
Interpretation
31
 and Kelly Casey Mullally‘s Patent Hermeneutics: Form and 
Substance in Claim Construction.
32
 Both of the articles focused solely on the 
U.S. jurisdiction. Both promoted the ―context-dependent inquiry‖ or the 
―fact-intensive inquiry‖ that favors the extrinsic/contextual evidence over the 
text to be interpreted.
33
 However, when most existing approaches already 
interpret patent claims in context rather than in isolation, a more important 
question is not ―context or no context‖ but ―which context‖ and ―how much 
context.‖34 Their research invites us to critically examine the theoretical basis 
for the legal rules of claim interpretation.  
Only recently has scholarship begun to pay serious attention to the 
intersection of patent law and the theory of legal interpretation, such as Peter 
Lee‘s Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever 35 in 2011, 
Christian E. Mammen‘s Patent Claim Construction as a Form of Legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
the lawyer to fundamental change in the overall shape of law and legal institutions, not merely by 
describing, but by guiding explanation of, legal change in relation to social change.‖ 
31 Craig Allen Nard, supra note 16. 
32 Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 Fla. L. 
Rev. 333 (2007) 
33 The extrinsic evidence refers to all evidence external to patent and prosecution history. For example, 
Kelly believes that ―a substantive approach allows a decision maker to consider broader information set to 
determine meaning…A substantive interpreter approaches her task with the view that it is necessary to 
look at context to attain meaning of a word. Context is less important, if not unimportant together, to a 
formalist.‖ Id. Nard emphasizes ―the relevance of extrinsic context and industry custom…a pragmatic 
textualist approach would consider extrinsic evidence without a threshold determination of intrinsic 
ambiguity.‖ Supra note 16.   
34 Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 Yale L.J. 409 (1990). 
35 Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100 (2011). 




 and Dan Burk‘s Dynamic Claim Interpretation37 in 2012, 
and Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B Solum‘s The Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction in Patent Law
38
 in 2013. In summary, these studies have explored 
two fundamental pairs of concepts on the meaning of claim terms: (1) 
―interpretation‖ versus ―construction‖ 39  (sometimes referred to as ―thing 
construction‖ versus ―word construction‖ 40); (2) ―static meaning‖ versus 
―dynamic meaning.‖ 41  These studies help to introduce the important 
long-established concepts in legal interpretation into patent claim 
construction,
42
 and they all raise an essential question: what do we mean by 
the ―meaning‖ of a claim term? Apparently, there is a growing need for a 
deeper theoretical understanding and further practical applications in the field 
of patent claim construction.  
This thesis will further explore another pair of critical concepts: 
                                                        
36 Mammen, supra note 24. 
37 Dan Burk, Dynamic Claim Interpretation, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law (Shyam 
Balganesh, ed.) (2012), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005251 
38 Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law 123 
Yale L.J. 530-614 (2013).   
39 Id. (―Rather, the payoff of drawing the interpretation-construction distinction is antecedent: it tells us 
which issues are problems of linguistic meaning, and which issues are problems of legal effect. This is 
important because the two types of problems call for different solutions.‖) 
40 Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing 
Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 493 (2008) (―courts can sanction play 
between thing-scope and meaning- scope.‖)   
41 Burk, supra note 37. (―Dynamic claim interpretation, like dynamic statutory interpretation, is not a call 
to abandon the text under consideration, but it is a call to recognize that meaning is not manifest, 
immutable, or hermetic. While there is some superficial appeal to the certainty promised by originalism, 
reliance on the ―plain‖ or ―ordinary‖ or otherwise purportedly self-evident meanings of claims is more apt 
to deter innovation than is transparent, dynamic interpretation.) 
42 Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 549 (2009). 
(―One type of activity, which we might call interpretation proper, is the ascertainment of meaning. 
Another, which constitutes a far larger task, is constitutional construction— implementing and applying 
the Constitution in practice, and building out institutions to perform constitutional functions.‖) See also, 
Jiri Janko, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation: Incorporating Semiotic Theory of 
Meaning-Making into Legal Interpretation, 38 Rutgers L.J. 601 (2007).(―interpretation is the process of 
determining the meaning that parties attached to their bargained-for language. Construction, on the other 
hand, is the application of public policy and various canons of construction to give a contract its 
meaning.‖) 
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―meaning (or connotation)‖ versus ―applications (or denotation)‖43 in patent 
claim interpretation. The concept of application lies at the core of philosophical 
hermeneutics.
44
 ―That branch of science which establishes principles and rules 
of interpretation and construction is called hermeneutics.‖ 45  The term 
―philosophical hermeneutics‖46 is often associated with Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and his book Truth and Method, which is regarded as one of the two or three 
most important works of this century on the philosophy of humanistic studies.
47
 
The philosophical hermeneutics regards interpretation as a dialectical play 
between the interpreter‘s own horizon and the horizon of the text formed in 
the past.
48
 According to Gadamer, all understanding involves a ―fusion of 
horizons‖ in which the legal text acquires meaning only in its application to 
the case at hand.
49
 
In legal interpretation, the dynamic approaches derived from philosophical 
                                                        
43 Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux (ed.), Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 
441 (1988) (―This distinction [meaning/application] parallels the philosopher‘s related distinctions 
between connotation and denotation, and intention and extension… This distinction also parallels those 
between sense and reference.‖); See also, E. E. C. Jones, Mr. Russell's Objections to Frege's Analysis of 
Propositions, 19 Mind 75, 379-386 (1910) (―According to Frege what a Categorical Affirmative 
Proposition asserts is: identity of denotation (or application—Bedeutung) with difference of intension (or 
connotation or ‗meaning‘—Sinn).‖); Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference 
Distinction, 50 St. Louis University Law Journal, 555 (2006), quoting John Stuart Mill, who introduced 
―connotation‖ and ―denotation‖ in his A System of Logic (―[W]henever the names given to objects convey 
any information, that is, whenever they properly have any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they 
denote, but in what they connote.‖) 
44 Russell Weaver, Questioning Keats: an Introduction to Applied Hermeneutics 55 (2006). Russell 
Weaver was also aware of the central position of application in discussing the applied hermeneutics: 
―The priority given to application is parallel to the priority of existence in Heidegger‘s ontology‖ 
45 Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and Construction in 
Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedents and Authorities 64 (1839). 
46 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 175 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans.,2nd ed., 
2004). Hermeneutics is ―the art or technique of understanding and interpretation.‖ See also, Paul Ricoeur, 
The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays In Hermeneutics xiv (2004). ―Interpretation…is the work of 
thought which consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels 
of meaning implied in the literal meaning.‖ Robert J. Dostal, The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer 118 
(2002) (―Thus, every word, writes Gadamer ‗carries with it the unsaid‘; every speech ‗brings a totality of 
meaning into play without being able to express it totally.‘‖). 
47 Gadamer, Id., Translator‘s Preface. 
48 Gadamer, supra note 46, 301. To have a horizon means that one‘s vision is always limited to what can be 
seen in a given time from a particular vantage point. 
49 Francis J. Mootz, Law Hermeneutics and Rhetoric, 228 (2010). 
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hermeneutics in interpretation of constitutions, statutes and treaties recognize 
the interplay between historical and contemporary contexts.
50
 For instance, in 
the field of constitutional interpretation, according to Professor Herman 
Philipse, Gadamer‘s theory of ―fusion of cultural horizons‖ is considered as 
the philosophical counterpart to the conception of the ―living‖ or ―evolving‖ 
Constitution,
51
 i.e. the meaning of the Constitution may evolve in light of 
current circumstances.
52
 Such ―living-force‖ 53  vision has also been 
implemented by Australian courts,
54
 distinguishing between the meaning of 
the words (connotation) and their intended applications (denotation) in 
constitutional interpretation.
55
 The meaning of a constitutional term is its 
                                                        
50  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 Univ Penn LR. 
1479.(1989)(Theoretically, my model of dynamic statutory interpretation offers quite a different focus 
from traditional theories of statutory interpretation because it treats the evolutive context as a persuasive 
source of statutory meaning which should be considered in addition to the statute's text and legislative 
history.) Randal N.M. Graham, Right Theory, Wrong Reasons: Dynamic Interpretation, the Charter and 
―Fundamental Laws‖, 34 SCLR (2006) 169.(―As time passes and the text is applied to unforeseen 
situations, the statute‘s meaning evolves to become something more than what the drafters 
intended…Because dynamism explicitly recognizes the evolutive nature of language…‖) The leading 
―dynamist‖ scholars are Alexander Aleinikoff, William Eskridge, Daniel Farber, and Philip Frickey. See 
generally, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20 (1988).  
51Herman Philipse, Antonin Scalia‘s Textualism in philosophy, theology, and judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution, 3 Utrecht Law Review 169-192 (2007). (―Let me therefore turn to my own field and discuss 
briefly how Textualism fares in philosophy. Its main opponent is still Gadamer‘s theory of interpretation. It 
is illuminating to dissect this theory because it is the paradigmatic philosophical counterpart of Justice 
Scalia‘s main scapegoat, the doctrine of The Living Constitution.‖) Adam Winkler et al. (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Vol. 6, 2712 (2000) (―Over the past two hundred years, 
American constitutional interpretation has undergone a transformation from its early static and 
TEXTUALIST tradition to a modern, dynamic approach wherein a ‗living constitution‘ changes to 
accommodate the needs of the times.‖) Louis J. Virelli III, Constitutional Traditionalism in the Roberts 
Court, 73 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (―Living constitutionalism advocates a dynamic approach to 
constitutional interpretation, where contemporary notions of justice and societal needs drive constitutional 
meaning.‖) Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts about State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 Penn St. L. Rev. 
837 (2011) (―A third approach to constitutional interpretation is one that advocates for a ―living‖ 
constitution. According to proponents, the meaning of a constitution is not static or fixed in time, as the 
originalists contend. Rather, the meaning of the constitution is dynamic, capable of changing in response 
to changing conditions in society.‖) 
52 Miguel Schor, Contextualizing the Debate between Originalism and the Living Constitution, 59 Drake 
Law Review 961-72 (2011) 
53 Michael Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship?, 24 
Melb. U. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2000) (approving of Andrew Inglis Clark's argument that the Australian 
Constitution must be "made a living force" and arguing that present understandings of the Constitution's 
meaning should control interpretation today). 
54 Greg Craven, Heresy as Orthodoxy: Were the Founders Progressivists? (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 
87; See also, Robert Shenton French et.al (ed.), Reflections on the Australian Constitution 20 (2003). (―A 
constitution is sometimes described as a ‗living instrument‘ or as having ‗living force‘.) 
55 Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon (ed.), Comparative Constitutional Law 602 (2011). 




 and connotations have usually been understood to consist of ―the 
essential qualities or characteristics of the concept referred to.‖57 The basic 
theme is that whilst the connotation remains constant, the denotation may vary 
over time.
58
 A search for connotation, or, a search for the ―essential 
differentia‖,59 has been considered as a ―middle ground‖ 60 or ―moderate 
form‖61 of interpretation. 
Patent claim interpretation is often outcome dispositive in delineating the 
legal limits of the right to exclude.
62
 The minimum TRIPS patent term ends 
twenty years after filing.
63
 As time progresses in the patent term, there are 
more ideas, insights and knowledge for innovation.
64
 On one hand, the words 
must be assigned the meaning which they bore at the time of filing in order to 
enforce the public notice function;
65
 on the other hand, the courts must 
respond to effects of technological changes so as to provide sufficient 
                                                        
56 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 25 (2008)(―All the judges accepted that one had to 
look to the meaning … and that ―meaning‖ referred to the connotation rather than the denotation of the 
expression.‖) 
57 H. P. Lee &Peter A. Gerangelos (ed.),Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen Continent: Essays in 
Honour of George Winterton 266(2009) 
58 H. P. Lee & George Winterton (ed.), Australian Constitutional Landmarks 94 (2003).  
59 Simon Evans, The Meaning of Constitutional Terms: Essential Features, Family Resemblance and 
Theory-Based Approaches, 29 UNSWLawJ 207 (2006). 
60  Ginsburg & Dixon, supra note 55. (―Some jurists find a middle ground, in which the original 
commitments of the constitution are understood at a fairly general level. This practice is embodied in the 
Australian doctrine distinguishing between the unchanging ―connotation‖ of a constitution provision and 
its ―denotation‖, a distinction explained by Jeffrey Goldsworthy as the distinction between the meaning of 
the ―words‖ and their intended applications (denotation).‖) 
61 Brendan Lim, Review Essay: An Australian Reads ‗Living Originalism‘  34 Syd. Law Rev. 809 (2012). 
62 Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 Ind. L.J. 779 (2010). (―The act of 
interpreting the claims therefore delineates the legal limits of the right to exclude.‖) 
63 TRIPS Article 33 ―Term of Protection‖ ―The term of protection available shall not end before the 
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.‖ 
64 Tun-Jen Chiang, Ex Post Claiming, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 523 (2010)(―As time progresses in the life of a 
patent, the likelihood of capturing later insights increases because there are more later insights to 
capture.‖) 
65 Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp.,284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931) (Patent claims ―inform the public during the life of 
the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely 
used or manufactured without a license and which may not.‖); see PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn 
Int'l, 355 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith , 959 F.2d 936, 943 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 




 Therefore, how to preserve meaning over time and 
across changing technological environment is one of the most difficult issues 
that judges face in claim construction. Based on a theoretical refinement of 
existing approaches, this thesis proposes the dynamic patent claim 
interpretation. Under the proposed dynamic claim construction principle, the 
meaning of a claim term is its connotation: what a person having ordinary 
skill in the art‖ (a ―PHOSITA‖) would have understood the essential 
attributes of the technical solution referred to by the term at the time of filing. 
The connotation-denotation analysis has the capacity to accommodate 
technological changes by assessing whether the new item possesses all the 
essential attributes determined at the time of filing. 
67
 Philosophical 
hermeneutics can hopefully bring fresh insights into the ongoing issues in 
claim interpretation. 
This thesis has three major goals: to enhance our understanding on how 
courts perform claim construction to establish the meaning of patent claims, to 
critically evaluate the theories underpinning the different existing claim 
interpretation approaches, and to introduce an alternative theory and propose a 




                                                        
66 Cotropia, supra note 5. 
67 Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Interpretation and Evolutionary Originalism 27 Fed L. Rev. 323 (1999) ( 
―with some potential for evolution‖) 
68 Claim construction is also used to determine whether the patent is invalid for failing to meet the 
conditions and requirements of patentability. i.e., the invention is ―novel‖, involves ―inventive step‖, and is 
―industrially applicable‖ compared to the prior art. See, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Basic Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) Principles, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/1800_1801.htm (last visited Feb 08, 2012). Due 
to the volume of work that will be required as well as the time involved, this Thesis will focus on the claim 
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 The Thesis proceeds as follows. Part I of the Thesis describes the 
prevailing claim interpretation approaches in different jurisdictions. Although 
the ordinary meaning approach (Chapter 1), the purposive approach (Chapter 2) 
and the constructive approach (Chapter 3) have their own advantages, they all 
have limitations in ascertaining the meaning of the patent claims, which cause 
confusions and debates in the claim construction process. Part II gives a brief 
introduction of the general interpretive theories and unveils the underlying 
theoretical justifications of the above approaches in patent claim interpretation 
(Chapter 4). It then exhibits the deficiencies of these theories in guiding claim 
interpretation (Chapter 5).  
Part III introduces an alternative theory of philosophical hermeneutics and 
its application in legal interpretation, and examines the implications for claim 
interpretation (Chapter 6). It proposes the general principle of the dynamic 
approach based on philosophical hermeneutics, and attempts to offer a practical 
formula for applying the principle (Chapter 7). Part IV of the Thesis responds to 
possible criticisms from different standpoints. It also addresses several concerns 
about applying the proposed approach and defends the proposed dynamic 
approach (Chapter 8). Finally, the dynamic claim interpretation is used to 
analyze three test cases (Chapter 9).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
construction in resolving the infringement issue, that is, whether the allegedly infringing product or 
process falls within the scope of protection of the patent. World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO 
Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use 212 (2nd ed., 2004) (―As already stated, the task of 
the court in the determination of infringement is the assessment of the scope of protection defined by the 
patent and whether the alleged infringement falls within that assessed scope.‖) 
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PART I: THE CURRENT INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES IN 
PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 THE ORDINARY MEANING APPROACH 
This Chapter begins with introduction of the ordinary meaning approach 
adopted by courts in claim interpretation. The so-called ―ordinary meaning‖ is 
not that ordinary. A PHOSITA is introduced to provide an objective basis of 
ordinariness, which suggests that a claim term has a generally known and 
commonly accepted meaning in a technological field, and such meaning is 
independent of the patentee‘s intent. This approach is favored by interpreters 
who attempt to promote public notice function of the patent claims, minimize 
the decision costs and ensure that certainty in patent law is not undermined. 
Although a well-established ordinary meaning of a claim term can be found in 
some cases, sometimes there is more than one meaning of the term at the time 
of filing, and sometimes the ordinary meaning does not resolve the ambiguity 
in the claim texts. Under these circumstances, the notion that a claim term has 
an ―ordinary meaning‖ is not a helpful one. The ordinary meaning approach is 
currently taken by courts in the United States. This Chapter shows how this 
approach works and the difficulties involved in its implementation. This 
Chapter further examines the current role played by ordinary meaning in the 
determination of patent infringement. Under the ordinary meaning approach, 
more explanation is needed in demarcating the patent scope in the context of 
after-arising technology.   
  17 
 
Section 1 What makes ordinary meaning ordinary? 
To interpret the terms of patent claims, one approach begins with their 
ordinary and accustomed meaning from the view of an ordinary artisan. The 
general assumption is that since the words have been carefully chosen by the 
patentee in order to convey a clear meaning to a PHOSITA at the time of filing, 
general usage should prevail with the words unless a different intention is 
manifested.
69
 This interpretive method is named as the ―ordinary meaning 
approach‖ in the thesis.  
The ordinary meaning approach is popular in several jurisdictions. For 
example, it was held in the leading U.S. case Phillips v. AWH. Corporation 
70
 
that, ―the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that 
the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the 
time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent 
application.‖ In a series of Australian cases, it has been held that ―when 
interpreting the claims, the court considers the ordinary meaning which a 
person skilled in the art would have understood at the priority date.‖71 Deeply 
                                                        
69 York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Cent., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
("Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on 
their ordinary meaning."). Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)("In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the claim terms, the words are 
presumed to take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in 
the art"). 
70 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Markman v. Westview 52 F.3d 
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (―The focus in construing disputed terms in claim language is … on the 
objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have understood the 
term to mean.‖); Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(―Courts must presume that the terms in a claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise compelled, give 
full effect to the ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms.‖); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM 
Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 
1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(―In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the claim 
terms, the words are presumed to take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those 
of ordinary skill in the art‖) 
71 Décor Corp Pty Ltd v. Dart Industries Inc. (1988) 13 IPR 385; Flexible Steel Lacing Company v. 
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influenced by the U.S. patent law, the Japanese courts require that the scope of 
patent protection be decided on the basis of claim language.
72
 It is believed that 
―the scope of the exclusive right of a patent is measured according to the 
language of the claims. The terms in the claims must be interpreted in light of 
the ordinary meanings of the terms, the contents of the specification and 
drawings, the prosecution history, the state-of-the-arts at the time of filing, and 
the comprehension of the skilled-in-the-arts.‖73 
Several typical rules of finding ordinary meaning were summarized by 
Sheppard J in the Australian case of Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v. Dart 
Industries Inc.
74
 His Honor stated: 
In summary, the relevant rules of construction which may be distilled from the 
authorities referred to are as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                 
Beltreco Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 331 at 350 (―As a general rule, the terms of a specification should be accorded 
their ordinary English meaning.‖); Baygol Pty Ltd v. Foamex Polystyrene Pty Ltd (2005) 64 IPR 437 (In 
constructing a patent claim, the ordinary meaning of the language selected to define the claim is of prime 
importance); see also James Lahore, Patents, Trade Marks & Related Rights 18 (2001). Priority date is the 
date that is assumed to be the date of invention for patent law purposes. Article 4 of the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property established the system of priority rights. Under the priority rights, 
applicants have up to 12 months from first filing their patent application in which to make further 
applications in member countries and claim the original priority date. Article 2 paragraph 1 of the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) in conjunction 
with the Paris Convention provides a "derived" Convention priority right. Some priority rights are defined 
by multilateral conventions such as the European Patent Convention (EPC) or the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) and domestic laws. 
72  Toshiko Takenaka, Harmonizing the Japanese patent System with its U.S. Counterpart through 
Judge-Made Law: Interaction between Japanese and U.S. Case Law Developments, 7 Pac Rim L. & Pol'y 
J. 249 (1998). See also, Stephen Lesavich, The New Japan-U.S. Patent Agreements: Will They Really 
Protect U.S. Patent Interests in Japan? 14 Wis. Int'l L.J. 155(1995) (―The Japanese courts adhere more 
strictly to the literal interpretation of the patent claims.) Nancy J. Linck & John E. McGarry, Patent 
Procurement and Enforcement in Japan—A Trade Barrier, 27 GW J. Int'l L. & Econ. 411 (1993-1994) 
(―The historic purpose of the Japanese patent system, to infuse technology into the Japanese economy and 
to share technology among manufacturing firms, has led courts to follow a policy of narrowly interpreting 
claims.‖) 
73 UEDA Takuya. Judge, Intellectual Property High Court of Japan. A Japanese View on Questions raised 
by Phillips v. AWH Corp., http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/documents/pdf/thesis/050722_23_1.pdf (Last visited 
March 7, 2010). Paragraph 1, Section 70 of the Japanese Patent Law provides that ―Basically, claim should 
be interpreted on the basis of the claim language.‖ Paragraph 2 reads: ―The meaning of a term or terms of 
the patent claims shall be interpreted in the light of the specification and the drawings.‖ 
74 Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v. Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385. 
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(1) The claims define the invention which is the subject of the patent. These must 
be construed according to their terms upon ordinary principles. Any purely 
verbal or grammatical question that can be answered according to ordinary rules 
for the construction of written documents is to be resolved accordingly.  
… 
(5) If a claim be clear, it is not to be made obscure because obscurities can be 
found in particular sentences in other parts of the document. But if an expression 
is not clear or is ambiguous, it is permissible to resort to the body of the 
specification to define or clarify the meaning of words used in the claim.
75 
The term ―ordinary meaning‖ is most often encountered in legal 
interpretation. Ordinary meaning does not entail that words and phrases are 
always to be interpreted in a purely literal way. Generally speaking, ordinary 
meaning is the meaning that would be understood by a competent language 
user upon reading the words.
76
 Unlike other forms of legal interpretation, the 
claim language is not addressed to an ordinary speaker of English,
77
 but to an 
ordinary artisan (who is presumed to know all of the relevant art within the 
field of invention and any analogous technical fields).
78
 It is also an objective 
meaning of the term which is independent of the patentee's intent or purpose. 
                                                        
75 Id. Although a claim must be understood in the light and context of the whole specification, as a general 
rule, the words of a claim are not to be altered by a gloss taken from the body of the specification and 
essential integers are determined by a common sense assessment of what the words of the claim convey in 
the context of the existing published knowledge at the time: see also Rehm Pty Ltd v Websters Securities 
Systems (International) Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 79 at 92; Kimberley-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico 
Trading International Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 1. It is not legitimate to narrow or expand the boundaries of 
an anomaly as fixed by the words of a claim by adding words drawn from other parts of the specification: 
see Flexible Steel Lacing Co v. Beltreco Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 331. 
76 Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation 50 (2d ed. 2007). 
77 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Judges should give the statute the 
meaning that would be attached to the textual language by an ordinary speaker of English. 
78 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed.Cir.2005). The ―‗ordinary meaning‘ of a claim term is 
its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.‖ 
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In patent law, the introduction of the concept of ordinary meaning by the courts 
raises a fundamental question: How to define ―ordinary‖ in the specific context 
of patent claim interpretation?   
In contractual interpretation or statutory interpretation, the rules of 
interpretation require that common and everyday words are given their 
―ordinary meaning‖ and technical terms are given their ―specialized 
meaning‖. 79  The distinction between ordinary meaning and non-ordinary 
meaning here is dependent upon different types of audience, that is, whether it 
is the non-technical community or the technical community.
80
 Patent claim 
consists of a written statement composed in both everyday words and words of 
art.
81
 However, one important feature of claim interpretation is that claims 
must be construed from the perspective of a PHOSITA, who is presumed to 
know all of the relevant art within the field of invention and any analogous 
technical fields.
82
 That means claim terms are not to be given their meaning to 
a layman but rather are given meaning known to those in the particular art. For 
example, words such as ―expression‖ and ―control‖ have specialized meaning 
in pharmacology in addition to their commonly known meanings that will be 
familiar to the layperson.
83
 If the same criterion (non-technical/technical 
                                                        
79 Kenneth W. Clarkson, West's Business Law: Text and Cases : Legal, Ethical, International, and 
E-commerce Environment 219 (2006). 
80 Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation 79 (2010) (―the 
distinction between ordinary meaning and technical meaning is dependent upon the audience and its 
relation to the speaker.‖ ) 
81 Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 Rutgers L.J. 61. (2006). (―there are still 
a significant number of common, everyday words being defined on a regular basis by the Federal Circuit 
that provide value to the notion of a lexicon.‖) 
82 Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed.Cir.1985). See also, Guidelines for 
examination in the EPO, 11.3 Person skilled in the art: The hypothetical person is an ―ordinary practitioner 
in a field of technology aware of what was common general knowledge in the art.‖ 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/guiex/e/c_iv_11_3.htm (last visited Oct 30, 2010). 
83  Simon Fraser, Breaking Down the Divisions between General, Academic, and Technical Vocabulary: 
The Establishment of a Single,. Discipline-based Word List for ESP Learners, 12 Hiroshima Studies in 
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audience) is applied, the claim meaning would be better regarded as 
―specialized‖ instead of ―ordinary‖. 
Then, why is it called ―ordinary meaning‖? It is the customary use of 
words in the context of the written description by those skilled in the art that 
accurately reflects the ―ordinary‖ meaning of the terms in the claims.84 Hence, 
the criterion for the distinction between ordinary and non-ordinary meaning in 
claim interpretation is dependent upon the average knowledge and skill level 
of the artisans --the hypothetical legal personage is neither a genius nor a 
layperson.
85
 It is a conceptual device like the reasonable person in tort law,
86
 
which emphasizes an objective standard of ordinariness:
87
 first, the ordinary 
                                                                                                                                                 
Language and Language Education 151 (2009). The author differentiated the ―lay-technical‖ words, 
which had a technical flavor, but likely to be known by the layperson and the ―cryptotechnical‖ words, 
which have an additional, more specialized meaning. More examples of cryptotechnical words were 
given, such as ―value‖, ―control‖, ―activity‖, ―base‖ etc. 
84 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) (8th Edition), August 2001, Latest Revision 2010, 
2111.01 Plain Meaning http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2111_01.htm (last 
visited 19/06/2012). 
85 Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (both laymen and 
geniuses are excluded from the PHOSITA standard). Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 
454 (Fed.Cir.1985). (―[a] person of ordinary skill in the art is ... presumed to be one who thinks along the 
line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who undertakes to innovate, whether by patient, and 
often expensive, systematic research, or by extraordinary insights ...‖) See also, Osenga, supra note 81  
(arguing that "the community whose understanding and shared reaction should be the focus of 
interpretation is that collectively represented by the [ordinary artisan]" (emphasis added)). 
86 Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law's Mysterious 
Personage, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 267 (2002) (―Patent law's "person having ordinary skill in the art" has been 
likened to the reasonable person of tort law.‖); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: 
Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 156 
(2012) (―Such reasonableness standards are thought to be objective because they exclude personal 
idiosyncrasies from the analysis.‖) See, e.g., The Restatement of Torts (2d) § 283 (―In dealing with this 
problem the law has made use of the standard of a hypothetical reasonable man. Sometimes this person is 
called a reasonable man of ordinary prudence, or an ordinarily prudent man, or a man of average prudence, 
or a man of reasonable sense exercising ordinary care. It is evident that all such phrases are intended to 
mean very much the same thing.‖) 
87 Mayo Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective 
Standard 219 (2003) (―to invoke the ordinary person as a way of retaining an objective element in the 
standard…‖).Steven P. Smith & Kurt R. Van Thomme, Bridge Over Troubled Water: The Supreme Court‘s 
New Patent Obviousness Standard in KSR Should Be Readily Apparent and Benefit the Public, 17 Alb. L.J. 
Sci. & Tech. 127 (2007) (―Basing the level of ordinary skill in the art on these prior art-centric metrics has 
some appeal as it appears more objective than examining the level of skill from a ―human‖ perspective - 
i.e., based on the perspective of either the inventor or some member of the industry.‖) Jonathan J. Darrow, 
The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law's PHOSITA Standard, 23 Harv. J. of L. and Tech. 227 (2009) (―A 
disciplined approach that conceives of the PHOSITA‘s art as competent production rather than innovation 
ensures that the goods and services available today will remain available while simultaneously preserving 
patent incentives for those actively seeking to advance the useful arts.‖) Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
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meaning approach suggests the existence of objective meaning independent of 
patentee‘s intent or purpose; second, the ordinary meaning of patent claims is 
the generally known, well-understood and commonly accepted meaning by the 
scientific and technological community at the time of the invention.
88
  
Under the ordinary meaning approach, the commonly accepted meaning 
by a PHOSITA is thought to better serve the notice function of patent claims 
in order to enhance legal certainty,
89
 because in some cases the ordinary 
meaning is readily apparent or discernable to interpreters.
90
 It is also believed 
that the search for an ordinary meaning can substantially reduce decision cost 
and burdens of acquiring and processing information.
91
 The ordinary meaning 
approach is frequently applied in the U.S. courts. To gain a deeper 
understanding of the operation of this approach, the following paragraphs will 
take its application in the U.S. courts as an example for analysis.   
                                                                                                                                                 
1303, 1311(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The purpose of this standard is to ―provide an objective basis from 
which to begin claim interpretation.‖   
88 Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999)("[W]ords in patent claims 
are given their ordinary meaning in the usage of the field of the invention, unless the text of the patent 
makes clear that a word was used with a special meaning."). Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys, Inc., 357 
F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (―Claim language generally carries the ordinary meaning of the 
words in their normal usage in the field of invention.‖). 
89 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (a ―‗zone of uncertainty…would 
discourage invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field‘‖) (quoting United Carbon 
Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 
520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) (―Claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a notice function.‖). Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (the notice function 
―has become paramount and the need for certainty as to the scope of patent protection has been 
emphasized‖). 
90 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("In some cases, the ordinary meaning of 
claim language . . . may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases 
involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood 
words.‖) 
91 David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning? 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1565 (1997) (―the ordinary meaning is 
an obvious point of agreement in circumstances in which disagreement is too costly. Sometimes it is more 
important that things be settled than that they be settled right: ordinary meaning provides a way to settle 
things.‖) See also, Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74 (2000) (―courts' foremost 
concern should be to minimize the costs of judicial decision making and of legal uncertainty.‖) Ruoyu R. 
Wang, Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward a More Formalistic Patent Claim Construction 
Model, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J.153 (2004) (claiming ―[formalism] gradually reduces courts‘ interpretive 
burdens and mistakes, increases interpretive accuracy and predictability, and encourages a norm formation 
for patent drafting.‖). 
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Section 2 The ordinary meaning approach in the U.S. courts  
A. A brief introduction 
The right of individuals to patent their inventions is derived from the U.S. 
Constitution in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which gives Congress the 
authority to ―promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.‖ 92 The US Congress enacted The First United States 
Patent Statute in the year 1790, which was a short act of seven sections.
93
 In 
1870 the legislation relating to patents was revised and consolidated into a 
single act,
94
 and the basic structure of the present law was adopted in 1952 
when congress passed a new patent act codified under Title 35 of the United 
States Code. 35 U.S.C §112 sets forth the following requirement:  
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing 




Since its establishment in 1982, the Federal Circuit has developed 
comprehensive case law concerning the critical issue of patent claim 
                                                        
92 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution. 
93 Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790). The First United States Patent Statute, 
CHAP. VII. --An Act to promote the progress of useful Arts. 
94 Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (July 8, 1870) CHAP.CCXXX --An Act to revise, 
consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights. 
95 35 U.S.C §112 Specification. (―The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention.‖) 




 The 1995 Federal Circuit Markman decision (Markman I) 
explicitly held that claim construction must determine the objective meaning of 
the disputed terms at the time of the invention, from the eyes of those of 
ordinary skill in the art.
97
 The 1996 Supreme Court Markman decision 
(Markman II) established that the claim construction is a question of law, and it 
is for the Court, and not for the jury, to construe patent claims.
98
 The 1998 
Federal Circuit Cybor Corp. v. Fas Technologies decision
99
 confirmed that 
claim construction is a question of law, which shall be reviewed 
non-deferentially on appeal.
100
 As a result, claim interpretation of patents is 
                                                        
96 The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 
96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) The great influence of the Federal 
Circuit decisions on patent law has been widely recognized. See e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age 
of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387 (―The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . 
has become the de facto supreme court of patents.‖). Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal 
Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. Rev. Vol. 1105 
(2004) (―The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has become, by far, the most powerful 
and influential force in the U.S. patent system.‖) 
97 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 986 (holding ―Thus, the focus in construing disputed terms in claim language is 
not the subjective intent of the parties to the patent contract when they used a particular term. Rather the 
focus is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have 
understood the term to mean.‖) 
98 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (―Markman I‖).The Federal 
Circuit held that ―[I]n a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of 
law the meaning of language used in the patent claims.‖ Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 
370 (1996). The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit‘s Markman I decision, agreeing that judges, 
not juries, should construe a patent‘s claims. For previous cases, see e.g. Specialty Composites v. Cabot 
Corp., 845 F.2d 981,986 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that claim interpretation is a matter of law and the 
reviewing court need not defer to the district court); Read, 970 F.2d at 822 (determining that claim 
construction is a matter of law for the court); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrie, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that claim construction is a matter of law and disagreement over the meaning of a 
claim term does not necessarily create a factual dispute precluding summary judgment); Senmed, Inc. v. 
Richard-Allen Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 818 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that claim construction is a 
matter of law that may be submitted to the jury if the judge insures that the law is correctly applied); SRI 
Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.. 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that claim 
construction is a matter of law with de novo review); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 
1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that the determination of what is patented is a matter of law); SSIH 
Equip. v. United States Int'l Trade Conim'n, 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir.1983) (stating that the scope of 
what is patented is a question of law).  
99 Cybor Corp.v. Fas Technologies, Inc.,138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding ―we review claim 
construction de novo on appeal‖). 
100 Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., Nos. 08-1392, -1393, -1422 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit, when considering claim construction, found itself ―stranded between the 
language‖ in the Supreme Court‘s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 
(1996), and the language in the Federal Circuit‘s decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 
F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).  Specifically, the Court found that the ruling in Markman makes 
multiple references to factual components of claim construction, while in Cybor the Federal Circuit 
interpreted Markman as holding that claim construction was solely a question of law, which the Federal 
Circuit should review without deference. (―In sum, claim construction involves many technical, scientific, 
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now normally done in a separate hearing in the absence of the jury, known as a 
―Markman hearing.‖  
In 2005, the Federal Circuit‘s en banc decision in Phillips stands as the 
most authoritative decision on claim construction doctrine.
101
 Under the 
ordinary meaning approach, if no novel uses of claim words are expressly 
disclosed by the patent,
102
 an inventor‘s claim terms should take on their plain 
meaning from the perspective of a PHOSITA at the time of the invention.
103
 
This approach describes a ―heavy presumption‖ in favor of the meaning that 
would be ordinarily attributed by a PHOSITA to the terms,
104
 rather than a 
heavy presumption of dictionary definitions. The ―heavy presumption‖ is that 
the ordinary meaning of a claim term may be overcome only:
105
  
                                                                                                                                                 
and timing issues that require full examination of the evidence and factual resolution of any disputes 
before setting the meaning of the disputed terms.‖) 
101 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
102 Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (―The patentee may 
demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including 
in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of 
claim scope.‖);  See also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (―When a patentee acts as his own lexicographer in redefining the meaning of particular claim terms 
away from their ordinary meaning, he must clearly express that intent in the written description.‖). 
103
 Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell 
Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Elekta Instrument, S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int'l, Inc., 
214 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000), Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 
Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1988); ZMI Corp. v. 
Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1988).   
104 Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that although 
claim construction analysis must focus on the language of the claims, the terms used bear a ―heavy 
presumption‖ that they have the meaning a PHOSITA would ordinarily attribute to the terms); see also, 
James R. Barney, In Search of ―Ordinary Meaning‖, 85 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc‘y 101(2003). 
105 CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (―Generally speaking, we indulge 
a "heavy presumption" that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning‖, quoting Johnson 
Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). See also, Barney, id., 
providing a detailed evolution of the "heavy presumption" in favor of the ordinary and accustomed 
meaning. Robert C. Weiss & Todd R. Miller, Practical Tips to Enforcing and Defending Patents, 85 J. Pat 
Trademark Off. Soc'y 791 (2003). The authors listed the following canons used by US courts: 
 -Where intrinsic evidence unambiguously sets out claim scope, it controls; 
-There is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language; 
-General and technical dictionaries can be used to determine ordinary meaning; 
-A claim term may be read with reference to the specification but a limitation/expansion from the 
specification should not be read into the claim; 
-If possible, a claim should be construed to encompass a disclosed embodiment of the invention; 
-Claims should be construed to uphold their validity unless their clear language shows otherwise; 
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a. When ―the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth 
a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution 
history.‖  
b. When ―the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that 
term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly 
disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to 
the invention.‖  
c. When ―the term ‗chosen by the patentee so deprive[s] the claim of 
clarity‘ as to require resort to the other intrinsic evidence for a definite 
meaning.‖ 
d. When the patentee phrased the claim in step- or means-plus-function 
format, ―a claim term will cover nothing more than the corresponding structure 
or step disclosed in the specification, as well as equivalents thereto.‖ 
The meaning of a patent claim has been recently explained by Judge 
Moore in Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC.
106
 Applying 
this ordinary meaning presumption in that case, the phrase ―attached to said 
pad‖ was defined as ―affixing an item to either an exterior or an interior 
                                                                                                                                                 
-Where a claim is susceptible to a broad and narrow construction, the narrow should be adopted; 
-The presumption of claim differentiation may be overcome by intrinsic and relevant extrinsic evidence. 
106 Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment, Case No. 11-1114 (Fed. Cir., Feb. 1, 2012) (Moore, J.) (―To 
act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must "clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term" 
other than its plain and ordinary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). It is not enough for a patentee to simply disclose a single embodiment or use a word in the 
same manner in all embodiments, the patentee must "clearly express an intent" to redefine the term. 
Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Kara Tech. 
Inc. v. Stamps.com, 582 F.3d 1341, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2009)…The standard for disavowal of claim scope 
is similarly exacting.") See also, Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., Nos. 08-1392, 
-1393, -1422 (Fed. Cir. 2010), (―Because an inventor must evince a ―clear intention‖ to limit the claim 
terms to a specification embodiment, this court examines other claims to detect any contrary 
intentions.‖) 
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surface‖.107 The district court improperly limited the term ―attached to said 
pad‖ to mean attachment only to an external surface.108 The Appellate Court 
allowed the presumption to be rebutted only when clear and convincing 
evidence demonstrated that a PHOSITA in the pertinent art would give that 
term a different meaning in context: 
The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning 
as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of 
the specification and prosecution history. There are only two exceptions to this 
general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own 
lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term 
either in the specification or during prosecution…. The patentee is free to choose 
a broad term and expect to obtain the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning 
unless the patentee explicitly redefines the term or dis-avows its full scope. 
For example, in Allergan, Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,
109
 although the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed term ―-N(R4)2‖ required identical 
R4 moieties, the court held that the plaintiff Allergan had acted as its own 
lexicographer and redefined the term away from its ordinary meaning to 
encompass compounds in which the R4 moieties were non-identical. As the 
Court pointed out, ―[t]he inventor‘s lexicography governs when the 
specification reveals a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee 
                                                        
107 Id. (―The plain meaning of the term ―attached‖ encompasses either an external or internal attachment.‖) 
108 Id. (―Because the parties based the stipulation of non-infringement on the district court‘s erroneous 
construction of this claim term, we vacate and remand The district court held that ―the specification 
redefines ‗attached‘ by implication.‖) The court held that the word attached was limited to attached to the 
outside of an object because the embodiments in the specification consistently use the term ―attached‖ to 
indicate affixing an actuator to the outer surface of an object and use the word ―embedded‖ when referring 
to an actuator inside an object. For additional support for the notion that at-tached and embedded have 
different meanings, the court pointed to claim 1 which uses the word ―attached‖ and dependent claim 10 
which uses the word ―embedded.‖ 
109 Allergan, Inc. v. Barr Lab., Inc., No. 2012-1040 (Fed. Cir., 2013) 
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that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess.‖110  
As a default, a judge should assume that the words have their ordinary 
meaning. The preference for the ordinary meaning, i.e., the common usage of a 
term in a pertinent art, is easily understandable. ―The advantages of this 
presumption are its formality, ease of application, and predictability, all of 
which should reduce judicial discretion.‖ 111  The Federal Circuit has long 
recognized the need for certainty and public notice.
112
 The post-Markman II 
empirical statistics show that the U.S. courts predominantly adopt the 
―hyper-textualism‖113 and the ―procedural approach‖114, which both have a 
strong preference for the intrinsic evidence.
115
 It is believed that ―in most 
situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity 
in a disputed claim term.‖116 Since Phillips, the law makes it clear that the 
                                                        
110 Id. As a result, the defendants' drugs infringed the asserted claim. 
111 Miranda McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia's Ordinary 
Meaning Method of Statutory Construction, 78 Miss. L. J. 129 (2008). 
112 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 586 (Fed. Cir.2000) (en banc) 
(discussing reliance on public record to effect public notice); Timothy Holbrook, supra note 21. 
113 Nard, supra note 16. Professor Craig Allen Nard characterized two approaches of the Federal 
Circuit‘s claim interpretation as ―hyper-textualism‖ and ―pragmatic textualism.‖ In Professor Nard‘s 
view, the former stresses textual fidelity and internal textual coherence, but eschews extrinsic evidence 
as an interpretive tool. A hyper-textualist judge ―rarely finds ambiguity. If ambiguity is found, expert 
testimony may be used to educate the judge in the relevant technology—not for the purpose of 
interpreting the ambiguous claim language.‖ Professor Nard concluded that the ―hyper-textualism 
remains the predominant interpretive approach to claim interpretation.‖  
114 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 96 . Professor Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge categorized two 
distinct methodological approaches in the Federal Circuit as ―procedural approach‖ and ―holistic 
approach‖. They observed that the procedural approach is featured by adherence to a relatively strict 
rules-based hierarchy of interpretive sources, with a particular emphasis on the ordinary meaning of 
disputed patent claim language, while the holistic approach is a far less structured analysis, utilizing the 
array of possible interpretive information in a flexible, case-specific fashion. Based on their empirical 
research on the Federal Circuit‘s methodological approaches to claim construction in all written opinions 
since Markman II, Professor Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge found that the Court utilized the 
procedural approach in 63% of the cases and the holistic approach in the remaining 37%. 
115 It must be pointed out that the above two studies both acknowledge that various claim construction 
methodologies consult essentially the same sources of meaning, including the intrinsic evidence (claim 
language itself, specification and prosecution history files) and extrinsic evidence (dictionaries and 
expert testimony). Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 96. But as they argued, the critical difference lies 
―in the process (or absence thereof) by which such information is used.‖ The authors were aware that the 
distinction drawn in the article obviously invoked some debate between the textualist and pragmatist 
schools of interpretive method. 
116 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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intrinsic evidence serves as the principal source for claim construction, as the 
Federal Circuit pointed out, ―the ordinary meaning of a term must be considered 
in view of the intrinsic evidence: the claims, the specification, and the 
prosecution history.‖117 It is believed that the public notice function of claims is 




B. Circumstances where ―ordinary meaning‖ would be inappropriate. 
Under the ordinary meaning approach, the words of the claim are to be given 
their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a PHOSITA at the 
time of invention.
119
 While ordinary meaning interpretation may be useful in 
some cases, sometimes claim terms lack a well-established ordinary meaning at 
the time of filing, and sometimes the ordinary meaning does not resolve the 
parties‘ dispute.120  Under these circumstances, the notion of a claim term 
having an ordinary meaning is not a helpful one. 
Firstly, in some cases, the dispute over the meaning of a particular claim 
                                                        
117
 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The specification ―teaches about the 
problems solved by the claimed invention, the way the claimed invention solves those problems, and the 
prior art that relates to the invention,‖) Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). (―The specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is 
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.‖ )   
118 R. Polk Wagner & Joseph Scott, Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Federal Circuit in Edward H. Phillips v. 
AWH Corporation (2004), http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/Phillips_Amicus_Wagner_Miller.pdf 
(last visited 21/06/2012). (―Conversely, the public notice function is worst served when litigation is 
required to interpret even the most banal of claim terms.‖) Karen C. Mitch, Comment, Pondering a 
―Baffling‖ Situation: The ―Reconstruction of Claim Construction, 4 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 623 
(2005). (―Through an iterative use of the ordinary dictionary, claim construction would be more simple, 
cost effective and efficient in serving the public notice function of the claim.‖) 
119 Phillips III, 415 F.3d at 1312. (citing Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116). 
120 O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir.2008). The 
O2 Micro district court had refused to interpret the terms ―only if‖ and instead allowed the terms to go to 
the jury without any instruction from the court. The jury found that the defendant had infringed, and the 
judge issued an injunction. The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred because a court is required 
to construe terms when either: 1) the terms have more than one ordinary meaning; or 2) failure to define 
the terms does not settle the parties‘ dispute. 
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term is not settled by appeal to its ordinary meaning.
121
 The reason is that 
patent claim interpretation is highly sensitive to a particular context of the 
invention (i.e., a new process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
improvement thereof)
122
. Because of the uniqueness of the subject matter of a 
patent claim, claim construction requires a detailed understanding and analysis 
of particular facts more than common knowledge in the art. It has been pointed 
out that the ordinary meaning may not be so ordinary at all: the so-called 




A potential defense is that the ordinary meaning is determined in the rich 
and complex context of the invention, and a PHOSITA needs to consult an 
eclectic set of intrinsic materials (claims, specifications and prosecution history 
files) and extrinsic materials (such as  dictionaries
124
 and expert testimony
125
) 
                                                        
121 Menell et al. supra note 5. 
122 2107 Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance with the Utility Requirement, 
defining statutory subject matter in the patent claim. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) (8th 
Edition) (2001) Latest Revision July 2010, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2107.htm (last visited 22/06/12). 
123 Menell, et.al, supra note 5. The authors pointed out that identification of ordinary meaning as the 
―objective baseline‖ puts tremendous emphasis on this term, which can create unfortunate confusion and 
error. The authors proposed that the claim construction process started with the ―initial understanding‖ of 
claim language, which focused on a particular claim term of interest, and the endpoint of the analysis was 
the ―proper construction.‖ See also, Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, ―Purposivism,‖ and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 Tax L. Rev. 677 (1996). 
124 Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (―It has been long 
recognized in our precedent and in the precedent of our predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, that dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court 
in determining the ordinary and customary meanings of claim terms.‖). The Court quoted a series of cases 
where the dictionary meanings were emphasized. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 
1325, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (―The ordinary meaning of a claim term may be determined by reviewing a 
variety of sources, including . . . dictionaries and treatises . . . .‖); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
288 F.3d at 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (―[O]ur precedents show that dictionary definitions may establish a 
claim term‘s ordinary meaning.‖); Optical Disk Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334-35 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (―For such ordinary meaning, we turn to the dictionary definition of the term.‖); Quantum Corp. 
v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (―[W]e see no error in the district court‘s use of 
dictionary definitions to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the relevant claim limitation.‖); Pfizer, Inc. vs. 
Teva Pharms.USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The court agreed with the district court‘s 
determination that ―one of skill in the art would understand ‗saccharides‘ to encompass more than sugars,‖ 
and would include ―polysaccharides‖.  Extrinsic evidence in the form of technical dictionaries, treatises, 
and expert testimony were used to support this conclusion drawn from the '450 patent.) See also, Scott A. 
  31 
 
when construing claim terms. However, there has been concern that with 
everything taken into consideration, ―claim language must be given varying 
meanings according to nonspecific inferences drawn from the case-specific 
‗context‘ surrounding a given dispute, eviscerates the concept of public notice 
by shifting the relevant analytic framework from the objective understanding of 
the relevant public to the necessarily subjective understanding of the particular 
(judicial) decision-maker.‖ 126  Then the notion of ―ordinary meaning‖ has 
limited descriptive or instructional value.
127
  
Secondly, in some cases, the ordinary meaning of a term is apparent, but 
in other cases, there may be several meanings to choose from.
128
 In fact, the 
invention may cover a range of levels of abstraction,
129
 and the disputed term 
                                                                                                                                                 
Turk, The Proper Method for Using Dictionaries to Construe Patent Claims, 6 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 
43 (2006); Daniel S. Matthews, Baffled: Phillips v. AWH Corp. and the Reexamination of Dictionary Use 
in Patent Claim Interpretation, 6 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 153, 163 (2004). 
125 NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (―Unfortunately, 
on the record before us, we are unable to say with certainty whether or not one of skill in the art would 
understand that a power supply is designed to provide a constant voltage to a circuit. Given the complex 
technology involved in this case, we think that this matter can only be resolved by further evidentiary 
hearings, including expert testimony, before the district court.‖) See NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident 
Microsystems, Inc., No. 98-699-KAJ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8054, at44–46 (D. Del. May 9, 2003) 
(finding that the expert testimony was ultimately unhelpful, and that the use of ―power supply‖ in the 
specification rendered the construction adequately clear), aff‘d, 110 F. App‘x 103 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
However, the potential utility of expert testimony in claim construction, and the concomitant need for 
credibility determinations, is apparent. See also, Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 
1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) In Pitney Bowes, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had properly 
taken and considered expert testimony on the way that persons of ordinary skill in the art. Karl Koster, 
Extrinsic Evidence in Patent Claim Interpretation: Understanding Post-Markman Confusion, 8 J. Intell. 
Prop. L. 113 (2000); Breton A. Bocchieri, When is Extrinsic Evidence Really ―Extrinsic‖? 48 IDEA 
523(2008). Howard G. Pollack, The Admissibility and Utility of Expert Legal Testimony in Patent 
Litigation, 32 IDEA 361 (1992). David H. Binney & Toussaint L. Myricks, Patent Claim Interpretation 
After Markman - How Have the Trial Courts Adapted? 38 IDEA 155, 184 (1997). Dennis Crouch et al., 
Defining Your Terms, 168 Pat. World 10 (2004) (―The use of scientific expert testimony hasbeen proposed 
as a way to uncover the ―ordinary meaning‖ of claim terms.‖) 
126  Wagner & Scott, supra note 118. The authors suggest that the court hold that: ―1. The 
presumptive-ordinary-meaning (POM) framework for interpreting claim language outlined above and 
established in the court‘s recent jurisprudence is mandatory and binding; and, 2. that dictionaries or similar 
objective reference sources will be used to determine the ordinary meaning of claim language.‖ 
127 John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their Interpretive Community: A Call for an 
Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 321–386 (2008). (―…the result is a claim 
construction jurisprudence that seems rootless and unusually vulnerable to methodological swings.) 
128 James R. Barney, supra note 108. 
129 Burk & Lemley, supra note 20; See also, Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent 
Law, http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1434465 (last visited November 28, 2011) 
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may have a spectrum of meanings, and that the ordinary meaning rule does not 
help us choose among those meanings. One seemingly simple claim term may 
implicate contradictory canons of construction.
130
 Take the famous Nystrom v. 
Trex Co case
131
 for example. The main claim construction issue was related to 
the claim term ―board‖. Based on the statements in the specification and the 
prosecution history, the district court found that Nystrom had limited the scope 
of the claim term ―board‖ to mean a ―piece of elongated construction material 
made from wood cut from a log.‖132 On appeal, the Federal Circuit cited the 
definitions of the term ―board‖ in several dictionaries, such as the Webster‘s 
Third International Dictionary (2002) and the American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language (4th ed. 2000), accepting a broader construction: ―the 
ordinary meaning of the word ―board‖ encompasses both a piece of cut wood or 
sawn timber and a similarly-shaped item made of a rigid material.‖133 However, 
in view of Phillips, the Federal Circuit reheard the case and withdrew its 
decision, resulting in a totally different outcome. The same panel ruled that the 
term ―board‖ should be interpreted in the context of the specification and the 
prosecution history of the patent.
134
  
                                                        
130 David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates 
in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223. (2008).(―As Nystrom exemplifies, there are clear problems with 
claim construction. Despite the fact that the canons of claim construction seem to be useful and practical 
tools for district court judges, in many cases at least one claim term will implicate contradictory canons of 
construction.‖) Mitch, supra note118. (―These include confusion when there are multiple definitions for a 
single term, misinterpretation if the incorrect dictionary is used and a possible change away from intended 
meaning of the term that would be illustrated if the specification were referenced first.‖) 
131 Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
132 Nystrom v. Trex Co., No. 2:01cv905 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2002). 
133 Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2004). After reviewing these references, the court found the 
word ―board‖ to encompass both a piece of wood and a similarly shaped piece of a rigid material. The 
court found this because ―Nystrom did not disclaim boards made from materials other than logs.‖  
134 Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2005)( ―What Phillips now counsels is that in the absence of 
something in the written description and/or prosecution history to provide explicit or implicit notice to the 
public—i.e., those of ordinary skill in the art—that the inventor intended a disputed term to cover more 
than the ordinary and customary meaning revealed by the context of the intrinsic record, it is improper to 
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Various courts are ―unduly wedded to what they perceive to be the 
‗ordinary meaning‘ of a claim term.‖ 135  The understandings of ―ordinary 
meaning‖ are not unified and occasionally even conflict with one another, 136 
which have caused much confusion and inconsistency in the patent claim 
interpretation process.
137
 Although the Phillips Court attempted to provide a 
unified claim construction approach in search of the ―ordinary meaning‖ from 
the perspective of a skilled person, 
138
 the everlasting high reversal rates 
frustratingly suggest that ―the promises of pre-trial predictability and expedient 
patent litigation seem to remain a tantalizing dream.‖139 Federal Circuit has 
been divided and reached contradictory decisions on the issue as to how to 
reconcile claim language with the description in the specification.
140
 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
read the term to encompass a broader definition simply because it may be found in a dictionary, treatise, or 
other extrinsic source.) 
135 Menell et al., supra note 5. The authors believe that it is unfortunate that the Federal Circuit has failed 
to expressly disavow the ―heavy presumption of ordinary meaning.‖ Lawyers have persisted in citing 
pre-Phillips case law to argue this standard, and district courts have all-to-frequently adopted this obsolete 
rule. 
136 Tom Brody, Claim Construction Using Contexts of Implication, 13 Va. J. L. & Tech. 3 (2008). 
137  American Piledriving Equipment, Inc., v. Geoquip, Inc. No. 2010-1283; American Piledriving 
Equipment, Inc. v. Bay Machinery Corporation No. 2010-1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Linn, Circuit Judge).This 
appeal concerns claim construction and infringement issues common to seven separate law-suits filed by 
American Piledriving in different district courts across the United States. Whether the accused devices 
infringe the ‘964 Patent largely turns in each action on the construction of three claim terms. ―Of the 
district courts that have considered those terms, no two have construed all three terms the same way.‖ 
138 Ehab M. Samuel, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Inc.: A Baffling Claim Construction Methodology, 16 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 519 (2006). 
139 Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 1075 (2001); See also Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, 
and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 Hastings L.J. 1025(2007）(From the results of the logistic 
regression model, this study finds that patent infringement cases arising from the district courts are 
significantly more indeterminate than most other categories of cases reviewed by the Federal Circuit.) 
David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing 
Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and The International Trade Commission, 50 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1699 (2009).   
140 Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd., 657 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Arlington Industries Inc. v. 
Bridgeport Fittings Inc.,632 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and Retractable Technologies Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Judges were on opposite sides of the issue in these cases, 
each in turn penning the majority opinion in one and the dissenting opinion in the other. See also, SRI 
International v. Matsushita Electric Corp. 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985).(―If everything in the 
specification were required to be read into the claims, or if structural claims were to be limited to devices 
operated precisely as a specification-described embodiment is operated, there would be no need for 
claims.‖); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004). (―Even when the 
specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively 
unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‗words or expressions 
of manifest exclusion or restriction.‘‖) Intervet Inc. v. Merial Limited, No. 2009-1568 (Fed. Cir., 
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Federal Circuit expressed a general preference for intrinsic evidence over 
extrinsic evidence,
141
 but the court did not articulate an absolutely fixed 
evidence hierarchy for future claim construction cases, holding that: ―There is 
no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.‖ 142 
According to a post-Phillips empirical survey from July 13, 2005, immediately 
after the Phillips decision until September 2006, claim construction reversal 
rates remain high. ―The overall reversal rate for these cases was 53.5%. 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit changed 33.3% of the district courts‘ claim 
constructions, resulting in 39.5% of these cases having one or more terms 
reversed.‖ 143  An empirical study also shows that Post-Phillips claim 
construction cases hide the analysis of evidence under the guise of ordinary 
meaning. ―Many Federal Circuit decisions now cite directly to the claims as a 
source of authority to establish that the ordinary meaning of the claim term 
controls.‖ 144 
                                                                                                                                                 
2010)(―Construing the claims in light of the specification does not, however, imply that limitations 
discussed in the specification may be read into the claims.‖) 
141 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 981; See also Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 
1582-83 (Fed.Cir.1996) (establishing that the court must look first to the intrinsic evidence, the patent 
claims, the specification (the written description an drawings), and the prosecution history (the record of 
the patent application process in the Patent and Trademark Office) before relying on extrinsic evidence, i.e. 
evidence other than the intrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, treatises, expert and inventor testimony); 
Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (clarifying that Vitronics 
does not prohibit courts from examining extrinsic evidence, even when the patent document is clear; 
rather, Vitronics warned courts not to rely on extrinsic evidence to contradict the clear meaning discernible 
from the intrinsic evidence); Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (confirming the order of preference of claim construction evidence). Goldenberg v. Cytogen Inc, 
373 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ( holding ―Extrinsic evidence, although not part of the intrinsic evidence, 
may be used to aid a court in construing claim terms as they would be understood in the relevant art, but 
may not be used to vary the meaning disclosed by the patent itself.‖) 
142 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1324(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
143 Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 215 
(2007). See also, Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (Amgen V), 469 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
Chief Judge Michel has identified four problems with patent claim construction: (1) a steadily high 
reversal rate; (2) a lack of predictability about appellate outcomes; (3) loss of the comparative advantage of 
district court judges; and (4) inundation of the federal circuit with ―the minutia of construing numerous 
disputed claim terms‖.   
144 Id., Saunders. As the empirical study shows, although there seems to be ―only 6% of cases explicitly 
based on dictionary definitions and 45% based on the specification‖, the methodology of claim 
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The search for an ordinary meaning is to promote the public notice 
function of the claim and protects the public‘s reliance on definitive statements 
made during the process of patent prosecution.
145
 However, because of the 
confusion in understanding the concept of ordinary meaning, claim construction 
seems to be easily molded in any way desired by the courts.146 As Justice 
Bradley wisely stated in 1886: 
Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax which 
may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the 
specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something 
different from, what its words express.
147
 
Section 3 Ordinary meaning serving as a basis for infringement 
decision  
The determination of whether a patent claim has been infringed requires a 
two-step analysis: (1) construction of the claims; and (2) comparison of the 
construed claim to the accused product.
148
 In the second step, the court can 
find literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalent. 
                                                                                                                                                 
construction is actually less clear. Joseph See also, Miller & James Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles 
and Rules for Dictionaries in the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. Rev 829 (2005). From 1995 
to 2004, the nine years have seen more than a ten-fold increase in the number of times per year that the 
Federal Circuit, in its majority opinions, expressly relies on publicly available reference sources such as 
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and learned treatises.  
145 Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2003). 
146 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, Circuit Judge, with whom 
Newman Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting). (― Again today we vainly attempt to establish standards by 
which this court will interpret claims. But after proposing no fewer than seven questions, receiving more 
than 30 amici curiae briefs, and whipping the bar into a frenzy of expectation, we say nothing new, but 
merely restate what has become the practice over the last ten years—that we will decide cases according to 
whatever mode or method results in the outcome we desire…‖) 
147 White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 7 Sup. Ct. 72 (1886). 
148Terence P. Ross, Intellectual Property Law: Damages and Remedies 160 (2000). ―Specifically, the 
patent infringement analysis is conducted in two steps: (1) construction of the claims; and (2) comparison 
of the construed claim to the accused product.‖ Amgen, Inc. v. Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 313, 
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., 
concurring)(―to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.‖) 
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Literal infringement is present only when each and every element set forth in 
the patent claims is found in the accused product.
149
 The line between claim 
construction and the determination of infringement is often not so sharply 
drawn in patent litigations. ―Where there is no genuine dispute over any 
relevant facts regarding the accused product, but only disagreement over 
possible claim interpretation,‖150  the claim construction and infringement 
inquiries collapse into one.
151
 
This Section studies the relationships between the ordinary meaning 
construction and the infringement analysis. When courts speak of a claim 
term‘s ordinary meaning, they do not mean its literal meaning. Literal meaning 
is determined by ―the grammatical and lexical elements, unaffected by the 
context or what the speaker ‗meant‘ to say.‖152 It was observed that the U.S. 
courts put more and more effort into construing the ordinary meaning of the 
claims, rather than mitigating the harshness of literal construction by the 
                                                        
149 Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
150 See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt–Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (―Where the parties do 
not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused product . . . but disagree over possible claim 
interpretations, the question of literal infringement collapses into claim construction and is amenable to 
summary judgment.‖). MyMail. Ltd. v. America Online, Inc., Nos. 06-1147, -1172 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 20, 2007) 
(―Because there is no dispute regarding the operation of the accused systems, that issue reduces to a 
question of claim interpretation and is amenable to summary judgment.‖) O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond 
Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd.,521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("When the parties raise an actual dispute 
regarding the proper scope of the[ ] claims, the court, not the jury, must resolve the dispute."). 
151 Jason R. Mudd, To Construe or Not to Construe: At the Interface Between Claim Construction and 
Infringement In Patent Cases, 76 Mo. L. Rev. 709 (2011).(―the structure and operation of an accused 
device is often undisputed, so that determination of infringement will collapse into a question of claim 
construction.‖) Where the relevant aspects of the accused products‘ structure and operation are undisputed, 
the question of whether those products infringe on the claims of a patent turns solely on the interpretation 
of those claims. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
Because World Wide and Bensons do not dispute any relevant fact regarding the accused products, but 
rather disagree over claim interpretation, ―the question of literal infringement collapses to one of claim 
construction and is thus amenable to summary judgment.‖ Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 
73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
152 Thomas Burns McArthur & Roshan McArthur (ed.), Concise Oxford Companion to the English 
Language, ―Semantics and Grammar‖ (2005). Dominiek Sandra et al., Cognition and Pragmatics, 68 
(2009) (―Granted, the purely linguistic-semantic meaning of a sentence may sometimes be vague and need 
amplification from the context in which it is uttered. But the sentence still has a default semantic meaning, 
however imprecise…in fact, literal meaning is widely assumed.‖) See also, François Recanati, Literal 
Meaning, 70 (2003) (―Non-literal meaning is secondary meaning.‖) 




 As a result, the interpretation of the ordinary 
meaning of patent claim has emerged as a central question in infringement 
disputes, and therefore, it is crucial to clarify what ordinary meaning is. 
A. A brief introduction of the ―literal/ equivalents‖ infringement analysis  
The U.S. Patent Act of 1952, like the 1870 Patent Act, favors a peripheral 
system of patent protection requiring that an applicant ―particularly pointing out 
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.‖154 In 1876, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Merrill v. Yeomans155 
that ―The public should not be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it 
without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights.‖ Therefore, a strict 
literal interpretation of the language of the claim, using the exact meaning of the 
words, could be used to define the protection afforded by the patent claim.
156
 
To ask what is the literal meaning is to simply look at the term in question and 
find meaning in virtue of linguistic properties of the term, such as its dictionary 
                                                        
153 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 Stan. 
L. Rev. 955 (2007). The study refers to the three time periods in either of two ways: (1) ―pre-Festo, Fed. 
Cir. Festo, and post-Supreme Court Festo‖; or (2) ―pre-Festo, mid-Festo, and post-Festo.‖ It was found 
that in the doctrine of equivalents cases decided in 1993 through 1995, before the Federal Circuit or 
Supreme Court decisions in Markman, patentees won 40.0% of the doctrine of equivalents cases, 
compared with only 24% in the last eight years. See also, Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 Cardozo. L. REV. 1371, 1378–79 (2010); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the 
Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 25 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1157 (2011). 
(―…distinguished academics have studied the so-called ―demise‖ of the doctrine of equivalents. 
Professors John Allison, Mark Lemley, and Lee Petherbridge have each empirically analyzed this 
doctrine. All of their studies conclude that successful use of the doctrine has substantially diminished 
over time.‖) 
154 35 U.S.C. § 112, Specification. See also Anthony. W. Deller, Patent Claims §5 (1971) (2d ed.) (stating 
peripheral definition involves ―marking out the periphery or boundary of the area covered by the claim 
and holding as infringements only such constructions as lie within that area,‖ and central definition 
involves ―drafting of a narrow claim setting forth a typical embodiment coupled with broad 
interpretation by the courts to include all equivalents constructions.‖) 
155 Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876). 
156 Richard T. Holzmann, Infringement of the United States Patent Right: A Guide for Executives and 
Attorneys 73 (1995) (―In general, if the words of a claim read on an allegedly infringing device or method, 
then there is said to be literal infringement of that claim.‖) 
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meaning and rules of grammar.
157
 
However, to limit a claim by its literal language is not realistic because 
―outright and forthright duplication is …very rare.‖158 A claim which is limited 
to its literal language would be easily avoided by a copyist, because ―the ways 
of tangibly implementing a described structure or process are many, and there is 
usually no need to copy literally every element of an invention.‖159The U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged that limiting the scope of protection to the literal 
wordings of a claim would reduce a patent‘s value to virtually nothing.160 ―For 
this reason, the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve 
judicial resources but is not necessarily the most efficient rule.‖161 
It is a popular legal theory that a general term in language has a central core 
of determinate meaning and a surrounding penumbra of indeterminate 
meaning.
162
 That is, the literal meaning of patent claims is supposed to be 
generally clear and distinct, but in a minority of cases the judge must of 
                                                        
157  François Recanati, Literal Meaning, 98 (2004).(Differentiation between in virtue of features of the 
context or in virtue of linguistic properties of the expression-type.) 
158 Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
159 Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, Patent Disputes: Litigation Forms and Analysis 6-27 
(2003). 
160 Graver Tank & Mfg Co v. Linde Air Prods Co, 339 US 605, 607 (1950). (―Such a limitation would 
leave room for–indeed encourage – the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial 
changes.‖) See also Tanuja V. Garde, Legal Certainty, Stare Decisis and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 27 
E.I.P.R. 365-370 (2005). 
161 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731-32.(2002) (The 
language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete 
precision the range of its novelty. 
162 Timothy A. O. Endicott, Linguistic Indeterminacy, 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 667-697 (1996). 
See also H. Hart, The Concept of Law 119 (1961) (―Nothing can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty 
and a penumbra of doubt when we are engaged in bringing particular situations under general rules.‖)  
Burr Henly, Penumbra: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 91 (1987-1988) (―The 
penumbra metaphor illustrates instead the problem of law. It expresses, as much as anything, the distance 
judges have to travel between fact and law and how poorly equipped they are to bridge this gap.‖) Jeremy 
Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509 (1994) (The 
image of borderlines suggests a circle with a centre, where everything is clear, and a circumference where 
things become uncertain. It suggests that some cases just are core cases—in law, perhaps, ―easy 
cases‖—and others just are penumbral cases—in law, ―hard cases‖.) 
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necessity go outside the strict terms of the claims. 163  The doctrine of 
equivalents was introduced to extend patent protection beyond the scope of 
literal claim language in Winans v. Denmead.
164
 The scope of a patent is not 
limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims 
described. In Graver Tank & Mfg Co v. Linde Air Prods Co,
165
 the Supreme 
Court established the triple-identity test indicating that ―the doctrine of 
equivalents is founded on the theory that, if two devices do the same work in 
substantially the same way and accomplish substantially the same result, they 
are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape.‖166 Even if the 
claim term is a fuzzy quantitative limitation (such as ―substantially all‖) 167 or 
an absolute limitation (such as ―at least‖),168 the triple-identity test can still be 
applied. 
The triple-identity test was not the sole means of determining 
equivalence.
169
 In Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
170
 the 
                                                        
163 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―application of the doctrine 
of equivalents is the exception, however, not the rule.) 
164 Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 15 How. 330 (1853) (holding ―the law so interprets the claim without the 
addition of these words. The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty 
to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions.‖) 
165 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 608 (1950).  
166 Id.   
167 Pozen Inc. vs. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. 2011-1584, -1585, -1586 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (―the multilayer 
tablet claimed in the ‘183 patent requires ‗substantially all of the naproxen and triptan [to be] segregated 
and separated for the purpose of independent dissolution.‘‖) The court applied the triple-identity doctrine 
and found that ―substantially all the triptan is segregated and separated into the equivalent of a first 
distinct layer, in an equivalent side-by-side ar-rangement, and this achieves the result of independent 
dissolution.‖  
168 Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. vs. Perrigo Company 2010-1246 (Fed. Cir., August 5, 2010) 
(―We thus concluded that the doctrine of equivalents was not foreclosed with respect to the claimed 
range.‖) The district court stated that the term ―at least‖ indicates an absolute lower limit of the range, 
however, on appeal, the Federal Circuit held that ―the mere existence of a numerical value or range in a 
claim, absent more limiting language in the intrinsic record, does not preclude application of the doctrine 
of equivalents.‖ 
169 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). In this case, a patent process 
included the claim limitation of a pH range ―from approximately 6 to approximately 9‖. The accused 
process incorporated a pH of only 5, which the patentee conceded did not literally infringe its patent. 
However, both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court agreed that the accused process infringed under 
the doctrine of equivalents.  
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Federal Circuit rejected the triple-identity test and held that the ―substantial 
difference‖ test should be the touchstone for the doctrine of equivalents. The 
application of the doctrine rests on the substantiality of the differences between 
the claimed and accused products or processes, assessed according to an 
objective standard. The court stated that evidence of interchangeability, 
designing around or copying was relevant to determining what was 
insubstantial. The Supreme Court did not devise a bright-line rule for the 
application of the doctrine.
 171
 Instead, it compared the two tests and found that 
different ―linguistic frameworks‖ may be more suitable to different cases: 
There seems to be substantial agreement that, while the triple identity test may be 
suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often provides a poor framework for 
analyzing other products or processes. On the other hand, the insubstantial 




The Supreme Court also expressed the fear that the doctrine of equivalents 
had ―taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims,‖ thereby 
―conflict[ing] with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory 
                                                                                                                                                 
170 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1519-20 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Known 
interchangeability between the accused and claimed elements is evidence of an insubstantial change. 
Evidence of copying indicates that there are only insubstantial differences between the accused and 
claimed elements. To ―design around‖ is to use the teachings from a patent to design a new invention 
that does not infringe upon and improves over the prior art. It carries a presumption of substantial 
differences and weighs against finding equivalence. 
171 Id. (―With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in going further and micro 
managing the Federal Circuit's particular word choice for analyzing equivalence. We expect that the 
Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case by case 
determinations, and we leave such refinement to that court's sound judgment in this area of its special 
expertise.‖) 
172 Id. (―In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the test is 
probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or 
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention? Different linguistic frameworks may be 
more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts.‖) 
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claiming requirement.‖ 173  Though the doctrine of equivalents serves the 
equitable purpose of preventing an infringer ―from stealing the benefit of an 
invention,‖ 174  it has been blamed for contradicting the peripheral patent 
system.
175
 The doctrine of equivalents extends the patentee‘s rights beyond the 
linguistic limits of a claim,
176
 which places the public in the ―unenviable 
position of having little or no notice as to where the claim erosion might end.‖177  
In response to the uncertainty created by the doctrine of equivalents, courts 
have imposed various limitations upon its application, such as the all elements 
rule,
178
 the prosecution history estoppel,
179
 the rule of prior art,
180
 the rule of 
dedication
181
 and limiting equivalents in the ―means-plus-function‖ claims to 
                                                        
173 Id. 
174 Texas Instruments Inc v. US International Trade Commission, 805 F 2d 1558, 1572 (Fed Cir 1986). 
175 See e.g. Burk & Lemley, supra note 5; see also Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: 
Twelve Years of Federal Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
1033 (1994); Paul M. Janicke, Heat of Passion: What Really Happened in Graver Tank, 24 AM. Intell. 
Prop. L. Ass‘n Q.J. 1 (1996); John McDermott, Hilton Davis and the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Little 
Change, A Little Mischief, 37 IDEA 755 (1997); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents 
and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1157 (2004). 
176 Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23 Harvard Journal of Law 
and Technology 1 (2009) (―the patent holder is given control over something that by definition she did not 
possess at the time of her application.‖) 
177 Jeffrey R. Kuester, Peripheral Claiming System Erosion: Why Draft Claims Anymore? The Federal 
Circuit‘s Continued Assault on Claim Breadth, Intell. Prop. Today, Vol. 8, No. 11, 58 (2001). 
178 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (holding that the determination 
of equivalence in an infringement action should proceed on an element-by-element basis). Thus, each 
element of the claimed invention must be present literally or equivalently in the accused device. See also 
Pennwalt Corp v Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F 2d 931 (Fed Cir, 1987). 
179 A judicially-crafted principle limiting the enforceable scope of patents based on acts occurring during 
their application process. Prosecution history estoppel applies when an applicant during patent prosecution 
narrows a claim ―to avoid the prior art, or otherwise to address a specific concern . . . that arguably would 
have rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable. Warner-Jenkinson Co v Hilton Davis Chemical 
Co, 520 US 17, 30–31 (1997); See also Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co (Festo VIII), 
535 US at 735–36 (2002) 
180 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc, 279 F.3d at 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(holding ―The doctrine of equivalents expands the reach of claims beyond their literal language. That this 
expansion is guided and constrained by the prior art is no surprise, for the doctrine of equivalents is an 
equitable doctrine and it would not be equitable to allow a patentee to claim a scope of equivalents 
encompassing material that had been previously disclosed by someone else, or that would have been 
obvious in light of others‘ earlier disclosures.)   
181 Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d. 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996) the Federal Circuit held that where a patent 
application discloses unclaimed subject matter, that subject matter must be deemed to have been dedicated 
to the public. Therefore the doctrine of equivalents can not apply to such subject matter. 




 The Supreme Court decision in Festo set a 
further ―foreseeability‖ limitation to the doctrine. 183  Under the new 
foreseeability bar, the patentee must show that at the time of the amendment, 
one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim 
that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.
184
 The new bar 
places considerable burdens on the patentee, including the requirement to prove 
the negative proposition that the asserted equivalent was not foreseeable at the 
time of amendment.
185
 The Federal Circuit assessed the scope of foreseeability 
for rebutting prosecution history estoppel in a recent case Duramed 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories, Inc..
186
 The Court found the 
amendment was substantially related to patentability and triggered the 
presumption under Festo. Hence, the prosecution history estoppel barred 
Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc.‘s allegations of infringement under the doctrine 
of equivalents.
187
 Even in the case where the doctrine of equivalents was 
                                                        
182 Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, (Fed. Cir. 1998) the 
Federal Circuit expressed that such claims limit equivalence to later-developed technologies (those 
"developed after the patent is granted"). See also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). The Federal Circuit further stated that ‗[in other words, an equivalent structure or act 
under § 112 for literal infringement must have been available at the time of patent issuance, while an 
equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents may arise after patent issuance and before the time of 
infringement.‘‖ 
183 Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).  
184 Id. An amendment did not raise a complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents, and there were three 
exceptions, namely that (1) the equivalent was ―unforeseeable at the time of the application,‖ (2) ―the 
rationale underlying the amendment [bears] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in 
question,‖ or (3) that ―some other reason suggest[s] that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to 
have described the insubstantial substitute in question.‖ 
185 David B. Walker, The Imperfection of Language: Festo Sets a Foreseeability Bar for Prosecution 
History Estoppel, The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy studies,  
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.545/pub_detail.asp (last visited, Jan 1, 2010). 
186 Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories, Inc., No. 10-1419 (Fed. Cir. July 21, 2011). 
See also, Energy Transp. Group, Inc. v. William Demant Holdings A/S. No. 2011-1487, -1488, -1489 (Fed. 
Cir. Oct 12, 2012). (―ETG has not overcome the presumption that the narrowing amendment was made to 
secure the patent. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002). The 
prosecution history in this case shows that the claim limitation at issue was added in response to a rejection 
of closely related claims, and provides no other explanation for the limitation.‖)  
187 Id. The district court granted Paddock‘s motion, finding that (1) Duramed‘s amendment was 
substantially related to patentability and, because it narrowed the scope of the asserted claims, it 
triggered the presumption under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 
1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc), that Duramed surrendered all territory between the original and 
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applied, the court cautioned that ―it is the role of the court, however, to ensure 
that the doctrine of equivalents is not permitted to overtake the statutory 
function of the claims in defining the scope of the patentee‘s exclusive 
rights.‖188 
B. Ordinary meaning construction in determining patent scope  
The doctrine of equivalents is a judge-made law driven by the desperation of 
being trapped by literal interpretation.
189
 In recent years, there has been a 
growing tendency to question the literal/functional distinction. The following 
paragraphs will discuss this trend and the elevating role of ―ordinary meaning‖ 
in substantively determining patent scope. 
Modern courts are concerned with finding the ordinary meaning instead of 
the literal meaning of the word found in the dictionaries and encyclopedia.
190
 
Ordinary meaning is the meaning that is more commonly used or more 
commonly understood in the pertinent technology field
191— even the plainest 
                                                                                                                                                 
amended claim scope; and (2) Duramed‘s argument—that the use of PVA as an MBC in a 
pharmaceutical formulation was unforeseeable at the time of the amendment—did not rebut the Festo 
presumption. 
188 Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, Nos. 11-1629, -1630, -1631 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2012). See also, Sage 
Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
189 In Kirin-Amgen Inc. and Others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel and Others [2004] UKHL 46, Lord 
Hoffman discussed the issue of whether Europe should have a doctrine of equivalents. ―It seems to me that 
both the doctrine of equivalents in the United States and the pith and marrow doctrine in the United 
Kingdom were born of despair. The courts felt unable to escape from interpretations which "unsparing 
logic" appeared to require and which prevented them from according the patentee the full extent of the 
monopoly which the person skilled in the art would reasonably have thought he was claiming.‖ 
190
 The leading case in this line is Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). While previous decisions had recognized that dictionaries could be used to construe claims, Texas 
Digital went much further. In particular, it rejected the view that dictionaries should be characterized as 
mere extrinsic evidence, indicated a presumption in favor of using a dictionary to discern the ordinary 
meaning of claim terms, and suggested that consulting intrinsic evidence prior to consulting a dictionary 
―invites a violation of our precedent counseling against importing limitations into the claims.‖   
191 Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path 
to Plain Meaning, 13 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 97 (2012) (―The sense of a term that is more commonly 
used in a given context may be referred to as the term‘s ordinary or most frequent meaning.‖) 
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words such as ―a‖192 or ―only if‖193 need to be read through the eyes of a 
PHOSITA.
 194
 Compared with looking at literal meaning, construing claim 
terms according to their common usage in the pertinent art at the time of filing is 
more contextual.  
Recent empirical studies show that a ―doctrine reallocation‖ and ―doctrine 
replacement‖ have occurred in the Federal Circuit.195  It has been noticed that 
the growth of claim construction hearings practically ―killed the doctrine of 
equivalents in the 1990s.‖ 196 Three major reasons have been given for this 
―doctrine reallocation‖ and ―doctrine replacement‖. 197  First, since claim 
construction and the doctrine of equivalents serve similar functions—―both are 
directed to the scope of protection for a patentee‖ 198  — the rise in the 
                                                        
192 Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex International, Inc. 423 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) The majority 
found the term ―a‖ to be prima facie lacking in ambiguity, based on established case law holding 
that the word ―a‖  means one or more. In contrast, the dissent argued that ―a‖ means only one, 
based on the specification‘s repeated and consistent disclosure that the term ―a,‖ in the context of 
―a cable,‖ was associated with only one cable. 
193 O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,. 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir.2008). (―A determination 
that a claim term ‗needs no construction‘ or has the ‗plain and ordinary meaning‘ may be inadequate when 
a term has more than one ‗ordinary‘ meaning or when reliance on a term‘s ‗ordinary‘ meaning does not 
resolve the parties' dispute.‖) 
194  Christopher Hutton, Language, Meaning and Law 85 (2009) (―In law, there is a profusion of 
terminology in this area, which reflects both its centrality and its difficulty: ‗clear‘, ‗plain‘, ‗literal‘, 
‗natural‘, ‗meaning on its face‘, etc. …One strong piece of evidence for the difficulty of these concepts is 
the quite startling silence of academic linguistics on the definition and nature of literal meaning.‖) 
195 David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1157, 
1158 (2011). Petherbridge, supra note 5. (―There has been an increase in the rate that the court uses claim 
construction in connection with decisions on the doctrine of equivalents and an apparent increase in the 
impact of claim construction decision-making on equivalents decisions.‖) It finds that an increase in 
unpredictability developed around the year 2000, and that it associates well with the strengthening of 
distinctly different judicial approaches to the task of construing claims. 
196 Allison & Lemley, supra note 153. The study refers to the three time periods in either of two ways: 
(1) ―pre-Festo, Fed. Cir. Festo, and post-Supreme Court Festo‖; or (2) ―pre-Festo, mid-Festo, and 
post-Festo.‖ It was found that in the doctrine of equivalents cases decided in 1993 through 1995, before 
the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court decisions in Markman, patentees won 40.0% of the doctrine of 
equivalents cases, compared with only 24% in the last eight years. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, Circuit Judge, dissenting)―today‘s 
new rule further erodes the residue of the doctrine of equivalents, for its foreseeable result is to deprive 
amended claims of access to the doctrine of equivalents.‖) 
197 Schwartz, supra note 195. 
198 Id. (―When construing claims, the judge often knows the structure of the accused products. Using this 
knowledge, the judge may provide a broader construction to ambiguous claim language so as to avoid 
confronting the doctrine of equivalents. In other words, courts may have found these doctrines to be 
substitutes for each other.‖) 
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importance of claim construction has subsumed the doctrine of equivalents. 
Second, during the process of interpretation, judges can use functional 
definitions to define the claim terms, therefore claim construction ―has arguably 
expanded to encompass the doctrine of equivalents.‖199 Third, when the judge 
has construed the claims, he was less inclined to submit the case to a jury. 
―Since the doctrine of equivalents exists only as a backstop for patentees who 
lose on literal infringement, lumping them together makes it much more likely 
that a fact-finder that rejects one claim will reject them both.‖200  
The literal/functional distinction has been abandoned in other jurisdictions. 
The UK House of Lords said in the Catnic case
201
: 
Both parties to this appeal have tended to treat ‗textual infringement‘ (i.e. literal) 
and infringement of the ‗pith and marrow‘ of an invention as if they were 
separate causes of action, the existence of the former to be determined as a matter 
of construction only and of the latter upon some broader principle of colourable 
evasion. There is, in my view, no such dichotomy; there is but a single cause of 
action and to treat it otherwise …is liable to lead to confusion. 
Patent claims not only inform patent observers about the patented 
invention,
 202
 but also substantively define patent scope,
203
 i.e., whether the 
                                                        
199 Id. (Consequently, the need for the doctrine of equivalents was effectively eliminated) 
200 Allison & Lemley, supra note 153. To test this hypothesis, the authors constructed four datasets. The 
fourth dataset bears out the hypothesis. The doctrine of equivalents was alive and well before Markman, 
but has been in decline ever since. 
201 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. (1982) R.P.C. 183. 
202 In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (―It is the claims which define the metes and 
bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system.‖); Zenith Labs., Inc. v. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (―It is the claim that sets the metes and 
bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system.‖); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 622 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (―In drafting an original claim of a patent 
application, the writer sets out the metes and bounds of the invention.‖). 
203 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., 
concurring) (―to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case‖). See also, Cotropia, 
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patent should be given a broad scope or narrow scope. The parties often 
―dispute not the meaning of the words themselves, but the scope that should be 
encompassed by this claim language.‖ 204  The ―literal/ equivalents‖ 
infringement analysis allows the scope of equivalents to expand with time and 
evaluates equivalency at the time of infringement.
205
 The patent protection is 
extended over unforeseen or after-arising developments in technology.
206
  
By comparison, ordinary meaning approach rests on the idea that the 
commonly-understood meaning of a claim term in the pertinent art at the time of 
filing represents a basis for determining patent scope.
207
 Therefore, judges look 
to the meaning that the term would have to a PHOSITA as of the effective 
                                                                                                                                                 
supra note 5; Lee, supra note 35. (―‗substantive‘ claim construction can serve as a lever for optimizing 
patent scope.‖) Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect,15 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 215 
(2008) (―Because nearly everything in a patent case turns on claim construction (e.g., whether 
infringement has occurred, or whether the patent meets the requirements for patentability), it is thought to 
be a key and dispositve issue most patent cases.‖) 
204 O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,. 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir.2008). Gretchen A. 
Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in. Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim. 
Construction Methodology, 8 J. Intell. Prop. L. 175,175-76 (2001) (―a patentee will advocate a broad 
interpretation of the claim in order to pursue an easier infringement proof. In contrast, the accused will 
typically advance a more narrow view of the claim.‖) 
205 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) (―Insofar as the question 
under the doctrine of equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed element, the 
proper time for evaluating equivalency – and thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements – is 
at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent issued‖). Ray D. Weston, Jr., A Comparative Analysis 
of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Can European Approaches Solve an American Dilemma?, 39 IDEA: J. 
Law & Tech. 35 (1998) (―Equivalence arises from identity between a claimed invention and an accused 
device.‖) William T. Ralston, Foreign Equivalents to the U.S. Doctrine of Equivalents: We're Playing in 
the Same Key But It's Not Quite. Harmony, 6 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 177 (2007) (―the scope of 
equivalent elements may increase as new equivalent elements are developed or discovered after the filing 
of the patent.‖) Timothy Chen Saulsbury, Pioneers versus Improvers: Enabling Optimal Patent Claim 
Scope, 16 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 439 (2010). For example, an inventor claimed the 
incandescent light bulb. One court may treat all types of incandescent bulbs, regardless of their filament 
material, as a single genus; A second court may see things differently and consider the property of having a 
specific filament material in constructing thing-types. Accordingly, this court would treat incandescent 
bulbs with different filament materials as discrete thing-types. 
206 Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. 151, 159-160 (2005) (after-arising equivalents protection extends effective patent life by 
providing the patentee with control over these later-developed improvements.) 
207 John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of. Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. (2005) (―The rapid decline of the doctrine of equivalents was perhaps the least 
predictable consequence of the seminal Markman opinion. Elevation of the public notice function of 
claims and emphasis upon the duties of the drafter have left little room for a nontextual theory of patent 
infringement.‖) 




 If such approach is strictly followed, judges would simply try to 
apply what would have been covered in the past to the new circumstances, 
even those that were not in existence at the time of filing. However, as time 
passes, advances in technology may ―undermine the relevance‖209of original 
understandings or practice to contemporary circumstances. A PHOSITA 
reading the term ―means of exchange‖ in 1980s could not possibly have 
contemplated the ―e-money‖ (a digital equivalent of cash) that emerged in 
early 1990s.
210
 The adherence to the fixed understanding of how a PHOSITA 
would have interpreted a disputed claim term is necessarily hypothetical but 
still narrow.
211
 Judges have to accommodate new technologies by invoking 
the doctrine of equivalents,
212
 which has been long criticized to undermine 
legal certainty. In practice, judges sometimes resort to the short-hand 
expressions such as the ―plain meaning‖ or ―ordinary meaning‖ of claim terms 
to provide a broadest possible scope, which may ―obscure the correct 
analysis‖.213 Due to developments in scientific knowledge, new problems are 
always arising, justification and persuasion will be better achieved by claim 
interpretation that is responsive to advances in technology. 
                                                        
208 Menell at el., supra note 5.  
209 Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 Ind. L.J. 1183, 1244 (2012). 
210 A. Vasudevan, Central Banking for Emerging Market Economies 55 (2003) (―electronic money, or 
e-money, or e-cash has been in existence in many industrialized economies since about early 1990s.‖) 
211 Cotropia, supra note 206. 
212 Lemley, supra note 7. 
213 Superguide Corp v. DirecTV Enterprises, 358 F.3d 870 (2004) (Michel, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
the result.) 
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CHAPTER 2 THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH 
This Chapter discusses another widely used claim interpretation method called 
the purposive approach. The purposive approach focuses on what the patentee 
was aiming at when he chose the words he used. A PHOSITA is employed as a 
construction tool to work out what the patentee was intending to mean by the 
words of his claim at the time of filing. To define the purpose or intent is to 
decide what a PHOSITA similarly situated would understand the patentee to 
have in demarcating the invention. The PHOSITA would possess the common 
general knowledge of technology, the knowledge about patent drafting 
conventions and patent application practices, as well as the potential use of the 
invention. The purposive construction advances the goal that claim 
construction should be reasonable and fair to both the patentee and the public. 
This Chapter then takes the modern UK purposive construction as an example 
to show the strengths and limitations of this approach. It outlines the evolution 
of the UK purposive approach in three phases: the Protocol Questions, Lord 
Hoffmann‘s one compulsory question, and the Technip principles. Through 
these phases, the UK courts gradually acquire a mature sense of purposive 
construction. The purposive construction is more situational and flexible than 
the ordinary meaning approach, but has its own problems. For example, 
sometimes the intent was not clear, sometimes there are technological changes 
that patentee did not originally contemplate and therefore have developed 
meanings which he did not intend. Under these circumstances, judges might 
fail to offer explicit reasons for selection of meaning.  
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Section 1 Patentee’s intent in purposive construction  
The purposive approach has been widely used across different fields of legal 
interpretation, such as statutory interpretation and contractual interpretation.
214
  
In patent law, the claim language was chosen by the patentee at the date of 
filing to describe something which he regarded as an invention.
215
 The 
essence of this approach is what the person skilled in the art would have 
understood the patentee to have been using the language of the claim to 
mean.
216
 A PHOSITA is employed ―as a purposive construction tool through 
which courts attempt to correctly determine the boundaries that dictate the 
scope of a patent.‖ 217  A PHOSITA would read the patent claim on the 
assumption that ―its purpose is both to describe and to demarcate an 
invention—a practical idea which the patentee has had for a new product or 
process…. It is this insight which lies at the heart of ‗purposive 
construction.‘‖218  
The purposive approach was established in the seminal decision of the 
                                                        
214 William L. Hayhurst, The Art of Claiming and Reading a Claim, in Patent Law of Canada 193(G. F. 
Henderson ed., 1994) (―purposive construction is nothing new, though Lord Diplock is credited with first 
using the expression in patent cases.‖) For instance, in the most cited English contract law case Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society [1997] UKHL 28, it laid down that a 
purposive approach must be taken to interpretation of contracts. Lord Hoffmann set out five principles for 
interpreting contracts: The right meaning is what the document conveys to a reasonable person; this 
includes everything in the "matrix of fact", or relevant background circumstances; prior negotiations are 
excluded from this (a point which has been much criticized since); the meaning of words is not a literal 
meaning, but the one reasonably understood from the context the meaning should not contradict a common 
sense view of what a contract required. 
215 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183 (H.L.) Lord Diplock explained that 
―…a patent specification is a unilateral statement by the patentee, in words of his own choosing, addressed 
to those likely to have a practical interest in the subject matter of his invention (i.e. ―skilled in the art‖), by 
which he informs them what he claims to be the essential features of the new product or process for which 
the letters patent grant him a monopoly.‖ 
216 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd vs. Premium Aircraft Interiors Group Ltd and Premium Aircraft Interiors 
UK Ltd [2009] EWHC 26; Andrew Rich & Will James, Patents: Claim Construction, 27 E.I.P.R. 2005 
N42-44 (2005).  
217  Richard Gold & Karen Lynne Durell, Innovating the Skilled Reader: Tailoring Patents to New 
Technologies, 19(1) Intellectual Property Journal 189 (2005). 
218 Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and Others [2004] UKHL 46. 
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House of Lords in Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd
219
 in 1982. Lord 
Diplock mandated a ―purposive approach‖ to claim interpretation:   
A patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a 
purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal 
analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge.
220 
It has become increasingly common for courts to use the purposive 
approach to construe the meaning of patent claims. For instance, in Genelabs 
Diagnostics Pte Ltd v. Institut Pasteur and Another
221
 and a series of cases
222
, 
the Singapore Court of Appeal held that it is settled law that a patent claim 
should be construed purposively which would accord fair protection to the 
patentee and yet provide a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties. The 
application of the purposive construction approach was also applied in the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Whirlpool Corp 
223
 and Free World Trust,
224
  
where the Court made it clear that a claim is to be construed through an 
objective determination of the meaning intended by the inventor, as interpreted 
through the eyes of one skilled in the art. ―[P]atent claims are to be construed in 
an informed and purposive fashion and that excessive literalism is to be 
                                                        
219 Catnic Components Ltd and another v. Hill and Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183. 
220 Id. 
221 Genelabs Diagnostics Pte Ltd v. Institut Pasteur and Another [2000] SGCA 60.  
222 See e.g., FE Global Electronics Pte Ltd and Others v. Trek Technology (Singapore) Pte Ltd and 
Another [2005] SGCA 55. The Court restated that the Catnic purposive approach endorsed by the UK 
House of Lords was ―consonant with the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art 69 of the European Patent 
Convention, which provides, inter alia, that a patent should be interpreted ―as defining a position … which 
combines a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties‖. First 
Currency Choice Pte Ltd v. Main-line Corporate Holdings Limited [2007] SGCA 50. (―Clearly then, the 
starting point in patent construction is to ask the threshold question: What would the notional skilled 
person have understood the patentee to mean by the use of the language of the claims? In this endeavor, the 
language that the patentee has adopted is more often than not of utmost importance (see Kirin-Amgen at 
[34])‖) 
223 Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067; 2000 SCC 67. 
224 Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc. et al. [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, 2000 SCC 66. 
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avoided.‖ 225  The purposive approach has also received the authoritative 
endorsement of the courts in South Africa in the Supreme Court of Appeal of 
Africa in Triomed 
226
and reaffirmed in the Flag and Flagpole case.
227
 
It should be noted that, the purposive approach concerns with the 
patentee‘s objective intent, that is, ―what would the skilled reader think was 
the inventors‘ purpose,‖ 228  rather than what the patentee actually intended.As 
Lord Hoffmann pointed out in his Kirin-Amgen judgment, ―there is no window 
into the mind of the patentee or the author of any other document.‖229 It may 
be that the patentee never anticipated that effect of restriction, but if a skilled 
person could consider that he intended so, then he will be bound by the narrow 
wording. By employing the method of purposive construction in interpreting 
claims, the courts seldom distinguish the terms of ―intent‖ or ―purpose.‖ 230 To 
avoid confusion, this thesis also uses the term ―intent‖ to mean purpose for the 
                                                        
225 Wenzel Downhole Tools Ltd v National-Oilwell Canada Ltd [2011] FC 1323, 98 CPR(4th). 
226 Aktiebolaget Hässle and Another v. Triomed (Pty) Ltd 2003 (1) SA 155 (SCA) (Nugent JA) (―…the 
claim must be construed to ascertain the intention of the inventor as conveyed by the language he has 
used.‖) 
227 Vari-Deals 101 (Pty) Ltd v. Sunsmart Products (Pty) Ltd [2007] SCA 123. (―Nowhere, in the relevant 
passage, did the learned Judge disapprove of the Catnic approach – he simply cautioned that it should be 
applied with care.‖) 
228 Convatec Ltd. & Ors v. Smith & Nephew Healthcare Ltd & Ors [2011] EWHC 2039 (Pat) (―it is always 
important to bear in mind that the skilled person reads the specification in light of the common general 
knowledge and appreciating that its purpose is to describe and demarcate an invention, that is to say a 
practical idea for a new product or process‖); Glaverbel SA v. British Coal Corp. and Another [1995] 
R.P.C. 255, 268, 269: (―A patent is construed objectively, through the eyes of a skilled addressee.‖) 
229 Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and Others [2004] UKHL 46, 
reported as [2005] RPC 169. 
230 Hereinafter, the terms ―intent‖ or ―purpose‖ in the quotations are underlined by the author. Generics 
[uk] Ltd (t/a Mylan) v. Yeda Research and Development Co Ltd & Anor, EWHC 1848 (Pat) [2012] 
(―Binnie J delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada added in Whirpool Corp v Camco Inc 
[2001] FSR 46 at [49(c)] that "a 'mind willing to understand' necessarily pays close attention to the purpose 
and intent of the author.") Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Jet Airways (India) Ltd & Ors, EWHC 2153 (Pat) 
[2012] (―The purposive construction would lead to a construction of a claim which did not cover that 
acknowledged prior art: it can hardly have been the inventor's purpose to cover that which he expressly 
recognises was old. … The fact that the skilled person is faced with a conundrum, that the patentee cannot 
have intended to cover BA First…‖) Datacard Corporation v. Eagle Technologies Ltd, EWHC 244 (Pat) 
[2011] (―It is trite law that a patent is addressed to … those with practical knowledge and experience of the 
kind of work in which the invention is intended to be used. The addressee comes to a reading of the 
specification with the common general knowledge of persons skilled in the relevant art, and he or she reads 
it knowing that its purpose is to describe and demarcate an invention.‖)  
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consistency of discussion.   
Both the ordinary meaning approach and the purposive approach interpret 
the language of the claim from the perspective of a PHOSITA in the pertinent 
art at the time of invention or filing. Under the purposive approach, if a 
patentee had chosen to define his claim in narrow terms, the court should not 
rewrite it in broader language simply because it thought a wider form of 
wording would have been easy to formulate.
231
 In Société Technique de 
Pulverisation STEP v. Emson Europe Ltd,
232
 Hoffmann LJ in the UK Court of 
Appeal explained that:  
The well known principle that patent claims are given purposive construction 
does not mean that an integer in a claim can be treated as struck out if it does 
not appear to make any difference to the inventive concept. It may have some 
other purpose buried in the prior art and even if this is not discernible, the 
patentee may have some reason of his own for introducing it. 
The Australian court also warned in Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v. 
Coretell Pty Ltd that purposive construction does not necessarily mean the 
expansion of patent scope: 233 
To give a purposive construction to a patent specification, and in particular its 
claims, is not to engage in a process of reasoning that extends the patentee‘s 
                                                        
231 Brugger v. Medicaid Ltd [1996] R.P.C. 635 (―No doubt it could be said that a limitation to an insert 
which is cylindrical is very narrow. It could be avoided by having the inlet flue and insert with square 
cross-section. But that is how the patentee has chosen to define his monopoly. Similarly it is not 
appropriate to ignore the requirement of an insert.‖)  
232 Société Technique de Pulverisation STEP v. Emson Europe Ltd [1993] RPC 513. ―Integer‖ is a well 
known term of art. It means a feature called for by a claim. It might be a physical component; or it might be 
some other definite limitation, e.g. a requirement that a value fall within a specified numerical range. 
233 Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 121 (15 September 2011); See 
also,Peng Lian Trading Co. v. Contour OPTIK Inc. and others [2003] 2SLR 560; [2003]SGCA 25. 
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monopoly to the 'ideas' disclosed in the specification. Nor does it extend the 
patentee‘s monopoly to products or processes that the patentee did not, by the 
claims, define as the invention, even if those products or processes can be seen 
to perform the same function as the invention or to be based on the patentee‘s 
―ideas‖.  
Therefore, the two approaches of claim interpretation are very likely to 
produce the same result, but there are clear differences between them. First, 
under the purposive approach, purpose is vital to the construction of claims,
234
 
whereas the ordinary meaning approach seldom looks for the patentee‘s 
purpose or intent.
 235
 Under the purposive approach, interpreters will infer the 
patentee‘s intention from the claim language and the teaching in the patent, as 
well as ―any commercial or technical reason‖ for thinking that the patentee 
would or would not have wanted to exclude an infringing technology.
236
 
Under the ordinary meaning approach, ―unless the patentee has demonstrated 
a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of 
                                                        
234 Ancon Ltd. v. ACS Stainless Steel Fixings Ltd., [2009] EWCA Civ 498; See also, Virgin Atlantic v 
Premium Aircraft [2009] EWCA Civ 1062; [2010] FSR 10 at paragraph 5. (―The approach is termed 
―purposive construction‖ because it has regard to the inventor‘s purpose.‖) Wheatley & Anor v Drillsafe 
Ltd & Ors [2000] EWCA Civ 209. (―This involves examining the words of the claim through the eyes of a 
person to whom the specification is directed, in the context of the specification as a whole.‖) Ranbaxy 
(UK) Ltd v Astrazeneca AB [2011] EWHC 1831 (―The question is what the skilled person would have 
understood the patentee to be using the language of the claim to mean. This is sensitive to context. The 
skilled person reads the specification in light of the common general knowledge and appreciating that its 
purpose is to describe and demarcate an invention, that is to say a practical idea for a new product or 
process.‖) 
235 Colleen Murphy, Are Humans Animals? Patent Claim Construction in Martek Biosciences Corp. v. 
Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3D 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009),79 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1213 (2011). 
(―By interpreting ―animals‖ to include humans, the Federal Circuit did not consider what Martek intended 
to be its invention at the time the patent application was filed. As the dissenting judges stated, reading the 
specification as a whole leads to the conclusion that the DHA supplements were meant only for non-human 
animals.‖) 
236 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Ratiopharm GmbH EWCA Civ 252[2009] (―The point here is 
whether, as r/S contend, claim 1 of 246 and claim 6 of 730 do not extend to a form of dosage in which some 
of the oxycodone is on the outside of the coating…There is nothing in the language of claim 6 of 730 
which excludes a tablet which has all the characteristics it sets out, but with the additional feature of an 
external application of oxycodone. There is also nothing in the teaching in the patent to suggest that such a 
tablet was intended to be excluded. Nor is there any commercial or technical reason for thinking that the 
patentee would have wanted to exclude an otherwise infringing article with such an additional feature.‖) 
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manifest exclusion or restriction,‖ it is improper to read a ―purpose‖ 
requirement into a patent claim.
 237
 For example, in Martek case,
238
 one 
disputed issue was whether the claim term ―animal‖ included a human being. 
If the term is read purposively with the specification as a whole— in this case, 
the specification demonstrated the references to economic and food-producing 
animals, the intent of the patentee was to exclude humans,
 239
 and a narrow 
definition would be more likely to be adopted: ―animal‖ would encompass only 
those animals raised for production of food and milk products, thereby not 
including humans.
240
 However, the Federal Circuit of the United States held 
that the statements did not ―rise to the level of a clear intention to limit the 
claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or 
restriction.‖241 Hence the term ―animal‖ should be broadly construed to mean 
―any organism belonging to the kingdom Animalia.‖  
Second, the purposive approach recognizes that ―there may be no 
                                                        
237
 Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., No. 11-1204 (Fed. Cir. June 11, 2012). (―We agree with Toshiba that 
the district court improperly read a ―purpose‖ requirement into claim 1. The plain language of the claim 
requires that the number-of-recording planes identifying information ―represents the number of recording 
planes of the recording medium.‖ ‘966 patent cl.1 (emphasis added).‖) In dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk 
took the view that "the specification and the prosecution history of the ‘966 patent make clear that the 
central objective of the patent was to identify whether an optical disc was a one-sided disc or a two-sided 
disc." Given this construction, he would have affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment of 
non-infringement. 
238 Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
239 Id. (Lourie, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judge Rader joins, dissenting in part.) The dissenters 
argued that the intent of the patentee was only to include humans and animals in the food product of the 
supplemented animals, not to include humans to make food products for humans. (―It is true that the 
specification states, in one sentence, ―The term ‗animal‘ means any organism belonging to the kingdom 
Animalia.‖ It is also true that humans belong to the kingdom Animalia. However, the lines in the 
specification directly following that sentence list a host of non-human animals from which one derives 
food or milk:…‖)   
240 Murphy, supra note 235. (―The narrow approach of claim construction would include the patentee‘s 
intent of what the invention covered… The narrow approach closely follows this intent by establishing the 
baseline of the claim terms from the claim language and specification that the inventor set forth.) 
241 Id. In a Markman hearing, the district court held that the claim term ―animal‖ meant ―any member of 
the kingdom Animalia, except humans.‖ However, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the isolated 
statements cited by the dissent do not rise to the level of ―a clear intention to limit the claim scope using 
words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.‖ 
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generally accepted definition.‖242 Therefore, to give effect to the purpose of 
the patentee requires more complex contextual information than the ordinary 
usage of the technical term.
 243 
In order to ascertain what the patentee was 
intending to mean, the PHOSITA is supposed to have in mind not only the 
common knowledge of the relevant technology,
244
 but also the patent practice 
such as the patent applications,
245
 and the generalised drafting conventions by 
which the patent and its claims were framed.
246
 For example, in Virgin 
Atlantic Airways Ltd v Premium Aircraft,
247
 one construction issue is whether 
                                                        
242 Ancon Ltd. v. ACS Stainless Steel Fixings Ltd., [2009] EWCA Civ 498 (Court of Appeal, 2009) (Jacob, 
J.) Ppatentees are often faced with the problem ―to describe something which, at any rate ... is new; which 
has not existed before and of which there may be no generally accepted definition.‖ 
243 Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., 2000 SCC 67 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067. The Supreme Court of Canada 
stated that: ―Intention is manifested in words, whose meaning should be respected, but words themselves 
occur in a context that generally provides clues to their interpretation and a safeguard against their 
misinterpretation.‖ 
244 Cephalon Inc, Cephalon France SAS and Cephalon (UK) Ltd v Orchid Europe Ltd and Generics (UK) 
Ltd (t/a Mylan) [2011] EWHC 1591 (Pat). (This construction was based on the general teaching of the 
patents as well as the common general knowledge of the skilled person, a drug formulation scientist) 
245
 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd vs. Premium Aircraft Interiors Group [2009] EWCA Civ 1062, [2010] 
RPC 8 (―…Finally there is a somewhat more general question (because there is no express rule about 
drafting or construction involved) of whether the skilled reader will know about the practice of divisional 
applications. It arises because the Patent is a divisional and says so.… Likewise when there is a reference 
to the patent being a divisional application, it would be perverse to work on the basis that the skilled man 
would not know what that means. A real skilled man reading a patent which, as in the case of the Patent, 
refers to ‗the parent application‘ would surely say ‗what's a parent application?‘– and he would go on to 
ask a man who knows, probably a patent agent.‖) Ranbaxy (UK) Ltd vs. Astrazeneca AB ([2011] EWHC 
1831 (Pat); [2011] F.S.R. 45) (―The skilled person must therefore be taken to know the basic drafting 
conventions used to frame a patent and its claims. This has a particular relevance to Ranbaxy‘s submission 
that the skilled person would recognise that claim 1 has been drafted in the Swiss form…‖) Datacard 
Corporation v. Eagle Technologies Ltd [2011] EWHC 244 (Pat) (―More recently, in Virgin Atlantic 
Airways Ltd v Premium Aircraft Interiors UK Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1062, [2010] RPC 8 the Court of 
Appeal held that the skilled reader is to be taken to know the purpose of (i) including reference numerals in 
patent claims, (ii) dividing claims into pre-characterising and characterising portions and (iii) filing of 
divisional applications, and to bring that knowledge to bear when he considers the scope of the claim.‖) 
See also, Jonathon D. C. Turner, Purposive Construction: Seven Reasons Why Catnic is Wrong, [1999] 
E.I.P.R. 531. (―it appears to him to be there for some legal or other non-technical reason, as of course it 
is…Thus the skilled person can only interpret the claims purposively when he has been told what is their 
purpose in patent law.‖)   
246 Schenck Rotec GmbH v. Universal Balancing Limited [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat) (―There is a clear 
drafting convention in European patents. In a product claim the words ―apparatus for achieving a result‖ 
almost always means ―suitable for‖.  The skilled reader would be aware of that convention.  In this 
context ―suitable for‖ means ―capable of‖ or ―not incapable of‖ performing the function.‖ )  
247 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd vs. Premium Aircraft Interiors UK Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1062. The judge 
posed the following questions: Does the skilled reader take into account that the patentee, when putting 
numerals into his claim, knew that they would not be used by the skilled reader to limit his claim? (Rule 29 
(7) of the Implementing Regulations to the EPC. ―… These reference signs shall not be construed as 
limiting the claim.‖); Does the skilled reader when he sees such a two-part claim take this rule into account 
so that he at least expects the pre-characterizing portion to describe matter which is part of the prior art? 
(Rule 29(1) of the Implementing Regulations: the pre-characterising portion to describe matter which is 
part of the prior art); Does the skilled reader know about the practice of divisional applications? (Art. 76 of 
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claim 1 for a passenger seating system should be limited to ―flip-over seats‖, 
which is the only one specific embodiment. In this case, the court reasoned 
that because the PHOSITA knows the facts that (1) the patentee has divided 
out what is in this patent from a parent application in the practice of divisional 
applications; (2) the pre-characterizing portion is about something the patentee 
considered old; (3) the patentee could not have intended his use of the 
reference numeral to be used against him. So the PHOSITA would not expect 
the language used to be limited to flip-over seats.
248
 In order to gain a better 
understanding of the claim text, the PHOSITA has to relate it to the concerns 
of the patentee at a particular time.  
Third, under the ordinary meaning approach, courts indulge a heavy 
presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning;
249
 
in comparison, under the purposive approach, the PHOSITA is more willing to 
understand the implication of the patent. The courts have pointed out that 
purposive construction ―can lead to the conclusion that a technically trivial or 
minor difference between an element of a claim and the corresponding 
                                                                                                                                                 
the EPC , implemented by Art 25 of the Implementing Regulations) The judge answered that ―the notional 
skilled reader is to be taken as knowing these matters and bringing them to bear when he considers the 
scope of the claim.‖ See also, Schenk Rotec GmbH v Universal Balancing Limited [2012] EWHC 1920 
(Pat) (―Professional representatives who draft patents know that part of the job of patent examiners is to 
apply the various rules and guidelines relating to novelty. They have a profound influence on claim 
drafting.‖) Citing the judgments of Floyd J in Qualcomm v. Nokia [2008] EWHC 329 (Pat), Peter Prescott 
QC in Folding Attic Stairs v Loft Stairs Co Ltd [2009] EWHC 1221 (Pat), Arnold J in FNM v Drammock 
Intnerational [2009] EWHC 1294 (Pat), and Lewison J (as he then was) in Zeno Corporation v 
BSM-Bionic Solutions Management GmbH [2009] EWHC 1829 (Pat). (―The phrase in question does not 
use the word "for" but nevertheless the phrase is clearly a definition of an object by reference to its 
function or properties.‖) 
248 Id. (―On the conclusion we reach, namely that the claim is not limited to flip-over, it is now accepted 
that the Contour bed falls within claim 1.‖) 
249
 CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See also, K-2 Corp. v. 
Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).("[T]he ordinary and accustomed meaning of a 
disputed claim term is presumed to be the correct one…") Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Zebco 
Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, (Fed. Cir. 1999). (The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be 
given their ordinary and accustomed meaning.") 
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element of the alleged infringement nonetheless falls within the meaning of 
the element when read purposively. This is not because there is a doctrine of 
equivalents: it is because that is the fair way to read the claim in context.‖250 
The patentee‘s purpose is collected not only from the use of express terms,251 
but also from the necessary implications arising from the patent documents, 
such as the potential use of the invention‖.252 Necessary implications are 
implications needed to prevent defeating obvious purposes of the legal text.
253
 
If any clear indication of patentee‘s intent is to be found, effect must be given 
to it. In patent claims, the choice of words could create an implication that 
they are essential to the invention, though not expressly stated.
254
 For example, 
the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that the identification of essential 
elements is made according to the intent of the inventor, ―expressed or inferred 
from the claims.‖255  The Court emphasized that a patent must be read by a 
―mind willing to understand‖, which ―necessarily pays close attention to the 
purpose and intent of the author.‖256 In the Flag and Flagpole case, the 
                                                        
250 Ancon Ltd. v. ACS Stainless Steel Fixings Ltd., [2009] EWCA Civ 498.   
251 Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc.,405 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) at 1374 (―words or 
expressions of manifest exclusion or explicit disclaimers in the specification are necessary to disavow 
claim scope.‖) (quoting Housey Pharms., Inc. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
252 Gold & Durell, supra note 217. Using the purposive approach via the skilled reader allows an evolution 
of patents‘ version of the reasonable person; there is ―no one better placed than a skilled reader to truly 
understand the implication of a patent and to be able to assess its scope.‖  
253 Morell E. Mullins, Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 9 (2000). 
254 Catherine Colston & Kirsty Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law 185 (2005). The authors 
summarized that purposive construction of a claim allows a court to ―interpret a word in it in the light of 
the function it was intended to serve…concentrating on the essentiality of the language chosen by the 
patentee to achieving the function of that integer as part of the invention.‖ E.g., Free World Trust v. Électro 
Santé Inc. et al.(2001) 9 C.P.R. (4th) 168 (Canada). 
255 Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc. et al.(2001) 9 C.P.R. (4th) 168 (Canada). See also, Easton Sports 
Canada Inc. v. Bauer Hockey Corp., (2011) FCA 83, the Court reproduced the summary of claim 
construction propositions set out at para. 31 of Free World Trust. (―(iv) according to the intent of the 
inventor, expressed or inferred from the claims, that a particular element is essential irrespective of its 
practical effect.‖) 
256 Generics [UK] Ltd (t/a Mylan) vs. Yeda Research and Development Co Ltd & Anor [2012] EWHC 
1848 (Pat), quoting Binnie J‘s judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Whirpool Corp vs. Camco 
Inc [2001] FSR 46 at [49(c)] 
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Supreme Court of Appeal of Africa also used the context of implication in the 
discussion of claim construction: 
It is plain from a consideration of claim 3, read with the claims preceding it, 
that claim 1 is not confined to what counsel referred to as a ‗unitary pole‘. 
Claim 2 can only be construed as referring to a pole with at least two 
constituents - a non-flexible base and a tapered, flexible, fibreglass top. 
Moreover, claim 3 contemplates a pole in which the tapered section is ‗integral 
with the pole‘. The necessary implication is that claim 1 includes, within its 
scope, a multi-component pole.
257
 
The ultimate question of the purposive approach is ―what does the word or 
phrase actually mean, when construed purposively?‖258 In Rockwater Ltd v. 
Technip France SA,
259
 Jacob LJ in the UK Court of Appeal followed the 
purposive approach to ascertain the inventor‘s purpose from the description 




You learn the inventor‘s purpose by understanding his technical contribution 
from the specification and drawings. You keep that purpose in mind when 
considering what the terms of the claim mean. You choose a meaning consistent 
with that purpose – even if that involves a meaning which, acontextually, you 
                                                        
257  Vari-Deals 101 (Pty) Ltd v. Sunsmart Products (Pty) Ltd [2007] SCA 123. ―It is plain from a 
consideration of claim 3, read with the claims preceding it, that claim 1 is not confined to what counsel 
referred to as a ‗unitary pole‘. Claim 2 can only be construed as referring to a pole with at least two 
constituents - a non-flexible base and a tapered, flexible, fibreglass top. Moreover, claim 3 contemplates a 
pole in which the tapered section is ‗integral with the pole‘.‖ 
258 Ancon Ltd. v. ACS Stainless Steel Fixings Ltd., [2009] EWCA Civ 498 (Court of Appeal June 16, 2009) 
(Jacob, J.) 
259 Rockwater Ltd v. Coflexip SA [2004] R.P.C. 46. Claim 1 of the patent defined a process by stating that 
the tensioning means comprised ―the last means for guiding the conduit at the level of the floating 
support‖. Claim 3 defined a device for operating the process claimed in claim 1, similarly with ―the said 
tensioning means comprising the last means for guiding the flexible conduit on board the floating 
support.‖ 
260 Tickner v. Honda Motor Co Ltd, [2002] EWHC 8 (Pat) . 
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would not ascribe to the word or phrase.  
To gain a deeper understanding of the purposive approach to claim 
interpretation, the following section will discuss the purposive approach in the 
UK courts as an example. 
Section 2 The evolvement of purposive claim interpretation in U.K. 
courts 
The current English patent system is mainly governed by the U.K. Patent Act 
1977. The Act establishes a law of patents applicable to future patents and 
applications for patents, and gives effect to certain international conventions on 
patents, such as the European Patent Convention (EPC).
261
 Section 125 of the 
Patent Act 1977 provides that the Protocol on the interpretation of Article 69 of 
the Convention shall apply for the purposes of §125(1), stating that ―the extent 
of the protection conferred by a European patent or a European patent 
application shall be determined by the terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the 
description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims.‖262 The intact 
General Principles of Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC are as 
follows:  
Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that the extent of the protection 
conferred by a European patent is to be understood as that defined by the strict, 
                                                        
261 The preamble of the 1977 Act declares that it was passed to ―establish a new law of patents applicable 
to future patents and applications for patents; to amend the law of patents applicable to existing patents 
and applications for patents; to give effect to certain international conventions on patents; and for 
connected purposes.‖ The European Patent Convention (EPC) provides the legal backbone for its 
patenting practice. The European Patent Office (EPO) offers a uniform application procedure leading to 
patent protection in up to 40 European countries. European Patent Convention (EPC 1973) 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/contents.html (last visited, March 3, 2010).   
262 Section 125 (1), The Patents Act 1977, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf (last visited, 
Nov.28, 2009). 
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literal meaning of the wording used in the claims, the description and drawings 
being employed only for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity found in the 
claims. Nor should it be taken to mean that the claims serve only as a guideline 
and that the actual protection conferred may extend to what, from a consideration 
of the description and drawings by a person skilled in the art, the patent 
proprietor has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a 
position between these extremes which combines a fair protection for the patent 
proprietor with a reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties.
263
 
The English patent legislation explicitly provided that claims performed 
the role of determining the scope of patent protection.
264
 The UK Court is 
clearly mindful of the desirability of consistency of practice across Europe, and 
takes due account of the way that the courts of other EPC Contracting States and 
the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office (EPO) interpret these 
provisions.
265
 Under the previous British Patent Act 1949, a test called ―pith 
and marrow‖ was developed, which favored a literal and narrow claim 
construction.
266
 The old rule for claim construction under previous law was 
outlined by Lord Porter in Electric and Musical Industries Ltd v. Lissen Ltd: 
267
  
If the claims have a plain meaning in themselves [emphasis supplied], then 
                                                        
263 Article 1, General Principles, Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the Convention, adopted at 
the Munich Diplomatic Conference for the setting up of a European System for the Grant of Patents on 
5 October 1973 (as revised by the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000). 
264 David J. Brennan, The Evolution of English Patent Claims as Property Definers, 4 Intellectual 
Property Quarterly, 361(2005). 
265 UK Patent Act 1977, Practice notices, 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/p-law/p-pn/p-pn-subjectmatter.htm (last visited, Nov.28, 
2009). 
266 ―Pith and marrow‖ is a phrase invented by Lord Cairns in Clark v. Adie (1877) 2 App Cas 315, 320; 
According to the House of Lords rulings of Kirin-Amgen: ―The pith and marrow doctrine was always a bit 
vague (―necessary to prevent sharp practice‖ said Lord Reid in C Van Der Lely NV v Bamfords Ltd [1963] 
RPC 61, 77) and it was unclear whether the courts regarded it as a principle of construction or an extension 
of protection outside the claims.‖ See also Anna Zavagnin, The Patent Scope in the U.S. and in the U.K.: 
Doctrine of Equivalents versus Catnic/ Improver Test, 1 Erasmus Law and Economics Review 
165-205(2004).  
267 Electric and Musical Industries Ltd v Lissen Ltd [1938]56 RPC, 23, 57. 
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advantage cannot be taken of the language used in the body of the Specification 
to make them mean something different. 
The court using this test looks at the literal wording of the claim, which is 
generally regarded as ―fence post‖ interpretation. 268 This fence-post approach 
regards words of a claim as a sort of conceptual ―fence‖ that marks the edge of 
the patentee‘s rights, and whatever is not claimed is considered ―disclaimed‖.269 
To become more consistent with the Article 69 of the EPC and its Protocol, the 
UK courts abandoned the old test, and began to replace pure literal 
interpretation with purposive construction of claims, which involves some 
departure from the literal reading of words in the claims.  
The purposive approach was established in the seminal decision of the 
House of Lords in Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd
270
 in 1982. In this 
case, the defendant‘s lintel involved a rear support member extending six 
degrees off ―vertically‖—the limiting word used in the claim by the patentee. 
Lord Diplock found that it would be obvious to a skilled person in the art that 
the patentee did not intend to make exact verticality. 
The question in each case is: whether persons with practical knowledge and 
experience of the kind of work in which the invention was intended to be used, 
would understand that strict compliance with a particular descriptive word or 
                                                        
268 Electrical and Musical Industries v. Lissen [1939] 56 RPC 23.(Lord Russell) (―what is not claimed is 
disclaimed‖)Thomas K. McBride, Jr., Patent Practice in London - Local Internationalism: How Patent 
Law Magnifies the Relationship of the United Kingdom with Europe, the United States, and the Rest of the 
World, 2 Loy. Int'l L. Rev. 31 (2005). Matthew Fisher, New Protocol, Same Old Story? Patent Claim 
Construction in 2007; Looking Back with a View to the Future, 2 I. P. Q., 133-162 (2008). The author 
concluded that the UK courts have a natural predilection to according the wording of the claim its literal 
meaning. 
269 Burk & Lemley, supra note 5. 
270 Catnic Components Ltd and another v. Hill and Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183. 
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phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an essential 
requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside the monopoly 




In Improver v. Remington,
272
 Hoffmann J formulated Lord Diplock‘s 
approach in Catnic into three questions. They have subsequently become 
known as the ―Improver Questions‖, which were re-named by the Court of 
Appeal as the ―Protocol Questions‖ in Wheatley v. Drillsafe.273 The Protocol 
Questions are: 
(i) Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? If 
yes, the variant falls outside the claim. If no:- 
(ii) Would this fact (ie that the variant has no material effect) have been obvious 
to the skilled person at the date of publication of the patent? If no, the variant falls 
outside the claim. If yes:- 
(iii) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the 
language of the claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the 
primary meaning was an essential requirement of the invention? If yes, the 
variant is outside the claim. If no, then the variant falls within the scope of the 
claim. 
It is important to note that the answers to the first two questions are not 
conclusive, and the third question asks whether the skilled person might still 
                                                        
271 Catnic Components Ltd and another v. Hill and Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183.  
272 Improver Corporation v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd [1990] F. S. R. 181. A variant is a feature 
embodied in the alleged infringing product which is not within the literal or contextual meaning of a 
descriptive word or phrase in the claim. 
273 Wheatley v. Drillsafe Ltd [2001] RPC 7. 
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exclude the variant from the scope of protection even if it works in obviously 
the same way as the patented invention.
274
 ―The Protocol Questions have been 
widely applied by the English courts over 15 years as a method of patent claim 
construction.
275
 It has been commented that: ―there ought to be little difficulty 
in ... construing a claim. In fact, this is not so.... At present, in the aftermath of 
Catnic, the area of uncertainty is very large.‖ 276 In PLG Research Ltd v. Ardon 
International,
277
 the Court of Appeal casted the first doubt on the otherwise 
accepted Catnic/Improver approach, and stated that the construction of patent 
claims should be based on the Protocol on Interpretation of Article 69 of the 
EPC rather than the Protocol Questions.
278
 But the courts in a series of cases
279
 
declared that the comments of the Court of Appeal in PLG v. Ardon were 
irrelevant to the court‘s final decision and therefore obiter dictum. They 
continued to confirm that the Protocol Questions accorded with the Protocol.  
                                                        
274 Improver Corporation v. Remington Consumer Product Limited [1990] F.S.R. at 192. Hoffman J. 
added the following perspective on these questions at p. 190 [of the Improver decision]: ―Even a purposive 
construction of the language of the patent may lead to the conclusion that although the variant made no 
material difference and this would have been obvious at the time, the patentee for some reason was 
confining his claim to the primary meaning and excluding the variant. If this were not the case, there would 
be no point in asking the third question at all.‖ 
275 Rich & James, supra note 216. 
276 Blanco White, Patents for Inventions 15 (1983).) 
277 PLG Research Ltd v. Ardon International Ltd (1995) F.S.R. 116, [1995] R.P.C. 287. Comments see 
Gordon D. Harris, Trends in U.K. Patent Litigation: The Age of Reason? 21 E.I.P.R. 254-263 (1999); 
Catherine Colston, Principles of Intellectual Property Law 21(1999); Yu, supra note 22, 92. 
278 Canon v. GCC [1995]1 H.K.C.729; Judge Rogers stated: ― ... no more than that a sensible and proper 
interpretation of the claims as defining the scope of the invention claimed as part of a document which 
describes and claims the invention should be given. In my view, the 1977 Act, art 69 and the Protocol, 
when taken together, are really saying the same thing as Lord Russell said in EMI v. Lissen Ltd (1939) 56 
RPC 23 at p 39 onwards. Although it has often been said that there was no majority of the House of Lords 
in favor of Lord Russell‘s view, it seems to me that his approach is, in reality, the sensible approach to the 
question of construing a specification.‖ In EMI v. Lissen, 56 RPC 23, 39 (H.L.) (Eng.), Lord Russell said as 
follows: ―The function of the claims is to define clearly and with precision the monopoly claimed, so that 
others may know the exact boundaries of the area within which they will be trespassers. Their primary 
object is to limit and not to extend the monopoly. What is not claimed is disclaimed …A patentee who 
describes an invention in the body of a specification obtains no monopoly unless it is claimed in the claims. 
As Lord Cairns said, there is no such thing as infringement of the equity of a patent (Dudgeon v. Thomson 
LR 3 App Cas 34).‖ 
279 Assidoman Multiplack Ltd v. Mead Corp [1995] F.S.R. 225; Kastner v. Rizla Limited [1995] RPC 585; 
Beloit Technologies Inc v. Valmet Paper Machinery Inc [1995] RPC 705; Warheit v. Olympia Tools Ltd 
[2002] EWCA Civ. 1161(CA). 
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However, the threefold, structured questions have been criticized as 
inappropriate particularly in relation to fast developing technologies.
280
 Facing 
the difficulties, on October 21, 2004, the House of Lords issued a significant 
judgment in the Kirin-Amgen v. TKT case
281
 to address the important principles 
of patent claim construction. Lord Hoffmann noted that the judge at the first 
instance had erroneously re-analyzed the question of ―non-literal‖ infringement 
by applying the Protocol Questions. Affirming that the universally applicable 
bedrock of patent construction was the principle of purposive construction of 
patent claims, Lord Hoffmann held that the Protocol questions were not to be 
treated as legal rules, to be followed rigidly at all times: 
When speaking of the ‗Catnic principle‘ it is important to distinguish between, on 
the one hand, the principle of purposive construction which I have said gives 
effect to the requirements of the Protocol, and on the other hand, the guidelines 
for applying that principle to equivalents, which are encapsulated in the Protocol 
questions. The former is the bedrock of patent construction, universally 




Lord Hoffmann further held that there was only one compulsory question 
that the Court must ask: ―What would a person skilled in the art have 
understood the patentee to have used the language of the claim to mean?‖283 
According to Lord Hoffmann, once this question had been answered, the 
                                                        
280 P. Oliver, Kastner v. Rizla: Too far, Too fast, 18 E.I.P.R. 28 (1996); P. Mole, Beauty and the Beast: The 
Festo Case and the New Protocol to Article 69 EPC, 25 E. I. P. R. 40–45 (2003); H. Dunlop, Court of 
Appeal Gets to Grips with the Protocol, 25 E.I.P.R. 342 (2003); Matthew Fisher, supra note 268; Turner, 
supra note 245. 
281 Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd and others [2004] UKHL 46. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
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judge‘s task was complete. The judgment of Kirin-Amgen is an impressive step 
in patent claim construction evolution. It clarifies that the Protocol Questions 
may not always be instructive, and a patent‘s claims should cover what the 
person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to have used the 
language of the claims to mean.
284
   
 
In the 2005 post-Amgen case Mayne Pharma v. Pharmacia,
285
 Lord 
Justice Jacob applied the new test and provided a ―practical working guide‖, 
also well known as the Technip Principles, to the construction of patents, 
repeating the essential principles of purposive construction laid down by Lord 
Hoffmann. The Technip Principles were refined by Justice Pumfrey in 
Halliburton Energy Service v. Smith International.
286
 In 2009, Lord Justice 
Jacob further amended the Technip Principles in Virgin v. Premium Aircraft 
287
 
by using the language of the EPC 2000.
288
 An abbreviated version of them is as 
follows: 
                                                        
284 Simon Thorley et al., Terrell on the Law on Patents (16th ed., 2006). See also, Phillip Johnson, 
Publication Review: Terrell on the Law of Patents, 29 E.I.P.R. 76 (2007). 
285 Mayne Pharma Pty Limited v. Pharmacia Italia SpA [2005] EWCA Civ 137. Jacob LJ. gave the leading 
judgment and referred to the list of principles of patent construction he had given in Rockwater Ltd v. 
Technip France SA [2004] EWCA Civ 381., noting that his list had been approved, save for one minor 
matter, by the House of Lords in Amgen. Omitting the one minor matter from the list, he recited the 
principles once again, and suggested it would generally be sufficient to use his summary as a ―practical 
working guide‖.   
286 Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. Smith International (North Sea) Limited, Smith International, Inc., 
Smith International Italia SpA [2006] R.P.C. 2, [2005] EWHC 1623. See also, Cranway Ltd v. Playtech 
Ltd & Ors [2009] EWHC 1588 (Pat) cite as [2010] FSR 10.  
287 Virgin v. Premium Aircraft [2009] EWCA Civ 1062, [2010] RPC 8 (―One might have thought there 
was nothing more to say on this topic after Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel [2005] RPC 9 RPC 9. 
The judge accurately set out the position, save that he used the old language of Art 69 EPC rather than that 
of the EPC 2000, a Convention now in force. The new language omits the terms of from Art. 69. No one 
suggested the amendment changes the meaning. We set out what the judge said, but using the language of 
the EPC 2000.‖); 
288 The old language of Article 69 provided that ―the extent of protection conferred by a European patent 
or a European patent application shall be determined by the terms of the claims.‖ The new language omits 
the terms of from Article 69 of the EPC 2000, a convention that entered into force on 13 December, 2007. 
See, the European Patent Convention, Article 69 Extent of protection, Amended by the Act revising the 
European Patent Convention of 29.11.2000, 
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2010/e/ar69.html (last visited, July 29, 2011) 
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(i) The first overarching principle is that contained in Article 69 of the European 
Patent Convention;  
(ii) Article 69 says that the extent of protection is determined by the claims. It 
goes on to say that the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the 
claims. In short the claims are to be construed in context. 
(iii) It follows that the claims are to be construed purposively—the inventor's 
purpose being ascertained from the description and drawings. 
(iv) It further follows that the claims must not be construed as if they stood 
alone—the drawings and description only being used to resolve any ambiguity. 
Purpose is vital to the construction of claims. 
(v) When ascertaining the inventor's purpose, it must be remembered that he may 
have several purposes depending on the level of generality of his invention. 
Typically, for instance, an inventor may have one, generally more than one, 
specific embodiment as well as a generalised concept. But there is no 
presumption that the patentee necessarily intended the widest possible meaning 
consistent with his purpose be given to the words that he used: purpose and 
meaning are different. 
(vi) Thus purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day 
concerned with the meaning of the language used. Hence the other extreme of the 
Protocol—a mere guideline—is also ruled out by Article 69 itself. It is the terms 
of the claims which delineate the patentee's territory. 
(vii) It follows that if the patentee has included what is obviously a deliberate 
limitation in his claims, it must have a meaning. One cannot disregard obviously 
intentional elements.  
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(vii) It also follows that where a patentee has used a word or phrase which, 
acontextually, might have a particular meaning (narrow or wide) it does not 
necessarily have that meaning in context.  
(vii) It further follows that there is no general "doctrine of equivalents."  
(viii) On the other hand purposive construction can lead to the conclusion that a 
technically trivial or minor difference between an element of a claim and the 
corresponding element of the alleged infringement nonetheless falls within the 
meaning of the element when read purposively. This is not because there is a 
doctrine of equivalents: it is because that is the fair way to read the claim in 
context. 
(ix) Finally purposive construction leads one to eschew the kind of meticulous 
verbal analysis which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge. 
 It has been observed that the Protocol Questions are now much less used 
by the English courts.
 289 
The one compulsory question from Kirin-Amgen is 




                                                        
289 Brian Whitehead et al., Patent Construction after Amgen: Are Patent Claims Construed More Widely 
or Narrowly than Previously? 1 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 332 (2006).  
290 E.g. Siemens Schweiz AG v. Thorn Security Limited [2007] EWHC 2242 (Ch) (―The approach I should 
adopt to construction is that set out by Pumfrey J in Halliburton v Smith [2005] EWHC 1623‖); Intervet 
UK Limited v Merial & Others, [2010] EWHC 294 (Pat) (―The task for the court when construing a patent 
claim is to determine what the person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to have been 
using the language of the claim to mean: see Kirin Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2004] 
UKHL 46, [2005] RPC 9 at [30]-[35]. In that case the list of principles to be found in the judgment of 
Jacob LJ in Technip France SA‘s Patent [2004] EWCA Civ 381, [2004] RPC 46 at [41] was approved 
subject to one point.‖) Cephalon Inc & Ors v Orchid Europe Ltd & Ors [2011] EWHC 1591 (Pat) (―The 
approach to construction is not in dispute. It is as stated by Lord Hoffmann in Kirin Amgen v TKT [2005] 
RPC 9. The task for the court is to determine what a person skilled in the art would have understood the 
patentee to have used the language of the claim to mean. In Virgin v Premium Aircraft [2009] EWCA Civ 
1062, [2010] RPC 8 at [5], Jacob LJ said this, approving a summary by Lewison J of the applicable 
principles.‖) Schenck Rotec GmbH v. Universal Balancing Limited [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat) and Smith & 
Nephew Plc v Convatec Technologies Inc [2012] EWHC 1602 (Pat) (―The leading authority is Kirin 
Amgen v TKT [2005] RPC 9. The key point is that construction is concerned with what a reasonable person 
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Section 3 Problems with the purposive approach in the UK courts   
The shift from a literal approach to a purposive approach is an attempt to keep in 
line with the provisions of the EPC, which is intended to balance the interests of 
the public with those of the inventors. Since Kirin-Amgen, all turns on what 
Lord Hoffmann called the compulsory question: what would a person skilled in 
the art have understood the patentee to have used the language of the claim to 
mean? Purposive construction is interested in discovering how the patentee‘s 
point of view (which is objectively evaluated by a PHOSITA) influences claim 
texts. It encourages interpreters to understand and explain how the patentee 
considered and communicated his ideas at the time of filing. The patent claim 
can also be interpreted purposively so as to avoid absurdity. For example, the 
Singapore High Court took the purposive approach in Ng Kok Cheng v. Chua 
Say Tiong.
291
 One disputed claim of the patented invention was ―a door lock 
comprises: …an outer casing enclosing the main body.‖ The Singapore High 
Court noted that ―the dictionary meaning of a particular word is not necessarily 
its meaning when it is used in a patent,‖ and to give such an interpretation 
―would lead to an absurd result because if the main body was fully enclosed, the 
key cylinders would be inaccessible, the shackle bar would not be able to pass 
through the auxiliary body and into the main body and the rod would not be 
disposed between the two bodies.‖ Therefore, although the dictionary meaning 
indicated that the main body must be fully enclosed by the outer casing, the 
judge concluded that it was clear that in the context of the patent, the outer 
                                                                                                                                                 
would understand the author to be using the words to mean. Guidelines on the general approach were 
given by the Court of Appeal in Virgin Atlantic v Premium Aircraft [2010] FSR 10.‖) 
291 Ng Kok Cheng v. Chua Say Tiong [2001] 3 SLR 487; [2001] SGHC 143; Suit 783/2000 (22 Jun 
2001). 
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casing was not intended to fully enclose the main body.  
Although the purposive approach results in many benefits, it has some 
conceptual difficulties in centralizing the role of patentee‘s purpose in 
determining claim meaning.  
A. Sometimes the intent is not clear. First, it may well be that the 
expression of intent is not clear. Interpreters often disagree over the central 
question: ―Is this meaning implied or is it not?‖ 292 , reaching different 
outcomes. Under the purposive approach, it is necessary that a practical 
purpose for describing and demarcating the boundary should be found.
293
 
However, the language used in patent claims is generally more technical and 
sometimes more obscure than everyday language,
294
 and claim drafters often 
make the definitions of the claims terms as broad as possible,
295
 which leaves 
it hard to precisely determine the intent of the patentees. Sometimes patentees 
use descriptive language to mark the outer boundary of a category of inventive 
things that ―extends well beyond the specific embodiments of an invention 
that the inventor discloses‖,296 and sometimes a patent may, for one reason or 
                                                        
292 E.D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation 89 (1967).(―… the crucial issue-the problem of implication. Of 
course, this problem is not itself more important than a good many others in hermeneutic theory, but when 
our central concern is validity we always have to ask whether a particular meaning is or is not implied by 
an utterance.‖) 
293 Duncan Curley & Hiroshi Sheraton, The Lords Rule in Amgen v TKT, 27 E.I.P.R.154-158 (2005). See 
also, Convatec Ltd. and others v Smith & Nephew Healthcare Ltd and Others [2011] EWHC 2039 (Pat) 
(2011) ("Finally I remind myself that it is always important to bear in mind that the skilled person reads the 
specification in light of the common general knowledge and appreciating that its purpose is to describe and 
demarcate an invention, that is to say a practical idea for a new product or process.") 
294 Alan L. Durham, Patent Law Essentials: A Concise Guide 21 (2004). 
295 David Pressman, Patent It Yourself: Your Step-by-Step Guide to Filing at the U.S. Patent Office 203 
(2011). 
296 Collins, supra note 40. 
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another, claim less than it teaches or enables.
297
  
Since the intent is often debatable and the use of prosecution history files 
as an aid to construction is prohibited in UK,
298
 the search for what the 
patentees would have meant may often be replaced by what seems optimal for 
the detached hypothetical person.
299
 Where the intent is not clear, the court has 
to ―make its best estimate of the skilled person‘s best estimate of what the 
patentee intended in relation to a situation which it never contemplated.‖300 
Then there is concern that whether modern interpreter‘s reconstruction of the 
estimated, ideal and hypothetical intent in a historical context is merely a 
reflection of his own concerns. Lawyers and patent practitioners are concerned 
that ―in most cases (including virtually all mechanical patents), provided the 
courts have agreed on the nature of the invention, the outcome will be the same 
irrespective of whether the Improver or Amgen approach is adopted.‖301 Lord 
Hoffmann also conceded in Kirin-Amgen that:  
No doubt there will be patent lawyers who are dismayed at the notion that the 
Protocol questions do not provide an answer in every case. They may feel cast 
adrift on a sea of interpretative uncertainty. But that is the fate of all who have to 
                                                        
297 Occlutech GmbH v. AGA Medical Corp [2010] EWCA (Civ) 702. 
298 Occlutech GmbH v. AGA Medical Corp [2010] EWCA (Civ) 702. Courts in Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom prohibit the use of file wrappers as an aid to construction. 
299 One might analogize to the objective theory of contract interpretation, which holds that ―the intentions 
of the parties to a contract or alleged contract are to be ascertained from their words and conduct rather 
than their unexpressed intentions.‖  Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract 
Formation and Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 427 (2000). The author articulated that ―the reason for 
the persistence of objective approaches can be found in the legal profession's distrust of the testimony of 
parties. This distrust resulted in court-imposed rules forbidding party testimony starting in the sixteenth 
century. When legislatures overturned these rules in the nineteenth century, the profession, acting through 
the courts, made party testimony of intention irrelevant, giving birth to the modern objective theory.‖ See 
also, Catherine Mitchell, Interpretation of Contracts: Current controversies in law 49 (2007). ―Evidently 
the personal idiosyncrasies and motives of the parties are not a feature to be taken into account, but 
beyond that, it is not clear what precisely is included and excluded by the reference to ―a reasonable 
person, circumstanced as the actual parties were.‖ 
300 Turner, supra note 245. 
301 Whitehead et al, supra note 289. 
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understand what people mean by using language.
302 
B. Sometimes there are several possible purposes found in the claims. ―A 
claim is an abstraction and generalization of an indefinitely large number of 
concrete, physical objects.‖303 Depending on the level of generality of the 
invention, there may be more than one single purpose found in the claim text.
304
 
Some interpreters employing the purposive method are willing to find the 
objective intent of the patentee at a more abstract level, and thereby seldom 
conclude that the patentee wants to confine the meaning of his claim: ―Of 
course in this exercise you must also be fair to the patentee – and in particular 
must not take too narrow a view of his purpose – it is the widest purpose 
consistent with his teaching which should be used for purposive 
construction.‖305 Some scholars advocated ―broader and more comprehensive 
articulation‖ of purposive approach in the hope of inferring patentee‘s intent 
from the underlying purposes of the patent legislation, like encouraging new 
and useful inventions.
306
 Such an approach is more policy-based, because the 
                                                        
302 Kirin-Amgen, Inc.et al. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.et al. [2004] UKHL 46. 
303 Peter D. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals 39 (1975); See also, Collins, supra note 40. (―In fact, 
courts often use scope in a fashion that makes it synonymous with word meaning. ―[T]he full scope of [a 
term‘s] ordinary meaning‖ is, and is nothing more than, the term‘s ordinary word meaning… This concept 
of the scope of a peripheral claim is the claim‘s meaning-scope.…Thing-scope measures the size of the set 
of distinct things described by the claim. The larger the set is, the broader the thing-scope of the claim.‖) 
See also, Chiang, supra note 129. 
304 Rockwater Ltd v. Coflexip SA [2004] R.P.C. 46. (―The inventor might have several purposes depending 
on the level of generality of his invention. Typically, he might have one or more specific embodiments as 
well as a generalized concept. To be fair to the inventor, it was the latter which mattered when construing 
the claims, particularly the widest claim.‖) Smith & Nephew Plc v. Convatec Technologies Inc [2012] 
EWHC 1602 (Pat) (―I remind myself that claims are not construed alone or in the abstract but in their 
context in the specification; that purposive construction is vital (there may be several purposes and several 
embodiments) and that one is in the end concerned with the meaning of the language used.‖)  See also, 
Twining & Miers, supra note 15, 256. (―One should not be misled into thinking that to adopt a purposive 
approach necessarily means that there is a single purpose to be found, or that different judges will agree on 
what purpose(s) of a disputed provision might be.‖) 
305 In Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and Others [2004] UKHL 46, Lord 
Hoffmann explained, ―If, when speaking of the widest purpose … I would respectfully disagree. There is 
no presumption about the width of the claims. A patent may, for one reason or another, claim less than it 
teaches or enables.‖ 
306 M. Sajewycz, Patent Claim Interpretation as It Should Be: Promoting the Objects of the Patent Act, 13 
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construction of the patentee‘s objective intent to some extent contributes to the 
realization of the goals and values of patent law. However, although the patent 
systems in different jurisdictions serve the general purposes, for example, ―the 
provision of a reward system for those who invest in technological and 
scientific progress,‖307 there are various underlying sub-goals of the patent 
system.
308
 As there can be different interpretations of purposes, different 




Some interpreters are reluctant to generalize the meanings of the claims 
beyond their primary meaning, and consequently often find a restricted 
intention.
310
 Compared to the broad purposive construction, the followers of 
the restrictive purposive interpretation value a relatively higher degree of 
certainty and predictability in claim construction.
311
 They ask whether the 
patentee intended strict adherence to claim limitations. This indicates that a 
                                                                                                                                                 
C.I.P.R 173 (1996). Further discussed by Alex Wellington in The Metes and Bounds of Purposive Claim 
Construction in Canadian Patent Law, 18 I.P.J. 31(2004). 
307 Rob J. Aerts, The Legitimacy of Patent Law-Making in Europe and the US - A Tentative Comparison, 
38 Int'l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Comp. L. 165-182 (2007). 
308  Christian Von Drathen, Patent Scope in English and German Law under the European Patent 
Convention 1973 and 2000, 39 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
384-419 (2008). For instance, the scope of patent protection should provide fairness to the patentee and a 
reasonable degree of certainty for third parties. Here ―fairness‖ means protection of the complete inventive 
teaching, and ―certainty‖ is referred to its perceptibility by an objective and benevolent third party. 
309 Sherman, supra note 5. (―the interesting feature of these decisions is that with fixed subject matter - 
that is, the patent and the infringing article - being interpreted in the light of identical (or very similar) 
laws, the cases can be read like a controlled experiment in legal interpretation.‖); See also, John P. Hatter, 
Jr, Comment, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Litigation: An Analysis of the Epilady Controversy, 
5 Ind. Int‘l & Comp. L. Rev. 461 (describing differing results obtained by British and German courts 
considering alleged infringement of the same product).   
310 Sherman, supra note 5. See also, Turner, supra note 245. The author commented that this narrow 
interpretation ―is regarded as a rather complex way of asserting the primacy of the claim language.‖ 
311 One might analogize to the objective theory of contract interpretation, which holds that ―the intentions 
of the parties to a contract or alleged contract are to be ascertained from their words and conduct rather 
than their unexpressed intentions.‖  Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract 
Formation and Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 427 (2000). The author articulated that ―the reason for 
the persistence of objective approaches can be found in the legal profession's distrust of the testimony of 
parties. This distrust resulted in court-imposed rules forbidding party testimony starting in the sixteenth 
century. When legislatures overturned these rules in the nineteenth century, the profession, acting through 
the courts, made party testimony of intention irrelevant, giving birth to the modern objective theory.‖ 
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general intention derived from the claims can seldom overcome linguistic 
limits.  
Compared with the broad, open reading of patent claims in other 
jurisdictions, 
312
 the UK courts were traditionally more likely to give a narrow 
reading.
313
  In Occlutech GmbH v. AGA Medical Corp,
314
 the UK Court of 
Appeal used the purposive construction and searched for the intent of the 
patentee principally by analyzing the semantics and syntax of the patent claim 
texts. The Court intensively discussed the use of the disputed claim term 
―clamps‖ in paragraph [0025] and paragraph [0026] of the patent. The Court 
found that since the patentee has made distinction between ―clamps‖ and 
―alternatives to clamps‖ in these paragraphs, the skilled person would see that 
he could do this in either of the two ways described.
315
 Hence, the skilled 
                                                        
312 Toshiko Takenaka, Claim Construction and the Extent of Patent Protection: a Comparative Analysis 
of the Phillips en banc Federal Court Decision, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 119-130 (2006). In a series of 
five Supreme Court decisions of 2002 (namely Schneidmesser I and II, Custodiol I and II and 
Kunststoffrohrteil), the Federal Supreme Court has reconfirmed the above principles of claim 
interpretation: ―The considerations to be applied by the person skilled in the art must be focused on the 
semantic content of the technical teaching protected in the patent claim such that the person skilled in the 
art takes into consideration the deviating embodiment with its modified means as the equivalent solution.‖ 
(Federal Supreme Court, Judgment of 12th March 2002, IIC 2003, 302-Kunststoffrohrteil (Plastic Tube 
Parts)) Epilady Germany II, abridged and translated in 24 I.I.C. 838, 839 (1993) (OLG 1991). 
313 E.g. Iain C. Baillie, Where Goes Europe? The European Patent, 58 J.P.O.S. 153,167(1976); Brian 
Turner, The German Formstein Case: An Alternative Harmony, 14 E.I.P.R. 181-183 (1992). Hugh Dunlop, 
Harmonizing the doctrine of equivalents, Managing Intellectual Property, February 2003, at 42-48; Mario 
Franzosi, Equivalence in Europe, 25 E.I.P.R 237-240 (2003). Improver Corp v. Remington Consumer 
Products Ltd [1990] F.S.R. 181. The patent in suit was a European patent, issued by the EPO and 
designated valid for a considerable number of contracting states including the UK and West Germany. The 
claims of the Epilady patent described a bent spring driven by a motor contained in a hand-held housing to 
achieve a hair plucking effect. In the allegedly infringing device, the bent spring was replaced by a bent 
hollow rubber tube in which circumferential slits had been cut, so as to achieve a similar effect to the 
windings of the Epilady spring. Improver Corp v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd [1990] F.S.R. 181. 
See also, Improver v. Raymond Industrial Ltd. [1990]1 HKLR 33;Improver v. Raymond Industrial Ltd. 
[1991] 1 HKLR 25. Hong Kong adopted the Catnic Questions and ultimately reached the same conclusion 
as his UK counterparts did, but gave fundamentally different answers to the three Catnic questions. 
Scholar comments see Tim J. Hancock, Hong Kong: European Patent—Law Applicable in Hong Kong, 
E.I.P.R. (1990), 12(12), D234-235.   
314 Occlutech v. AGA Medical Corp [2010] EWCA Civ 702. The patent claim in question required the 
metal strands of the occluder to be ―clamped with clamps at the opposed ends of the device‖. The device 
alleged to infringe – made by Occlutech – did not have clamps at each end of the device. Instead it 
consisted of a ―sock‖ of metal strands, with the loose ends of the strands being at only one end of the 
device. They were then held together by welding. 
315 Id. Paragraph [0025] of the description: ―…One method which has proven to be useful to prevent the 
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person would read the reference to plural form of ―clamps‖ as a distinctive and 
necessary feature of the invention.
316
 
C. Sometimes patentee uses a broad term encompassing variants that could 
not have been contemplated at the time of filing. 
Under the purposive approach, judges are bound to construe a claim as a 
―person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to be using the 
language of the claim to mean‖ at the time of filing.317 This approach pays 
close attention to the inventor‘s purpose conveyed by the claim text.318 
Therefore, claim meaning is constrained by how the patentees (from the 
perspective of a hypothetical person of skill in the art) would have applied the 
claim language to particular cases at the time of filing, if they had 
contemplated it. 
                                                                                                                                                 
braid from unravelling is to clamp the braid at two locations and cut the braid to leave a length of the 
braid having clamps (15 in Figure 2) at either end, thereby effectively defining an empty space within a 
sealed length of fabric. These clamps 15 will hold the ends of the cut braid together and prevent the braid 
from unravelling.‖ Paragraph [0026] of the description: ―Alternatively, one can solder, braze, weld or 
otherwise affix the ends of the desired length together (e.g. with a biocompatible cementitious organic 
material) before cutting the braid…‖ Occlutech GmbH v. AGA Medical Corp [2009] EWHC 2013 (Ch); 
Mann J held that ―The juxtaposition of paragraphs 0025 and 0026 demonstrate that the patentee has not 
provided a sort of dictionary definition of ―clamp‖. He has referred to clamps, and then referred to 
alternatives to clamps. I do not understand how this amounts to defining clamps to include those other ―not 
clamps‖ (as it were). ‖ 
316 Id. The Court repeated that ―the risk of any ambiguities due to careless wording of the patent 
specification must in principle lie with the patentee.‖ Therefore, the allegedly infringing product secured 
by welding rather than by the application of external clamps did not fall within the scope of protection. 
AGA Medical Corporation v. Occlutech GmbH, German Supreme Court, 10 May 2011, Case No. X ZR 
16/09. In Germany, for the same patent, the first instance court (the Düsseldorf Landgericht) and appeal 
court (the Düsseldorf Oberlandesgericht) reached the opposite conclusion from the UK courts. In their 
view the skilled person would appreciate that the function of the clamps was to hold together the ends of 
the metal strands. The Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court stated that although the claim ―describes 
configurations in which one clamp each is present at the proximal and at the opposed – distal – end. Yet the 
average skilled person will not content himself with this mere linguistic understanding.‖ However, the 
German Supreme Court finally held that there was no infringement under the literal or the doctrine of 
equivalents. The German Supreme Court found that welding, which did not use clamps, were not 
equivalent to clamps. 
317 Kirin-Amgen Inc and others (Respondents) v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and others [2004] 
UKHL 46, [2005] RPC 9. 
318 Mayne Pharma v. Pharmacia Italia [2005] EWCA Civ 137; Halliburton v Smith International [2005] 
EWHC 1623 (Pat) ―(c) It follows that the claims are to be construed purposively—the inventor‘s purpose 
being ascertained from the description and drawings.‖ 
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The problem with this approach is that it does not adequately explain the 
effect of technological changes on the construction of meaning. Patents 
involve new ideas in response to changes in technology,
319
 and patentees often 
claim the invention at a level of considerable abstraction and generality. As 
pointed out by Jacoba LJ in Mayne Pharma: ―(v) When ascertaining the 
inventor‘s purpose, it must be remembered that he may have several purposes 
depending on the level of generality of his invention. Typically, for instance, 
an inventor may have one, generally more than one, specific embodiment as 
well as a generalised concept.‖320 There is the possibility that the patentee used 
a general and abstract claim term but could not have envisaged the variations at 
the time of filing. Under such circumstance, judges must justify the interpretive 
outcome in concrete cases by explaining how it can be seen as the result of a 
justifiable reading of a claim term—whether the claim scope should encompass 
after-arising technologies or not. 
The UK courts acknowledge- the possibility of a patent scope covering 
an after-arising technology if the claim term is ―sufficiently general.‖321 The 
question to be asked is whether the person skilled in the art would understand 
the description in a way which was sufficiently general to include the new 
technology. But in fact, it would be hard to argue that a claim, upon its 
construction at the time of filing, could cover products or processes which 
involve the use of technology then unknown or not in existence. The result is 
                                                        
319 Lemley, supra note 7. (―In that case, the Court found that the meaning of the term ―bridge‖ in a 1790 
statute did not mean the same thing in 1860 after the development of railroad bridges. The term was the 
same, but its scope had changed over time in response to changes in technology.‖) 
320 Mayne Pharma Pty Ltd v Pharmacia Italia SpA [2005] EWCA Civ 137, ―But there is no presumption 
that the patentee necessarily intended the widest possible meaning consistent with his purpose be given to 
the words that he used: purpose and meaning are different.‖   
321 Id. at paras, 78-85. 
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that the UK courts tend to be rather ―narrow-minded‖ when it comes to the 
interpretation of claim terms: 
―What makes the issue of after-arising technology more difficult to cover in the 
English context is the fact that the skilled person is to construe the claim as on the 
date of the publication of the patent application. Therefore, such person does not 
have the benefit of the after-arising technology with which to construe such a 
claim and thereby to include a variant within its scope.‖
 322
 
When faced with unforeseeable technological changes, a gap of 
understanding has been created between the present and the past technological 
contexts. The reliance on the historical application of a claim text at the time 
of filing may be of little help in addressing new issues raised by technological 
advances. General and abstract claim terms give rise to competing meanings, 
and the development in factual knowledge would challenge the scope of the 
asserted claims. A more justifiable approach is needed to explain the effect of 
changing circumstances on the claim text. 
One will not be warranted in asserting that the purposive approach is the 
final answer to claim construction. The patentee‘s purpose alone is not a 
conclusive guide. But the Technip Principles definitely get one thing right, that 
is, ―Purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day 
concerned with the meaning of the language used.‖323 
                                                        
322 Nicholas Pumfrey et al., The Doctrine Of Equivalents in Various Patent Regimes--Does Anybody Have 
It. Right?, 11 Yale J.L. & Tech.261 (2009). 
323 Rockwater Ltd v Technip France SA [2004] EWCA Civ 381. 
  77 
 
CHAPTER 3 THE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH 
The previous two chapters discuss the conceptual and practical problems 
presented by the ordinary meaning approach and the purposive approach. This 
Chapter introduces the third approach to patent claim interpretation, namely, the 
constructive approach to claim interpretation. The constructive approach does 
not focus on the ordinary meaning of the claim text or what the patentee would 
have intended, but identifies the content of a claim based on an analysis of the 
problem/solution within the teaching of the invention. The understanding of a 
claim term is thus highly dependent on the function which the content fulfills 
in the invention. The similarities and differences between this approach and 
the other two approaches will be discussed. Comparatively speaking, the 
constructive approach is a less restrictive and more liberal form of claim 
construction. First, it prefers a description of pragmatic function to linguistic 
form. Second, it elaborates the significance of the invention in light of the 
prior art. Third, it involves using general legal principles such as the eclectic 
principle and the fairness principle to choose evidence or doctrines that best 
suit the question at hand. The problem of the constructive approach is that the 
scope of the claim can be unpredictable, which may afford inadequate 
protection to the public interest. Despite its imperfections, this Chapter 
summarizes a few useful ideas from this approach that can enhance our 
understanding of claim interpretation, such as the understanding of technical 
content in different contexts, as well as the necessity for a balance between 
preserving legal certainty and adapting the claim text to the changes of 
technology. 
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Section 1 Identifying content in patent claim on a problem/solution 
basis 
The constructive approach provides an alternative way of understanding claim 
meaning. It realizes that to obtain ordinary meaning or to grasp patentee‘s 
objective intent may be undesirable. Although these two notions are convenient 
when dealing with the meaning of legal language in general, they are not always 
helpful in resolving patent disputes because of the distinctiveness of the 
inventions and the rapid technological changes. Under the constructive 
approach, claim interpretation is to specify the content (opposed to linguistic 
expression) contained in a text
324
 by using the reference of a PHOSITA. The 
―content‖ or the ―subject matter‖325 of the patent claim is the technical feature 
of the invention, i.e., the content of the technical solution.
326
 The constructive 
approach has taken a less restrictive stance regarding the form of words and 
focuses on the function of a term from analysis of problem/solution of the 
                                                        
324Ferenc Kovács, Linguistic Structures and Linguistic Laws 203 (1971) (discussing ―the relation between 
content (meaning) and (linguistic) form‖); Edoardo Zamuner & David Kennedy Levy, Wittgenstein's 
Enduring Arguments 161 (2009) (―This is in line with a more general tendency, namely to employ the 
terms 'content' and 'meaning' interchangeably.‖) 
325 Duncan Bucknell, Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology and Chemical Inventions: World Protection and 
Exploitation 62 (2011) (―The technical content of the patent claims in China are treated as an integrated 
technical solution…it follows from the above, that in China patent claims are to be interpreted with 
reference to and based on the disclosure in the description and drawings as well as detailed consideration 
of the technical filed of the invention, including the prior art, its technical solutions, uses and effects.‖). See 
also, Uta Köster, The Interpretation of Patent Claims in Germany Legal Development and Current Case 
Law (2003) The author introduced the ―triple division theory‖ including the immediate subject matter 
(literal words), the subject matter and the general inventive thought. (―the judge in the infringement 
proceedings had primarily to deal with the interpretation of the investigated subject matter of the 
invention.‖) http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=23271 (Last visited Nov 26, 2012) 
326 Guidelines for Patent Examination 2010 (In accordance with the provisions of Rule 122 of the 
Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People‘s Republic of China, the previous Guidelines 
for Examination, which were promulgated on May 24, 2006 and entered into force on July 1, 2006, are 
revised. The revised Guidelines for Patent Examination are promulgated and shall enter into force on 
February 1, 2010), translated by State Intellectual Property Office of The People‘s Republic of 
China.(―Guidlines‖) Article 7.8: ―Examination According to Rule 19. The claims shall describe the 
technical features of the invention. The claims shall not contain any words or sentences that have no 
relation to the contents of the technical solution.‖) 




 Its goal is to ―define clearly the technical terms involved, as well 
as to elucidate the significance and consequence of the respective 
invention.‖328 
For example, in China, Article 59 of the 1984 Patent Law of the People‘s 
Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as China‘s Patent Law, ―CPL‖) 
stipulates that ―the scope of protection in the patent right for an invention or a 
utility model shall be determined by the contents of the patent claim. The 
specification and appended drawings may be used to interpret the contents of 
the patent claim.‖329 The wording is different from the CPL 2000 version 
stipulating that ―the specification and appended drawings may be used to 
interpret the patent claim.‖330 The contents of a claim shall be determined 
―according to the description of the claim and in consideration of the 
understanding of the claim by regular technicians in the same field after 
reading the specification and drawings‖,331 with full account taken of the 
                                                        
327 Alexander Harguth, Patents in Germany and Europe: Procurement, Enforcement and Defense: An 
International Handbook 176 (2011) (―That is, the patent claims are not limited to the strict literal meaning 
of the claim language. Rather, terms of the claims are interpreted to sufficiently cover the technical 
teaching as disclosed in the description.‖) 
328 Batteriekastenschnur [1989] GRUR 903, 904 (German Federal Supreme Court) ), 22 IIC 104 (1991) 
(―From these principles, this Court deduced that the interpretation of the patent claims serves not only to 
eliminate any ambiguities but also to define clearly the technical terms involved, as well as to elucidate the 
significance and consequence of the respective invention‖) 
329  Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted at the Fourth Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Sixth National People‘s Congress and promulgated by order No. 11 of the President of 
the People‘s Republic of China on March 12, 1984, and effective as of April 1, 1985, revised Dec 27, 
2008), Art. 59, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited July 31, 2011) (P.R.C.). According to Article 2 of 
the CPL, ―inventions-creations‖ include inventions, utility models and designs.  
330  Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted at the Fourth Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Sixth National People‘s Congress and promulgated by order No. 11 of the President of 
the People‘s Republic of  China on March 12, 1984, and effective as of April 1, 1985, revised 
Aug.25,2000), Art.56, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited July 31, 2011) (P.R.C.). Xu Yong Wei yu 
Ning Bo Shi Hua Tuo Tai Yang Neng Ke Ji You Xian Gong Si Qin Fan Fa Ming Zhuan Li Quan Jiu Fen 
An [Xu Yongwei vs. Ning Bo Hua Tuo Solar Energy Technology Co Ltd.] No. 64, Civil Case Review, 
Supreme People‘s Court (2011). The Supreme People‘s Court ruled in the case that the embodiments in 
the specifications should not be imported to limit the claim scope. 
331 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in 
the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court., Dec. 28, 
2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) , Art.2, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited June 20, 2011) 
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In the Batteriekastenschnur case
333
 the German Supreme Court 
explained its claim construction approach as follows: ―As this court first 
explained in its Formstein decision, subsequently in the decision Ionenanalyse, 
and most recently in its decision Schwermetalloxidationskatalysator, the 
decisive basis for establishing the scope of protection of a patent is, pursuant 
to section 14 of the 1981 Patent Act, the content of the claims, for the 
interpretation of which the description and drawings must be referred to.‘‘ The 
Court then cited the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 and stated: ‗‗In 
examining the question whether the patented invention is being used, it is 
therefore necessary to begin by establishing the content of the patent claims 
based on technical expertise.‖334 
In Formstein, the Federal Court of Justice confirmed that the principle set 
out in the Protocol also applies to German patents.
335
 Under the former 
German practice before the harmonization of interpretation of Article 69 EPC, 
patent claims were seen as guidelines in defining the general inventive 
                                                                                                                                                 
(P.R.C.)(hereinafter, ―Judicial Interpretation‖). According to the Guidelines, 2.4 Person Skilled in the Art, 
the ―regular technicians‖ means the person skilled in the art, a fictional person who is presumed to be 
aware of all the common technical knowledge and have access to all the technologies existing before the 
filling date or the priority date in the technical field to which the invention pertains, and have capacity to 
apply all the routine experimental means before that date. However, he is not presumed to have creativity. 
332 National Science and Technology Commission of China, Intellectual Property System in China 
(Bluebook No.7 on Science and Technology in China) (1992). The National Science and Technology 
Commission, now the Ministry of Science and Technology, provided an official overview of the 
intellectual property legal system in China in the form of a blue book. 
333  Batteriekastenschnur [1989] GRUR 903, 904 (German Federal Supreme Court) ), 22 IIC 104 
(1991).See also, Jonathan Radcliffe, Ulrich Worm, Mayer Brown in Current Patent Litigation Trends: UK 
and Germany, World Intellectual Property Report, 26 WIPR 40, 07/01/2012. 
334 Id.  
335 Formstein, BGH GRUR 1986, 803. See also, Pagenberg, New Trends in Patent Claim Interpretation 
in Germany - Good-bye to the "General Inventive Idea",26 IIC 228 (1995) 




 which is in contrast to the traditional UK approach where patent 
protection was strictly tied to the wording of the claims. The Protocol was 
intended to eliminate major discrepancies and provide a middle course 
between the UK and German traditions of interpretation to claims.
337
 While 
the UK courts began to adopt the purposive approach where the scope of 
protection can extend beyond its literal meaning to encompass variants of a 
claimed invention, the German courts have also made changes to be more in 
line with the Protocol and decided that the protection of a general inventive 
idea is no longer possible under the new law.
338
 However, the application of 
this provision in the national courts is far from uniform.
339
 The Epilady cases
340
 
illustrated how UK and German courts have reached conflicting outcomes 
related to identical European Patent claims: as a result of different claim 
interpretation,
341
 the patent was held to be infringed by the German courts, 
but not by the UK courts.
342
  
There are two reasons why German approach is different from the UK 
approach under the same legal provision. First of all, serving as written 
                                                        
336 Turner, supra note 245. 
337 Tanya Aplin & Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 716 (2013); See 
also, David Vaver, Lionel Bently, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Essays in Honour of 
William R. Cornish 99 (2004). (―The Protocol decreed that claims were not to be limited to the strict 
literal meaning of their words, a repudiation of the deemed United Kingdom approach, but, also, were 
not to be viewed as merely a guideline, a repudiation of the deemed German approach.‖) 
338 Aufsatz von Jochen Pagenberg, New Trends in Patent Claim Interpretation in Germany - Good-bye to 
the "General Inventive Idea", 19 IIC 788 (1988)   
339 Jochen Pagenberg, The Scope of Art.69 European Patent Convention: Should Sub-combinations be 
Protected? - a Comparative Analysis on the Basis of French and German law IIC 1993, 24(3), 314-345 
340 See, e.g.,Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prod. Ltd. [1990] 17 F.S.R. 181 (Ch. Pat. Ct.1989) 
(discussing both English and German cases from trial to appeal) 
341 Id. In the U.K., the Court of Appeal decided that the term ―helical spring‖could not cover a slitted 
rubber rod because there was no suggestion that the inventors of the Epilady device had considered using a 
rubber rod. In Germany, however, the D üsseldorf Landgericht interpreted the claims more functionally 
and concluded that the slitted rubber rod operated in essentially the same way as the helical spring and 
found that the substitution was disclosed in the claims when read in view of the description through the 
eye of man skilled in the art. 
342 Adam Jolly & Jeremy Philpott, The Handbook of European Intellectual Property Management: 
Developing, Managing and Protecting Your Company's Intellectual Property 332 (2012) 




 for claim construction, the Protocol 
permits a claim to be construed more broadly than its literal language but does 
not define specifically that breadth:
344
 ―Neither the EPC nor the Protocol set 
out how the scope of protection is to be determined.‖ 345 Such flexibility 
results in patent claims to be interpreted by national courts as they would be 
under each country‘s national patent system. It is believed that ―each approach 
is appropriate for the legal culture in which it resides.‖346A second, but more 
subtle reason is that the German texts of the EPC use the word ―Inhalt‖, which 
has a broader meaning (―the surrounding content where a term appears must be 
considered‖) 347  than the English word ―terms‖. This translation issue 
provides additional room for interpretation in German courts. Under the 
current constructive approach, terms of the claims are construed in the context 
                                                        
343 Alexander James Stack, International Patent Law: Cooperation, Harmonization, and an Institutional 
Analysis of WIPO and the WTO 95 (2011). (―It has been argued that this reality requires there to be an 
international court to decide patent cases; otherwise, attempts to adopt minimum standards on claim 
construction and other patent law fundamentals will be frustrated.‖) 
344 Ray D. Weston, A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Can European Approaches 
Solve an. American Dilemma, 39 J.L. & Tech. 35 (1998) (―European scholars understandably tend to 
interpret Article 69 as they would interpret a claim under the national patent system of their home states. 
British lawyers could find the level of certainty they desired in the strong expression that the scope of 
protection "shall be determined by the terms of the claims." German patent lawyers, on the other hand, 
discovered all the breadth they wanted in the distinction between the "terms" of the claims and the claim 
language: the former suggested the elements one derives by interpretation, the essential content, substance, 
or core of a claim.‖) 
345 Pumfrey et al., supra note 322 (―Unfortunately, this Article leaves broad room for interpretation and is 
not understood in the same way all across Europe.‖) 
346 David Vaver and Lionel Bently (eds.), Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Essays in Honour 
of William R. Cornish 99 (2004).See also, David L. Cohen, Acticle 69 and European Patent Integration, 
92 Nw. U. L. Rev 1082 (1997-1998) (―German jurisprudence, like English jurisprudence, is still strongly 
rooted in its historical practice…while legal integration is possible, it requires a level of mutual cultural 
adaptation.‖) 
347 Ray D. Weston, A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Can European Approaches 
Solve an. American Dilemma, 39 J.L. & TECH. 35 (1998) See also,  Turner, supra note 245 (―Article 69 
of the European Patent Convention provides that the extent of protection of a European patent is to be 
determined by the terms (or ―inhalt‖ or ―teneur‖ in the equally authentic German and French texts) of the 
claims.‖) Donald S. Chisum & Stacey J. Farmer, Lost in Translation: The Legal Impact of Patent 
Translation Errors on Claim Scope, in , in Toshiko Takenaka (ed.), "Patent Law And Theory A Handbook 
of Contemporary Research" 289 (2009). (―In the German and French versions of Article 69 (1) EPC 1973, 
the translated equivalent of  ‗terms of claims‘ is ‗Inhalt der Patentanspruche‘ and ‗teneur des 
revendications‘ respectively. Interesting, both ‗Inhalt‘ and ‗teneur‘ suggest a broader interpretation to a 
multi=lingual reader that the surrounding content where a term appears must be considered, which could 
extend the more literal meaning given to an English ‗term‘.‖) 
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of the solution that the patent application objectively discloses.
348
 
The constructive approach is more conceptually justifiable than the other 
two approaches in establishing claim meaning. While the ordinary meaning 
approach and the purposive approach have difficulties in dealing with some 
situations (e.g., claim terms lack a well-understood meaning at the time of 
invention, or the ordinary meaning does not resolve the ambiguity; the intent 
is not clear even to the patentee himself, or there are technological changes 
that patentee did not originally foresee and therefore have developed meanings 
which he did not intend), the constructive approach is always capable of 
identifying the technical properties of the subject matter in the claim, because 
a claim is a verbal portrayal of an invention.
349
 The following paragraphs will 
further compare the similarities and differences between the constructive 
approach and the other two approaches. 
A. The constructive approach and the purposive approach 
According to the purposive approach, patents should be interpreted on the basis 
of the inventor‘s purpose instead of a literal meaning. 350  Under both the 
purposive approach and the constructive approach, the strict literal rule has 
                                                        
348 Harguth, supra note 327, 177. (―The understanding of a term is thus primarily influenced by the 
function it fulfills within the claimed teaching.‖) 
349 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd, 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) (―An invention 
exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an 
afterthought written to satisfy the requirement of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows 
for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do 
not exist to describe it.‖) 
350 Rockwater Ltd v Technip France SA [2004] EWCA Civ 381, [2004] RPC 46; Virgin Atlantic Airways 
Ltd v Premium Aircraft Interiors UK Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1062, [2010] RPC 8,(― (ii) Article 69 says that 
the extent of protection is determined by the claims. It goes on to say that the description and drawings 
shall be used to interpret the claims. In short the claims are to be construed in context. (iii) It follows that 
the claims are to be construed purposively - the inventor's purpose being ascertained from the description 
and drawings.‖) 
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been relaxed. There are two main differences between them: Firstly, under the 
constructive approach, the intention of the patentee is not the last authority in 
determining the meaning of the text, and there are other equally legitimate 
authorities for that determination.
351
 The purposive approach focuses on ―a 
practical idea which the patentee has had for a new product or process.‖352 
However, unlike the purposive approach, the constructive approach does not 
make patentee‘s purpose at the time of filing the primary concern of 
interpretation. Second, under the constructive approach, the interpreter adopts 
an evaluative stance to specify the content.
353
The interpreter‘s own reasoning 
and evaluation (by using the reference of a PHOSITA) of what is to be achieved 
by the disputed feature plays a critical role. The constructive approach is 
interested in identifying the content or the subject matter from a 
problem/solution analysis:
354
 assessing the disadvantages of the prior art and 
the advantages to be achieved by the invention:
355
 
Terms of the claims are construed in the context of the solution that the patent 
application objectively discloses….In other words, the skilled person needs to 
                                                        
351  Cristina Lafont, Meaning and Interpretation: Can Brandomian Scorekeepers be Gadamerian 
Hermeneuts?, in Andrzej Wierciński,Gadamer's Hermeneutics and the Art of Conversation 164 (2011). 
(―That is, it is perfectly possible and legitimate to provide an accurate description of what the author 
intended to say in the author‘s own terms. It is just that there are many other things that can be illuminating 
in interpreting a text.‖) 
352 Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and Others [2004] UKHL 46. 
(―…reads the specification on the assumption that its purpose is both to describe and to demarcate an 
invention—a practical idea which the patentee has had for a new product or process…It is this insight that 
lies at the heart of ‗purposive construction‘.‖) 
353 Lafont, supra note 351. 
354 Tilman Müller-Stoy, German Federal Supreme Court: On the interpretation of the scope of protection 
of a patent claim and the role of the court expert (Decision of February 12, 2008, Case X ZR 153/05 
–―Mehrgangnabe‖/ ―Multi-gear hub‖) (2008) http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=76230 (Last 
visited Nov 26, 2012)(― patent claims are usually interpreted on the basis of a so-called function-oriented 
interpretation, i.e. the literal meaning of a claim feature is interpreted in the light of its technical function 
from the point of view of the average person skilled in the art…the objective technical results and 
advantages achieved in the future with the patented teaching in view of the actually claimed subject 
matter.‖) 
355 Harguth, supra note 327, at 177. (―German courts often name this a ‗function oriented interpretation of 
patent claims.‘‖)   
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read the specification in a reasonable way to identify the particular functions of 
the terms by which they provide for the inventive solution. The understanding of 
a term is thus primarily influenced by the function it fulfills within the claimed 
teaching.  
One example is Muller v. Hilti case
356
 in the German Court. To interpret 
the patent claim ―a washer…is introduced before tightening between head and 
flange,‖ a PHOSITA would have understood that the prior art used long screws 
and the flange was tightened along a circular path, and in order to overcome the 
difficulty of the prior art, short screws would be used and the flange would be 
tightened along a straight path.
357
 By formulating the technical problem and 
solution, the term ―introduced‖ was interpreted as ―inserted into tightening 
position along straight line along a flange surface.‖  
Another example is the ―Overhead Stereo Building‖ case in the Chinese 
court.
358
 Claim 1 read as ―several house units are arranged on the surrounding 
space and the surface of the space support structure…the top surface of the 
space structure is roadway.‖ To construe the claim, Shanghai High People‘s 
Court determined the advantageous aspects (―You Yi Xiao Guo‖) of the 
invention
359
 (to increase the area of structure and improve comfort and 
                                                        
356 Muller v. Hilti ("Tension Screw"; Spannschraube [1999] GRUR, 909-914 2000 P.I.B.D. III, 305; 2002 
IIC, 746-749); In Muller v. Hilti the German courts decided that the European patent was not infringed, 
whereas the Swiss and French courts decided otherwise. See also S. Luginbuehl, European Patent Law: 
Towards A Uniform Interpretation, (Edward Elgar, 2011) at 3-6. 
357 Mario Franzosi, Three European Cases on Equivalence – Will Europe Adopt Catnic?, 32 IIC 113 
(2001). 
358Wang Qun su Shang Hai Shi Bo Hui Fa Guo Guan he Zhong Guo Jian Zhu Di Ba Gong Cheng Ju You 
Xian Gong Si [Wang Qun v. Pavilion France at Expo Universelle Shanghai and China Construction 
Eighth Engineering Division] No.83, 3rd Tribunal, Final decision, Shanghai High People‘s Court (2010) 
(P.R.C).This case was selected by the Supreme People‘s Court as one of the Ten Typical Intellectual 
Property Rights Cases in 2010, Chinacourt, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/201104/25/449078.shtml (last visited 30 July, 2011). 
359 Ren Wen Lin su Dong Fang Jia Yuan Bei Jing Li Ze Zhuang Shi Jian Cai You Xian Gong Si [Ren Wenlin 
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communication), and the indispensable solution of achieving this goal (by 
extending outward from the space support structure). Based on such analysis, 
the Court narrowly defined ―surface‖ in Claim 1 as ―surface excluding the top 
surface of the space support structure.‖   
The purposive approach asks whether the strict compliance with the 
particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim would have been 
intended by the patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention.
360
 The 
purposive approach interprets claim meaning right at the time of filing and 
allows extension to future equivalents
361
 only when the claim term is 
sufficiently general and abstract to include the new technologies.
362
 In Ancon 
Ltd vs. ACS Stainless Steel Fixings Ltd,
363
 Ancon argued that the Judge 
construed claim term ―the head has a generally elliptical cone shape‖ too 
narrowly—they argued that by virtue of the amendments made to the Protocol 
in 2000, infringement should be found under the doctrine of equivalents. The 
Court of Appeal pointed out that the House of Lords has already indicated that 
there has been no change to the EPC in this respect—there is nothing in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
v. Oriental Home Beijing Li Ze Deco Construction Co. Ltd] No. 6988, Civil Tribunal, Beijing No.2 
Intermediate People‘s Court (2004) (―Claims are not isolated but closely in connection with the 
specifications and drawings…one must take into account of all patent documents to properly understand 
the claims, making clear the purpose of the invention, its function and effect…‖) See also, Zhang Lian Qin 
su Tian Jin Tai Guan Jian Cai Gong Mao You Xian Gong Si [Zhang Lianqin v. Tianjin Guan Tai 
Construction Industry & Trade Co. Ltd ] No. 1830, Civil Tribunal, Beijing No.1 Intermediate People‘s 
Court (2006) (―According to the specification, the ‗enhanced layer‘ can be omitted. However, the purpose 
and the technical effects of the ‗enhanced layer‘ have been fully explicated in the specifications and the 
drawings, and the technical means of the ‗enhanced layers‘ is also specified. Therefore, the ‗enhanced 
layer‘ is one of the essential elements of the patent.‖) 
360 Catnic Components Ltd. vs. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183 (H.L.). at 243. 
361 Jonathan Radcliffe, European Union: Current Patent Litigation Trends: UK and Germany (2012) 
(―UK courts are now taking a nuanced approach that is firmly rooted in the overarching requirement under 
Article 69 of the European Patent Convention that the claims themselves must determine the scope of 
protection.‖) http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=198524&signup=true (last visited Oct 1st, 
2012) 
362 Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and others [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 
RPC 9. 
363 Ancon Ltd vs. ACS Stainless Steel Fixings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 498. 
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travaux préparatoires to the EPC 2000 to show a clear intention to change the 
law in this way.
364
   
By comparison, under the constructive approach, a patent claim may be 
interpreted ―below‖ or ―beyond‖ the claim language,365 on the basis of the 
technical teaching as disclosed in the description.
 366
 On the one hand, a 
restrictive interpretation of a patent claim ―below‖ its literal meaning is justified 
if the technical result to be achieved by the invention is only achieved by a 
technical teaching according to such restrictive interpretation.
367
 On the other 
hand, the subject matter embraces solutions ―as being technically equivalent‖368 
to the claimed teaching, based on ―ideas deriving from the meaning of the 
content of the invention defined in the claims.‖ 369  While the purposive 
approach often uses the perspective of a PHOSITA to support a narrow claim 
                                                        
364 Id. Ancon argued that even if the claim as properly construed did not cover the ACS assembly, there 
was infringement nonetheless by virtue of the amendments made to Art 69 of the EPC and the Protocol 
thereto in 2000. The Court held that ―In the event it is not necessary to consider this argument. All I would 
say is that has considerable difficulties both because our House of Lords has indicated it makes no 
difference (see Kirin-Amgen at [49]) and because a trawl through the travaux préparatoires to the EPC 
2000 does not show a clear intention to change the law.‖ See also, Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel Limited and others [2004] UKHL 46 (Holding ―Since the Catnic case we have article 69 
which, as it seems to me, firmly shuts the door on any doctrine which extends protection outside the 
claims. I cannot say that I am sorry because the Festo litigation suggests, with all respect to the courts of 
the United States, that American patent litigants pay dearly for results which are no more just or 
predictable than could be achieved by simply reading the claims.‖) 
365Müller-Stoy, supra note 354. (―…the Federal Supreme Court had to decide whether at all, and if yes, 
under which circumstances an interpretation of a patent claim ―below‖ its literal meaning applies.‖) See 
also, Toshiko Takenaka, Patent Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research 295 (2008). In 
the German version of Article 69 (1) EPC 1973, the translated equivalent of ―terms of the claims‖ is 
―Inhalt der Patentanspruche‖, which suggest a broader interpretation that the surrounding content where a 
term appears must be considered. 
366 Brieflocher [2001] GRUR, 232, X ZR145/98, Federal Supreme Court, quoted in Harguth, supra note 
327, at 176. (―Terms can thus be given the broadest possible technical understanding under the disclosed 
teaching.‖) 
367 Mehrgangnabe/ Multi-gear hub [2008], Case X ZR 153/05,German Federal Supreme Court. 
368  Formstein [1986] GRUR 804, German Federal Supreme Court. See also, Duncan Bucknell, 
Pharmaceutical,  Biotechnology and Chemical Inventions: World Protection and Exploitation 90(2011) 
369  Batteriekastenschnur [1989] GRUR 903, 904 (German Federal Supreme Court);see also, 
Kunststoffrohrteil [2002] GRUR 511(German Federal Supreme Court) as well as in four other cases of the 
same date (Schneidmesser I & II, Custodiol I & II, all 2002): (―infringement by equivalence is still 
possible, if: (a) the variant achieves the same 
technical effect (at least in essence); (b) the skilled reader could have discovered the variant without 
inventive effort at the priority date as a solution equal in function; and (c) the considerations of the skilled 
reader must be directed to the semantic content of the patent claim in such a way that he would 
contemplate the variant as being an equal solution.) 
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construction, the constructive approach inclines to expand the semantic 
meaning to include equivalents.
370
 
 According to the Several Provisions of the Supreme People‘s Court on 
Issues Concerning Applicable Laws to the Trial of Patent Controversies 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―Provisions‖), the content of a patent claim 
includes ―the scope determined by the essential technical features explicitly 
recorded in the claims, as well as the scope determined by the features 
equivalent to those essential technical features.‖ 371  The second paragraph 
further explains the definition of equivalent features: ―the features perform the 
same function and achieve the same result in the same way as the features 
explicitly recorded in the claims, and those can be imagined by the ordinary 
technological person in the specific technical area through reading patent claims 
and specifications without creative labor.‖ 372  The focus on the technical 
content of patent claims has a greater tendency to expand the scope of patent 
protection and cover the after-arising technologies.
373
 
                                                        
370 Golden, supra note 127.(―Although courts in a number of countries putatively use an ordinary artisan 
perspective for claim construction, they have used this perspective to justify strikingly different 
interpretive methodologies.‖) See also, Toshiko Takenaka, Claim Construction and the Extent of Patent 
Protection: A Comparative Analysis of the Phillips en banc Federal Circuit Decision, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 
& Prac. 119, 130 (2005) (noting that German "courts use the perspective of a hypothetical person in the art 
. . . to expand the literal meaning" to include "variations and equivalents," whereas Japanese courts 
historically invoked this perspective "to support a narrow claim construction" tied to "disclosed 
embodiments"). 
371 Article 17, para. 1, Several Provisions of the Supreme People‘s Court on Issues Concerning Applicable 
Laws to the Trial of Patent Controversies (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court, June. 22, 2001, 
effective July. 1, 2001), translated in LawInfoChina (last visited July 16, 2011) (P. R.C.).  
372 Id. para. 2. See e.g., Shaan Xi Jing Ye Bo Li Gang You Xian Gong Si Yu Yong Chang Ji Shui Fu He Cai 
Liao You Xian Gong Si Qin Fan Shi Yong Xin Xing Zhuan Li Quan Jiu Fen An [Shaanxi Jingye Glass Fibre 
Reinforced Plastic Co., Ltd vs. Yongchang Sekisui Composite Co., Ltd] No. 181, Civil Appeal, Supreme 
People‘s Court (2010).(―When deciding whether the technical feature of the defendant‘s product is 
equivalent to that of the patented invention, we not only ask whether it can be imagined by the ordinary 
technological person without creative labor, but also ask whether the feature performs the same function 
and achieves the same result in the same way as the feature explicitly recorded in the claims. Both 
conditions must be satisfied.‖) 
373 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing CO v. Beiersdorf(Austra1ia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253. Justice 
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B. The constructive approach and the ordinary meaning approach 
The constructive approach and the ordinary meaning approach both interpret 
claim terms from the eyes of a PHOSITA.
374
 Under the ordinary meaning 
approach, the analysis focuses on the ordinary and customary meaning of a 
patent claim term to a PHOSITA,
375
 rather than what the patentee actually 
invented, reduced to practice, and disclosed to the public.
376
 The patentee‘s 
broad construction often prevails, unless there is an ―explicit definition‖ or a 
―clear disavowal.‖377 By comparison, the constructive approach at all times 
requires interpreting the disputed claims by ―following the inventive purpose, 
plan, existing technology and inventive effects as stated in the description and 
drawings, and applying that interpretation to comparison of the patent and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Aickin in the High Court of Australia said: It remains the law that a defendant may not take the substance 
of an invention unless the wording of the claims make it clear that the relevant area has been deliberately 
left outside the claim. 
374 Shen Zhen Shi Lan Ying Wu Jin Su Jiao Zhi Pin Chang yu Luo Shi Zhong Qin Fan Shi Yong Xin Xing 
Zhuan Li Quan Jiu Fen An [Shenzhen Lanying Metal & Plastics Products Co.,Ltd vs. Luo Shizhong] No. 
248, Civil Case Review, Supreme People‘s Court (2011). The Supreme People‘s Court ruled that the 
patent claim should be interpreted from the perspective of a PHOSITA, and not be limited by the literal 
wording. 
375 Menell et. al., supra note 5, (―It is unfortunate that the Federal Circuit has failed to expressly disavow 
the "heavy presumption of ordinary meaning." Lawyers have persisted in citing pre-Phillips case law to 
argue this standard, and district courts have all too- frequently adopted this obsolete rule.‖) Mohammad 
Nilforoush, The Elusive Role of the Specification in Patent Claim Construction, 4 Intellectual Property 
Brief No. 1, 34-53 (2012).(―When the emphasis is on avoiding improperly reading limitations from the 
specification into the claims…this approach places more emphasis on the rule that the claims define the 
scope of the patent right and emphasizes giving claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning.‖) 
376 Retractable Technologies Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Judge 
Moore‘s dissent, with which Chief Judge Rader joined. Judge Moore asserted that the process of claim 
construction should not be confused with a validity determination, and that claim terms should be given 
their plain and ordinary meaning unless ―the inventor acted as his own lexicographer‖ or expressly 
disavowed claim scope. Scholars and courts split on the opinion whether the inventor's contribution to the 
art – ―what the inventor actually invented‖ – should be considered in the claim construction process. 
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa‘ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). (―Ultimately, the 
interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what 
the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to 
the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent‘s description of the invention will be, in the 
end, the correct construction.‖)  
377 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 
(2006). Unless the alleged infringer can prove ―an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope,‖ or 
that patentee used a ―special definition . . . that differs from the meaning [a claim term] would otherwise 
possess.‖ 
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imitation, so as to reach a sound solution of the dispute.‖378  
Under the constructive approach, the terms of the claim are less limited to 
the semantic meaning of the claim language. Rather, they are interpreted to 
sufficiently cover the actual technical teaching as disclosed in the 
description.
379
 For example, in the ―Auto-recording counter ticket‖ case,380 
independent Claim 1 read as: ―…then to convey the machine-readable ticket to 
the read-write equipment.‖ One of the disputes was how to interpret the term 
―convey‖. The plaintiff argued that the term was unambiguous and clear on its 
face, and therefore should be given an ordinary meaning broad enough to 
include ―conveying the ticket either by machine or by human.‖ To interpret, 
Guangdong High People‘s Court determined the advantageous aspects of the 
invention, which was to enhance efficiency and lower labor intensity. The Court 
then analyzed the technical solution to achieve the goal of enhancing the 
utilization rate of the computers at the ticket counter and lowering labor 
intensity. To fulfill the goal, the solution must be limited to the use of machine, 
and hence the term should be narrowly defined as ―conveyed by the conveying 
machine or any equivalent apparatus.‖ 
Compared with the ordinary meaning approach, the constructive approach 
is based on a more factual problem-solution analysis:
 381
 what is the 
                                                        
378 Peter Feng, Intellectual Property In China 217 (1997).  
379 Harguth, supra note 327, 176. (―Terms can thus be given the broadest possible technical understanding 
under the disclosed teaching…German courts often name this a ‗function oriented interpretation of patent 
claims.‘‖) 
380 Shen Zhen Pai Li Ke Ji You Xian Gong Si su Shen Zhen Xian Dai Ji Suan Ji You Xian Gong Si 
[Shenzhen Paili Technology Co. v. Shenzhen Modern Computer Co.] No. 34, Final Decision, 3rd Civil 
Tribunal, Guang Dong High People‘s Court(2010). 
381 Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (―[W]hen the meaning of a term in the 
claim is disputed and extrinsic evidence is necessary to explain that term, then an underlying factual 
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significance or advantages of the invention? The determination of content of 
the patent claim has a direct impact on the scope of protection. The 
constructive approach can be considered as a more flexible policy lever in 
resolving patent disputes. For instance, in Chinese courts, patent claim 
interpretation is regarded as an important policy lever to exert influence on 
―public interest and the development of national interest and technology‖.382 A 
broader scope of protection is given for ―frontier inventions with important 
significance‖, but a restriction is imposed on the scope of protection for 
―combination inventions or selective inventions.‖383 Rather than elevate the 
role of intrinsic evidence, the constructive approach permits a variety of sources 
that might be appropriate and helpful in determining the technical content.384 
When the meaning of the claims cannot be determined by the claims, 
specifications and prosecution history files, the interpretation may be made by 
reference to the public documents such as reference books and textbooks and 
the ordinary understanding by the person skilled in the art.
385
 In practice, it is 
also common for Chinese judges to solicit opinions on intellectual property 
policies from the administrative departments and seek advice on the overall 
                                                                                                                                                 
question arises, and construction of the claim should be left to the trier or jury under appropriate 
instruction.‖); 
382 Cheng Yongshun & Luo Lihua, Zhuan Li Qin Quan Pan Ding: Zhong Mei Fa Tiao Yu An Li Yan Jiu 
[Patent Infringement Determination: A Comparison between the Chinese and the US Laws and Cases] 
28(1998). 
383 Beijing High People‘s Court, Several Questions Concerning Patent Infringement Judgments Opinion 
(Trial Implementation) (promulgated by the Beijing High People‘s Court, Sept. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 
29, 2001), Art. 40, translated in Chinalawandpractice (last visited June 20, 2011) (P.R.C.). (―2001 
Opinion‖) 
384 David Luban, What‘s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism, in Morris Dickstein (ed.), The Revival of 
Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture, 275 (1998). (―The pragmatist mistrusts the 
pretensions of totalizing Big Think theories to capture all that is important in law. The pragmatist is willing 
to give every theory a hearing, however, and to appropriate insights from any source if they seem useful.‖)  
385 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in 
the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court., Dec. 28, 
2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) , Art.3, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited June 20, 2011) (P.R.C.) 
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technology development from the experts in the pertinent fields.
386
 
However, it does not mean that the constructive approach totally 
disregards the form (the linguistic expression) of the claims. In fact, form and 
content are mutually dependent. Form cannot be separated from content 
because form serves as an expressive medium for its meaning.
387
 The 
technical content is communicated through words and drawings. In the Dalian 
Xinyi Construction Materials case,
388
 the Supreme People‘s Court of China 
pointed out that ―all technical features recorded by the patentee in the patent 
claim are essential technical features.‖ The Court also clearly called for ―a full 
respect for all technical features recorded in the patent claim,‖ so that ―the 
public will not be confused by the unpredictable changes made to the contents 
of the patent claim.‖389  
                                                        
386 Wang Pingrong, Chong Su Wo Guo Zhi Shi Chan Quan Si Fa Jian Ding Zhi Du De Jian Yi 
[Proposals for Restructuring the Intellectual Property Judicial Appraisal System in China], Zhong Guo 
Si Fa Jian Ding[Chinese Journal of Forensic Sciences], Issue 1, pp.78. (2008)(―In judicial practice, since 
intellectual property cases are concerned about very technical problems and most judges lack technical 
backgrounds, they heavily depend on experts to differentiate and identify the disputed facts…the two 
most common ways are expert consultation and consignment of forensic authentification.‖) Jiang 
Hongyi, Zhi Shi Chan Quan Jian Ding Bu Ke Hui Bi De Kun Jing [The Dilemmas Faced by Intellectual 
Property Judicial Appraisal System], Zhong Guo Fa Ming Yu Zhuan Li [China Invention & Patent] Issue 
10, pp.57 (2007) (―The appraisal procedures are apparently more frequently invoked in patent 
infringement cases than any other cases.‖) 
387 Paul A. Boghossian, Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers,12 (2008). (―One cannot threaten 
linguistic meaning without threatening thought content, since it is from thought that linguistic meaning is 
held to derive; one cannot threaten linguistic meaning that thought content is held to derive.‖) 
388 Da Lian Xin Yi Jian Cai You Xian Gong Si yu Da Lian Ren Da Xin Xing Qiang Ti Jian Cai Chang 
[Dalian Xinyi Construction Materials Co. Ltd. v. Dalian Renda Wall Materials Factory], No. 1, 3rd Civil 
Tribunal, Supreme People‘s Court (2005). See also, Zhang Zhen yu Yang Zhou Jin Zi Hao Xie Ye You 
Xian Gong Si, Bao Tou Shi Tong Sheng Xie Dian Qin Fan Shi Yong Xin Xing Zhuan Li Quan Jiu Fen An 
[Zhang Zhen vs. Yangzhou Jinzihao Footwear Co Ltd, Baotou Tongsheng Shoe Shop] No.630, Civil 
Case Review, Supreme People‘s Court(2011) 
389 Id. A series of cases decided by the High People‘s Court have obviously attempted to limit the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents. Huo Jing He yu Chang Zhou Heng Tong Su Pu Er Su Liao You 
Xian Gong Si [Huo Jinghe et.al v. Changzhou Hengtong Superior Plastics Industry Co. Ltd], No. 0095, 3rd 
Civil Tribunal, Jiangsu High People‘s Court (2007). The Jiangsu High People‘s Court denied the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents and adhered to the all-element rule. Zong Shen Ke Ji Kai Fa Yan 
Jiu Gong Si yu Lv Xiao Rong [Zongshen Technology Research and Development Co. Ltd v. Lv Xiaorong 
et. al], No. 156, Civil Tribunal, Chongqing High People‘s Court (2007). Chongqing High People‘s Court 
also rejected the doctrine, holding that ―if the doctrine of equivalents applied, the insert materials would 
be extended beyond cast iron recorded in the claim, which would unreasonably expand the scope of 
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In sum, under the constructive approach, interpreters are not restricted to 
look at the ordinary sense of the term or give effect to the patentee‘s purpose. 
The constructive approach gives interpreters more room to construe the claim 
terms than the ordinary meaning approach and the purposive approach. The 
following section will take the practice of Chinese courts as an example to show 
how this approach actually works.  
Section 2 The application of the constructive approach in Chinese 
courts  
Currently in China, there are 56 Intermediate People‘s Courts having 
jurisdiction to interpret claims in patent infringement litigations and 31 High 
People‘s Courts to authorize the judgments of claim interpretation on appeal.390 
The Supreme People‘s Court is the only court resolving conflicts between lower 
courts and providing coordinative guidelines and regulations for judicial 
practice.
391
 As one scholar has commented, ―China‘s protection of intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                 
patent protection.‖ Xinjiang Nong Ye Ke Xue Yuan Nong Ye Gong Cheng Gong Si yu Shi He Zi Shi Hua 
Nong Zong Zi Ji Xie Zhi Zao You Xian Gong Si[Xin Jiang Academy of Agriculture Technology Co., Ltd v. 
Shihezi Huanong Machinery Manufacture Co. Ltd]  No. 10, Final Decision, 3rd Civil Tribunal, Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region High People‘s Court (2007). The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
High People‘s Court overturned the lower court‘s decision based on the doctrine of inferior change, and 
invoked the all-element rule. Non-infringement was found. Yang Jing yu Tian Jing Li Tai Xie Ye You Xian 
Gong Si [Yang Jing v. Tianjing Li Tai Shoe Industry Co. Ltd] No. 65, Civil Appeal, Supreme People‘s Court 
(2009). 
390 Opinions of the Supreme People‘s Court‘s on Comprehensively Strengthening the Trial Work 
Involving Intellectual Property Rights to Provide Judicial Safeguard for the Construction of an 
Innovative Country (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court., Jan. 11, 2007, effective Jan. 11, 
2007), translated in LawInfoChina (last visited July 16, 2011) (P.R.C.). The Supreme People‘s Court has 
highlighted the importance of uniform judgments on patent litigations. More independent intellectual 
property tribunals and panels will be set up in lower courts and professional personnel will be in charge 
of the review and enforcement of patent cases.   
391 Wu Yuhe, Zhuan Li Quan Li Yao Qiu Bao Hu Fan Wei Ji Deng Tong Wu Pan Ding: Zui Gao Fa Yuan 
<Guan Yu Chu Li Zhuan Li Qin Quan Jiu Fen An Jian You Guan Wen Ti Jie Jue Fang An Cao Gao> 
Ping Jie [Scope of Patent protection and the determination of equivalents: Comments on the Supreme 
People‘s Court‘s draft on ―Solutions to several questions on resolving patent infringement disputes‖], 
Zhong Guo Zhuan Li Yu Shang Biao [China Patents and Trademarks], Issue 76, pp27-39 (2004). 
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property rights has come a long way in a short time.‖392 In China, patent claim 
construction is guided by CPL and the relevant judicial interpretations and 
regulations. The Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute 
Cases, which came into force in January 2010, re-emphasizes that the people‘s 
court shall determine the content of a claim in Article 2.
393
  
The constructive approach requires a factual inquiry into the technical 
problem being addressed and the solution to that problem through the invention. 
Such claim construction directly affects the substantive scope of the patent 
rights and actually involves a delicate balancing of policy concerns: the 
interpreter needs to make sure the patent claim scope is ―just right‖, i.e., not 
being too broad or too narrow. The constructive claim construction is guided by 
some general and overarching principles. This Section will highlight three main 
principles of claim interpretation used in Chinese courts, namely, the eclectic 
interpretation, the equivalent interpretation and the fairness interpretation. 
A. The eclectic interpretation 
The eclectic principle was established by the Beijing High People‘s Court in the 
Several Questions Concerning Patent Infringement Judgments Opinion (Trial) 
(hereinafter referred to as ―2001 Opinion‖). The 2001 Opinion provides 
suggestions on how to determine patent infringement and is not legally binding 
                                                        
392 Cynthia Smith, A Practical Guide to Chinese Patent Law, 29 Seton Hall Legis. J. 643 (2005). 
393 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in 
the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court., Dec. 28, 
2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) , Art.2, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited June 20, 2011) (P.R.C.). 
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to all courts in China. However, because the Beijing High People‘s Court has 
rich experience in solving patent-related disputes, the 2001 Opinion is in fact a 
very important legal source to which courts at different levels may cite as a legal 
basis in their decisions. The spokesman of the Intellectual Property Tribunal of 
the Supreme People‘s court in answering the correspondent‘s questions 
explained that, ―Article 2 of the Judicial Interpretation establishes the eclectic 
principle in patent claim construction from a macro view.‖ 394 
According to Article 6 of the 2001 Opinion, the eclectic interpretation is 
proposed as a middle position between the ―peripheral definition‖ and the 
―central definition‖ to combine the reasonable and justifiable protection of the 
patentees with public legal certainty as well as reasonable public interest.
395
 
―Peripheral definition involves marking out the periphery . . . area covered by 
the claim and holding as infringements only such constructions as lie within that 
area.‖ 396 Peripheral claiming is the current claiming regime codified in 35 
U.S.C. § 112,
397
 in which patent claims define the boundaries of the patented 
invention.
398
 The patent claim was seen as a means through which the 
patentee could recite the specific metes and bounds of the patented invention. 
                                                        
394 The spokesman of the Intellectual Property Tribunal of the Supreme People‘s court in answering the 
correspondent‘s questions about the Judicial Interpretation 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2009-12/29/content_2012814.htm (last visited, Jan 
20, 2010 ) The eclectic principle is upheld in Judicial Interpretation and often cited in the decisions, 
although some scholars believed that China took a wholesale shift towards US-style claim construction. 
Ronald Fernando, A Case for Internationally Adopting a Modified US-Style Approach to Claim 
Construction (2009) http://works.bepress.com/ronald_fernando/1/ (Last visit July 7, 2012) (―Each of these 
principles runs counter to the false notion (provided in Article 1) that China follows a 
―middle-of-the-road‖ approach to claim construction; and instead, these principles support the argument 
that China employs a fence-post approach to claim construction.‖) 
395 Article 6, 2001 Opinion.  
396 Teleflex, Inc. v. Focosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See also Martin J. 
Adelman et al., Cases And Materials on Patent Law, 634–642 (American Casebook Series 1998). Ridsdale 
Ellis, Patent Claims §§ 4–5 (1949). 
397 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9. Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 
57, 84 (2005) 
398 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201. The Patent Act of 1870 changed the claiming 
requirements, specifying that the patentee needed to claim her invention distinctly and with particularity. 
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399
 Central definition is the use of a patent claim to define the core of the 
patented invention. ―Central definition involves the drafting of a narrow claim 
setting forth a typical embodiment coupled with broad interpretation by the 
courts to include all equivalent constructions.‖ 400 Civil law countries such as 
Germany traditionally
401
 adopted the central definition, where claims were 
seen as defining the general inventive concept of an invention. 402  
The eclectic interpretation is consistent with Article 1 of the Protocol on 
the Interpretation of Article 69 of the EPC. The Protocol favors neither a strict 
literal interpretation nor a liberal interpretation by merely using the claims as a 
guideline. 
403
 Article 6 of the 2001 Opinion also declares that the claims should 
not be interpreted by the ―peripheral definition‖ principle that expects the scope 
of patent protection to be exactly the same as that recorded by the literal 
wording of the claims, and employs the specifications and appended drawings 
only for the purpose of resolving ambiguity in the meaning of the claim terms. 
Neither should patent claims be interpreted by the ―central definition‖ principle 
that merely establishes a general gist of the invention, and expands the actual 
scope of protection to what, from a consideration of the description and 
                                                        
399 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 14 (―Claims define what the inventor considers to be the scope of her 
invention, the technological territory she claims is hers to control by suing for infringement.‖). 
400 Teleflex, Inc. v. Focosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See also Martin J. 
Adelman et al., Cases And Materials on Patent Law, 634–642 (American Casebook Series 1998). 
401 Mineko Mohri, Maintenance, Replacement and Recycling - Patentees' Rights in the Aftermarkets: 
Germany, the U.S. and Japan 17 (2010) (―Germany had the tradition of the central form of claim 
interpretation. However, upon the adoption of the European Patent Convention (―EPC‖) in 1973, Germany 
moved towards the harmonized interpretation of claims.‖) 
402  Toshiko Takenaka, Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan (1995) 
(describing Germany‘s ―central claiming‖ system). Burk & Lemley, supra note 5 (―Central claiming was 
also the approach in Germany until accession to the European Patent Convention required harmonization 
with the peripheral approaches of other EPC member states; at that point, Germany moved to an 
intermediate position that continues to incorporate many aspects of central claiming.‖) 
403 Turner, supra note 245. (―Accordingly, patent claims should be interpreted on the basis that their 
purpose is neither to define the boundary of the monopoly, nor to act merely as guidelines for ascertaining 
the scope of the protection from the description and drawings, but rather to state the invention described 
and exemplified in the description and drawings, with a view to combining fair protection for the patentee 
with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties.‖)  
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appended drawings by a technical expert, the patentee has contemplated. The 
purposive approach enables the UK to meet its obligations under Article 69 
EPC and its Protocol. Therefore, the constructive approach shares this same 
bedrock principle underlying the purposive approach: there shall be a balance 
between a narrow literal interpretation by means of the claims and a broad 
interpretation of the general inventive idea of the specification.  
But the constructive approach differs from the purposive approach on the 
understanding of Article 2 of Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC, 
which states that ―For the purpose of determining the extent of protection 
conferred by a European patent, due account shall be taken of any element 
which is equivalent to an element specified in the claims.‖ To protect the public 
legal certainty, the UK courts are very careful in imposing restrictions on 
equivalent interpretation. By comparison, the constructive approach uses the 
equivalent interpretation frequently as showed in the following paragraphs.  
B. The equivalent interpretation  
It has been commented that for the purpose of determining the extent of patent 
protection, ―under the European Patent Convention, interpretation of the claims 
is the only way in which such flexibility can be provided. Article 69 precludes a 
doctrine of equivalents along the lines of US law or the pre-Catnic English 
approach, according to which a claim means X but can be infringed in certain 
circumstances by an equivalent or colourable imitation of X.‖ 404 Under the 
                                                        
404 Id.( ―It also includes the knowledge that there is no principle of colourable infringement under the 
European Patent Convention, and hence that the balancing of the requirements of reasonable certainty and 
fair protection has to be achieved by a degree of flexibility in the interpretation of the claims.‖) 
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purposive approach, there is no ―different‖ or ―other‖ test to find the equivalent 
which stays outside the meaning of the claims. In Amersham Pharmacia 
Biotech v. Amicon,
405
 Lord Justice Aldous stated that ―I do not believe that the 
Protocol introduced into our law a doctrine of infringement by equivalent effect 
by use of a different mechanism. That may be for the future.‖ Lord Hoffmann 
has explained that: 
[In the English approach] the question of equivalence is taken into account as 
part of the process of interpretation. But equivalence is not a principle which 
operates outside the claims and gives protection to something which upon a fair 




Lord Hoffmann further acknowledged that there is no doctrine of 
equivalents under the EPC: 
Since the Catnic case we have article 69 which, as it seems to me, firmly shuts the 
door on any doctrine which extends protection outside the claims. I cannot say 
that I am sorry because the Festo litigation suggests, with all respect to the courts 
of the United States, that American patent litigants pay dearly for results which 




However, the doctrine of equivalents is widely adopted by Chinese courts. 
                                                        
405 Amersham Pharmacia Biotech AB v. Amicon Limited [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ.1042; Aldous L.J. at 
para.32 referred to two systems between which there was no material difference when they were carried 
out, in the sense that they produced the same result, but with a different mechanism. They showed different 
ways that could produce an equivalent result. 
406 Lord Hoffman, Patent Construction, 108 Heft 9, GRUR 720 [2006], reproduced at CIPA [2006] No.11, 
727. 
407 Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and others [2004] UKHL 46. 
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408
 The application of the doctrine of equivalents, which had not been provided 
in the CPL but already existing in judicial practice,
409
 was first recognized by 
the Supreme People‘s Court decision in Ningbo Oriental Movement Factory v. 
Jiangyin Jinling Hardware Co. Ltd in 2002.
410
 The Court held that:  
Determination of the protection scope of patent right should be based on the 
substantive contents of the claims, and descriptions and drawings can be used to 
clarify the ambiguous terms in the terms. The protection of the scope can be 
extended to the equivalent technical features that can be imagined by an ordinary 
person skilled in the art without creative labor after reading the specifications and 
drawings… that is, the equivalent feature performs the identical function in 
substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result. 
The application of the doctrine of equivalents must be based on both the 
triple-identity test and the test of easy association without creative labor of an 
ordinary skilled person.
411
 The Judicial Interpretation officially authorizes 
several doctrines already in practical use, including the means-plus-function 
                                                        
408 Chang Zhou Bo Yun Zhuang Shi Cai Liao You Xian Gong Si yu Cai Zu Sheng [Changzhou Decoration 
Material Co. Ltd vs. Cai Zusheng] No. 0013, Intellectual Property Tribunal, Final Decision, Jiangsu 
Higher People‘s Court (2011) (―Even the allegedly infringing process changed the operating step in Claim 
1, but it objectively achieve the same effect and generate the same product.‖); Qin Zhou Chuang Hua Gong 
Kong She Bei You Xian Gong Si yu Qin Zhou Hua Cheng Zi Kong She Bei You Xian Gong Si [Qinzhou 
Chuanghua Industrial Control Equipment Co. Ltd v. Qinzhou Huacheng Automatic Control Equipment 
Co.Ltd] No. 79,  3rd Civil Tribunal, Final Decision, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Higher 
People‘s Court (2010) (―both have direction controller, the claimed invention has one controller but the 
allegedly infringing product has two controllers…but both has the same function and achieve the same 
result.‖)  
409 See e.g., Shenzhen Chuang Ge Ke Ji Shi Ye You Xian Gong Si su Mei Guo Kang Bai Dian Nao You 
Xian Gong Si [Shenzhen Chuangge Scientific & Technology Enterprise Co. Ltd and Ma Xiguang vs. US 
Compaq Computer Company], No. 36, Intellectual Property Tribunal, Beijing High People‘s Court 
(1998). 
410 Ning Bo Shi Dong Fang Ji Xin Zong Chang su Jiang Yin Jin Ling Wu Jin Zhi Pin You Xian Gong Si 
[Ningbo Oriental Movement Factory v. Jiangyin Jinling Hardware Co. Ltd], No. 1, 3rd Civil Tribunal, The 
Supreme People‘s Court (2002). 
411 Opinions of the Supreme People‘s Court‘s on Comprehensively Strengthening the Trial Work 
Involving Intellectual Property Rights to Provide Judicial Safeguard for the Construction of an 
Innovative Country (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court., Jan. 11, 2007, effective Jan. 11, 
2007), translated in LawInfoChina (last visited July 16, 2011) (P.R.C.).  




the doctrine of public dedication (Article 5),
 413
 the 
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel (Article 6),
 414
  and reaffirms the 
doctrine of equivalents, ―where the alleged infringing technical solution 
contains technical features identical or equivalent to all the technical features 
described in a claim, the people‘s court shall determine that it falls into the 
scope of protection of the patent.‖415 
Therefore, interpreters employing the constructive approach not only have 
flexibility in construing the language of the claims, but also can use a separate 
test to find the equivalents outside the language of the claims.
416
 It is less 
limited to the wording of claims than the other approaches. 
417
 Due to the broad 
understanding of the concept of ―content‖, interpreters frequently extend the 
                                                        
412 Article 4 of Judicial Interpretation: ―For technical features described by function or effect in a claim, 
the people‘s court shall determine the content of these technical features according to the specific way of 
implementation of the functions or effects described in the specification and drawings or an equivalent 
way of implementation.‖ 
413 Article 5 of Judicial Interpretation: ―Where a right holder includes a technical solution, which is 
described only in the specification or drawings, not in the claims, in the scope of protection of a patent in a 
patent infringement dispute case, the people‘s court shall not support it.‖ 
414 Article 6 of Judicial Interpretation: ―Where a right holder includes a technical solution, which the 
patent applicant or patentee has abandoned through an amendment of claims or specification or through a 
statement in the patent granting or invalidation procedure, in the scope of protection of a patent in a patent 
right infringement dispute case, the people‘s court shall not support it.‖ 
415 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in 
the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court., Dec. 28, 
2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) , Art.7, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited June 20, 2011) (P.R.C.). 
416  Li Mingde, Preface to Scope of Patent Claims: Patent Claim Construction and Doctrine of 
Equivalents, in Yan Wenjun, Zhuan Li Quan De Bao Hu Fan Wei [Scope of Patent Claims: Patent Claim 
Construction and Doctrine of Equivalents] (2007).(―Equivalence interpretation is the most difficult part 
of the patent claim construction.‖) 
417 Hu Bei Wu Shi Yao Ye Gu Fen You Xian Gong Si Yu Ao Nuo (Zhong Guo) Zhi Yao You Xian Gong Si, 
Wang Jun She Qin Fan Fa Ming Zhuan Li Jiu Fen An [Hubei Wushi Pharmaceutical Co Ltd vs. Aonuo 
(China) Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd. and Wang Junshe] Supreme People‘s Court, Civil, Certiorari, Retrial 
Petition, Civil Judgment No. 20 (2009). The technology was appraised by Beijing Zitu Intellectual 
Property Appraisal Centre. Both the trial court and appellate court gave a broad interpretation of the term 
and found that the ―calcium gluconate‖ was equivalent and substitutable to ―active calcium‖. No.23, Final 
Decision, 3rd Civil Tribunal, Hubei High People‘s Court (2007); No. 00169, First Instance, 5th Civil 
Tribunal, Shi Jiazhuang Intermediate People‘s Court (2006). The Supreme People‘s Court disagreed, and 
reasoned that since there was a description in the specification that ―soluble calcium is calcium gluconate, 
calcium chloride, calcium lactate, calcium carbonate or active calcium‖, ―calcium gluconate‖ and ―active 
calcium‖ were two parallel concepts depending upon the semantic and syntactic cues. However, in 
construing another disputed term ―Glutamic acid(Glu) and Glutamine(Gln)‖, the Supreme People‘s Court 
asked whether ―Diaminohexanoic acid hydrochloride‖ was an equivalent to the claimed term. While the 
lower courts found equivalency, the Court decided that ―Diaminohexanoic acid hydrochloride‖ was more 
advanced in solubility and stability, and there were substantial difference between the two. 
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scope of patent claims to the equivalent technical features beyond their literal 
terms in infringement litigations.
418  
C. Fair interpretation  
The principle of fairness is highlighted in patent claim interpretation in Chinese 
courts: 
Patent claim interpretation shall follow the principle of fairness.
419 
 On one hand, 
the interpretation must take full account of the contribution to the prior art made 
by the patentee, in order to soundly identify the scope of patent and protect the 




The rationale behind this fairness principle is that it ensures that the choice 
of meaning is fully thought through by the interpreter and that both the 
patentee‘s contribution and the public interest have been fully taken into 
account. The principle of fairness is used not only to avoid under-protection of 
patentee‘s rights, but also to prevent the abuse of monopoly, which raises policy 
concerns. The fairness principle can be used to avoid the absurd results and 
                                                        
418 Article 17, para. 1, Several Provisions of the Supreme People‘s Court on Issues Concerning Applicable 
Laws to the Trial of Patent Controversies (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court, June. 22, 2001, 
effective July. 1, 2001), translated in LawInfoChina (last visited July 16, 2011) (P. R.C.). See also, Liu 
Jixiang, Shi Lun Zhuan Li Qin Quan Su Song Zhong De Deng Tong Yuan Ze de Shi Yong [The 
Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Infringement Cases], in Cheng Yongshun, Zhuan Li 
Qin Quan Pan Ding Shi Wu [Practice of Decisions of Patent Infringement], 82 (2002) (―To determine 
equivalents at the time of infringement takes into account the benefits of the patentees and is more 
practical‖). But some scholars believe that the equivalents should be determined at the time of filing, see 
e.g., Yi Jun et.al, Ru He Que Ding Zhuan Li Quan De Bao Hu Fan Wei? [How to Determine the Scope of 
Protection of Patent Rights?] in Pan Jie Yan Jiu [Case Study] Vol.2, No. 4 (2008) (―When deciding 
whether a technical solution is an equivalent, it is at the time of filing rather than at the time of 
infringement that the PHOSITA should consider, so as to avoid including improvements into the 
monopoly.‖) 
419 Article 4, General Principles of the Civil Law of the People‘s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Nat‘l People‘s Cong., April. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987, revised Aug 27, 2009), translated in 
LawInfoChina (last visited June 15, 2011) (P.R.C.).  
420 Article 9, 2001 Opinion. 
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correct the claim drafting mistakes. For example, in Ye Guandong vs. 
Yangjiang Hongyang Food Industry Co., Ltd.,
421
  the subject matter of the 
claim was a ―washing and glue-extracting process bucket‖. Claim 1 recorded a 
feature of ―a filter net set inside the bucket and relatively under the outlet.‖ 
The allegedly infringing product used a filter net set above the outlet. The 
court decided that the claim contained an ―obvious error‖ based on 
consideration of the claim language, the specification and drawings from a 
PHOSITA‘s perspective. It was recommended that ―courts should not 
understand the content of the claim mechanically and narrowly but understand 
it in a fair and ‗matter-of-fact‘ way.‖422 
The rule against surplusage was also introduced to protect patentee‘s rights 
due to his lack of experience and skill in claim drafting. The rule against 
surplusage is stipulated in Article 47 to Article 55 of the 2001 Opinion. 
According to this rule, the obviously additional technical features recorded in 
the claim can be omitted, for the patent scope can be only determined by the 
essential technical features of the patent claim.
423
The judges can wipe out the 
―superfluous technical features‖, i.e. the obviously additional technical features, 
from the claims.  
The rule against surplusage was first established in the seminal case Zhou 
                                                        
421 Ye Guandong Su Yangjiang Hongyang Shi Pin Gong Ye You Xian Gong Si Zhuan Li Qin Quan Jiu 
Fen [Ye Guandong vs.Yangjiang Hongyang Food Industry Co. Ltd] No. 6,  3rd Civil Tribunal, 
Preliminary Decision, Guangzhou Intermediate People‘s Court (2003); No.158, Final Decision, 
Guangdong Higher People‘s Court (2004). 
422 Lin Guanghai & Qiu Yongqing, Zai Zhuan Li Su Song Zhong Ru He Jie Shi Quan Li Yao Qiu [How 
To Interpret Patent Claims in Infringement Litigations] (2012) 
http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/gdcourt/front/front!content.action?lmdm=LM119&gjid=2012030808235387
8047 (last visited July 7, 2012) 
423 Article 47, 2001 Opinion. 
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Lin v. Beijing Hua Ao Electronic Medical Equipment Co. Ltd 
424
in 1995. Zhou 
Lin was the patentee of an invention named ―Apparatus and a method of 
production for bio-frequency spectrum matching-effect field treatment.‖ Zhou 
Lin sued against Hua Ao Company for infringing the patent by making and 
selling the ―WSPA Broadband Bio-simulation Wave Spectrum Treatment 
Apparatus.‖ Beijing High People‘s Court identified six essential technical 
features from the patent claim but asserted that the seventh feature, i.e. the 
stereo system for musical treatment, has no substantial meaning and does not 
produce any indispensable functions. The Court believed that the seventh 
feature was added by the patentee ―because of inexperience‖425, and therefore it 
should be considered as an inessential and superfluous technical feature.
426
 In 
order to strike a balance of public and private interests, the judges have to 
exhibit a certain degree of flexibility by interpreting the meaning of the claim 
terms.
427
 In the end, each case must still be decided in light of the nature of 
the claimed invention.  
Section 3 The dilemma of the constructive approach in Chinese courts 
The constructive approach is an attempt to come up with an alternative 
                                                        
424 Zhou Lin su Hua Ao Dian Zi Yi Liao Yi Qi You Xian Gong Si[Zhou Lin v. Beijing Hua Ao Electronic 
Medical Equipment Co.Ltd], No. 22, 3rd Civil Tribunal, Beijing High People‘s Court (1995). 
425 Id. 
426 The rule against surplusage was later reaffirmed in the case Bei Jing Tai Yang Neng Yan Jiu Suo su 
Dong Guan Shi Hao Te Dian Qi Gong Si [Beijing Solar Energy Research Institute v. Dongguan Haote 
Electric Co. Ltd], No. 24, Final Decision, the Intellectual Property Tribunal, Beijing High People‘s Court 
(1998). It was discovered that the composition and proportion of the electric heating panels of the 
defendant‘s product were both within the scope of the patented claim, but the defendant argued that its 
product did not have the second recorded technical feature ―an insulation layer.‖ The Beijing High 
People‘s Court upheld the lower court‘s decision, and reasoned that the insulation layer was merely 
designed for enhancing the insulation property of the material and had no impact on the electric heating. 
Therefore, insulation layer was only an additional non-essential technical feature and the rule against 
surplusage should apply. 
427 Turner, supra note 245. 
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approach to ascertain claim meaning. China‘s young patent system is maturing 
and critically learning from the rich experience of patent systems in other 
jurisdictions.
428
 It is deeply aware of the predicament of the peripheral 
definition which purports to use claim language to set the outermost boundaries 
of patent rights,
429
 and the central definition which extends patent protection 
beyond the scope of the claim and weakens the notice function. The 
constructive approach requires a balance between ―the reasonable and 
justifiable protection of the patentees‖ and ―the public legal certainty as well as 
the reasonable public interest‖.430 It follows the theme of the Protocol on the 
Interpretation of Article 69 EPC to provide a middle ground between a strict 
literal interpretation and a broader one. However, ―this is surely what the 
interpretation of patent specification is all about. But then it does not seem 
likely that many courts will admit that their decisions do not comply with this 
standard.‖431  
Generally speaking, the constructive approach is flexible in determining 
the scope of protection, which can tip the balance one way or the other. The 
constructive approach emphasizes substance rather than form. However, there 
is an enormous and diverse range of properties the content can stand for. A 
word like ―attach‖432 can be used to describe a diverse range of means to join 
                                                        
428 Ronald S. Fernando, A Case for Internationally Adopting a Modified US-Style Approach to Claim 
Construction (2009) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/ronald_fernando/1 (Last visited Oct 23, 
2010). China has made remarkably positive changes to its patent enforcement system throughout the last 
decade. The rapid progress has been largely driven by integrating best practices from other countries into 
China's patent enforcement system. As a side effect, the integration strategy has turned China into a unique 
and valuable testing ground for conflicting principles in patent law from which best practices emerge and 
where flawed ideas are exposed. 
429 Burk & Lemley, supra note 5. 
430 Article 6, 2001 Opinion. 
431 Van Empel, The Granting of European Patents 307 (1975). 
432 Chen Hong Bo yu Shang Hai Ke Mo Wu Jin Pei Jian You Xian Gong Si [Chen Hongbo v. Shanghai 
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or fasten. The constructive approach seeks the technical content hidden behind 
words which inherently include their equivalents.
433
 This approach 
demonstrates a potentially expansive scope of the claims,
434
 which is subject to 
the interpreter‘s fairness analysis combining with a PHOSITA‘s understandings 
of the claims and specifications.
435
 The wide discretion ―invariably leads to 
inconsistent application of legal principles and a concomitant lack of 
predictability.‖436  
 Although courts purport that they have followed the same approach, the 
outcomes of the same case can be very different. 
437
 The Yuanda Metal Co. Ltd. 
cases tried respectively in three High People‘s Courts are a typical example of 
the inconsistent claim interpretation. Yuanda Metal Company was the owner of 
a patent related to ―A Detachable Handlebar of Directional Scooters‖. The 
Company brought patent infringement lawsuits against three manufacturers in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kemo Hardware Accessories Co. Ltd.] No. 76, 3rd Civil Tribunal, Final Decision, Shanghai High People‘s 
Court (2010). The disputed claim read as ―balls attached between plate and guide rail.‖ The allegedly 
infringing product arranged the balls within an additional slide rail between plate and guide rail. The Court 
construed ―attach‖ as direct contact with both plate and guide rail. Non-infringement was found. 
433 Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) ( ―[T]he substantial 
equivalent of a thing, in the sense of the patent law, is the same as the thing itself‖ . . . . If the essential 
predicate of the doctrine of equivalents is the notion of identity between a patented invention and its 
equivalent, there is no basis for treating an infringing equivalent any differently from a device that 
infringes the express terms of the patent.) 
434  Zhang Rongyan, Che Ba Shou Zhuan Li Qin Quan An Pou Xi [Analysis of the Handlebar 
case—Determination of the Scope of Protection‘, Zhong Guo Fa Ming Yu Zhuan Li [China Invention & 
Patent] vol. 7, pp. 22 (2006). The author believed that this practice unreasonably expands the scope of 
patent monopoly and leads to an abuse of the doctrine of equivalents. For different opinions see also Meng 
Fanxin, Deng Tong Yuan Ze Zai Shi Yong Xin Xing Zhuan Li Qin Quan Su Song Zhong De Shi Yong 
[Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the Infringement Litigation of Utility Model Patent], Zhong 
Guo Zhuan Li Yu Shang Biao [China Patents & Trademarks], issue 1, pp. 10 (2006). 
435 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in 
the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases (promulgated by the Supreme People‘s Court., Dec. 28, 
2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) , Art.2, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited June 20, 2011) (P.R.C.) 
436
 Louis S. Sorell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected Aspects of Patent Law in China and the United 
States, 11 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 319 (2002). 
437 Cheng & Luo, supra note 382. In practice, it has been recommended by some scholars that when 
interpreting the claims, the courts take reference from the specifications and drawings ―positively and 
initiatively, instead of negatively and passively.‖ See also Yan Wenjun, Zhuan Li Quan De Bao Hu Fan 
Wei [Scope of Patent Claims: Patent Claim Construction and Doctrine of Equivalents] 443(2007). It is 
recommended that courts interpret the patent claims in every circumstance, whether ambiguity exists or 
not. 
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Shanghai, Zhejiang and Guangdong High People‘s Courts. The interpretation 
of the same claims varied significantly from court to court.
438
  
The disputed term was ―a circle of aligning holes‖ and the allegedly 
infringing product had ―only one aligning hole.‖ The last two paragraphs of the 
specification clearly recorded a curved-handlebar which enabled the riders to 
hold the scooter at the best position and allowed them to adjust the angle of the 
handlebar for convenience. The Guangdong High People‘s Court and Zhejiang 
High People‘s Court refused to read this limitation into the patent claim and 
held that the specification was only an applicable example. The courts therefore 
concluded that the patent claim itself did not limit the scope of protection to a 
curved-handlebar, and found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 
However, Shanghai High People‘s Court stated that without the limitations in 
the specification, the goal of the invention could not be accomplished. Since the 
allegedly infringing product did not have the essential technical feature of ―a 
circle of aligning holes,‖ the two technologies were not equivalent in way, 
function or result, and therefore non-infringement was found. 
Moreover, some interpreters believe that inferior change is a special form 
of the equivalent change, and it should be embraced into the scope of protection 
in order to fairly protect the patentee‘s rights.439 Article 41 of the 2001 Opinion 
                                                        
438 Yuan Da Jin Shu Shi Ye You Xian Gong Si su Tian Qi Yun Dong Yong Pin You Xian Gong Si[Yuanda 
Metal Industry Co. Ltd v. Tianqi Sports Equipment Co. Ltd.] (2004) The High People‘s Court of Zhejiang 
Province; No. 6, 3rd Civil Tribunal, The High People‘s Court of Guangdong Province (2003); No.6, 3rd 
Civil Tribunal (Intellectual Property), The High People‘s Court of Shanghai (2003). This case was also 
listed as one of the top 10 Intellectual Property cases of Zhejiang Province in 2004.  
439 Beijing Wan Te Fu Co. Ltd yu Beijing Ke Lin Zhong Yi Xue Ji Shu Yan Jiu Suo [Beijing Wantefu 
Technology Co. Ltd v. Beijing Kelinzhong Institute for Medical Technology], No. 108, Final Decision, 
Civil Tribunal, Beijing High People‘s Court (2003). See also, Liu Xiaojun, Bian Lie Xing Wei Qin Fan 
Zhuan Li Quan Zhi Yan Jiu[The Infringement under the Doctrine of Inferior Change], 4 Intellectual 
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provides that, ―if the inferior method or product intentionally omits some 
essential technical features in the patented claim in order to make it worse than 
the function or effect of the invention, and the inferior method or product 
apparently resulted from the omission of the essential technical features, the 
doctrine of equivalents should be applied and infringement should be found.‖440 
Here the ―inferiority‖ was also considered as a particular type of the broader 
concept of ―equivalents.‖441   
For example, in Beijing Wantefu Technology Co. Ltd v. Beijing Kelinzhong 
Institute for Medical Technology,
442
 the allegedly infringing product omitted 
one claimed feature, i.e. ―a hematoma pulverizer‖, and replaced it with a normal 
syringe. Based on the description of the invention, the flush fluid was ejected 
from the micro-hole at the end of the hematoma pulverized needle to form 
high-pressure vortex flow, so that the hematoma could be pulverized and 
washed. However, in the allegedly infringing product, the flush fluid was 
infused by the needle of the syringe, so that the hematoma could be soaked and 
dissolved, which would take longer time. Apparently, the allegedly infringing 
product was inferior to (not equivalent to) the claimed invention in technical 
effect. On appeal, the Beijing High People‘s Court invoked the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Property 22 (2006) (―A broad concept of equivalents include inferior changes.‖) Sun Nanshen, Chan Pin Ji 
Shu Te Zheng Yu Zhuan Li Qin Quan De Pan Ding Biao Zhun [Product Features and the Criteria for 
Deciding Patent Infringement], Pan Jie Yan Jiu [Case Law], Issue 3, pp. 79 (2003) (―The doctrine of 
equivalents should be applied extensively into the inferior changes.‖) 
440 Article 41, 2001 Opinion. 
441 See also, Liu Xiaojun, Bian Lie Xing Wei Qin Fan Zhuan Li Quan Zhi Yan Jiu[The Infringement under 
the Doctrine of Inferior Change], 4 Intellectual Property 22 (2006) (―A broad concept of equivalents 
include inferior changes.‖) Sun Nanshen, Chan Pin Ji Shu Te Zheng Yu Zhuan Li Qin Quan De Pan Ding 
Biao Zhun [Product Features and the Criteria for Deciding Patent Infringement], Pan Jie Yan Jiu [Case 
Law], Issue 3, pp. 79 (2003) (―The doctrine of equivalents should be applied extensively into the inferior 
changes.‖) 
442 Beijing Wan Te Fu Co. Ltd yu Beijing Ke Lin Zhong Yi Xue Ji Shu Yan Jiu Suo [Beijing Wantefu 
Technology Co. Ltd v. Beijing Kelinzhong Institute for Medical Technology], No. 108, Final Decision, 
Civil Tribunal, Beijing High People‘s Court (2003). See also Liu Huiming, Discussion on the Doctrine of 
Equivalents in Determining the Scope of Patent Protection, 4 Global Law Review 98 (1999). 
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inferior change and adopted a broad scope of patent protection. 
The Supreme People‘s Court has become aware that the doctrine of 
equivalents has been used without proper limitations.
443  
Article 3 of the 





 prosecution estoppel files
446
 and patentee‘s definition as own 
lexicographer
447
 in interpreting the disputed claims. Article 7 of the Judicial 
Interpretation also highlights the all-element rule for determining patent 
infringements, with the hope of controlling the undue expansion of the claim 
meaning.
448
 However, the application of the all-element rule is never an easy 
                                                        
443 Wei Zheng, Deng Tong Yuan Ze De Wu Du Yu Wu Yong[Misreading and Misapplication of the Doctrine 
of Equivalents], Zhong Guo Zhuan Li Yu Shang Biao [China Patents & Trademarks], Issue 3, pp 3 (2006)( 
―It is undeniable that the applications of the doctrine of equivalents are inconsistent with abuse due to the 
lack of clear legal principles and rules.‖ ) See also, Cheng Du You Ta Zhi Yao You Xian Ze Ren Gong Si Su 
Jiang Su Wan Gao Yao Ye You Xian Gong Si Qin Fan Fa Ming Zhuan Li Jiu Fen Zai Shen An[Chengdu 
Youta Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd vs. Jiangsu Wangao Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd] No. 158, Case Review, Civil 
Judgment, Supreme People‘s Court (2009). The trial court and Appellate Court in China both adopted a 
broad interpretation and found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the Supreme People‘s court 
reviewed the case and overturned the decision. 
444 Tai Shan Xian Qu Jian Cai You Xian Gong Si Yu Guang Zhou Xin Lv Huan Zu Ran Zhuang Shi You 
Xian Gong Si, Fu Zhi Hong Qin Fan Shi Yong Xin Xing Zhuan Li Quan Jiu Fen An [Forerunner Building 
Products of Taishan Ltd. vs. Guangzhou New GEP Decoration Material Co., Ltd ] No. 871, Civil Appeal, 
Supreme People‘s Court (2010).(―If a different understanding of the content expressed by the claim leads 
to a dispute regarding the scope of protection, the specifications and the drawings can be used to 
interpret the claim.‖) 
445  Guang Zhou Zhao Ying Wu Jin You Xian Gong Si Su. Huang Gang Ager You Xian Gong Si. 
[Guangzhou Zhao Ying Hardware Co. Ltd vs. Huang Gang Ager Hardware Manufacturing Co. Ltd.], No. 
1180, Civil Appeal, Supreme People‘s Court (2010) (―If the disputed term in independent Claim 1 is 
unclear, the dependant Claim 2 can be used to interpret that term. This is not regarded as a limitation.‖). 
See also, Yin Wei & Wei Lan, Ru He Zheng Que Jie Shi Zhuan Li Quan Li Yao Qiu [How To Interpret 
Patent Claims Correctly], Ren Min Fa Yuan Bao [People‘s Court Daily], pp. 6, 2011, Jan 13. 
446 If the surrender of protection took place in the progress of patent filing, the statements made by the 
patentee could not only give rise to an estoppel in applying the doctrine of equivalents, but also restrict the 
meaning of the terms in claim construction. Zhu Yu Zhen su Ning Bo Fang Tai Chu Ju You Xian Gong Si 
[Zhu Yuzhen v. Ningbo Fang Tai Kitchen Utensils Co. Ltd], No. 017, The 3rd Civil Tribunal, Final 
Decision, Jiangsu High People‘s Court (2004). The Jiangsu High People‘s Court pointed out that ―since the 
patentee redefined the term ‗directly open towards outdoor‘ in the patent reviewing process in order to 
meet the criterion of novelty, he is prevented from recapturing the content that he has explicitly 
surrendered, otherwise it will impair the public interest.‖ The High Court reasoned that ―there is no need to 
invoke the doctrine of equivalents‖ and found no infringement by adopting a narrow interpretation. 
447 Fu Jian Duo Ling Gang Ye Ji Tuan You Xian Gong Si Yu Qi Dong Shi Ba Ling Gang Wan You Xian 
Gong Si Qin Fan Fa Ming Zhuan Li Quan Jiu Fen An [Fujiang Duoling Steel Group Co. Ltd vs. Qidong 
Baling Steel Shot Co., Ltd.] No. 979, Civil Appeal, Supreme People‘s Court (2010).(―The specification 
points out the specific definition of ‗two-stage crushing‘…so the meaning of the term should be based on 
such definition. ‗Two-stage crushing‘ includes primary crushing and fine crushing. ‖) 
448 See also, Rule 3.1.2., Guidelines to Patent Examination of China (2010). According to the Guidelines 
to Patent Examination of China, in determining whether a certain technical feature is an essential technical 
feature, the examiner shall start from the technical problem to be solved and take account of ―the whole 
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task.
449An overly broad application may improperly ―swallow the doctrine of 
equivalents entirely‖ and limit infringement to ―a repeated analysis of literal 
infringement.‖450 
As long as a separate test of equivalence is permitted, the interpreter may 
go beyond the claim language, which would violate the middle way required 
by the Protocol that considers the public notice function of patent claims and 
the desire to encourage innovation. To achieve predictability in interpretation, 
it is important to clearly set out different circumstances where a broader or a 
narrower meaning should be adopted. This requires the continually changing 
technological context to be taken into account. Explicit and concrete guidance 
is needed for interpreters to give justifiable reasons for accepting a particular 
interpretation, i.e., why they would want to define the claim term as such.  
In sum, although the constructive approach purports to walk between the 
lines of overly restricted interpretation and overly broad interpretation, the 
combination of different and sometimes conflicting methods creates more 
                                                                                                                                                 
contents‖ of the description, rather than simply take the technical features of an embodiment as the 
essential technical features. 
449 Kahrl, supra note 1. As illustrated by the practice in the U.S. courts, the doctrine of equivalents is 
inapplicable if a claim limitation is totally missing from the accused device, however, ―whether or not a 
limitation is deemed to be vitiated must take into account that when two elements of the accused device 
perform a single function of the patented invention, or when separate claim limitations are combined into 
a single element of the accused device, a claim limitation is not necessarily vitiated, and the doctrine of 
equivalents may still apply if the differences are insubstantial.‖ DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1314, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33-34; Pennwalt Corp. v. 
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934-35, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo 
Companies, Inc., 16 F.3d 394, 398(Fed. Cir. 1994); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Communication 
Laboratories, Inc., No. 01-1544, -1591 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 17, 2002). 
450 Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (―… the 
above-quoted statements from Dolly, Wiener, and Sage would force the All Elements rule to swallow the 
doctrine of equivalents, reducing the application of the doctrine to nothing more than a repeated analysis of 
literal infringement. Once a negative determination of literal infringement is made, that failure to meet a 
limitation would preclude a finding of infringement under the doctrine. The doctrine of equivalents would 
thus be rendered superfluous under USSC's view, because a finding of non-infringement would be 
foreordained when a court has already found that the accused subject matter does not literally fall within 
the scope of the asserted claim.‖)  
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questions than it answers. It was commented that ―the patent law in China, as 
arguably transplanted out of context with the aim to encourage inventions and 
pursue economic development, invites difficulties for many sectors while its 
objectives, as shall be seen later, are hardly accomplished.‖451 Because of the 
non-rivalrous and non-exclusive nature of intangible objects,
452
 to strike a right 
balance between the patentee‘s interest and the public good is an undisputable 
goal.
453
 The general principle of ―middleness‖ can be the basic underpinning 
for patent claim interpretation, but it fails to provide useful instructions about 
how to balance competing interests in different situations. Explicit guides are 
necessary to help interpreters find in each concrete case a middle way between 




                                                        
451 Liu Deming, The Transplant Effect of the Chinese Patent Law, 5 Chinese J. Int'l L. 733 (2006). 
452 Richard A. Spinello & Herman T. Tavani, Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World: Theory 
and Practice 5 (2005). (―Unlike tangible objects, intellectual objects are public goods. Public goods are 
both non-rivalrous and non-exclusive. An object is non-rivalrous if consumption by one person does not 
diminish what can be consumed by others…A good is non-exclusive if it is impossible to exclude people 
from consuming it.‖) 
453 See e.g. Aubrey Silberston & Klaus Boehm, The British Patent System I. Administration 163 (1967) 
(―…at the heart of all patents policy—the problem of hitting right balance between the public interest in 
restricting the grant of monopolies and the private interests of the patentee.‖); D. Vaver, Intellectual 
Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law 69 (2006) (The balance between individual gain and the public 
good was the foundational aim of the intellectual property law.); Christian Lenk et al., Ethics and Law of 
Intellectual Property: Current Problems in Politics, Science and Technology 98 (2007) (―much current 
discourse on IP policy ranges along a single dimension, between two extreme nodes—the grant of private 
rights to exclude and the defense of the public domain.‖); Michael A. Gollin, Driving Innovation: 
Intellectual Property Strategies for a Dynamic World 45(2008) (―Balancing exclusion and access is one 
goal on which all should be able to agree.‖)  
454 Shan Qiao & Yan Chunguang, Si Fa Shi Jian Zhong Dui Zhuan Li Quan Li Yao Qiu Jie Shi De Shi Li 
Fen Xi [Case Analysis of Patent Claim Interpretation in Judicial Practice], Zhong Guo Fa Ming Yu 
Zhuan Li[China Invention & Patent] Issue 4, 72 (2006). 
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PART II: THE INTERPRETIVE THEORIES UNDERLYING THE 
APPROACHES 
CHAPTER 4 PROMINENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN 
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
This Chapter explores the theoretical bases of the three claim construction 
approaches discussed in Part I. For a long time, patent claims have been 
analogized both to statutes and contracts. The theories of claim interpretation 
remain poorly understood by comparison to the rich literature on statutory and 
contractual interpretation. This Chapter recognizes the distinguishing features 
of claim interpretation. Claim interpretation is to explicate the meaning of a 
claim text in terms of what the PHOSITA means by it in the technological 
context. All the theories of meaning behind the claim construction approaches 
explain language use in particular contexts from the pragmatic point of view. 
Three types of theories underpinning current approaches are introduced 
respectively for discussion: (1) the ordinary use-based theory of meaning 
establishes the conventional use of a term among technological community; (2) 
the intention-based theory of meaning emphasizes the role of the author‘s 
intention, which is considered as the crucial determinant of what that term 
means. (3) The content-based theory of meaning ascertains the interpreter‘s 
construction of contents of the claims. Different theories demonstrate different 
ways of reasoning the meaning of a claim term. The legal outcomes are heavily 
influenced by the interpretive theories adopted by the judge. 
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Section 1 Distinguishing characteristics of patent claim 
interpretation  
Theories of legal interpretation have been fashioned by legal scholars based on 
interpretative theories influential in other disciplines, especially in philosophy 
and literature.
455
 In interpreting a legal text, a judge might look to three kinds of 
meaning: (i) word meaning (what the words of the provision mean, considered 
independently of the intentions of those who adopted them and independently 
of the intentions of those to whom they are addressed), (ii) speaker meaning 
(what those who adopted the provision took it to mean), and (iii) hearer 
meaning (what those to whom the provision is addressed take it to mean).
456
 
For a long time, the patent claims have been analogized both to statutes and 
contracts.
457
 That is probably because ―patents are documents that are largely 
privately drafted, like contracts, but have broad effects on the general public, 
like statutes.‖458  
A. Patent claims interpreted like statutes 
                                                        
455 Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: Contemporary Interpretive Theory, Statutory, Construction, 
and Legislative Histories, 82 Law Libr. J. 419 (1990). 
456 Samuel C. Rickless, What is Legal Interpretation? A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication, 42 San 
Diego L. Rev. 519(2005).   
457
 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Circuit Judge Rader, concurring) (―Is 
claim construction amenable to resolution by resort to strictly algorithmic rules, e.g., specification first, 
dictionaries first, etc.? Or is claim construction better achieved by using the order or tools relevant in each 
case to discern the meaning of terms according to the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the 
time of the invention, thus entrusting trial courts to interpret claims as a contract or statute?‖); see also 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 Lewis & 
Clark Law Review 123 (2005); Crissa Cook, Constructive Criticism: Phillips V. AWH Corp. and the 
Continuing Ambiguity of Patent Claim Construction Principles, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 255 (2006); Frederick 
W. Claybrook, Jr., It‘s Patent that ―Plain Meaning‖ Dictionary Definitions Shouldn't Dictate: What 
Phillips Portends for Contract Interpretation, 16 Fed. Cir. B.J. 91(2007). 
458 Mullally, supra note 32;. See also, Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation xxiii (1957) 
(―Statutes are law. They are supposed to settle the rights and liabilities of the people. Every word in a 
statute is intended to have a definite purpose and no unnecessary words are intentionally used.‖) Curtis J. 
Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 Yale 
L.J. 824 (2007). E. Allan Farnsworth, ―Meaning‖ in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939, 946-52 
(1967). 
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The US Federal Circuit en banc Markman decision tried to determine an 
appropriate analogy for claim construction and finally concluded that claim 
construction is more akin to statutory interpretation: 
The more appropriate analogy for interpreting patent claims is the statutory 
interpretation analogy. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law strictly for the 
court. There can be only one correct interpretation of a statute that applies to all 
persons. Statutes are written instruments that all persons are presumed to be 
aware of and are bound to follow.
459
  
Statutory interpretation often focuses on the ordinary or natural meaning of 
the statute‘s language. The ordinary or natural meaning does not mean strict 
literal meaning,
460
  but means using the words or phrases in ―the same way that 
ordinary people in common usage might speak…any day of the week.‖461 
Adherence to the common sense understanding of the words is critical,
 462
 
because judges have to fulfill their duty as faithful agents of congressional 
                                                        
459 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,52 F. 3d (Fed. Cir. 1995) at 967, 986, 987 (Patent applications, 
unlike contracts, are reviewed by patent examiners, quasi-judicial officials trained in the law and presumed 
to ―have some expertise in interpreting the [prior art] references and to be familiar from their work with the 
level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to issue only valid patents." American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. 
Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed.Cir.1984); See also Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, 
Inc., 860 F.2d at 431 (Fed. Cir. 1988). However, Judge Mayer asserted that ―…claim construction may 
sometimes require the resolution of factual matters before a claim can be authoritatively construed. The 
exercise is further informed by decisions interpreting analogous instruments, for patents are legal 
documents like contracts or deeds.‖ (Mayer, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment).  
460 Michael Zander, The Law-Making Process 125 (5th, ed., 1999); See also Aharon Baraḳ, The Judge in a 
Democracy, 151(2006). Strict literalism has been criticized for its ―judicial shallowness‖ that encourages 
judges to adopt the most straightforward interpretation of the words without regard to whether the 
interpretation makes sense in a particular context. 
461 Tobias A Dorsey, Statutory Construction and Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends; 
Statutory Structure and Legislative Drafting Conventions; Drafting Federal Grants Statutes; And 
Tracking Current Federal Legislation and Regulations 96 (2010). See Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation v. Meyer, 510 U.S.471, 476 (1994), and General Dynamics Land System v. Cline, 540 U.S. 
581 (2004) 
462 Peter Tiersma & Lawrence Solan, The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law 94 (2012) (―As in all 
cases [of statutory construction], we begin by analyzing the statutory language, ‗assuming that the 
ordinary meaning of the language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.‘‖ ) 




 The Court would use the ordinary meaning that prevailed when the 
statute was enacted, not when it is being interpreted.
 464
 
Textualism has been one of the leading theories in the legal interpretation, 
particularly in statutory interpretation.465 Textualism began its rise in the 1980s 
in statutory interpretation in the United States Supreme Court, championed by 
Justices Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas on the U.S. Supreme 
Court and by Judge Easterbrook on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit. The primary characteristic of textualism is its attention to the 
fact of textuality itself,
466
 that is, ―how a term is used within the text.‖467 
Textualists believe that the text achieves meaning distinguishable from what the 
author may have intended.
468
 Ricoeur characterized the ―semantic autonomy of 
the text‖ as three-fold: autonomy (1) from the author‘s intention;469 (2) from the 
                                                        
463 William K. Wimsatt & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 54 Sewanee Review 468 
(1946). Revised version in: The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry 3-18 (1954). Textualists 
assume that textual meaning is ―detached from the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his 
power to intend about it or control it.‖ 
464 Dorsey, supra note 461. See BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States, 541 U.S.176 (2004). The Court has 
emphasized that a departure from plain meaning is justified in ―rare and exceptional circumstances.‖ See 
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 fn 33 (1978)   
465 Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism? 91 Va. L. Rev. 347 (2005). See also, William N. Eskridge, Jr., The 
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (discussing the rise of textualism among scholars and 
judges). The acceleration of this discourse occurred in the mid-1980s when prominent academics and 
members of the judiciary began urging a textualist approach to interpreting statutes. 
466 George H Taylor, Structural. Textualism, 75 B.U. L. Rev 321 (2007). 
467  Bradley C. Karkkainen, ―Plain Meaning‖: Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory 
Construction, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol‘y 401 (1994). Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a 
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in 
A Matter of Interpretation 16–18, 29–37 (1997) (―Textualism should not be confused with so-called strict 
constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute.‖) 
468Antonin Scalia & Amy Gutmann, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law viii 
(1998)(―judicial interpretation should be guided by the text and not by intentions or ideals external to it‖); 
Peter M Tiersma, Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory Interpretation, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 431 
(2001-2002) (―Statutes tend to be quite autonomous, not unlike messages set adrift in the currents of the 
ocean…The relative autonomous nature of legal texts thus provides a linguistic explanation for the 
development of plain meaning rule and textual approaches to interpretation.‖ ) Peter M. Tiersma, Legal 
Language 128 (2000) (―A judge interpreting a legal document can reasonably presume that the lawyer 
drafting it was successful in creating a carefully crafted and relative complete and autonomous document 
…these presumptions, obviously, form the underpinnings of the plain meaning rule.‖) 
469 Antonin Scalia, Law and Language, 157 First Things37, 37 (2005). Justice Scalia, one of the most 
prominent adherents of textualism, considers words as conventional symbols that convey an objective 
meaning, regardless of what their author intended them to mean (―What is needed for a symbol to convey 
meaning is not an intelligent author, but a conventional understanding on the part of the readers or hearers 
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cultural and sociological conditions of the text‘s production; 470 and (3) from its 
original audience.
471
 It is the objective of textualist interpretation to establish 
the ordinary meaning of a word at the time of the creation of the text.
472
  
Textualism attempts to constrain the discretion of judges from reading 
their own values and beliefs into the text.
473
 It favors understanding the text the 
way a neutral, detached and impartial observer would have understood it at the 
time it was created.
474
 It is believed that when interpreters are constrained by 
the text of the statute, statutory meaning becomes more certain and the cost of 
discerning meaning decreases.
475
 By employing the statutory interpretation 
analogy in claim construction, courts emphasize the public notice function of 
patent claims to enhance certainty of meaning.  
However, there still remain significant differences between the ―ordinary 
meaning‖ in statutory interpretation and claim interpretation. While statutory 
                                                                                                                                                 
that certain signs or certain sounds represent certain concepts.‖) 
470 Joel Schellhammer, Defining the Court‘s Role as Faithful Agent in Statutory Interpretation: Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005), 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1119 (2006) 
(―when contextual evidence of semantic usage points decisively in one direction, that evidence takes 
priority over contextual evidence that relates to questions of policy‖.) Frank B. Cross, The Theory and 
Practice of Statutory Interpretation 25 (2009). (―Textualism places limits on the sort of extrinsic evidence 
relevant to interpretation and its relative significance.‖) 
471 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences 91 (John B. Thompson ed. & trans., 1981); See 
also, Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action 74 (1991); Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the 
Surplus of Meaning 91 (1976) (―The text—objectified and dehistoricized—becomes the necessary 
mediation between writer and reader.‖) 
472 Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: the Basic Questions 67 (2007).   
473 Roger Colinvaux, What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good Judging Under a Textualist 
Lens, 72 Ind. L.J. 1133, 1141(1997). (―The text is meant to be objective and judges are meant to approach 
it using tools that are mechanical and so facilitate the likelihood that the result will be objective.‖) 
474 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, 34 (2007) (―According to new textualism, a judge 
should interpret a text according to the ordinary and natural meaning that the words would have to an 
ordinary person reading the text at the time it was created.‖); See also John F. Manning, Textualism and the 
Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 108–09 (2001).(―Modern textualists, however, are not 
literalists. In contrast to their early-twentieth-century predecessors in the "plain meaning' school, they do 
not claim that interpretation can occur ‗within the four corners‘ of a statute… Rather, modern textualists 
acknowledge that language has meaning only in context.) Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution 
Prescribe Rules for its Own Interpretation? 103. Nw. U. L. Rev. 857 (2009).(―It is the understanding of a 
hypothetical objective observer that matters.‖) 
475 Linda D. Jellum, Mastering Statutory Interpretation 20 (2008). (―When judges and litigants are 
constrained by the text of the statute, statutory meaning becomes more certain and litigation cost 
decreases.) 
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interpretation relies on publicly shared conventions for deciphering words from 
a neutral, detached and impartial observer, patent claim construction asks how 
an ordinary skilled person would read the claim text in a particular 
technological context.
476
 By comparison, patent claims are often interpreted in 
specific and constantly changing technological contexts, by referring to the 
highly context-sensitive and pragmatic technological knowledge which are not 
well known to a layman. Therefore, one cannot simply analogize claim 
interpretation to statutory interpretation either in theory or practice. 
B. Patent claims interpreted like contracts 
Patent claim interpretation has also been analogized to contract 
interpretation.
477
James Oldham made an observation of the case Liardet v. 
Johnson 
478
 that ―the contract model was more realistic, or at least plausible as 
an analogy, despite the fundamental nature of the patent as a bestowed grant.‖ 
In Kirin-Amgen, Lord Hoffmann referred to changes in approach led by Lord 
Wilberforce in cases such as Prenn v. Simmonds
479
 and Reardon Smith Line Ltd. 
                                                        
476 Gold & Durell, supra note 217. 
477 Mullally, supra note 32. (―The examiner typically rejects or objects to one or more claims in the 
application. In response, the applicant may amend her claims to address the examiner‘s concerns. The 
applicant may also submit arguments or additional information about the invention to overcome claim 
rejections, with or without making amendments to the claims. These transactions continue until either the 
examiner allows the claims or the applicant decides not to pursue them… This back-and-forth process is 
similar to a contract negotiation..‖) Jiri Janko, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation: 
Incorporating Semiotic Theory of Meaning-Making into Legal Interpretation, 38 Rutgers L.J. 601 (2007). 
(―Statutes and contracts do not come into being in the same way. The latter is often the product of 
bargaining, negotiation, or at least the product of the expectations of two parties.‖) Jonathan L. Moore, 
supra note 5. (―When responding to this initial rejection, an applicant will either submit arguments in 
support of the original claim or amend his or her claims in order to address the examiner‘s concerns. 
Undoubtedly, this process resembles the negotiating and bargaining that routinely occurs with contracts.‖) 
478 James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century 
731(1992). 
479 Prenn v. Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381. In Prenn v. Simmonds, Lord Wilberforce remarked that ―The 
time has long passed when agreements, even those under seal, were isolated from the matrix of facts in 
which they were set and interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations.‖ 




, and pointed out that: 
The author of a document such as a contract or patent specification is using 
language to make a communication for a practical purpose and that a rule of 
construction which gives his language a meaning different from the way it would 




In contractual interpretation, it is important to interpret that term according 
to the intention of the parties.
 482
 For example, European Principles of Contract 
Law provides that: ―if it can be shown that they shared a common intention, or 
that one party‘s intention was or must have been known to the other party, the 
contract will be interpreted accordingly even if that is not the literal meaning of 
the word used. If it is not possible to establish a common intention, the contract 
is to be interpreted objectively, according to the meaning that reasonable 
persons of the same kind (condition) as the parties would give to it in the same 
circumstances.‖ 483  Intentionalism is basic to contractual interpretation. 484 
                                                        
480 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989. 
481 Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] RPC 169. David J. 
Brennan, The Evolution of English Patent Claims as Property Definers, 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly 
361-399, (2005). In the UK, there is an explicit conception of the ―social contract‖ theory of patents: 
disclosure as the quid pro quo for exclusive patent right. 
482 Cross, supra note 470. When courts are required to interpret a contract, they must examine the intent of 
the contracting parties. The prevailing view is that a court should consider context, including extrinsic 
sources, in order to determine the intent of the contracting parties. Nelson, see supra note 465465. In 
statutory interpretation, the intentionalists interpret the words of a statute in the sense which their author 
intended to convey, that is, they regard the goal of statutory interpretation as being to discern and 
implement the intent of the legislature. 
483 Ole Lando, Hugh Beale, Commission on European Contract Law, Principles of European Contract 
Law xxxv (2000) Article 5.101 (1) of the European Principles of Contract Law provides that: (1) A 
contract is to be interpreted to the common intention of the parties even if it is different from the literal 
meaning of the words. (2) If it is established that one party intended the contract to have a particular 
meaning, and at the time of the conclusion of the contract the other party could not have been unaware of 
the first party. (3) If an intention cannot be established according to (1) or (2), the contract is to be 
interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties would give to 
it in the same circumstances. The European Principles of Contract Law can be found at: General Rules of 
Interpretation http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.principles.parts.1.to.3.2002/5.101.html (last visited 
Jul. 25, 2012) 
484 Cross, supra note 470, at 60. 
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Intentionalism posits the authorial intention as the constitutive basis for textual 
meaning. It holds that ―text alone, no matter how long and dense, can never 
yield meaning,‖485 Instead, the meaning of a text is identical to the meaning that 
its author intended it to communicate.
486
 John Wigmore rejected the plain 
meaning rule as unsound: 
…the ordinary standard or ‗plain meaning‘ is simply the meaning of people who 
did not write the document. The fallacy consists in assuming that there is or ever 
can be some one real or absolute meaning. In truth, there can be only some 
person‘s meaning, and that person, whose meaning the law is seeking, is the 
writer of the document.
487
 
There are strong and moderate versions of intentionalism. Steven Knapp 
and Walter Benn Michaels advocated strong intentionalism, arguing that the 
meaning of a text is identical to the meaning that its author intended it to 
communicate.
488
 Strong intentionalism believes that the author is the source of 
the authority over the meanings of the text he or she produces.
489
 The moderate 
intentionalism, which was advocated by Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy, held 
that the true meaning of a text is its ―utterance meaning‖ given the totality of 
                                                        
485 Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 629 (2005). Larry Alexander & 
Saikrishna Prakash, ―Is That English You're Speaking?‖ Why Intention Free Interpretation is an 
Impossibility, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 967 (2004). There can be no such thing as intention-free meaning. 
486 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Moderate versus Strong Intentionalism: Knapp and Michaels Revisited, 42 San 
Diego L. Rev. 669 (2005).  
487 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2462 at 198 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1981) (Emphasis in original). 
488 Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction, 14 
Critical Inquiry 49 (1987). See also, Lord Reid in Westminster Bank v. Zane (1966), A.C. 182, quoted in 
Alfred Phillips, Lawyers‘ Language: How and Why Legal Language is Different 95 (2003). 
489  Jacqueline Mariña, The Cambridge companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher 73 (2005); Tom 
Campbell, Prescriptive Legal Positivism: Law, Rights and Democracy 88 (2004). Hirsch, supra note 292, 
at 5 (―if the meaning of the text is not the author‘s, then no interpretation can possibly correspond to the 
meaning of a text, since the text can have no determinate or determinable meaning.‖) Mark Bevir, Meaning 
and Intention: A Defence of Procedural Individualism, 31 New Literary History 3, 386 (2000). So to 
understand what a text says, strong intentionalists would typically identify authorial intentions with prior 
purposes. 
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admissible evidence, which is distinct from both the speaker‘s meaning and the 
word meaning. 
490
 Moderate intentionalists ignore secret and disguised 
subjective intent but demands attention to the ostensible intention.
491
 They 
assume that any interpretation of the text must comport with the ―explicit, 
implicit, or reconstructed intention of its makers‖.492 It asserts that the meaning 
of a text is what the author‘s intent or purpose might plausibly have been, 
regardless of whether it matches the actual intentions of the author.
493
 Moderate 
intentionalism and textualism may yield the same result in many cases.
494
 The 
theories will yield different outcomes when the notional interpreter has access 
to ―evidence that goes beyond this public language meaning, which may 
support an attribution of intentions that resolves the case.‖ 495 
                                                        
490 Goldsworthy, supra note 486. (―Moderate intentionalists hold that an author may intend his text to 
mean something, but fail to give it that, or perhaps any, meaning.‖) See, Grant Huscroft & Bradley Miller, 
The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 49 (2011) (―Utterance meaning is 
distinct from both its sentence meaning and its speaker‘s meaning. Utterance meaning is the full meaning 
of an utterance, implied as well as expressed, and it depends on what the speaker‘s meaning appears to be, 
given evidence that is readily available to his or her intended audience, including the sentence meaning of 
the utterance and other clues such as its context.‖) Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sack, The Legal Process 
1374 (William N．Eskridge & Philip P．Frickey ed., 1994) (―under which a court interpreting a statute 
should ―decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and ... interpret the words of the statute 
immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it can.‖) The Hart and Sacks version of 
purposivism theory is based on two fairly sensible assumptions about the legislative process. The first 
assumption posits a legislature ―made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.‖  
Second, ―every statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act.‖  The two assumptions, 
taken together, proceed on the view that lawmakers enact laws not as a meaningless exercise but as a 
conscious effort to reach some objectivity. 
491 Abby Wright, For All Intents and Purposes: What Collective Intention Tells us about Congress and 
Statutory Interpretation, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 983 (2006); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation — In 
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983). It should be noted that both 
legislative intent and legislative purpose are different from what Judge Easterbrook has called ―raw intent‖ 
- that is, intent without any law, meaning that a ―law‖ could be enforced if it comported with a legislative 
purpose that had no instantiation in an actual statute—which is no longer a serious contender as an 
interpretive theory. 
492 Allan C. Hutchinson, It‘s All In the Game: A Nonfundationalist Account of Law and Adjudication, 91 
(2000). 
493 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 Boston University Law 
Review 204-238 (1980), in Constitutional Law and Its Interpretation 305(Jules L. Coleman & Anthony 
James Sebok ed., 1994).  
494 Huscroft & Miller, supra note 490, 49.(In any particular case, utterance meaning may be similar or 
even identical to sentence meaning, or to speaker‘s meaning, or to both. It all depends on how much 
contextual evidence of speaker‘s meaning is or was readily available to the intended audience, and how far 
speaker‘s meaning goes beyond sentence meaning.) 
495 Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law 141 (2011). In 
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 Intentionalism is attractive because it claims faithfulness to the original 
design or plan of the author.
496
 In the patent context, the inventor is presumed to 
convey his intent in the patent documents, ―much like the parties to a fully 
integrated, written contract are presumed to have conveyed their intent in the 
written contract.‖497 Under purposive construction, interpreters also construct, 
project or hypothesize a most plausible patentee‘s intention in light of the text 
and context. However, patent claim interpretation should be distinguished from 
contractual interpretation.  
Besides the unique use of an ordinary skilled person for specific technical 
issues, in patent claim interpretation there is no consensus ad idem (―meeting of 
minds‖ or ―common intention‖) 498  between the litigating parties, e.g. the 
patentee and the possible infringers, at a point of time in the past. A patent by its 
very nature is affected with a public interest.
499
 ―Patents, unlike contracts, are 
not executory in nature or discretionary in their issuance, and always involve a 
transaction with the federal government rather than any other entity.‖500 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
some cases of this sort, the interpreter may have access to evidence that goes beyond the public language 
meaning that is ambiguous or non-specific, which may support an attribution of intentions that resolves the 
case; in other cases of this sort, the public language meaning may be sufficient but the interpreter has 
access to information which supports a different outcome. 
496 W.K. Wimsatt, Jr., & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry 4 
(1954).  
497 Jessica C. Kaiser, Note, What's that Mean? A Proposed Claim Construction Methodology for Phillips 
v. AWH Corp., 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1009 ( 2005). (―The competitor to a patentee, unlike the nondrafter of 
the contract, did  
not have an opportunity to review the patent and object to provisions or refuse his assent before the patent 
issued. Therefore, in the case of patent claim construction, the court has stronger reasons to construe 
ambiguity against the drafter of the patent than in contract interpretation under the doctrine of contra 
preferentum.) 
498 Mindy Chen-Wishart, Contract Law 54 (2007). 
499 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), 8th Edition, August 2001, Latest Revision July 
2010,§ 1.56 Duty to disclose information material to patentability. 
500 Markman v. westview Instruments. Inc., 52 F.3d 984–87 (Archer, C.J., writing for majority and 
rejecting argument that claim construction should be analogized to the interpretation of contracts, deeds 
and wills), with id. at 997–98 (Mayer, J., concurring in judgment but rejecting majority view that claim 
construction is a matter of law solely for the judge; drawing instead an analogy between construction of 
patent claims and interpretation of contracts and deeds which may have underlying questions of fact), and 
id. at 1007 (Newman, J., dissenting and referring with approval to the treatment of disputes concerning the 
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patentee is obliged to make full disclosure of his invention in exchange for 
exclusionary right.
 501
 Therefore, judges not only need to ascertain and 
effectuate the intent of the inventor, but also need to ensure that the public 
interest is best served by injecting factual and policy considerations into claim 
construction.
502
 An intentionalist stance alone cannot account for the process of 
determining patent claim meaning. 
C. Uniqueness of patent claim interpretation 
This thesis does not analogize theories of claim interpretation to those of 
contractual or statutory interpretation, but highlights the distinguishing features 
of claim interpretation theories. The difficulty of patent claim interpretation has 
been best summarized as follows: ―Attaching verbal labels to non-verbal 
objects becomes more difficult as the complexity of the object increases, and 
this problem only deepens when, as well as labeling the object itself, we are 
additionally asked to use words to draw its boundaries.‖503 In patent law, once 
the claim text is interpreted, all subsequent determinations of whether the patent 
is infringed or whether the invention is patentable are governed by that 
                                                                                                                                                 
meaning of technical terms as fact issues for a trier of fact in contract cases). 
501 Osenga, supra note 81. (―The patentee agrees to make full disclosure of his invention, a task that he is 
not otherwise obligated to do, in return for receiving an exclusionary property right in the invention from 
the government.‖) 
502 Lee, supra note 35. The author proposed to shift attention away from the literal text of patent claims 
toward a substantive appraisal of a patent‘s technological contribution. (―Congress could amend the Patent 
Act to clarify that courts should consider an invention‘s technological merit, the accused device, and the 
competitive dynamics of a particular field when construing claim.‖) Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on 
Patents,§18.03 [2] [a]. A claim has been analogized as a contract, which is a bilateral instrument. (―To 
interpret the communication, it is also necessary to determine ―what a patentee intended to claim as his 
invention or discovery‖ and ―what invention or discovery the patent office intended to grant a temporary 
monopoly‖.) 
503 Matthew Fisher, The Tyranny of Words: Patent Claim Construction in the UK and US, 36 Common 
Law World Review 262 (2007). See also, e.g. Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (―On one side rests the very important, statutorily-created necessity of employing the 
clearest possible wording in preparing the specification and claims of a patent, one of ‗the most difficult 
legal instruments to draw with accuracy.‘ On the other lies the equally important, judicially-created 
necessity of determining infringement without the risk of injustice that may result from a blindered focus 
on words alone.‖) 




 The choice of interpretive legal theory has important effects on the 
outcomes of patent litigations.
505
  
In order to know how to read a patent claim text, we must have a better 
understanding of interpretation.
506
 Interpretations have to do with meanings.
507
 
―A general theory of meaning and interpretation is a theoretical conception 
which allows to grasp, in an overall way, the nature of linguistic expressions 
and what their meaning is, and also what their interpretation is.‖508 As Owen 
Fiss stated, ―interpretation, whether it be in the law or literary domain is… a 
dynamic interaction between reader and text.‖509 The discernment of legal 
meaning is an important feature of law.
510
 In legal interpretation, various 
theories of meaning and interpretation give an answer to these questions in 
some way or other. In patent claim construction, how do we locate meaning of 
a claim in the interpretive process: is it the intention of the patentee or an 
                                                        
504 Lefstin, supra note 27. See also, Douglas Y‘Barbo, Interpreting Words in a Patent, 1 Chi.-Kent J. 
Intell. Prop. 191, 192 (1999). (―Naturally, the accused infringer will urge a construction of the disputed 
term that places the accused device outside the just-determined scope, and not surprisingly this proffered 
construction is as broad as possible yet just barely avoids the accused device. Of course, the patent 
owner will urge a construction that places the accused device within the scope. Yet while the patent 
owner wishes to urge a construction that captures the accused device, he is careful not to offer a 
proposed construction that is so broad that the recently construed claims are judged invalid. Hence, the 
process of proffering an interpretation of the disputed claim's term has a strong self-policing character to 
it.‖) James R. Barney & Charles T Collins-Chase, An Empirical Analysis of District Court Claim 
Construction Decisions, January to December 2009, 2011 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2 (2011). The author 
believed that this description was generally accurate, but it left out an important exception: ―if an accused 
infringer believes that the accused device is likely to meet a particular claim limitation under any 
reasonable construction, he may choose to propose a very broad construction for that term (i.e., broader 
than the patentee‘s construction), in hopes of strengthening his invalidity defense.‖ 
505 Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High? Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of. Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 981 (2010) (―…cases in which 
claim constructions are both material and indeterminate—that is cases in which there are several plausible 
claim interpretations, each with substantial support in the case record, but each leading to a very different 
case result.)   
506 Aharon Barak, Hermeneutics and Constitutional Interpretation (― What is ―interpretation‖ and how is 
it accomplished?‖)   
507 Willem A. DeVries, Meaning and Interpretation in History, 22 History and Theory 253-63 (1983) (―it 
is through interpretation that we come to know meanings.‖) 
508 Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska, Meaning and Interpretation I, 85 Studia Logica 1, 108 (2007).  
509 Gary C. Leeds, The Latest and Best Word on Legal Hermeneutics: A Review Essay of Interpreting Law 
and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 375 (1990). 
510 Dennis Patterson, What is Legal Interpretation? Interpretation in Law, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 685 
(2005). 
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objective meaning of the claim text itself independent of the intention of the 
patentee? The theories underpinning the three claim interpretation approaches 
(the ordinary meaning approach, the purposive approach and the constructive 
approach) can be classified into three types: the ordinary use-based theory of 
meaning, the intention-based theory of meaning and the content-based theory of 
meaning.  
This thesis, however, is aware that theories of meaning are the terrain of 
the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics.
511
 The central task in 
law is the application of a historical text to a present case.
512
 Both in theory and 
in practice the ascertainment of meaning is far more complex than a simple 
application of a theory of meaning: ―interpretive problems are not reducible to 
linguistic problems.‖ 513 The theories of meaning, in fact, are used to provide 
insight to a range of possible approaches to meaning, which lead to competing 
modes of analysis for claim interpretation. They help to explain how judges 
approach their own interpretative tasks and explore key differences and 
overlaps between various approaches.  
To get a clearer concept of patent claim construction, first it is necessary to 
answer two questions: what constitute meaning of a patent claim, and, what 
goes to prove that meaning? Compared to interpretation of other legal texts, 
patent claim construction has its unique features, such as the perspective of the 
                                                        
511 Lawrence B. Solum, Artificial Meaning, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 69-86 (2014) 
512 Ralf Poscher, Hermeneutics, Jurisprudence and Law, in Jeff Malpas & Hans-Helmuth Gander (eds.), 
Routledge Companion to Philosophical Hermeneutics (2014) 
513 Pierluigi Chiassoni, A Nice Derangement of Literal-Meaning Freaks: Linguistic Contextualism and the 
Theory of Legal Interpretation (2005)  
http://www.giuri.unige.it/intro/dipist/digita/filo/testi/analisi_2006/07chiassoni.pdf (last visited at 
06/07/2014) 
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person having ordinary skill in the art,
514
 the technical nature of the subject 
matter,
515
 and the dynamic changes in technology,
516
 etc. It is the principal 
lesson of contemporary semantics that all words, legal and other wise, take their 
complete meaning from a relevant context.
517
 Patent claim interpretation 
explicates the meaning of a claim term in terms of what the ordinary skilled 
person means by it in a pertinent technological context, taking into 
consideration of the claims, the specification and drawings, as well as 
dictionaries and expert evidence, etc.. Various claim interpretation approaches 
all pay much attention to the use of terms by the specialized audience, i.e., the 
PHOSITA, in a specific technological context.
518
  
Despite many differences, all the theories of meaning behind these claim 
construction approaches share the common aim of ―looking at the actual uses of 
language and attention to the pragmatics of language,‖519 which is a vision of 
                                                        
514 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (―The person of ordinary skill in 
the art ―is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an understanding of their meaning 
in the field, and to have knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field.‖‖)See also, Gold & 
Durell, supra note 217. 
515  Menell et. al., supra note 5.(―The substantive law of claim construction can be analogized to 
interpretation of other texts, but various nuanced features – the perspective of the person of ordinary skills, 
the technical nature of the subject matter, distinctions between lay and technical terms, the importance of 
prosecution history, the interplay of multiple claims, and the need to safeguard the jury‘s role in 
determining infringement – distinguish interpretation of patent claims from contractual and statutory.‖) 
516 Lemley, supra note 7. 
517 Myres S. McDougal & Richard N. Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 
60 Yale Law Journal (1951), 258 at 289. 
518 Stephen Neale, Paul Grice and The Philosophy of Language, Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):509 – 
559 (1992). Wittgenstein et al, Philosophical Investigations lxxiii (2009); See also, Stanley Cavell, The 
Claim of Reason, 206-207 (1979). (―‗The meaning is the use‘ calls attention to the fact that what an 
expression means is a function of what it is used to mean or to say on specific occasions…‖) Stephen 
Neale, Paul Grice and The Philosophy of Language, Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):509 – 559 (1992). 
The only useful thing to say about the meaning of an expression is that ―it is used in such-and-such a way, 
or is usable in such-and-such circumstances.‖ James Conant, Wittgenstein On Meaning and Use, 
Philosophical Investigations 21:3 (1998) (quoting Wittgenstein‘s words, ―it is a mistake to think that the 
words themselves possess a meaning apart from their capacity to have a meaning when called upon in 
various contexts of use.‖ ‖) Finn Collin & Finn Guldmann, Meaning, Use, and Truth: Introducing the 
Philosophy of Language 21 (2005) (―Wittgenstein encapsulates this insight in the slogan ‗meaning is use‘.) 
519 Maria Baghramian, Modern Philosophy of Language, xxxiv (1999). 
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language as ―public practice and shared action.‖520 That is, in describing how a 
word is used in a specific context, we describe its meaning.
521
 They remind us 
that claim interpretation is not purely of linguistic interest, and the terms must 
always be understood in reference to how they occurs in a particular technical 




Section 2 Ordinary use-based theory in claim interpretation 
To begin with, the notion of the ordinary use of words or expressions is as 
follows: ―an expression which has an ordinary use, i.e. which is ordinarily used 
to describe a certain sort of situation… To be an ordinary expression it must 
have a commonly accepted use; it need not be the case that it is ever used.‖523  
The ordinary use-based theory holds that the meaning of the words corresponds 
to the ordinary meaning used in the given community of speakers in a given 
context.
524
 Relying on this theory, interpretations of patent claim are to be 
guided by the commonly accepted meaning of the terms used by a PHOSITA in 
the relevant technological community. Notably, this meaning is not a 
commonly understood public meaning in abstraction from any specific 
                                                        
520 Donatella Di Cesare, Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait 164 (2013).(―Precisely because language is 
always ‗public‘, it is always communal and necessarily dialogical.‖) 
521 Oswald Hanfling, Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, 43 (1989) (―knowing what it means is the same as 
knowing how to use it.‖) 
522 Joseph F. Hanna, Two Ideals of Scientific Theorizing, in Michael Burgoon (ed.), Communication 
Yearbook 5, 39 (1981). 
523 Norman Malcolm, Moore and Ordinary Language, in Richard M. Rorty (ed.), The Linguistic Turn: 
Essays in Philosophical Method 16 (1992). (―By this I do not mean that the expression need be one that is 
frequently used. It need only be an expression which would be used.‖) 
524 Fabrizio Macagno, The Presumptions of Meaning: Hamblin and Equivocation, 31 Informal Logic 4, 
368-394 (2011) (―On the one hand, the speaker presumes that the hearer knows the meaning of the words 
he used, because they correspond to the ordinary (in the given community of speakers) meaning (in 
context). On the other hand, the hearer interprets the words on the basis of the presumption that the speaker 
is using them according to their ordinary usage (in con-text).‖) 




 It is ordinary not in the sense of being plain, but that it is formulated 
based on the well-accepted and conventional usage of words in the scientific 
and technological community.
526
 The meaning of claims can be formulated as 
follows under this theory:  
(A) What a PHOSITA would understand a claim term α to mean by 
identifying its ordinary usage in the art at the time of filing. 
The theoretical rationale is that when a word or phrase has been widely 
used in a given community, using the word with a different meaning creates 
uncertainty and leads to further confusion. Thus, it is important that the 
interpretation will not result in any significant changes in the way that a word is 
commonly or ordinarily used. In patent claim interpretation, if no novel uses of 
claim words are expressly disclosed by the patent,
527
 an inventor‘s claim terms 
should take on their ordinary meaning from the perspective of the PHOSITA.
528
 
Such interpretation creates a ―heavy presumption‖ in favor of a term‘s ordinary 
                                                        
525 Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (―while this ‗ordinary 
meaning‘ rule is usually expressed as a pat formula, the context supplied by the field of invention, the prior 
art, and the understanding of skilled artisans generally is key to discerning the normal usage of words in 
any claim.‖)  
526Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Court gives claim 
terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. See also, 
Joseph LaLumia, The Ways of Reason: A Critical Study of the Ideas of Emile Meyerson, 105 (2004) 
(―Thus, convention, that is to say, ordinary use and disposition commonly attending such ordinary use, 
make such statements analytical.‖) 
527 Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (―The patentee may 
demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including 
in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of 
claim scope.‖);  See also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (―When a patentee acts as his own lexicographer in redefining the meaning of particular claim terms 
away from their ordinary meaning, he must clearly express that intent in the written description.‖). 
528
 Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell 
Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Elekta Instrument, S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int'l, Inc., 
214 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000), Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 
Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1988); ZMI Corp. v. 
Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 




 The motivation for the choice of the ordinary 
use-based theory is the desire to further the public notice function of claims.
530
 
―The function of claims is to enable everyone to know, without going through a 
lawsuit, what infringes the patent and what does not.‖531 Meaning enters the 
public domain and is more accessible and comprehensible to the readers,
532
 so 
that those who need to read patents would understand the scope of patent claims 
in a plain or straightforward manner.
533
 
With the aim of enhancing public notice,
534
 even if the commonly 
accepted meaning yields an absurd result, judges are not willing to redraft 
claims to avoid a nonsensical result; even if ―error‖ occurred in drafting of the 
claim, it is what the patentee claimed and what the public is entitled to rely on. 
For example, in Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
535
 the claim at issue 
related to a dough-producing process. The sole issue in this appeal was the 
                                                        
529 Barney, supra note 104. 
530 Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 542 (2009) (―The traditional concept of fair notice 
demands that no person be held to account under a law the content of which he was unable to know before 
hand. By seeking to discern the most reasonable, plain meaning of a statute, textualism by its very 
definition seeks to satisfy this dictate of fair notice.‖) 
531 Rich, supra note 6. 
532 Clark D. Cunningham, et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 Yale Law Journal 1561 (1994); See 
also Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law 126 (2005). (Textualism is widely embraced on a 
principle that the language in the legal text ought to be readily understood by the audience, ―in as straight 
forward and immediately comprehensible a way as possible.‖) 
533 See e.g. General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938). (―The inventor 
must inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted so that it may be 
known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not.‖) 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 373, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (―the public [would] be 
deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights.‖) 
534 Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 09-1557 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court‘s claim construction of the term ―centrifugal unit‖ in claim 16 of U.S. Patent No. 
6,705,983. The body of claim 16 refers back to ―the centrifugal unit,‖ further defining its height and radius 
dimensions. The district court construed the term ―centrifugal unit‖ as used in claim 16 to mean only the 
vessel, not the vessel and the tubing. The district court reasoned that because the vessel and tubing are 
always larger than the vessel alone, construing  ―centrifugal unit‖ to include the tubing in the context of 
dimensional limitations would yield an absurdity. The Federal Circuit reverse the district court's claim 
construction and hold that ―centrifugal unit‖ in claim 16 consistently means a vessel and a plurality of 
tubes, irrespective of its meaning in claim 1. 
535 Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Chef America urged the court 
to interpret the claim as if it read "heating the ... dough at a temperature in the range of," i.e., to apply the 
heating requirement to the place where the heating takes place (the oven) rather than the item being heated 
(the dough). 
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meaning of the following language in a patent claim: ―heating the resulting 
batter-coated dough to a temperature in the range of about 400° F. to 850° F.‖ 
The problem with this limitation was that undisputedly, if the dough was heated 
to the specified temperature range, ―it would be burned to a crisp.‖ Chef 
America, the owner of the patent, argued that ―to‖ should be construed to mean 
―at‖ because otherwise the patented process could not perform the function the 
patentees intended. However, the Federal Circuit held that ―these are ordinary, 
simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable,‖ and the 
court must look to the ordinary meaning of the claim terms ―even if the ordinary 
meaning produces a nonsensical result.‖536  
Another example is Teknowledge v. Akamai.
537
 In order to avoid summary 
judgment of invalidity for claim 29, the Plaintiff argued that the final phrase of 
the claim was an inadvertent typographical error and requested that the court 
change the phrase ―objects fetched from said clients‖ to either ―objects fetched 
for said clients,‖ or ―objects fetched from said servers.‖ The court denied the 
request and held that the plain meaning of the phrase to one skilled in the art was 
that the clients were the source of the objects, although the plain meaning 
presented a nonsensical result.
538
 The preoccupation within the four corners of 
                                                        
536 Id. 
537 Teknowledge vs. Akamai, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The U.S. District Court held that the 
correction of an alleged typographical error in the text of a patent claim would constitute an impermissible 
re-drafting of the patent. Sage Products Inc vs. Devon Industries Inc. 126 F 3d 1420 (Fed Cir 1997) The 
court suggested a doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, stating that a skilled patent drafter would have 
foreseen the limiting potential of the language actually used in the claim, and that the patent drafter was not 
prevented by any ―subtlety of language or complexity of the technology‖ from using language that 
encompassed the equivalent at issue. Freedman Seating Co v American Seating Co. 420 F 3d 1350 (Fed 
Cir 2005), the court held that the patentee had clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but failed to do 
so; therefore, the patentee had to bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration 
of its claimed structure. 
538 Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. vs. CTS Cement Manufacturing Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) The district court declined to correct the error of lacking a comma between ―f‖ and ―cl,‖ in 
the claimed compound C9S3S 3¯Ca(f cl)2 and found the asserted claim indefinite, holding that it was not 
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The ordinary meaning approach based on the ordinary use-based theory 
emphasizes the customary use and application of a term which grows out of a 
technological community. It is believed that ―the inquiry into how a person of 
ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term provides an objective baseline 
from which to begin claim interpretation.‖540 The quest for the patentee‘s intent 
is considered inappropriate in identifying the meaning of a claim term, since ―to 
consider the inventor‘s intent would be to thwart the very objectivity the 
PHOSITA provides.‖541 To ascertain the ordinary use of a claim term at the 
time of filing, judges prefer to inquire linguistic conventions, key sentence 
features and textual cross-references, and compare the relevant parts of the text 
of the whole document. There is a relatively fixed hierarchy of interpretive rules 
in favor of intrinsic evidence.
542
 For instance, the specification‘s significance 
                                                                                                                                                 
apparent on the face of the patent, even though it might be clear to one of ordinary skill in the art. On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit adopted a more contextual reading, ―if the correction is not subject to 
reasonable debate to one of ordinary skill in the art, namely, through claim language and the specification, 
and the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation, then a court can correct an obvious 
typographical error. In that regard, we note that the court has determined that the claimed formula 
C9S3S¯3Ca(f cl)2 ―corresponds to no known mineral,‖ and that one of ordinary skill in the art would 
know that the formula should contain a comma.‖ 
539
 Louis E. Wolcher, A Philosophical Investigation into Methods of Constitutional Interpretation in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 13 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 239 (2006). In the article, Professor 
Wolcher gave concise philosophical descriptions of methods of constitutional interpretation, he pointed 
out that to be an exercise of legal interpretation judges must follow, in good faith, some legally valid 
method of interpretation that they consider to be binding on them - either as ―textualism,‖ ―originalism,‖ 
―evolutionism,‖ ―judicial pragmatism,‖ or something else. He also noted the critique of textualism and 
originalism that ―any alleged public agreement about a word‘s meaning is haphazardly determined by a 
multiplicity of forces and the observer‘s selective reaction.‖ See also Adam M. Samaha, Originalism‘s 
Expiration Date, 30 Cardozo Law Review 1295 (2008). 
540 Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d at 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
541 Osenga, supra note 81. The author believed that ―a more appropriate mechanism for claim construction 
might instead be akin to textualism.‖ 
542 Nelson, supra note 486.(“What is clear is that judges whom we think of as textualists have a greater 
affinity for ‗rules‘ than judges whom we think of as intentionalists.‖) See also Paul Killebrew, Where are 
All the Left-Wing Textualists? New York University Law Review, 82 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1895 (2007) (The 
textualist goal is to ―provide judges with a rule-bound method of statutory interpretation that coincides 
with their vision of democratic lawmaking.‖) Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory 
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derives both from its statutory role as the repository of the ―full, clear, concise 




Section 3 Intention-based theory in claim interpretation 
Compared to the ordinary use-based theory of meaning, the intention-based 
theory opposes the idea that the meaning of technical terms shall correspond to 
ordinary use, instead, it stresses on the intentions of users. The intention-based 
theory argues that meaning should be interpreted in terms of the intentions of 
persons engaged in an act of communication.
544
 For example, Lady Welby 
defined ―meaning‖ as ―the intent which it is desired to convey – the intention of 
the user.‖ 545  Based on the intention-based theory of meaning, patentee‘s 
purpose or intent is the central issue in patent claim interpretation. The goal of 
seeking patentee‘s intent remains ―not only when the language of a text is found 
                                                                                                                                                 
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750 (2010) 
(―textualism is grounded in a different premise: the value of rule-based (and hence predictable) 
interpretation.‖) For a general discussion of the distinction between rules and standards, see e.g. Isaac 
Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 258 
(1974) (noting that ―[a] rule withdraws from the decision maker‘s consideration one or more of the 
circumstances that would be relevant to decision‖ while ―[t]he term ‗standard‘ de-notes . . . a general 
criterion of social choice,‖ such as efficiency or reasonableness); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: 
An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992) (―[A] rule may entail an advance determination 
of what conduct is permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator. . . . A standard may entail 
leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the ad-judicator.‖); Ofer 
Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better for Capitalism and 
Liberalism, 19 Public Interest Law 175 (2010). (―And in fact, clear and determinate rules would often 
produce less predictable environments than vague legal standards.‖) 
543 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
544 Christian Plunze, Why Do We Mean Something Rather Than Nothing? in G. Grewendorf, G. Meggle 
(ed.), Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Realty: Discussions with John R. Searle,105 (2002) (―The answer 
given by Paul Grice is that someone means something by hits utterance if and only if he intends to 
communicate something to an addressee.‖) For Paul Grice, what matters for a theory of language is what 
the agent intends to communicate. See, Stephen Neale, Paul Grice and The Philosophy of Language, 
Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):509 – 559 (1992). 
545 Lady Victoria Welby, What Is Meaning?: Studies in the Development of Significance, xx (1903) 
(―There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the Sense of a word, but only the sense in which it is 
used—the circumstances, state of mind, reference, ―universe of discourse‖ belonging to it. The meaning of 
a word is the intent which it is desired to convey—the intention of the user.‖) 
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to be ambiguous but in every case and at every stage of interpretation.‖546 
Under this theory, what the text means is determined by the utterer‘s 
communicative intentions in a particular situation, notwithstanding what others 
might have intended in those circumstances.
547
 It is believed that the reliance 
on ordinary meaning will ―frequently misperceive some speaker‘s intention, or 
misapply some background purpose or goal.‖ 548  As discussed in the last 
section, the ordinary use-based theory of meaning asks ―(A) What a PHOSITA 
would understand a claim term α to mean by relying on its ordinary usage in the 
art at the time of filing.‖ The intention-based theory asks what the person skilled 
in the art would have understood the patentee to be using the language of the 
claim to mean.
549
 The meaning of the claim term can be formulated as:  
(B) What a PHOSITA would have understood the patentee‘s intended 
meaning for claim term α at the time of filing, either expressedly or 
impliedly. 
Under the intention-based theory, it is important that the speaker intended 
her or his communicative intention to be recognized.
550
 Therefore, the 
purposive approach based on the intention-based theory does not question the 
subjective states of mind,
 551
 but reconstruct the patentee‘s hypothetical 
                                                        
546 Sullivan, supra note 76, at 194.  
547 Gerald L. Bruns, Intention, Authority, and Meaning, 7 Critical Inquiry 297-310 (1980). ( ―to interpret 
correctly means to stand in place of the author.‖) 
548 Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 231(1990). 
549 W L Gore & Associates GmbH v. Geox SPA[2009] EWCA Civ 794. 
550 Russell Eliot Dale, The Theory of Meaning (1996) (―Thus, Gardiner sees it as an essential feature of an 
act of speech that the speaker intends her or his communicative intention to be recognized.‖)  
http://www.russelldale.com/dissertation/1996.RussellDale.TheTheoryOfMeaning.pdf (last visited 31 
July, 2012 ) 
551 A case indicating the exclusion of external evidence is Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited and others v. 
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objective intent to describe and demarcate the scope of protection.
552
 It 
ascertains the patentee‘s objective intent by establishing ―some rational basis‖ 
within the knowledge and experience of a skilled person in the art.
553
 While the 
ordinary meaning approach focuses on the conventional usage of the term in the 
scientific and technological community, the purposive approach is most 
concerned with the particular purposes or intentions of patentee (from the 
perspective of the PHOSITA) existing at the time of filing.  
The two approaches are very likely to reach the same interpretive result, 
because both look for the ―codes‖ or ―maps‖ of the claim text in order to 
ascertain what claim term α means.554 However, the purposive construction 
does not treat the claim text as ―a mere place holder for concocting plausible 
                                                                                                                                                 
Warner-Lambert Company [2005] IESC 81 decided by the Ireland‘s Supreme Court. The key issue in the 
dispute concerns the proper interpretation of the patent and the admissibility of evidence: whether 
communications made by Warner-Lambert Company, including with the US Patent and Trade Mark 
Office, the European Patent Office, and the Danish Patent Office, were admissible in these proceedings for 
the purposes of patent claim construction. The Supreme Court held that the meaning of a claim text ―may 
not be a meaning which was actually intended by the patentee or the inventor…the relevant test is the 
understanding of the persons to whom it was addressed rather than the understanding of the patentee or 
inventor.‖ With this strict ―objective purpose‖ test, the appeal was dismissed. See also John Whelan & 
Ciara Cullen, Constructing Patent Claims, Managing Intellectual Property, Issue 158, April 01 (2006). 
552 Convatec Ltd. & Ors v Smith & Nephew Healthcare Ltd & Ors [2011] EWHC 2039 (Pat). (―it is always 
important to bear in mind that the skilled person reads the specification in light of the common general 
knowledge and appreciating that its purpose is to describe and demarcate an invention, that is to say a 
practical idea for a new product or process.‖) 
553 Kirin-Amgen Inc. vs. Hoechst Marion Roussel [2004] UKHL 46 (―I do not think that it is sensible to 
have presumptions about what people must be taken to have meant but a conclusion that they have 
departed from conventional usage obviously needs some rational basis.") Occlutech GmbH vs. AGA 
Medical Corp [2010] EWCA (Civ) 702 (―If there is a conventional meaning of a word or expression, either 
in the eyes of the skilled team, or in everyday language if the words have no special meaning to the team, 
then a conclusion that it has some unconventional meaning requires a rational basis.‖) The objectification 
of author‘s intent is popular in contract interpretation. See e.g. Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star 
Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] A.C. 749 at 778 (―The aim of the inquiry is not to probe the real intentions of 
the parties but to ascertain the contextual meaning of the relevant contractual language. The inquiry is 
objective: the question is what reasonable persons, circumstanced as the actual parties were, would have in 
mind.‖) See also Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R.896 
(―Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable 
person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in 
the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.‖)   
554 Barak, supra note 474, at 90. Judge Aharon Barak has classified the objective purpose into four levels: 
―At the lowest level, it is what the specific author would have wanted to carry out had he or she thought 
about it. At the intermediate level, it is what the reasonable author would have wanted to carry out. At the 
high level, it depends on the type of legal arrangement in question and its characteristics. At the supreme 
level, it actualizes the fundamental values of the legal system. I call these types of objective purpose the 
―intention‖ or will of the system.‖ 
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inferences about purpose,‖ 555  but seeks to identify what the patentee is 
implying in the broader context of the invention.
556
 It has been declared that 
―the triumph of purposive construction over formalism is that you have regard 
to materials outside the four corners of the document in order to divine 
meaning.‖557 Interpreters will have in mind the common general knowledge, 
the generalized patent practice and the potential of the invention in order to 
determine what the patentee intended to communicate when he used α in that 
circumstance.
558
 Since purposive construction is not limited to the commonly 
accepted meaning of a claim text,
559
 it is expected to rescue the claim meaning 
from absurdity and errors.
560
   
The differences between the understandings of meaning can be explained 
                                                        
555 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 73,. 79-80 
(2006). 
556 Hammar Maskin AB & Others v Steelbro New Zealand Limited [2010] NZCA 83. (―The claims of a 
patent specification must ―always be interpreted in their overall context and by reference to the object and 
description in the body of the specification‖); Lucas v. Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd [2006] 3 
NZLR 721 (SC). Catnic was applied in New Zealand through to the Peterson v. Lucas litigation.   
557 Michael D. Pendleton, A Defence of Purposive Construction, 22 E.I.P.R. 342 (2000). 
558 Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067; 2000 SCC 67.(― While ‗purposive construction‘ 
is a label introduced into claims construction by Catnic, supra, the approach itself is quite consistent in my 
view, with what was said by Dickson J. the previous year in Consolboard, supra, on the topic of claims 
construction, at pp. 520-21:We must look to the whole of the disclosure and the claims to ascertain the 
nature of the invention and methods of its performance…‖); see also, Improver Corporation v Remington 
Consumer Product Limited [1990] F.S.R. 181. The earlier case of Catnic Components Ltd. v Hill & Smith 
Ltd., Lord Diplock had established the principle that patents were to be read in a "purposive" manner. 
Hoffmann J formulated Lord Diplock‘s approach in Catnic into three questions which the court should ask 
itself. The first question asks whether the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works.   
559 Rockwater Ltd v. Coflexip SA [2004] R.P.C. 46. (―Purposive construction could lead to the conclusion 
that a technically trivial or minor difference between an element of a claim and the corresponding element 
of an alleged infringement nonetheless fell within the meaning of the element when read purposively.‖) 
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067; 2000 SCC 67 (―purposive construction is usually 
criticized by accused infringers for tending to expand the written claims. In fact, purposive construction 
can cut either way. Here it enabled the appellants to escape infringement…‖) 
560 Hammar Maskin AB & Others vs. Steelbro New Zealand Ltd [2010] NZCA 8. The body of a patent 
specification is always relevant to the interpretation of the claims, not just if the claims are ambiguous and 
capable of having more than one meaning. In this case, the defendant argued that, as the meaning of the 
claim ―a bearing‖ was clear on its face (ie there was no ambiguity) no reference could be made to the body 
of the specification. While the Court of Appeal agreed that the phrase "a bearing" in isolation from its 
context might more naturally denote a separate physical component, interpreted in the context of the 
specification as a whole, that phrase could only refer to "bearing" in a functional sense. The decision 
followed the judgment in Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd vs. Lucas [2006] 3 NZLR 721 (SC) 
(―each part of the specification is to be read objectively in its overall context, and in light of the function of 
that part, and the claims are to be interpreted by reference to the object and description in the body of the 
description.‖) 
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by the following example. A patentee claimed ―A polypeptide product of the 
expression in a eucaryotic host cell of a DNA sequence according to any of 
claims 1.‖561 The primary dispute between the parties was whether the term 
―host cell‖ should be interpreted narrowly as a cell which was host to 
―exogenous gene‖ only, or interpreted broadly as a cell which was also host to 
―endogenous gene‖. 562 The two ways of understanding meaning are: 563 
(1) What a PHOSITA would understand a claim term host cell to mean 
by identifying its ordinary usage in the art at the time of filing. 
(2) What a PHOSITA in patentee‘s shoes would have intended claim 
term host cell to mean at the time of filing, either expressed or 
implicated.  
Adopting the ordinary use based-theory of meaning, a PHOSITA would 
apply the customary and normal usage of the word in the particular field of 
art.
564
 The PHOSITA would find that ―the plain meaning of the claims controls 
                                                        
561 Kirin Amgen Inc v. Hoechst Marion Roussel [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] RPC 9. A product-by-process 
claim is a claim in which the product is described through the process with which it is made. It describes 
how a product is made, not how it is used. Cochrane et al. v. BadischeAnilin and Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 
293 (1884) (―Every patent for a product or composition of matter must identify it so that it can be 
recognized aside from the description of the process for making it, or else nothing can be held to infringe 
the patent which is not made by that process.‖) Pursuant to the Patents Act of 1949, a product made by a 
different process was distinguishable from an identical product that was already part of the state of the art. 
562 Id. (―The chief question of construction is whether the person skilled in the art would understand "host 
cell" to mean a cell which is host to the DNA sequence which coded for EPO. The alternative, put forward 
by Amgen, is that it can include a sequence which is endogenous to the cell, like the human EPO gene 
which expresses GA-EPO, as long as the cell is host to some exogenous DNA.‖) 
563 Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. and Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d. 69 (D. 
Mass. 2001), affirmed in part and vacated in part, 314 F.3d 1313, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003)In June 1999, 
Amgen brought an action in the District of Massachusetts asserting that Hoechst and TKT infringed claims 
of five US patents assigned to Amgen. (The five patents-in-suit include the ‗933 patent, the ‗698 patent, the 
‗080 patent, the ‗349 patent, and the ‗422 patent.) The patent claims at issue in the US are not directly 
comparable to those in the European patent. But in the U.S. cases, TKT urged that the district court erred 
by failing to limit the asserted claims to exogenous DNA, despite the fact that none of the claims in suit 
contain an "exogenous DNA" limitation. 
564 Id. (Rader, Chief Judge, dissenting in part) (―Claim language is to be given its ordinary and customary 
meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 1312-13. 
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here, and they plainly are not so limited.‖565 Therefore, the interpreter would 
not import into the claims the limitation that the gene be exogenous. In 
comparison, adopting the intention-based theory of meaning, a PHOSITA 
would be more willing to investigate the intent that the patentee desired to 
convey, by taking into consideration of the descriptions and the background 
knowledge at the relevant time.
566
 Since there was no knowledge of the 
technique of ―switching on‖ an endogenous encoding sequence, from a 
PHOSITA‘s perspective, the patentee would not have intended to use the term 
―host cell‖ to include the endogenous gene. 567  The second way of 
understanding meaning leads to a different outcome of interpretation. The 
divergent interpretations of the claims related to the same invention highlight 
the difficulty in construing patent claims of complex emerging technologies and 
may create obstacles for cross-broader enforcement of patent rights.
568
 
Section 4 Content-based theory in claim interpretation 
                                                                                                                                                 
In this case, neither party contends that ―body‖ has a special, technical meaning in the field of art, and thus 
claim construction requires ―little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly 
understood words.‖) 
565Amgen Inc v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc.,314 F.3d 1313, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003).The Court also 
remanded the case for the District Court to reassess infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 
566 Kirin Amgen Inc v. Hoechst Marion Roussel [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] RPC 9. (―The examples 
contained in the [patent in suit] are all concerned with EPO-encoding DNA which has been isolated 
outside the cell and inserted into the cell to which it is foreign. Indeed, at the relevant time, the routine 
method of production of a recombinant protein was by cloning the gene encoding the protein and the 
introduction of that clone into a self-replicating organism by transfection or transformation. There was no 
knowledge of the technique of 'switching on' an endogenous encoding sequence by transfecting the cell 
with exogenous DNA sequences as including an artificial promoter.") 
567 Id.The House of Lords finally held that ―the meaning of the term ‗host cell‘ is wholly dependent on 
context,‖ and explained that this was ―not reading words into the claim any more than when one says that 
in a particular context ‗the City‘ means ‗the City of London.‘‖See also, Kirin-Amgen v. Roche and 
Transkaryotic Therapies [2002] RPC 1.(―I am of the view that a cell is not a 'host cell' unless it is host to 
exogenous DNA encoding for EPO or its analogue. Such a conclusion is based in part on the teaching of 
the [patent in suit]. The terms 'host' and 'host cell' are used consistently to describe cells which have been 
transfected with exogenous or foreign DNA (ie DNA from outside that particular cell) which encodes 
EPO, with a view to securing expression of EPO in those host cells.‖) 
568Kirin-Amgen, Inc. et al v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.et al. [2004] UKHL 46. Even in the same UK 
jurisdiction, the trial judge held that claim 19 was invalid (for insufficiency) but that claim 26 was valid 
and infringed. The Court of Appeal (Aldous, Hale and Latham LJJ) held that both claims were valid but 
that neither was infringed. 
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The content-based theory is a theory of meaning advocated by the American 
philosopher Robert Brandom.
569
 Robert Brandom, following Wilfrid Sellars, 
develops a pragmatic view of meaning and attempts to specify and explicate 
the content expressed by an utterance or text.
570
 According to this theory, there 
are two styles of content specification: de dicto and de re.
 571
 The former type 
determines how the speaker thinks the content is, while the latter type 




De re specifications of conceptual content attempt to say what really follows 
from the claims made, what is really evidence for or against them, and so what 
the author has really committed herself to, regardless of her opinion about the 
matter. The de re style… requires laying facts alongside the claims of the text, in 




                                                        
569 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment 609 
(1998). See also, Joshua Wretzel, Speaking with the Dead: The Philosophical Implications of Brandom‘s 
Interpretive Oversights (2011).The author made an distinction between ―what is represented, the objective, 
de re, relational content of what is ascribed, on the one hand, and how it is represented its subjective de 
dicto, notional content, on the other.‖See also, Robert B. Brandom, Between Saying and Doing : Towards 
an Analytic Pragmatism: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism xii (2008) (―By calling it ―pragmatism‖ I mean 
a view inspired by insights of the later Wittgenstein, which situates concern with the meanings of 
expressions in the broader context of concern with properties governing their use.‖); Andrzej Wierciński, 
Gadamer's Hermeneutics and the Art of Conversation 159 (2011) (―According to Brandom‘s exposition, a 
purely de dicto interpretation would aim to tell us something about what the author intended to claim…in 
order to assess the truth of what the author intended to say, the interpreter needs to specify the content of 
the claim correctly. For this purpose a different type of interpretation may be needed.‖) 
570 Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality 99 
(2002). 
571 Jaroslav Peregrin, Tales Of The Mighty Dead (Book Review), 59 Erkenntnis 421-424 (2003). 
572 Espen Hammer, German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives 174 (2007). (―We understand what a 
concept in a particular text means by seeing how it is used by an author, and how it would be understood 
(used) in the community at the time. Or, in a different approach, we can try to understand how an original 
concept would be used in a later context, such as ours. In this latter case, one is concerned not with what 
the author took to follow from her premises, but with what really does follow. One can focus on what the 
conceptual content is about.‖) 
573 Brandom, supra note 570, at 102. 
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De re means ―of the thing.‖574 According to Brandom, the interpreter can 
specify the content without knowing what the author intended to claim.
575
 The 
key difference between the intent-based theory and the content-based theory is 
that the latter holds that ―intentions, whether stated by the author or inferred by 
an interpreter, provide just one sort of context against the background of which 
inferential significance can be assessed.‖ 576 The content-based theory allows 
words to carry somewhat different meanings than just convention or intention. 
Adopting the content-based theory, the constructive approach does not rely on 
the conventional usage of a term among the scientific and technology 
community, neither does it rely on the intent or purpose of the patentee. This 
approach holds that the interpreter can specify what the claim is really 
about.
577
 The constructive approach is an empirical inquiry
578
 into pragmatic 
facts in light of present context: the technical content, i.e. the technical solution 
of the patent,
 579 
which is presumed to lie beyond the conventional linguistic 
                                                        
574 A. Pablo Iannone, Dictionary of World Philosophy 136 (2013).(―De dicto…is contrasted with de re, 
which means ‗of the thing.‘‖) 
575 Wierciński,supra note 351. 
576 Jorge J. E. Gracia, A Theory of Textuality: The Logic and Epistemology 161 (1995) (―Meaning is not 
determined by their author alone, but by other factors as well, such as society and language…an 
interpretation is no longer concerned merely with understanding the meaning of the historical text, but 
with much more.‖) See also, Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365 (1990). (―the 
pragmatist judge believes that constitutional interpretation involves the empathic projection of the judge's 
mind and talent into the creative souls of the framers rather than slavish obeisance to the framers' every 
metronome marking.‖) See also, Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 71 (2003). 
Different interpreters, each with his own idea of the community‘s needs and interests, will weigh 
consequences differently. 
577 David L. Sherman, The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy By Robert C. Solomon, 228 (2003) 
( ―the interpreter‘s projection of completed textual meaning constitutes the meaningful being of the text.‖) 
See also, Bei Jing Tai Yang Neng Yan Jiu Suo su Dong Guan Shi Hao Te Dian Qi Gong Si [Beijing 
Institute of Solar Energy v. Dong Guan Hao Te Electric Company], No.24, Final Decision, Intellectual 
Property Tribunal, Beijing High People‘s Court (1998). The interpreter should not be confined by the 
literal wording of the independent claim but discover the ―real meaning‖ of the terms based on descriptions 
and drawings, as well as the goal of patented invention. 
578 Brandom, supra note 569, at 83 (1997) (―Semantics must answer to pragmatics…This means settling 
how linguistic expressions of those contents are properly or correctly used, under what circumstances it is 
appropriate to acquire states and attitudes with those contents, and how one then ought or is obliged to go 
on to behave.‖) 
579Xu Yao, Patent Rights [ Zhuan Li Cai Chan Quan—Cai Chan Quan An Li Jing Xi Cong Shu] 104 
(2005). Understanding of the scope of protection is not simply based on the words or prototypes, but is 
derived technically from the intact technical solution in the patent claims. 
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meaning of words and phrases. The focus on the specification of the technical 
content makes meaning of a claim term more specific and contextual.580 ―What 
matters in determining the scope of protection…is not the grammatical or 
general scientific understanding of the terms used in the patent, but the 
understanding of an average person skilled in the art when reading the very 
specific patent in dispute.‖581   
There are two particular hermeneutic characters in applying content-based 
theory to patent claim interpretation. Firstly, content-based theory always 
focuses on the interpreter‘s (using a PHOSITA as a reference) construction of 
the content or the subject matter, and emphasizes pragmatic significance of 
meaning.
582
 What distinguishes content-based theory from intention-based 
theory is that the former accepts that the interpreter‘s own context is a 
legitimate authority in determining the meaning of the text.
583
 To obtain a 
factual description of content, an interpreter will evaluate the disadvantages of 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2009-12/29/content_2012814.htm (last visited, Oct 
15, 2011 ) 
580 Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Theory and Social Theory, 20 Annual Review of Sociology 383-406 
(1994). (―They start from the present ―here and now,‖ rather than from the imagined original places and 
times‖) See also, Robert L. Hayman & Jr. & Nancy Levit, Jurisprudence: Contemporary Readings, 
Problems, and Narratives 457(1994) (―Being cognizant of the finite historical situation, pragmatists treat 
understanding as contextual and situated.‖) 
581 Reinhardt Schuster & Martin Köhler, Germany: Latest Trends in Patent Infringement Cases, Managing 
Intellectual Property (2000)  
http://www.managingip.com/Article/1321986/Germany-Latest-trends-in-patent-infringement-cases.html  
(last visited November 26, 2012) 
582 Charles S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, Popular Science, Monthly 12, 286-302 (1878) 
Charles Peirce wrote: ―consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of 
the object.‖ William James, Pragmatism 20 (2008) (―To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an 
object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — 
what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare.‖) See also, Ronald Dworkin, 
Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Fidelity as Integrity: The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, 
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249 (1997). 
583 Wierciński, supra note 569, at 164. (―According to Brandom, the intentions of the author are not the 
last authority in determining the meaning of the text simply because there are other, equally legitimate 
authorities for that determination (such as the interpreter‘s present context, etc.).‖) James A. Holstein & 
Jaber F. Gubrium (ed.), Handbook of Constructionist Research 92 (2008) The terms by which the 
interpreters understand are socially, historically and culturally situated. 
  139 
 
the prior art and the advantages of the invention from the eyes of a PHOSITA. 
Secondly, according to content-based theory, meaning is fluid and the 
technological conditions and customary usage are malleable. What 
distinguishes content-based theory from ordinary use-based theory is that the 
former accepts that social and linguistic conventions change over time.
584
 
When determining the content of the claims, the interpreter also takes into 
account of the equivalents at the time of infringement, i.e. the features that are 
identical or equivalent to the patented technical solution will be interpreted as 
coming within the scope of  the claims.  
In sum, the content-based theory focuses on the interpreter‘s construction 
of the subject matter within the changing context of interpretive 
communities,
585
 in contrasts with static and mechanical interpretations.
586
 The 
meaning of the claim term can be formulated as: 
 (C) What a PHOSITA would understand the subject matter referred to 
by the term α to be in light of changed context.    
For example, if the claim term host cell is interpreted under the 
constructive approach, the interpreter would first analyze the advantages of the 
invention over the prior art, e.g., the essence of the invention was the 
introduction of an exogenous DNA sequence coding for EPO into a host cell in 
                                                        
584 Irving King, Pragmatism as a Philosophic Method, 12 Philosophical Review 510 (1903). See also, 
Stanley E. Fish, Is There A Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities 43(1980). From 
the point of pragmatism, a fixed and permanent meaning in a text is considered to be an illusion.  
585  Stefan Neubert & Kersten Reich, Toward a Constructivist Theory of Discourse: Rethinking the 
Boundaries of Discourse Philosophy (2002) 
http://www.uni-koeln.de/hf/konstrukt/texte/download/constructivist%20discourse.pdf (last visited Aug 8, 
2012) 
586 Laurence Horn& Gergory Ward (ed.) The Handbook of Pragmatics, 451 (2006). 
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which it would be expressed. In order to achieve this goal and overcome the 
disadvantages of the prior art, ―the introduction of an exogenous DNA 
sequence‖ was an indispensable part of the solution. The PHOSITA would 
further decide whether the expression of EPO in a human cell ―by an 
endogenous gene naturally present‖ is an equivalent content to the technical 
solution at the time of infringement. The PHOSITA will probably find out that 
they are not equivalent in form of function, way and result. Based on the above 
analysis, the interpreter has good reason for adopting a narrow meaning and 
limiting the patentee‘s monopoly. 
This Chapter discusses the uniqueness of patent claim interpretation and 
introduces the theories of meaning behind three approaches including the 
ordinary use-based theory of meaning, the intention-based theory of meaning 
and the content-based theory of meaning. These theories share the common 
characteristic of paying attention to the pragmatics of language.
587
 Different 
underlying interpretive theories demonstrate different ways of explaining the 
meaning of a claim term.
588
 Depending on what a judge considers to be 
legitimate objectives and means of claim interpretation, he or she may reach a 
different outcome in a patent case.
589
 The next Chapter will discuss the 
                                                        
587 Pau Livingston, Philosophy and the Vision of Language, 41 (2008).( ―knowing the sense of a term as 
knowing how it is used.‖) 
588 G E Devenish, Nature of Legal Reasoning Involved in the Interpretation of Statutes, 2 Stellenbosch L. 
Rev. 224 (1991) (―It is for this reason that the interpretation of statutes requires a knowledge of the 
underlying methods of legal reasoning and its relationship with formal logic...a rational approach to the 
interpretation of statutes involve constructing and weighing arguments against each one another‖); See 
also Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (―As 
a result, various methods of legal reasoning becomes widespread because they produce substantive results 
in which the public has confidence and on which legal actors rely.‖)  
589 It is agreed that the canons do not mechanically determine interpretation reached by judges, but the 
canons have some value as rules of thumb, pointing to possible meanings that a language might have in 
context. Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1165 
(2008) (―a single claim can support several reasonable meanings because different judges may select 
different interpretive canons or may simply apply the same canons in different ways to generate differing 
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deficiencies of these theories in guiding interpreters in claim construction. 
                                                                                                                                                 
yet equally reasonable  interpretations.‖) Osenga, supra note 81 (―the canons of claim construction 
arguably effectuate some of the goals for claim construction and mitigate some of the Federal Circuit‘s 
failures as discussed in this Article, but because the canons are not uniformly employed and are hampered 
by limitations on their usage, they do not fulfill the goals with sufficient certainty.‖) 
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CHAPTER 5 DEFICIENCIES OF THE CONVENTIONAL THEORIES 
This Chapter presents limitations of the existing interpretive theories in guiding 
claim interpretation. Although these theories specify some goals to be pursued, 
there still remain a number of unresolved issues. (1) The ordinary use-based 
theory focuses on the ordinary use of claim term at the time of invention, which 
may be vague and stand in need of refinement. As a consequence, the ordinary 
use of a term sometimes fails to capture the distinctiveness of the invention or 
resolve the ambiguities about the scope of protection. (2) The intention-based 
theory presumes that meaning is the patentee‘s objective intent at the time of 
filing, which may be absent, ambiguous, or misleading. As objective intent is an 
artificial construct, it may enlarge the field of imaginative reconstructions and 
result in indeterminacy of meaning. (3) The content-based theory specifies the 
content of the patent claim in light of changed context, but the construction of 
content over time invites interpreters to exercise a broad discretion, which raises 
the question of how public notice function of patent claims could be served. The 
lack of evaluation criteria for assessing fairness also causes ongoing 
controversies. This Chapter does not declare that the above interpretive theories 
lack relevance or value; in practice, different theories pursue different goals and 
each theory contributes to understanding the claim meaning. The critical task of 
patent claim interpretation is then how to preserve original meaning across 
changed contexts. This Chapter points out that a theory of meaning that can 
mediate between the past and present technological contexts is a better fit for 
patent claim interpretation.  
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Section 1 Vagueness of ordinary meaning in claim construction 
A. Ordinary meaning in need of refinement 
It has been pointed out that one of the important defects of ordinary use-based 
theory is that ordinary meaning can be vague and ambiguous.
590
 Claim 
language is required to be very specific and clear, i.e., ―particularly pointing 
out and distinctly claiming‖ the subject matter which the applicant regards as 
his invention in patent law. The meaning of words in ordinary use may be 
unclear or may have a number of different uses. However, the real dispute 
between the litigating parties over the claim terms often concerns the 
distinctiveness of the invention, and when a term in its ordinary use is too 
general or abstract, ―there is some freedom of choice left as to how to turn it 
into an exact technical term, in other words, how to explicate it.‖591  As some 
judges and scholars have recognized, ―the proper construction is frequently not 
a term‘s ordinary meaning.‖592  
The ordinary meaning approach based on this theory places a particular 
emphasis on the ordinary use of the claim term so as to better serve a public 
                                                        
590 Kanti Lal Das, Philosophical Relevance of Language 83(2006). (―One of the important defects of 
ordinary language is that it is more or less ambiguous.‖) Andrei Marmor, Textualism in Context (2012) 
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 12-13. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2112384 (last visited Oct 10, 2012) 
(―This is what borderline cases of vague terms essentially are: cases about which there is no saying 
whether the instance falls within the extension of the term or not. Linguistically it can go either way. 
Therefore, when a court faces such a borderline case, paying close attention to what the law says is not 
going to be helpful at all.‖) 
591 Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, 28 (1988). Andrei Marmor, The Immorality of Textualism 
(2005) 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 2063, 65 (―An attempt to figure out what "tall" or "bald" really means in 
ordinary English can only reveal that these terms are vague and thus would necessarily have borderline 
cases.‖) 
592 Menell, supra note 5. (―The phrase ―ordinary meaning‖ is deeply engrained in the case law, but it is a 
slippery concept… Thus, the ―ordinary meaning‖ is not the first step in the analysis. Nor is it the endpoint, 
as Phillips and its progeny have confirmed.‖) Barney & Collins-Chase, supra note 504 (Our data indicate 
that when patentees argued ―no construction necessary‖ or ―ordinary meaning,‖ that argument prevailed 
38.5% of the time. In contrast, when accused infringers argued ―no construction necessary‖ or ―ordinary 
meaning,‖ they prevailed only 13.5% of the time.) 
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notice function. However, an attempt to figure out what that term really means 
reveals that the ordinary uses are sometimes too vague to demarcate the 
boundaries.
593
 ―Lacking any theoretical guidance, American courts have 
reached results without providing the patentee or the public an adequate 
explanation of their reasoning. Although the Court assured that claim 
construction remains the alpha and omega for determining patent scope, it 
failed to provide the terminology to discuss (or a standard to assess) when 
claim limitations would be stretched too far.‖594 
The ordinary use of a term may not be that helpful in resolving the 
interpretative issues that courts need to decide. As a result, interpreters often 
have to fine-tune the ―ordinary meaning‖ initially found in order to reach the 
final proper construction, which is more specific and descriptive. The following 
claims in different industries (mechanics, chemistry and software) were all 
construed by judges under the ordinary meaning approach.
595
 Interestingly, the 
parties in these cases did not dispute the ―ordinary meaning‖ initially 
understood by a PHOSITA,
596
 they nonetheless disagreed over the detailed 
characterization of the claimed invention, so as to differentiate it from the 
                                                        
593  Andrei Marmor, supra note 591. 
594 Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 
Berkeley. Tech. L.J. 1157, 1212-15 (2004). 
595 The claims (1) (2) and (3) are cited from the following three cases decided in the U.S. Federal Circuit. 
Cordis Corporation v. Boston Scientific Corporation, 2010-1311, -1316 (Fed. Cir. September 28, 2011); 
AIA Engineering Ltd. v. Magotteaux International S/A, No. 11-1058 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011);  Wang Lab. 
Inc. v. America Online Inc., 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
596 Cordis Corporation v. Boston Scientific Corporation, 2010-1311, -1316 (Fed. Cir. September 28, 2011) 
(―Cordis does not challenge the district court‘s construction of the term ―undulating‖ as requiring ―at least 
a crest and a trough.‖ We therefore do not review the construction itself, and instead focus on what that 
construction means.‖) AIA Engineering Ltd. v. Magotteaux International S/A, No. 11-1058 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 
31, 2011) (―While the parties agree on the ordinary meaning of ―solid solution,‖ they dispute the physical 
form of the alumina-zirconia material required by the ―solid solution‖ of claim 1 of the ‘176 patent.‖) 
Wang Lab. Inc. v. America Online Inc., 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999). (―The parties agreed before the 
district court that the term "frame" can in general usage be applied to bit-mapped display systems as well 
as to character-based systems; experts for both sides so testified. The disagreement was as to whether the 
term "frame" in the '669 claims embraced this general usage, or whether the term would be understood by 
persons of skill in this field as limited to the character-based systems described in the '669 patent.‖) 
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defendant‘s technology.  
(1) Each cell having one or more undulating sections. 
(2) A homogeneous solid solution of 20 to 80 % of Al2O3 and 80 to 20 
% of ZrO2. 
(3) Apparatus for locally processing frames of information. 
The ordinary and conventional use of the word is ascertained through a 
PHOSITA. The first claim relates to coronary stents having undulating 
longitudinal sections. A PHOSITA would commonly understand ―undulating‖ 
to mean ―rising and falling in waves, thus having at least a crest and a 
trough.‖ 597  In the second claim, there is also nothing unconventional or 
non-ordinary about the use of the word ―solid solution‖—a PHOSITA would 
have commonly understood the ordinary meaning of ―solid solution‖ to require 
a single, uniform crystalline structure in the field of chemistry.
598
 In the third 
claim, a PHOSITA would commonly understand that the term ―frame‖ could in 




According to the ordinary meaning approach, if the ordinary meaning of a 
                                                        
597 Cordis Corporation v. Boston Scientific Corporation, 2010-1311, -1316 (Fed. Cir. September 28, 2011) 
(The patentee did not challenge the district court‘s construction of the term ―undulating‖ as requiring ―at 
least a crest and a trough.‖) 
598  AIA Engineering Ltd. v. Magotteaux International S/A, No. 11-1058 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011) 
(―Initially, we note that Magotteaux and AIA agree that the ordinary meaning of ―solid solution‖ requires a 
single, uniform structure containing both a ―solvent‖ component and a ―solute‖ component, in which the 
solvent component dictates the overall structure of the solid.‖) The Federal Circuit held that the district 
court legally erred in its construction of ―homogeneous solid solution,‖ and that, correctly construed, this 
term was synonymous with ―homogeneous ceramic composite‖ in the patents at issue. 
599 Wang Lab. Inc. v. America Online Inc., 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (―The parties agreed before the 
district court that the term "frame" can in general usage be applied to bit-mapped display systems as well 
as to character-based systems; experts for both sides so testified.‖) 
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claim is readily discernible, further construction is unnecessary:
600
  
If the claim language is clear on its face, then our consideration of the rest of the 
intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear 
language of the claims is specified. . . . If however the claim language is not clear 
on its face, then our consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is directed 
to resolving, if possible, the lack of clarity.
601 
Since the words ―undulating‖, ―solid solution‖ and ―frame‖ are clearly 
used with their ordinary meanings from the eyes of the PHOSITA, the 
interpreter should look no further than that.602 However, such meanings are too 
general for differentiating the present inventions from the defendant‘s 
technologies. Throughout the interpretive process, the words should be 
construed in a more specific and precise way. For example, the real dispute in 
claim (1) is whether the construction of ―undulating‖ meant only a wave-like 
crest or more than just a single curve.
603
 The real dispute in claim (2) is the 
physical form of the material required by the ―solid solution‖. The patentee 
asserted that ―solid solution‖ involved a solute in a solvent with a single, 
uniform structure. The defendant, on the other hand, urged that the patentee 
                                                        
600 Julie S. Turner, Patent Claim Construction: Principles and Doctrines, 907 PLI/Pat 51(2007). 
601 Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc 256 F.3d 1323, 59 USPQ2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2001);see 
also, Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (―Generally, terms in 
a patent claim are given their plain, ordinary, and accustomed meaning to one of ordinary skill in the 
relevant art. After identifying the plain meaning of a disputed claim term, the court examines the written 
description and the drawings to determine whether use of that term is consistent with the ordinary meaning 
of the term.‖) 
602 Russell Holder, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Resurrection of Plain Meaning in 
California Courts, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 569 (1997) (textualist philosophy requires practitioners have a 
heightened awareness of the statute, related statutory provisions, rules of construction, and legislative 
process). 
603 Cordis Corporation v. Boston Scientific Corporation, 2010-1311, -1316 (Fed. Cir. September 28, 
2011). Citing claim 25, Patentee argued that ―undulating structures include those that have [only] a 
wave-like crest, and are not limited to structures that have both a crest and an associated trough.‖ The 
defendant, on the other hand, explicitly argued that "undulating" cannot simply mean "curved," and 
instead "requires that a structure have both a `crest' and a 'trough,'" The Court embraced Defendant's 
proposed construction and construed "undulating" to mean "rising and falling in waves, thus having at 
least a crest and a trough 
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used the term as a synonym for ―homogeneous ceramic composite.‖604 In claim 
(3), the disagreement was whether the term ―frame‖ in the claims embraced the 




As we can see from the table below, because the ordinary meaning fails to 
reveal the distinctiveness of the invention, the interpreters have to further 
explain ―what that construction means‖,606 and this may bring the potential for 
delay, uncertainty and expense of litigation. To reach the final construction, the 
actual reasons are varied, including but are not limited to: the final meaning is 
inherently implied by the general ordinary meaning;
607
 the final meaning is 
capable of avoiding contradiction with other parts of the specification;
608
 the 
final meaning can preserve the validity of the claim.
609
 After fine-tuning of the 
interpretation, the final meanings are already not the ordinary meanings 
initiatively grasped by a PHOSITA.  
Disputed terms ―undulating‖ ―solid solution‖ ―frame‖ 
Ordinary meaning 
by a PHOSITA 
rising and falling in 
waves, thus having at 
a solute in a solvent 
with a single, 
Can be applied to 
bit-mapped display 
                                                        
604 AIA Engineering Ltd. v. Magotteaux International S/A, No. 11-1058 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011). 
605 Wang Lab. Inc. v. America Online Inc., 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
606 Cordis Corporation v. Boston Scientific Corporation, 2010-1311, -1316 (Fed. Cir. September 28, 
2011). (―We therefore do not review the construction itself, and instead focus on what that construction 
means.‖) On appeal, the Federal Circuit focused on ―what that construction means‖ and held that the 
construction required multiple ―waves.‖  
607  Id. Accordingly, the terms ―crest‖ and ―trough,‖ as used in district court‘s claim construction, 
―implicate changes of direction, with the curve ex-tending beyond the point of inflection.‖ 
608 AIA Engineering Ltd. v. Magotteaux International S/A, No. 11-1058 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011). The 
Court attempted to avoid such contradictions when possible and noted that construing ―solid solution‖ to 
have the same meaning as ―ceramic composite‖ avoided this problem. 
609 Wang Lab. Inc. v. America Online Inc., 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (―it is not disputed that Wang 
had not been able to implement a bit-mapped protocol in the claimed system; the inventors testified that 
they had been unable to develop a NAPLPS-based decoder.‖) 
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Implication of the 
definition of ―waves‖ 
Avoid contradiction 










Patent claim fulfills the distinct function of defining the monopoly.610 
Therefore, claim construction is very often dispositive for the determination of 
infringement. When vagueness is found, ―we are only concerned with 
knowledge up to a margin of error; we are ignorant of precise facts.‖611 Even 
the well-understood ordinary meaning of simple, plain English words may yield 
no conclusions about the technical scope, or about the correct resolution of 
patent infringement disputes.
612
 To decide whether a word appears 
unambiguous on its face is highly intuitive, 
613
 a term that someone thinks is 
abundantly ordinary may seem totally undefined to others. Judges often have 
divided opinions on even the simplest words like ―board‖, ―baffle‖, ―vertical‖ 
                                                        
610 EA Kellaway, Principles of Legal Interpretation of Statutes, Contracts and Wills 505 (1995) 
611 Joey Frazee & David Beaver, Vagueness Is Rational Under Certainty, in Maria Aloni et al., Logic, 
Language and Meaning: 17th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 16-18, 
2009, Revised Selected Papers 161 (2010). 
612 O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,. 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008). O2 Micro Int‘l Ltd. 
v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2:04-CV-32 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2005). ). The construction of the 
terms ―only if‖ was the main dispute in the lower court. While the plaintiff argued that the term ―only if‖ 
needed no construction, the defendants argued that the term ―only if‖ should be construed to mean 
―exclusively or solely in the event that‖ or ―never except when.‖ In its Markman order, the district court 
ruled that no construction of ―only if‖ was needed, stating that the term ―has a well-understood definition, 
capable of application by both the jury and this court in considering the evidence submitted in support of 
an infringement or invalidity case.‖  But the appellate court held that the district court erred, and courts 
must construe terms when the parties were actually arguing over the scope of the claim and not just the 
meaning of the term. 
613 Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., Nos. 11-1215, 11-1257 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (―The district 
court agreed with Edwards that the ―cylindrical‖ support need not have a ―diameter … constant along the 
longitudinal axis‖ but instead could have a shape that merely ―related to a cylinder.‖ In so doing, the court 
provided no analysis of the claim language, the specification, or any intrinsic evidence to support its 
construction.‖) 




 The search for ordinary meaning would easily miss the chance to 
discuss and debate the reasons behind the decision on the scope of 
protection.
615
 As a result, separate methods such as the doctrine of equivalents 
and the substantiality test are introduced to demarcate the boundaries of the 
invention. The deviation from the textual language is because of the inability of 
ordinary meaning to accurately capture the invention.
616
  
B. Ordinary meaning and the changing technological context 
Recently there has been increased debate over whether the ―meaning‖ of a 
claim term changes with the enlargement of knowledge and the development of 
new technology.
617
 Take the technical term ―a monoclonal antibody‖ 618 for 
example. The term ―a monoclonal antibody‖ written in 1984 apparently referred 
to antibodies made with hybridoma only,
619
 however, the same term could 
cover all sorts of antibodies such as chimeric and humanized antibodies 
developed between 1984 and 1999.
620
 Has the meaning of ―a monoclonal 
antibody‖ changed or not changed? Some scholars argue that the meaning of 
claim terms will frequently change over time: ―Indeed, the risk of change in the 
                                                        
614 Alan L. Durham, Patent Law Essentials: A Concise Guide 54 (2d ed., 2004). The author reasoned 
that even words as simple as ―on‖ and ―a‖ have been the subject of intense debate in the context of 
patent infringement litigation. 
615 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2006) (―when judges define 
textualism in a way that places heavy reliance on the clarity/ambiguity distinction, they tend to aggravate, 
rather than alleviate, the problem of judicial leeway.‖) 
616 Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (―Often the invention is 
novel and words do not exist to describe it.‖) 
617 Chiang & Solum, supra note 38. 
618 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (2004) (―Because the first publication that disclosed 
chimeric antibody technology did not appear until four months after this filing, it is not surprising that the 
1984 application does not disclose any chimeric antibodies. Similarly, the first publication to disclose 
humanized antibodies appeared in May 1986.‖) 
619 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (2004). (―Thus, the term "monoclonal antibody" in 
1984 apparently referred to antibodies made with hybridoma and was not broad enough to encompass 
chimeric antibodies.‖) 
620 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (interpreting a patent that, 
when written in 1984, covered only mouse-derived antibodies, to cover all sorts of antibodies developed 
between 1984 and 1999, including chimeric and humanized antibodies). 
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meaning of terms over time is particularly great in patent law, because patents 
necessarily involve new ideas, and the process of assigning terms to describe 
those new ideas is not static.‖ 621 Some scholars argue that the meaning of claim 
terms is constant: ―This is not a change in linguistic meaning…But the set of 
real-world objects that fit within the definition has changed.‖ 622 
To gain a better understanding of the debate, it is useful to examine a pair 
of fundamental concepts: interpretation and construction (sometimes referred 
to as word construction and thing construction.) ―Interpretation‖ is the process 
that discovers the linguistic meaning of a text,
623
 and ―construction‖ is the 
process that gives a text legal effect.
624
 In reading claims, interpretation is the 
process of ascertaining the meaning of a claim term (semantic content), and 
construction goes beyond interpretation and delves into ―explaining the legal 
effects and consequences of the instrument in question‖ (legal content). The 
more semantic content is translated into legal content, the greater the 
interpreter‘s ―construction zone‖ 625  (where the interpreter can move from 
interpretation to construction).
626
 The distinction between words and things is 
similar to the distinction made between interpretation and construction. Patent 
claim construction is a way of establishing the relationship between the word 
and the thing.
627
 Meaning-scope can remain fixed on the date of filing while 
                                                        
621 Mark A. Lemley, supra note 7. 
622 Chiang & Solum, supra note 38. 
623 Willem A. DeVries, Meaning and Interpretation in History, 22 History and Theory 253-63 (1983) (―it 
is through interpretation that we come to know meanings.‖) 
624 Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Constitutional Commentary 
95-118 (2010). 
625 Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551 (2010). The author called the 
zone of underdeterminacy in which construction (that goes beyond direct translation of semantic content 
into legal content) is required for application, ―the construction zone.‖ 
626 Id. 
627 Richard Robinson, Definition 16, 20 (1950) (―The purpose of real definition, on the other hand, is 
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allowing thing-scope to expand over time to encompass after-arising 
technologies.
628
 Using such distinction to reconcile the debate above, there is 
no change in linguistic meaning, what changed was ―the set of real-world 
objects that fit within the description.‖629  
The distinction between the semantic (meaning) interpretation and legal 
(thing) construction provides a very helpful way to explain the fixation-growth 
paradox in patent claim construction.
630
 However, it has been a 
well-established principle that there is no such dichotomy between ―virtue 
fence‖ and ―actual invention‖ in claim construction.631 The strict distinctions 
between ―interpretation‖ and ―construction‖, or ―word construction‖ and ―thing 
construction‖ easily lead to a conclusion that finding linguistic meaning and 
determining the legal content are independent, two separate mechanisms.632 
                                                                                                                                                 
nothing to do with nomina or words or signs or symbols. It is something to do with res or things.‖)  See 
also, Peter D. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals 39 (1975) (―A claim is an abstraction and 
generalization of an indefinitely large number of concrete, physical objects.‖); Collins, supra note 40. (―In 
fact, courts often use scope in a fashion that makes it synonymous with word meaning. ―[T]he full scope of 
[a term‘s] ordinary meaning‖ is, and is nothing more than, the term‘s ordinary word meaning… This 
concept of the scope of a peripheral claim is the claim‘s meaning-scope.…Thing-scope measures the size 
of the set of distinct things described by the claim. The larger the set is, the broader the thing-scope of the 
claim.‖) See also, Chiang, supra note 129. 
628 Collins, supra note 40. 
629 Chiang & Solum, supra note 38. 
630 Collins, supra note 40. (The fixation theory asserts that claim scope is and/or should be fixed on the 
date a claim is filed and that this fixation makes it impossible for the claim to encompass AAT because a 
claim must grow in some sense after the filing date in order to encompass AAT. In stark contrast, the 
growth theory argues that literal claim scope does and/or should encompass AAT on a routine basis and 
that literal claim scope therefore cannot be fixed on the date of filing.) Mammen, supra note 24. (―There is 
fertile soil at the intersection of patent law and the theory of legal interpretation. Many of the issues that 
arise in patent claim construction cannot be easily answered by analogy to other fields of legal 
interpretation. But use of the analytic tools that general jurisprudence makes available can help advance 
our understanding of the enterprise of patent claim construction, and help to resolve some of the most 
vexing issues in the post-Markman world of claim construction.‖) 
631 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. (1982) R.P.C. 183. (―A patent specification should be 
given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind of 
meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge.‖) 
632 Chiang & Solum, supra note 38. (―…tells us which issues are problems of linguistic meaning, and 
which issues are problems of legal effect. This is important because the two types of problems call for 
different solutions.‖) Collins, supra note 40. (―There are two independent mechanisms, each of which 
implicates a different category of AAT. One mechanism focuses on the nature of things and the way in 
which thing-scope can be fixed in one sense and yet expand in another to encompass AAT. The other 
addresses an ambiguity in the meaning of meaning.‖) 
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Such distinction raises the old problem of form and substance—a sharp division 
between literal text and the spirit of invention has long been questioned and 
rejected by courts.
633
 In fact, the distinction between ―interpretation‖ and 
―construction‖ of meaning is not clear-cut but often muddled in reading claims. 
634
 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the ―mongrel‖ character 
of claim construction, having aspects that are both legal and factual.
635
 This 
thesis considers interpretation and construction as distinguishable but 
nonetheless intertwined activities.
636
 When ascertaining the ―ordinary 
meaning‖, courts deal with a mix of linguistic questions and factual questions.  
The ordinary use-based theory asks how the conventional usage of the 
words in the scientific and technological community can shed light on the 
understanding of the claim text. The concept of convention plays a significant 
role in the ordinary use-based theory of meaning. The question is whether 
convention is static or dynamic.
637
 The court has held that a patent claim is 
given its ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing 
                                                        
633 C. Ven Der Lely N.V. v.Bamfords Ltd.[1963] R.P.C. 61 at 75 (H.L.) (per Lord Reid) (―Copying an 
invention by taking its "pith and marrow" without textual infringement of the patent is an old and familiar 
abuse which the law has never been powerless to prevent. It may be that in doing so, there is some 
illogicality, but our law has always preferred good sense to strict logic.‖) 
634 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol' y 65 (2011). (―Although 
I begin by offering definitions of interpretation and construction, the labels are not important. Both 
activities could be called ―interpretation‖—for example, something like ―semantic interpretation‖ and 
―applicative interpretation.‖) See also, Huscroft & Miller, supra note 490, at 34. 
635 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378, (1996). 
636 Alex Wellington, The Metes and Bounds of Purposive Claim Construction in Canadian Patent Law, 18 
I.P.J. 31(2004). See also, Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum 
L. Rev.833 (1964) (―The distinction between interpretation and construction of contracts has been doubted 
or rejected, principally, it is believed, for two reasons: First, because it is difficult or impossible to draw the 
line between the two in many problematic cases, and secondly, because many courts in many cases have 
ignored the distinction.‖) 
637  Yoshitake Masaki, Critique of J. L. Austin‘s Speech Act Theory: Decentralization of the 
Speaker-Centered Meaning in Communication (2004) 
http://www.caj1971.com/~kyushu/KCS_02_Yoshitake.pdf (last visited Aug 16, 2012) (―convention must 
not be such static rules that exist independently of human agents and that simply connect the intention with 
the utterance. Instead, convention has to be a dynamic concept.‖) 
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date of the patent application.
638
 This is because to allow patentees to capture 
technologies that come into existence after the filing date would reward them 
for inventions they did not make.
639
 In patent claim construction, it is declared 
by the courts that ―we are powerless to rewrite the claims and must construe the 
language of the claim at issue based on the words used.‖640 Therefore, when 
ascertaining the ordinary meaning, stability is favored over change.
641
 
However, since claim construction is often outcome-determinative for a 
validity or infringement decision,
642
 fixing ordinary meaning at the time of 
effective filing sometimes fails to offer sufficient reasons for embracing or 
rejecting the after-developed technologies.
643
 As patent claim construction is 
becoming more and more important in demarcating the scope of protection,
644
 
judges may have to decide whether the ordinary meaning encompasses 
after-arising technologies, which is a task traditionally performed by the 
doctrine of equivalents.
645
 Patent law does not require that an applicant 
describe in his specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment 
                                                        
638 Phillips v.AWH Corp., No. 03-1269, -1286 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en banc). See also, Home 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (―The touchstone for discerning 
the usage of claim language is the understanding of those terms among artisans of ordinary skill in the 
relevant art at the time of invention.‖) 
639 Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Chiron Corp. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring) (stating that valid claims 
should not ―be construed broadly enough to encompass technology that is not developed until later and 
was not enabled by the original application‖). 
640 SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng‘g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir., 2006). 
641 Brian G. Slocum, Linguistics and 'Ordinary Meaning' Determinations, 33 Statute L. Rev. 39 (2012). 
642  Lester Horwitz & Ethan Horwitz, Patent Litigation: Procedure & Tactics (2013) Vol. 2, Chapter 6 
Claim Construction-Markman Hearings, § 6.01 (―Claim construction is the first step in any 
infringement or validity analysis and is largely outcome determinative of the litigation‖) Moore, supra 
note 5. (―The ultimate goal for a court when interpreting terms in a claim is to provide a fixed meaning 
which can then be compared with the allegedly infringing device. However, even though it is only the 
first step, it is usually determinative. Shortly after a district court's claim construction, infringement cases 
typically resolve via summary judgment or settlement. As A result, "litigants usually spend significant 
resources disputing the meaning of each claim term at issue in a suit.‖) 
643 Collins, supra note 40. (―simultaneous fixation of and growth in literal claim scope is a logical 
impossibility.‖) 
644 Schwartz, supra note 153. 
645 For the discussion of afer-arising technologies, see Cotropia, supra note 206; Lemley, supra note 7; 
Collins, supra note 40; Saulsbury, supra note 205. 




 When there is a change of scientific and technical 
knowledge, judges have a great chance to lean away from the claim text to 
satisfy the contemporary needs in the field of art, and this invites wider 
interpretive imagination.
647
 Looking for a static conventional meaning leaves 
us without a framework to justify different understanding at different times, and 
the process of claim interpretation would become inconsistent.
648
 As a result, 
the actual patent claim construction cases dealing with after-arising technology 
are not all uniform.
649
 It is important to balance needs for providing sufficient 
certainty to the public with providing flexibility to adequately protect the rights 
of inventors. 
Section 2 Reconstruction of a hypothetical intent 




                                                        
646 SRI Int‘l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). See also, ―it is not 
necessary to embrace in the claims or describe in the specifications all possible forms in which the claimed 
principle may be reduced to practice.‖ Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 11, 55 S. Ct. 279 (1935).   
647 Roger Colinvaux, What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good Judging Under a Textualist 
Lens, 72 Ind. L.J. 1133 (1997); See also, Jesse M. Barrett, Legislative History, The Neutral, Dispassionate 
Judge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the Latter Ideals Through the Former Tool, 73 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 819 (1998). 
648 Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 Ind. L.J. 759 (1999) (―certainty 
has proven to be somewhat elusive in recent years…There are essentially two reasons for this. First… 
part of certainty's elusive nature can be attributed to the inherent ambiguity of language. The second 
reason for certainty‘s evasiveness is the generous exercise of judicial discretion).See also Kirk M. 
Hartung, Claim Construction: Another Matter of Chance and Confusion, 88 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc'y 831(2006) (―claim construction still is a matter of chance and confusion for patent owners, accused 
infringers and their patent attorneys.‖). 
649 Robin Feldman, Rights in Biospace, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2006). (―…cases concerning how far a 
biotechnology inventor can reach toward future inventions stand in contradiction to each other. Some 
opinions conclude broadly that the definition of an invention includes all embodiments, even those that 
could not have existed at the time of the invention. Other opinions use claim construction doctrines to limit 
a patent holder‘s reach only to embodiments known at the time of the invention. Still others use a different 
set of doctrines to conclude that a patent holder‘s reach sometimes includes things that were unknown at 
the time of the invention, but not always. These opinions, pulling in different directions, make it difficult to 
predict how far an inventor can reach toward later inventions.‖) 
650  Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitution Interpretation, 103 
Northwestern University Law Review 2. 703 (2009). 
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According to the intention-based theory, meaning of a word is the intent which 
it is desired to convey. ―The meaning of a text is that which the author meant 
by his use of a particular linguistic symbol.‖651Therefore, interpretation is not 
necessarily dependent on conventions that function as connecting factors 
between text and what is meant by it,
652
 and the recognition of intention is at 
the heart of interpretation.
 653
 The intention-based theory emphasizes the 
objective intention rather than the subjective intention of the author.
654
 Rather 
than a real fact, the objective intent is an artificial construct.
655
 According to the 
intention-based theory, it is not the author‘s actual intentions that are crucial, 
but rather what might be called the author‘s objective intentions. It is what an 
ideal reader (in the context of patent law, the ideal reader is the PHOSITA) 
would rationally take the author to have intended that determines meaning. The 
                                                        
651 Hirsch, supra note 292, 255 (1967). 
652  Yoshitake Masaki, Critique of J. L. Austin‘s Speech Act Theory: Decentralization of the 
Speaker-Centered Meaning in Communication (2004) 
http://www.caj1971.com/~kyushu/KCS_02_Yoshitake.pdf (last visited Aug 16, 2012) See also,Hirsch, 
supra note 292, at 13 (―It is an empirical fact that the consensus does not exist, and it is a logical error to 
erect a stable normative concept (i.e. the public meaning) out of an unstable descriptive one. The public 
meaning is nothing more or less than those meanings which the public happens to construe from the text. 
Any meaning which two or more members of the public construe is ipso facto within the public norms that 
govern language and its interpretation.‖) 
653 Mark Greenberg, Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in Philosophical 
Foundations of Language in the Law, A. Marmor, S. Soames, eds. 133 (2011). See also, Gideon Rosen, 
Textualism, Intentionalism, and the Law of the Contract, in Philosophical Foundations of Language in the 
Law, A. Marmor, S. Soames, eds. 133 (2011) (―communicative intentions: the intention to cause certain 
beliefs or expectations in their audience in a characteristic way.‖) 
654 Subjective intentionalists hold that the texts can only be identified as texts by reference to actual 
authorial intent, ―the correct interpretation of a text is the meaning of the text that is compatible with the 
author‘s subjective intentions.‖ See Noel Carroll, Interpretation and Intention: the Debate between 
Hypothetical and Subjective Intentionalism, in The Philosophy of Interpretation 75 (Joseph Margolis & 
Tom Rockmore ed., 2000); Barak, supra note 474, at 136 (stating that the purpose comprises ―both 
subjective and objective elements,‖ and the subjective purpose reflects the subjective intention of the 
legislature, in contrast to the intention of the reasonable legislature, which forms a part of the objective 
purpose.) 
655 The objective intentionalists define meaning as ―an ideal audience‘s best hypothesis regarding the 
author‘s intention, given a certain restriction on available evidence.‖ Robert Stecker, Aesthetics and the 
Philosophy of Art: an Introduction 138 (2005); See also, Jerrold Levinson, Intention and Interpretation, in 
Intention and Interpretation 224(Gary Iseminger ed., 1992) (―Principally, a ‗best‘ attribution of intention 
to the hypothesized author is one that is epistemically best—that has the most likelihood of being correct, 
given the total evidence available to one in the position of ideal reader.‖); Patricia Waugh, Literary Theory 
and Criticism: an Oxford Guide 186 (2006) (―an interpreter‘s task is to hypothesize an author‘s intention 
from the point of view of an ideal member of the intended audience fully informed about ―the work‘s 
internal structure and the relevant surrounding context of creation.‖) 
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purposive construction is designed to ―elicit objectively‖656 what the patentee‘s 
intention is, instead of inquiring into his subjective or actual intention.  
It has been pointed out that ―interpretation‖ tends to become ―invention‖ 
as the characterization of the author becomes ―more abstract‖.657 In patent law, 
a PHOSITA is supposed to know not only the common general knowledge of 
the technology, but also the patent practice such as explicit drafting conventions 
by which the claims were framed,
658
 and the practice of filing divisional 
applications,
659
 as well as other commercial or technical reasons,
660
 etc.. 
Judges also look at all the ―objective‖ evidence661 outside the four corners of 
the claim texts in order to decide whether there is intent to restrict the scope of 
claims or not. ―You always have to go outside the circle of syntax and 
semantics, because you always have to ascertain what the author of the text 
intended it to mean.‖ 662  In cases where there is no direct and express 
information about such intent,
663
 claim meanings might be neither intended by 
nor known to the patentee. Two judges are very likely to reach two opposing 
but plausible results.
664
 Interpreters have to bring in their considerations in 
                                                        
656 Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp [2008] EWHC 329 (Pat). For example, when assessing infringing 
variants in a patent litigation, if the skilled person had foreseen but the actual inventor did not see, it may 
then be a ―self-inflicted‖ wound. Robert H C MacFarlane & Adam Bobker, Understanding Construction at 
Trial, 156 M.I.P. 114-116 (2006). 
657 Andrei Marmor, Interpretation And Legal Theory 25 (2005) (―The more abstract the characterization 
of the fictitious author, the greater amount of creativity the interpretation allows.‖) 
658 Schenck Rotec GmbH v. Universal Balancing Limited [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat). 
659 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v. Delta Airways Inc [2010] EWHC 3094 (Pat). 
660 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Ratiopharm GmbH [2009] EWCA Civ 252. 
661 Lord Bingham, A New Thing under the Sun? The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision, 12 
Edin. L.R. 374-390 (2008). A matrix of facts ―includes absolutely anything which would have affected 
the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man‖? 
662 Michael Robertson, The Impossibility of Textualism and the Pervasiveness of Rewriting in Law, 22 
Can. J.L. & Juris. 381(2009). See also, Moises Silva, Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation 107 
(1996) (―the interpretive key is thought to lie outside of the text itself in its origin or background.‖) 
663 Stephen Davies, The Philosophy of Art 119 (2006). The difference is that in establishing subjective 
intent, all hypotheses are trumped by direct, accurate information about the author‘s intention, even if what 
was hypothesized is more plausible than what was actually intended.   
664 Barak, supra note 474, 303 (―when there is no credible information about that intent . . . then the 
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reconstructing the ―practical purpose‖ of the patentee at the time of filing. 665 
Without concrete instructions to follow, it will be difficult for an interpreter to 
offer convincing justification for the claim that a certain interpretation is the 




After all, the intention-based theory ―tells you what you are doing when 
you are interpreting; you are looking for the author‘s intention. It doesn‘t tell 
you how to find it and it doesn‘t guarantee that you will find it.‖667 The same is 
true in purposive interpretation, ―it is good that Lord Hoffmann is telling us 
what to do (answer the crucial question
668
 and not the Improver questions), 
but he does not tell us how to do it in these specialized cases.‖669 The 
objective intent is an important factor but not the only factor in the 
determination of claim meaning.
670
 The real question is not whether the 
                                                                                                                                                 
interpreter abandons legislative intent in favor of the fundamental values of the system.‖)  
665 Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New 
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 Georgetown L J 1947 (2005). It has been criticized that the 
goal of bringing objectivity to patent claim cases through formalistic legal rules is a costly illusion.  
666 Posner, supra note 491. (―The task for the judge called upon to interpret a statute is best described as 
one of imaginative reconstruction. The judge should try to think his way as best he can into the minds of 
the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.‖). 
Also see, Cross, supra note 470. (―It is difficult to imaginatively reconstruct intent when circumstances 
have changed so dramatically.‖) 
667 Stanley Fish, Intention is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak‘s Purposive Interpretation 
in Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1109 (2008). (―Intentionalism is simply the right answer to a question (what is 
the meaning of a text?) and not a method. Knowing that it is intention you are after gives you no leg up 
when you are faced with the task of interpreting a particular text. You still have to determine what the 
intention is, and more often than not that determination will involve disputes in which, by offering 
different accounts of the intention animating a text, interpreters will give different accounts of its 
properties and meanings.‖) 
668 Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and others [2004] UKHL 46 (―there is 
only one compulsory question: What would a person skilled in the art have understood the patentee to have 
used the language of the claim to mean?‖) 
669 Paul Quan Kaih Shiuh & Teo Guan Siew, Interpreting Patent Claims: Some Thoughts on the UK 
Kirin-Amgen Decision, 18 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 203-233 (2006) (―Lord Hoffmann did not 
lay down any alternative guidelines to the Improver questions. Further guidance on how to interpret claims 
in such cases is noticeably lacking.‖) 
670 Michael Hancher, Three Kinds of Intention, 87 Modern Language Notes 827-851 (1972). 
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patentee intended a certain result,
 671
 but whether the result is legally justifiable 
given the specific context of the interpretive question. 
B. Determinacy is hard to be achieved in the context of changing technology 
When the intention-based theory asserts that ―meaning cannot be autonomous 
from intent‖,672 it assumes that as soon as meaning was formed by an author, it 
was reserved in the originating historical moment. The intention-based theory 
seeks for the ideal ―determinacy‖ of meaning: 
―Reproducibility is a quality of verbal meaning that makes interpretation 
possible…determinacy, on the other hand, is a quality of meaning required in 
order that there be something to reproduce…if a meaning were indeterminate, it 
would have no boundaries, no self-identity, and therefore could have no identity 
with a meaning entertained by someone else… ‖
673
 
The intention-based theory also holds authorial meaning to be sharable so 
that the interpreter is able to reproduce the verbal meaning. 
674
 The problem 
with this theory is that to ―share‖ a meaning is to have the same meaning that 
someone else has: ―This is perhaps an odd sort of ‗sharing‘: what I share 
remains someone else‘s.‖675 In a dynamic context, there would be states of 
                                                        
671 Gregory Leyh, Toward a Constitutional Hermeneutics, 32 American Journal of Political Science 369 
(1988). (―Texts and their histories do not exist out there in the past awaiting the disinterested recovery of 
their objective meaning.‖) 
672 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 485. Kaye Mitchell, Intention and Text: Towards an Intentionality 
of Literary Form 35 (2008) (―the author retains a relative autonomy from linguistic conventions‖). 
673 E.D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, in David Davies & Carl Matheson, Contemporary Readings in 
the Philosophy of Literature: An Analytic Approach 136 (2008) 
674 Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of Law, 148 (2000). (―Hirsch added that verbal 
meaning is a type or class of mental objects. Because all examples of the type share some characteristic…it 
is sufficient for the reader to identify the shared characteristic to reproduce the verbal meaning.‖) 
675 Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida 140 (1986) (―He shares it with me, but it is still his…The 
interesting move in Hirsch‘s argument are his definition of the precise nature of this property and this 
proprietorship.‖) 
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affairs that are utterly foreign to the author‘s intentions. However, fidelity to the 
authorial intent requires that its original meaning be preserved over time. In the 
context of patent claim construction, due to the complex and ever changing 
technological environment, there is a tension between the past and the present 
moment of interpretation.  
Under the purposive approach, because the PHOSITA is to construe the 
claim by ascertaining the patentee‘s purpose as on the date of patent application, 
it is more difficult to cover the issue of after-arising technology.
676
 Judges tend 
to give a narrow interpretation to the claim terms in order to avoid any 
over-reaching construct of meaning. As Lord Hoffman noted in Kirin-Amgen: 
I do not dispute that a claim may, upon its proper construction, cover products or 
processes which involve the use of technology unknown at the time the claim 
was drafted. . . . In the present case, however . . . the man skilled in the art would 
not have understood the claim as sufficiently general to include gene activation. 
He would have understood it to be limited to the expression of an exogenous 
DNA sequence which coded for EPO.
677
  
The problem is that the patentee usually did not contemplate future 
development of technologies at the time of filing. There are difficulties 
involved in speculating about the hypothetical intent of the patentees in 
relation to subject matter of which they had no knowledge or understanding of 
the relevant context. When the patentees could not have foreseen or 
                                                        
676 Pumfrey et al., supra note 322. (―In other words, unless the claim is general enough to cover variants 
that deploy after-arising technology, without running the risk of being invalidated for lack of sufficient 
disclosure or enablement, it may not be possible to construe such a claim to include the said variant.‖) 
677 Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and others [2004] UKHL 46. 
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contemplated the technological changes, it is difficult to attribute to them 
some intention about how to deal with later-developed technologies. For 
example, a PHOSITA for engineering and construction of satellite in the late 
1950‘s and early 1960‘s could not have foreseen the rapid acceleration of 
computer technology.
678
 A too restrictive construction makes the patent 
protection less effective as soon as a new technology is developed.
679
 
In recent years, the purposive approach has garnered accumulating 
legitimacy in claim construction in many jurisdictions. The intention-based 
theory may gain some benefits in patent claim construction for it breaks through 
the four corners of the literal text. However, its application brings with it 
significant difficulties both theoretically and practically. Intent or purpose plays 
a necessary role in patent claim interpretation, because the patent statute 
requires a statement of what the applicant claims as his invention.
680
 However, 
the controversies in patent interpretation cannot be reduced merely by the use of 
phrases like ―expressed intent‖ or ―objective basis.‖681  
Section 3 Interpreter’s construction of content of a claim  
A. Content-based theory faces the problem of preserving original meanings.  
Under the content-based theory, the author of the text is not the source of 
                                                        
678 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Although the applicant did not 
draft claims to the full extent of a patent's disclosure within the confines of the teachings of the prior art, 
the Federal Circuit nonetheless awarded him the shortfall via an equivalency theory. 
679 Toshiko Takenaka, Patent Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research 453 (2008). 
680 Edward B. Gregg, Some New Patent Cases in the Supreme Court, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 601 (1951). 
681 Livingston, supra note 123. Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A 
Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U.L. Rev. 523 
(1988) (―…although a legal text has an objective meaning to the extent that the reader is bound by the text 
and prevented from creating a meaning ex nihilo, any attempt to discover the meaning of the text is a 
misguided project that ignores both the dynamic interaction of the reader and the text, and the implications 
of the reader‘s finite and temporal nature.‖) 
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meaning, and patent claim interpretation is not a grasp of objective intention:
682
 
In patent claim construction, we grasp not the word, but the subject matter 
through the word.
683
 The interpreter is concerned with ―the essential content 
of a claim‖684 by looking at the technical problem and particular solution in 
the light of the prior art. The content-based theory has advantages in at least 
two aspects: Firstly, as the claim text must always particularly point out ―the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention,‖685 focusing on the 
content of the text can avoid the conceptual difficulties of finding ordinary 
meaning or the patentee‘s objective intent at the time of filing, e.g., there might 
be no well-established ordinary meaning, or the patentee‘s intent was absent or 
unclear, etc.. By articulating the descriptive feature of the technical content,
686
 
this theory allows the interpreters to attend to the distinctiveness of meaning in 
the field of the invention.   
Secondly, it has been pointed out earlier that the theories seeking meaning 
                                                        
682 Richard Shusterman, Croce on Interpretation: Deconstruction and Pragmatism, 20 New Literary 
History 199-216 (1988) (―no perfect foundational objectivity … and no titanic leap of imagination to place 
us in the mind of the author.‖) See also, Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 Michi. L. 
Rev.5, 1187-1255 (1994). (―It is prima facie unlikely that a conception of objectivity suitable for more 
purely evaluative or normative judgments would be suitable for more closely world-guided judgments.‖) 
683 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006). By statute, a patent‘s specification must ―conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as 
his invention.‖ Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) ("It has long been 
understood that a patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture to 'secure to [the 
patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what is still open to them."' 
684 Alessandro Steinfl, The Doctrine of Equivalents Through the Eyes of the European Patent Convention, 
Casrip Publication Series: Rethinking International Intellectual Property 114, 117 (2000), available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/symposium/Number6/Steinfl.pdf (―the German approach to both 
claim interpretation and infringement relied on interpreting patent claims broadly. Therefore, the claim 
language was heavily stretched beyond its strict literal meaning when adopting the [historic] doctrine of 
equivalents.‖) 
685 35 U.S.C. § 112, Specification. See also Anthony. W. Deller, Patent Claims §5 (1971) (2d ed.) (stating 
peripheral definition involves ―marking out the periphery or boundary of the area covered by the claim 
and holding as infringements only such constructions as lie within that area,‖ and central definition 
involves ―drafting of a narrow claim setting forth a typical embodiment coupled with broad 
interpretation by the courts to include all equivalents constructions.‖) 
686 Pirmin Stekeler-weithofer, The Pragmatics of Making It Explicit 72 (2008) (―…the difference in 
meaning between de dicto and de re ascriptions, according to which the expression ‗of x‘, when figuring 
within de re belief ascriptions, somehow contributes t the articulation of a descriptive feature of the 
ascribed belief that is not articulated by a corresponding de dicto ascription.‖) 
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at the time of filing are not consonant with the fast-changing technological 
context. Legal interpretation is always a practical response out of the present.
687
 
A theory of meaning needs the ability to continue to grow and adapt to new 
circumstances.
688
The content-based theory holds that conventional usage and 
authorial intention are useful but not binding in the light of changing 
experiences and perceptions—―interpreters can never be distanced from the 
text: they are always embedding their own meanings in it.‖689 The technical 
content inherently includes equivalents and the equivalents are often 
determined at the time of infringement.
690
 Interpreters can therefore adapt their 
decisions to the circumstances of the present day. 
The content-based theory overcomes the problem of ―lack of engagement 
on the interpreter‘s part‖ 691  in the intention-based theory. However, its 
                                                        
687  Howard J. Vogel, The Possibilities of American Constitutional Law in a Fractured World: A 
Relational Approach to Legal Hermeneutics, 83 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 789 (2006). (―a response out of the 
present, in light of future possibilities for the purpose of reaching a satisfaction in the present.‖ ); See also, 
Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Texas Law Review 1753 (1994). 
Williams James, "What Pragmatism Means". Lecture II in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old 
Ways of Thinking 20 (1907). (―He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, 
from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He 
turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power.‖) 
688 John E. Smith, Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism 50 (1978)( Pragmatism is a novel 
philosophical position which aims at ―sweeping away previous philosophical traditions in order to 
establish a new and ‗practical‘ outlook on the nature of things.‖) See also, William James et.al, The 
Meaning of Truth, 116 (1975) (―The whole originality of pragmatism, the whole point in it, is its use of the 
concrete way of seeing. It begins with concreteness, and returns and ends with it.‖); Rorty Richard, 
Consequences of Pragmatism. xli (1982). The criteria of justification are seen by pragmatists as 
―temporary resting-places constructed for specific utilitarian ends.‖ 
689 Stephen W. Littlejohn & Karen A. Foss, Theories of Human Communication 135 (2007). (―Readers are 
members of interpretive communities. So meaning really resides in the interpretive community of 
readers.‖) 
690 Zhong Guo Jie Fang Jun Kong Jun Zong Yi Yuan Su Bei Jing Da Lun Ke Ji Gong Si Qin Fan Dian Nao 
Zhong Pin Dian Liao Yi [China PLA General Hospital vs. Beijing Dalun Technology Co. Ltd] No. 390, 
First instance, Economics & Intellectual Property Tribunal, Beijing Intermediate People‘s Court (1995); 
No.4, Final Decision, Intellectual Property Tribunal, Beijing High People‘s Court (1996). Both courts 
found the time of infringement as the reference point for measuring equivalents. The patent claim was filed 
on October 8th, 1985 and the defendant‘s technology was developed in the 1990s. Compared with the 
claimed invention which had 19 features, 5 features including a control point, a switch, a modulator, a 
digital attenuator and a synchronous counter were absent from the defendant‘s technology. However, the 
court found that the defendant‘s technology performed the same function to achieve the same result in 
substantially the same way. It was fair to embrace the equivalents to the claims in response to the rapid 
development of software technology. 
691 Wierciński, supra note 569. (―in de dicto interpretation as described by Brandom, the orientation 
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disadvantage is also obvious: there is lack of the historical dimension of 
understanding.
692
 The content-based theory is not interested in merely what the 
historical author was committed to, but what would he have to be committed to 
in a more contemporary context.
693
 The constructive approach derived from 
this theory faces the problem of constructing technical content from the modern 
interpreter‘s circumstances and is therefore subject to interpreter‘s discretion 
(using a PHOSITA as a reference). Such approach cares less about preserving 
the original meaning of claims, but pays primary attention to the specification 
of the content.
694
 The content-based theory is still unsatisfactory in explaining 
the fixation and growth paradox in claim construction. Determination of 
equivalents at the time of infringement implies that the indefiniteness of 
interpretation will not come to an end until the judges have considered the 
allegedly infringing technology. As a result, the public is not likely to know 
what balance to strike between promoting invention and maintaining free 
competition. This situation is unsatisfactory because it produces unduly and 




B. Lack of evaluation criteria for assessing fairness  
                                                                                                                                                 
toward the validity of what is said in the text is missing. This lack of engagement on the interpreter‘s part, 
however, closes up the possibility of genuinely learning something from the text. ) 
692 Id. (―in de re interpretations as described by Brandom, the orientation toward what is said in the text is 
present, but what is missing is the openness toward the possibility that what the text says could be valid for 
us. This also precludes the possibility of learning from the text. ‖) 
693 Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality 99 
(2002) (―The motivating idea of de dicto specifications of the conceptual content of ascribed commitments 
is that the inferential context is to be supplied by the circumstances of production of the text…But besides 
the question of what one takes to follow from a claim one has made, there is the issue of what really 
follows from it.‖) 
694 Id. 100. (―Denotational de re ascriptions specify conceptual content by saying what it is one is talking 
about, in the normative sense of which object one needs to investigate the properties and relations of in 
order to assess the truth of the claim in question.‖) 
695 Smith, supra note 34. 
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The ordinary use-based theory develops an inquiry as what an interpreter 
would have understood the words to mean when the text was adopted. The 
intention-based theory focuses on what the interpreter would have understood 
the author to be using the words to mean when the text was adopted.
696
 The 
two theories can be considered as a ―close construction‖, 697 which respect 
intent and ―the most direct possible application of the text‖ to new cases. By 
comparison, the content-based theory is a more extensive construction, which 
can be considered as ―transcendent construction‖ that goes beyond the text and 
intent.
698
 The transcendent construction is derived from ―principles superior to 
the text‖, and it nevertheless remains within the spirit of the law or document to 
be construed.
699
 In the case of claim construction, superior principles are the 
general legal principles such as the eclectic principle and the fairness principle. 
Under the content-based theory, claim interpretation is a pragmatic 
activity in which decision must always be attentive to the purposes of invention, 
its function, way and effect, its contribution over the prior art, as well as the 
practical consequences of judicial decisions.
700
 The essence of constructive 
                                                        
696 Barnett, supra note 634. (―Unlike ascertaining original semantic meaning, however, ascertaining ―what 
the framers would have done‖ is a counterfactual, not a factual or historical inquiry.‖) 
697  Lieber, supra note 45, at 81. In this book, Lieber classified five types of construction: close 
construction, comprehensive construction, transcendent construction and extravagant construction. 
Gregory Leyh, Legal Hermeneutics History, Theory, and Practice 94 (1992) (―In general, Lieber argues 
for what he calls ‗close construction‘ but not ‗strict construction‘. Close construction respects intent and 
‗the directest possible application of the text … to new or unprovided cases‘. But strict construction 
refuses to go beyond the text at all.) 
698 Id. 
699 Id. 
700 Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 711(2004). Professor Williams 
James‘ definition of ―Pragmatism‖ from Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology Vol. II 321-322 (J. M. 
Baldwin ed., 1902). It is an admirable way to ―establish the different meanings of different conceptions by 
tracing and comparing their respective consequences.‖ Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse 
and the Surplus of Meaning 90(1976). To interpret a text then means to primarily consider it as the 
expression of certain socio-economic needs and as a response to certain problems well localized in a 
particular circumstance. Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 21(1996) 
(―The most pervasive and influential of these has been economic analysis, which treats law as a 
mechanism of wealth maximization; law-and-economics is the latest and most sophisticated manifestation 
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approach is the determination of technical contents, taking into account of 
present day disputes. It emphasizes the realization of ―fairness‖ in each and 
every case at hand.
701
 However, the concept of ―fairness‖ is inherently vague. 
As the claim is open for interpretation in various directions, different 
interpreters have different observations of particular facts and different 
determination of implications. The broad construction of the technical content 
has the implication of providing adequate protection of the rights of the 
patentee, while the narrow construction of the technical content has the 
implication of providing certainty to the public.  
There is a lack of concrete standards and stable criteria for resolving the 
conflicts between the private and public interests, especially when various type 
of evidence is pointing at different directions. The interpreters constantly attend 
to different interests of disputing parties in different patent cases, and adapt the 
judgments to changing values in contemporary society. 702  Without clear 
guidance and direction, the technical contents are always subject to revision, 
expansion or rejection by different interpreters,
703
 which leads to inconsistency 
of decision outcomes.
704
 Then the court may be presented with rival 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the Benthamite instrumentalist tradition in legal theory.‖) 
701 Article 9, Opinions. ―To protect the rights of the patentee and the public interest, patent claim 
construction should follow the principle of fairness, and reasonably ascertain the scope of protection by 
sufficiently considering the patentee‘s contribution over the prior art.‖ Article 11, ―Specifications and 
drawings can be used to expand or limit the scope of protection of the technical contents defined by the 
literal words, i.e. either incorporating the equivalent features into the scope of protection or restricting 
certain technical features by the specifications or drawings.‖ 
702 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1(1996). (A pragmatic judge is 
defined as one that ―always tries to do the best he can do for the present and the future, unchecked by any 
felt duty to secure consistency in principles with what other officials have done in the past.‖) 
703 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy 96(1920). 
704 Yan Wenjun & Liu Xin, Duo Yu Zhi Ding Yuan Ze Bi Jiao Yan Jiu [A Comparative Study of the rule 
against surplusage, in Research on Patent Law], in Legal Affairs Department of State Intellectual 
Property Office (ed.), Zhuan Li Fa Yan Jiu 2006 [Studies on Patent Law 2006],233 (2007). (―The rule 
against surplusage would harm the public function of patent claims and increases the cost of determining 
the patent scope…In order to clarify whether a technical feature is essential or not, the judges and the 
  166 
 
interpretations, given the uncertainty of which results are ―better‖— the best 
possible result takes on different values in different situations. The insufficient 
guidance on the decision-making process makes it unpredictable to know what 
justice requires or what fairness dictates. 
Application of constructive claim construction is proposed as a middle 
way to reduce the tension between the text and the authorial intent. However, it 
is not a final solution. It leaves immense latitude to judges in the process of 
judicial interpretation without providing useful criterion for determining patent 
scope. One should be alert to the potential danger of unconstrained interpretive 
freedom,
705
 which may erode public confidence in the patent system. 
Section 4 Fitting theory into practice   
As previously discussed, one distinguishing feature of theories of meaning 
underpinning claim construction practice is their attention to applying 
meaning in context, that is, to explicate the meaning of a claim term in terms of 
what the ordinary skilled person means by it in the particular field of 
invention.
706
  It is certainly right to say that one cannot separate the meaning of 
a word from the entire context in which it occurs. However, it would be more 
helpful to hear different answers to the essential question of interpretation: 
                                                                                                                                                 
litigants have to invest more time and energy in the litigation.‖)   
705JerzyWroblewski & Neil MacCormick, On justification and Interpretation, published in Law and Legal 
Interpretation 258 (Fernando Atria & D.Neil MacCormick ed., 2003) (The exercise of uncabined 
discretion without proper limitations violates two central values of judicial decision: non-arbitrariness and 
legality.) Stephen Neale, Paul Grice and The Philosophy of Language, Linguistics and Philosophy 15 
(5):509 – 559 (1992). The meaning of a word is its use in the language. 
706 Stephen Neale, Paul Grice and The Philosophy of Language, Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):509 – 
559 (1992). 
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―What is meaning?‖ Different theories pursue different goals,707 although the 
means or sources needed to accomplish these goals may converge at some 
point.
708
 The ordinary use-based theory holds that the meaning of a word 
corresponds to its ordinary usage in the given community of speakers.
709
 The 
intention-based theory argues that meaning should be interpreted in terms of the 
intentions of speakers engaged in an act of communication.
710
 The 
content-based theory focuses on the construction of the subject matter from the 




The weaknesses of the above three theories are further analyzed in this 
Chapter. The aim of the critical analysis is not to deny the possibilities of 
                                                        
707 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009) (―not 
only does textualism differ fundamentally from intentionalism and purposivism, but the gap between them 
gets wider with time.‖) For articles representing a new wave of scholarship that attempts to reach an 
accommodation among competing interpretive methods, see e.g. Molot, supra note 615; Nelson, supra 
note 465. Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Right: Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1143(1998). See also, Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999). In 
his articles, Professor Amar advocated ―holistic textualism‖ through which the words of a legal text are 
seen as part of broad linguistic and structural patterns rather than individual provisions. The holistic 
textualism was criticized that based on textual similarities, interpreters are likely to be distracted from the 
context of particular provisions and increase decision costs. See Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, 
Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: the Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 730(2000). 
708 Siegel, id. (―Attention to context and other interpretive conventions can sometimes help bridge the gap 
between interpretive methods, but sometimes it cannot.‖) 
709 Fabrizio Macagno, supra note 524. (―On the one hand, the speaker presumes that the hearer knows the 
meaning of the words he used, because they correspond to the ordinary (in the given community of 
speakers) meaning (in context). On the other hand, the hearer interprets the words on the basis of the 
presumption that the speaker is using them according to their ordinary usage (in con-text).‖) 
710 Christian Plunze, Why Do We Mean Something Rather Than Nothing? in G. Grewendorf, G. Meggle 
(ed.), Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Realty: Discussions with John R. Searle,105 (2002) (―The answer 
given by Paul Grice is that someone means something by hits utterance if and only if he intends to 
communicate something to an addressee.‖) For Paul Grice, what matters for a theory of language is what 
the agent intends to communicate. 
711 Charles S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, Popular Science, Monthly 12, 286-302 (1878) 
Charles Peirce wrote: ―consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of 
the object.‖ William James, Pragmatism 20 (2008) (―To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an 
object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — 
what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare.‖) See also, Ronald Dworkin, 
Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Fidelity as Integrity: The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, 
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249 (1997). 




 but rather to recognize the key dilemma of current theories of 
claim interpretation: the tension between preservation of the original 
understanding and adapting it to technology development. Claim construction 
is a process that ―can expand or restrict the reach of a patent into 
improvements.‖713 For example, it is necessary to explain why the meaning of 
claims is fixed at the time of filing yet grows to encompass improvements. 
714
As pointed out by Professor Chisum, a common policy objective on patent 
claim scope in all patent systems is ―fair protection for patent owners 
combined with a reasonable degree of certainty.‖715 In claim interpretation, on 
one hand, patent law requires the kind of certainty for the public to ascertain 
―where the patentee‘s proprietary interest begins and ends.‖ 716 Therefore we 
must preserve the original meaning over time. On the other hand, as the 
contemporary context influences the reading of the past text, technological 
changes will influence the application of the term in new cases, and claim 
construction needs to justify this change of understanding. 
Therefore, the critical task of patent claim interpretation is then how to 
                                                        
712  Mistrale Goudreau, The So-Called Purposive Construction of Patent Claims: Comments on 
Whirlpool and Free World Trust, 2 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 1, 219 (2005). 
(―The aim is neither to reject nor to prefer a method, but rather to use all appropriate methods to interpret 
a text in a just and reasonable manner, given the particular circumstances of a case.‖) 
713 Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the "Spirit" of Innovative Things: Looking to Complementary and 
Substitute Properties To Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1217 (2011). 
(―Some determine the permissible level of generality at which a claim can be drawn. Claim 
construction—the process through which judges determine the meaning of claim language to the 
PHOSITA—can expand or restrict the reach of a patent into improvements. In addition, a court can expand 
or contract patent protection beyond the literal scope of a claim through either the doctrine of equivalents 
(―DOE‖)139 or the reverse DOE.‖) 
714 Saulsbury, supra note 205. (―In the case of allegedly infringing improvements, a court‘s approach to 
thing construction determines whether literal claim scope can stay fixed in some sense at the time of filing 
even as it grows, in another sense, to encompass improvements.‖) 
715 Donald S. Chisum, Common and Civil Law Approaches to Patent Claim Interpretation: 'Fence Posts' 
and 'Sign Posts', in David Vaver & Lionel Bentley (eds.), Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: 
Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish, 107 (2004). 
716 Nard, supra note 648. 
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preserve original meaning across changed contexts.
717
 An appropriate theory 
is needed to establish a dialogue about meaning between that past texts and the 
present situation.
718
 A proposed patent claim interpretation must fit, and 
explain the legal practices it interprets as well as justify them. The goals to 
preserve the original meaning and to adapt the text to new situations may seem 
at odds with each other, but they actually are two sides of the same coin.
719
  
The trend in the field of legal interpretation, such as constitutional 
interpretation and statutory interpretation,
 720
 is toward unifying rather than 
separating originalism and living document,
721
 which will be analyzed in 
detail in the next Chapter. In a brief summary, the key concepts lying at the 
core of this trend are ―meaning (connotation/sense)‖ and ―application 
(denotation/reference)‖. 722  For example, it has been pointed out that 
                                                        
717 William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 
Colum. L. Rev. 782, 857 (1995). It is necessary to "translate" the original understanding of a constitutional 
provision into the present context. In analyzing Professor Lessig's model, Professor William M. Treanor 
explains that "a translator seeks to identify the ends that the Constitution's framers sought to advance and 
then interprets a constitutional provision in a way that best advances those ends in today's world." 
718 T.M. Seebohm, Hermeneutics. Method and Methodology, 46 (2005) (―The task of hermeneutics is to 
bridge the gap by re-creating the past horizon for the present reader.‖) 
719  Balkin, supra note 42. The author argued ―that original meaning originalism and living 
constitutionalism are not only not at odds, but are actually flip sides of the same coin.‖ The basic idea is 
that interpreters must be faithful to the original meaning of the constitutional text and to the principles that 
underlie the text. But fidelity to original meaning does not require fidelity to original expected application. 
720  Lawrence B. Solum, Interpretation-Construction Distinction, The Symposium: The 
Interpretation/Construction Distinction in Constitutional Law: Annual Meeting of the AALS Section on 
Constitutional Law, 27 Const. Comment 95. (2010-2011) (―These facts include the characteristics of the 
utterance itself—what marks appear in the writing?—and by facts about linguistic practice—how is that 
word used?—and what are the rules (or regularities) of syntax and grammar?‖) Laura A. Cisneros, The 
Constitutional Interpretation/construction Distinction: A Useful Fiction 27 Const. Comment 
71(2010-2011) (―construction is what happens when judicial and non-judicial actors take the product of 
the interpretation enterprise--i.e., the recovered meaning of the text--and then implement that meaning 
through legal rules that govern everyday social and political life.‖) Huscroft & Miller (ed), supra note 490, 
at 64 (2011) (Under original public meaning originalism , the original meanings of the concepts used (and 
their meaning in combination with each other) should be preserved, but we are not necessarily bound by 
either the intentions of the persons who framed the words, or by the general public expectation of how 
those words would be applied.‖) 
721 John T. Valauri, As Time Goes By: Hermeneutics and Originalism, 10 (3) Nevada Law Review 
719–731(2012) (―No longer is there a sharp line separating originalism and living constitutionalism. Some 
writers even combine the two theories into aspects of one theory.‖) See also, Randall N. Graham, A Unified 
Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 23 Statute L. REV. 91, 104 (2002) 
722 Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comm. 291. (2007) (―…they have tended 
to conflate two different ideas—the expected application of constitutional texts, which in not binding law, 
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interpreters must follow the ―original meaning‖, but are not constrained by the 
―original expected application‖. 723  The ―original expected application‖ 
concerns the problem how to adapt the meaning of a text to a concrete 
situation at a point of a time in the past, but it does not necessarily determine 
the final meaning.
724
 The original meaning of the text itself is limitless with 
possibilities and open to interpretation and reinterpretation, therefore, an 
interpreter is able to explore opportunities for the production of new meaning 
generated in a changing context.
 725
An appropriate theory of claim 
interpretation has to clarify the circumstances that justify the activity of 
construction, and to explain what information matters or how facts should be 
used consistently in determining the patent scope.
726
 The theory needs to 
provide a convincing justification for decision-making and enhance the overall 
coherence of claim interpretation.
727
  The philosophical hermeneutics is 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the original meaning, which is. ‖) See also, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional 
Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 5, 
7(2011). (―Brown v. Board of Education22 illustrates the potential distinction between anticipated 
applications of constitutional language and the Framers‘ intent, the original understanding, or the original 
public meaning… Obviously, it is the formal text of the Fourteenth Amendment that governs, and not the 
uncodified and erroneous ideas of the ratifiers of that text as to what it might mean.‖) 
723 Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Hellerand Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 926–39 
(2009), at 935. See also, John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as 
the Core of Originalism, 24 Const. Comment 371(2007) (―The original meaning is informed by, but not 
exhausted by,  its original expected applications… the expected applications can be strong evidence of the 
original meaning). 
724 Fallon, supra note 722. (―Whether—and, if so, when—originally intended or expected applications of  
constitutional language conclusively establish its original meaning is obviously a crucially important 
question with implications for how myriad constitutional questions ought to be resolved.‖)  
725 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Cannons about How 
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950) (―increasingly as a statute gains in age…its 
language is called upon to deal with circumstances utterly uncontemplated at the time of its passage. Here 
the quest is not properly for the sense originally intended by the statute, for the sense sought originally to 
be put into it, but rather for the sense which can be quarried out of it in the light of the new situation.‖) 
Dostal, supra note 46, 95. (In we are to be open to an alternative understanding of a text, we must 
acknowledge that we possess a pre-understanding, that, indeed, we are part of thick traditions and 
conditioned by the inevitably parochial character of our historical situation…we must acknowledge our 
lack of neutrality, our pre-conceptions and our biases.)  
726 Twining & Miers, supra note 15, at 344. (Description and conclusion of facts has to be translated into 
the context of normative reasoning.) 
727 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 150-68 (1977). See also, Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning 
and Legal Theory 156 (1978). The notion of coherence addresses the question about linking the various 
individual parts into one integrated whole. Barbara Baum Levenbook, The Role of Coherence in Legal 
Reasoning, 3 Law and Philosophy 3, pp. 355-74 (1984). To achieve the goal of coherence, different rules 
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especially relevant for law, which is grounded in the interpretation of 
authoritative texts from the past to resolve present-day disputes.
728
  
                                                                                                                                                 
must have some justificatory relation, either direct or indirect, to the same principle. J.M. Balkin, 
Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale 
L.J. 105 (1993).   
728 Francis Joseph Mootz III, Nietzschean Critique and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 24 Cardozo Law 
Review 967 (2003). It has been acknowledged that legal practice inevitably is hermeneutical, with 
lawyers and judges interpreting governing legal texts and the social situations in which they must be 
applied. See also Lieber, supra note 45 (―It is in vain, therefore, to believe in the possibility of forming a 
code of laws absolutely distinct, like mathematical theories. All that true wisdom requires is to make laws 
as distinct and perfect as possible, following both the dictates of reason and the suggestions of experience, 
and carefully to establish rules of interpretation and construction, or legal hermeneutics.) 
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PART III: THE APPLICATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
HERMENEUTICS TO CLAIM INTERPRETATION 
CHAPTER 6 PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 
This Chapter introduces an alternative interpretive theory, i.e. philosophical 
hermeneutics, to patent claim construction. It has been pointed out that the key 
challenge facing current theories of claim interpretation is the tension between 
preserving the certainty of claim scope coverage and adapting the claim to 
technology development. Philosophical hermeneutics‘ main concern is how the 
meaning of a text can be continually understood by interpreters in present 
conditions by reading the text. This Chapter introduces its core theoretical 
concepts such as ―Sache‖, ―application‖ and ―fusion of horizons‖. The dynamic 
legal interpretation derived from philosophical hermeneutics strives for 
adapting old texts to new circumstances. Scholars in the field of constitutional 
interpretation and statutory interpretation have realized that it is worthwhile to 
reconcile the fixed meaning and the evolving facts. Some express such idea by 
reference to the distinction between a fixed ―concept (connotation/sense)‖ and 
variable ―conceptions (denotation/reference)‖ of that concept. While the 
connotation of the words remains fixed, their denotation may vary over time. 
The main theoretical basis is that the applications of a general term do not 
exhaust the sources for understanding its essential characteristics. This Chapter 
studies the implications of this ―connotation-denotation‖ model for patent claim 
construction. 
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Section 1 Basic introduction to philosophical hermeneutics 
Since its emergence in the seventeenth century, the Latin word hermeneutica 
has referred to the art of interpretation.
729
 The modern use of the term 
―hermeneutics‖ can be traced to the work730 of Friedrich Schleiermacher and 
Wilhelm Dilthey, whose adherents look to hermeneutics as a general body of 
methodological principles. Emilio Betti and E.D. Hirsch, for example, sought to 
elaborate hermeneutics as a general body of methodological principles for 
humanistic studies,
731
 and argued strongly for the autonomy of the object of 
interpretation and the possibility of ―objectivity‖ in making valid 
interpretations.
732
 Philosophical hermeneutics, by comparison, is of very recent 
date. This term refers to the philosophical position of Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
Gadamer, following Heidegger, oriented his thinking to the more philosophical 
question of what understanding itself is.   
According to Gadamer, a person who wants to understand the text must 
question what lies behind what is said.
733
 Philosophical hermeneutics aims at 
                                                        
729 Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics 1 (1994); See also Jean Grondin, Sources of 
hermeneutics 19 (1995).  
730  Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings 225 (1998). Prior to 
Schleiermacher, the task of textual interpretation was thought to require different interpretive methods 
depending on the type of text to be interpreted. Schleiermacher is credited with taking the first steps toward 
developing a general hermeneutic methodology. In 1900, Dilthey applied Schleiermacher‘s description of 
―general hermeneutics‖ and expanded the scope of the hermeneutic application. See also, Alan D. Schrift, 
Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction 2(1990); 
Palmer, Richard, E., Hermeneutics 123 (1969). 
731 Gayle L. Ormiston & Alan D. Schrift, The Hermeneutic tradition: from Ast to Ricoeur (1990) (In 
general, Schleiermacher is credited with taking the first steps towards establishing a general hermeneutical 
methodology in contrast to a variety of regional hermeneutic approaches.) See also Richard Kearney, 
Twentieth-century continental philosophy 293(2003) (Betti and Hirsch have sought to argue anew for 
hermeneutics as a general body of methodological principles and rules for achieving validity in 
interpretation.) 
732 Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics 46(1969).  
733 Chris Lawn, Gadamer: A Guide For The Perplexed 75 (2006). Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, 88 (2008). ―The hermeneutical inquiry,‖ says Gadamer, ―is based on the fact that language 
always leads behind itself and behind the façade of overt verbal expression that it first presents.‖ 




 and emphasizes that there is no meaningful way to 
distinguish ―what the thing is‖ from interpretation.735 Therefore, philosophical 
hermeneutics is not centering the meaning of a text with its author's intent or 
its ordinary usage.
736
 but turning our attention to the subject matter of the 
expression. The best interpretation captures what the text has said that is true 
about the subject matter (die Sache) at stake in the text
737
 -- that is, ―the things 
themselves‖, which may be the things that the historical author did not have or 
could not have had.
738
  
Philosophical hermeneutics not only recognizes the pragmatics of 
language, but also reveals the interplay between text, author and interpreter.
739
 
For Gadamer, meaning is produced through an agreement between the 
                                                        
734 Tom Rockmore, In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century115 (2006) (―hence ontology, is 
descriptive, and description is interpretive, or hermeneutical.‖) See also, Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics 
129 (1969). (―Ontology must turn to the process of understanding and interpretation through which things 
appear.‖) 
735 Ingrid Scheibler, Gadamer: Between Heidegger and Habermas 139 (2000). (―For the ―content‖ of 
tradition exists in constantly widening possibilities, newly expressed in language.‖) 
736 Gadamer, supra note 46, 396. (―What is fixed in writing has detached itself from the contingency of its 
origin and its author and made itself free for new relationships. Normative concepts such as an author‘s 
meaning or the original reader‘s understanding in fact represent only an empty space that is filled from 
time to time in understanding…The idea of the original reader is full of unexamined idealization.‖) See 
also, David Couzens Hoy, Legal Hermeneutics: Recent Debates, in Kathleen Wright (ed.), Festivals of 
Interpretation (1990), pp. 111-35. (―Although hermeneutics does not deny a role for intentions in 
interpretation, neither does it privilege the original intentions of legal authors as textual meaning is 
determined.‖) Hans Georg Gadamer & Lawrence Kennedy Schmidt, Language and Linguisticality in 
Gadamer's Hermeneutics 63 (2000). (―…what comes to language is, certainly, different than the spoken 
word itself.‖) Burhanettin Tatar, Interpretation and the Problem of the Intention of the Author: H.-G. 
Gadamer Vs. E.D. Hirsch 9 (1998) (―It seems that according to Gadamer understanding means not only to 
share the same perspective with someone, but more basically to share the same ground which is the subject 
matter (Sache). Therefore, he seems to imply that in order to understand someone else‘s perspective, one 
has first to understand on what ground (subject matter) one‘s perspective is based. From this angle, 
understanding an author‘s intention must be secondary to understanding the subject matter.‖) 
737 Kathleen Wright (ed),Festivals of interpretation: essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's work 113 (1990). 
Barry D. Smith, Distanciation And Textual Interpretation, 43 Laval théologique et philosophique 2, 
205-216 (1987). The German word Sache means thing, subject matter, content, business, real issue at 
stake. (―In Gadamer's thought, we noted that the interpreter stands before the text as someone whose task it 
is to understand what the text is about, i.e., its Sache. ‖) See also, Tatar, supra note 736, 106. (―In this 
sense, Sache remains always as transcendental ground which asserts its truth in the dialogical process 
between the language of the text and that of the interpreter.) Nicholas Davey, Unquiet Understanding: 
Gadamer‘s Philosophical Hermeneutics 70 (2006) (―As such, a Sache denotes the subject matter of an 
expression, the substance of what is being addressed.‖) 
738 Kevin J. Vanhoozer (ed.),Hermeneutics at the Crossroads 16 (2006) 
739 Donatella Di Cesare, Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait 165 (2013). 
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interpreter and the author about the Sache, 
740
 rather than produced by the text, 
author or interpreter alone (see FIG 1). One important feature of this theory is 
its acknowledgment of our finitude and knowledge constraints. The past 
horizon is opened to us in an always incomplete manner,
741
 and the reader in 
the present horizon inevitably projects his prejudices onto a text.
742
 Gadamer 
argues that interpretation involves the ―fusion of the horizons‖ 743, that is, 
interpretation involves a merge of horizons of the past and present: on the one 
hand, we get to know the Sache from our preconceptions in the historical 
context;
744
 on the other, we are influenced by our present situation that reveals 
new dimensions of the Sache.
 745
 The ―fusion of horizon‖ is not two people 
becoming one through the elimination of difference. Instead, ―it is two distinct 
horizons finding common ground in their orientation to, and development of, 
                                                        
740 Gadamer, supra note 46, 292. (―The goal of all attempts to reach an understanding is agreement 
concerning the subject matter.‖) 
741Id, 296. (―Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author.‖) 
742Id, 269. (―A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting.‖) Gadamer, supra note 46, 
576 (1989) (―the fusion does not allow the interpreter to speak of an original meaning of the work without 
acknowledging that, in understanding it, the interpreter‘s own meaning enters in as well.‖) 
743 Chris Lawn, Gadamer: A Guide for the Perplexed, 66 (2006). Gadamer, supra note 46 at 301. For 
Gadamer the understanding of the other can be achieved by a ―fusion of horizons‖, a fusion between the 
interpreter‘s and the interpreted. The horizon is defined as ―the range of vision that includes everything 
that can be seen from a particular vantage point.‖ The horizons of interpretation constantly changes and 
can never be fully achieved or finally completed. 
744 David Couzens Hoy et al, Critical Theory, 190(1994).(―so for Gadamer even though the Sache guides 
the interpretation, the Sache is not eternal, but is itself evolving with the history of interpretation. There is 
no need to ask the metaphysical question whether the Sache remains the same or changes, since the Sache 
is not some external reality that exist independently of the process of interpretation.‖) 
745 Gadamer, supra note 46, at 321 (―The interpreter dealing with a traditional text seeks to apply it to 
himself… In order to understand that, he must not seek to disregard himself and his particular 
hermeneutical situation. He must relate the text to this situation, if he wants to understand at all.‖) See also 
Brian Leiter & Michael Rosen, The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy 62 (2007) 
(―interpretations change over time, and these changing interpretations are internal to the meaning of the 
art, text, or discourse in question, so that there is after all no such thing as an original meaning independent 
of these changing interpretations.‖); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1990) (―Interpretation is not merely an exercise in discovery, but involves a critical 
approach to the text. The interpreter questions the text, the presuppositions of which may be attenuated or 
undermined over time.‖) Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous 
Legal Text, 77 Minnesota Law Review 1065 (1993). Paul Campos regarded an interpreter as a hermeneutic 
reader ―constrained by both the text and the circumstances of its interpretation, but simultaneously 
empowered to engage the object of interpretation so as to make it the best linguistic artifact it can be for the 
purposes of a particular interpretive practice.‖ 
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die Sache.‖746 
Figure 1 Comparison between the traditional theories and the philosophical hermeneutics 
    FIG 1.1. Relationship in traditional theories       FIG 1.2 Relationship in philosophical 
hermeneutics 
     
Under the philosophical hermeneutics, meaning is not construed as the 
recapturing or repetition of the original intention. ―The meaning of a text 
surpasses its author not occasionally, but always. Thus understanding is not a 
reproductive procedure, but rather always also a productive one.‖747 Therefore, 
meaning is not simply discovered, but is decided after extensive 
deliberation.
748
A concrete application is always involved in order to understand 
the Sache.
749
 Understanding is generated through the interplay between the 
text, author and interpreter in concrete circumstances.
750
 Gadamer argues that 
                                                        
746Jan M. Broekman (ed.), The Semiotics of Law in Legal Education 11 (2011) 
747  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics xxv (2008). Chris Lawn, Wittgenstein and 
Gadamer 96 (2004) (―Interpretation (and translation) are not reproductive acts, they are productive and 
hence creative.‖) 
748 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary 
and Legal Studies 185 (1989). For example, it is concluded that ―the language of the statute is plain and 
admits of only one meaning‖ is, in the words of Stanley Fish, ―a product of perspective‖ and ―itself an 
interpretation.‖ 
749 Dostal, supra note 46. 
750 Georgia Warnke, Gadamer. Hermeneutics , Tradition and Reason 107 (1987) (―A transformation of the 
initial positions of both ‗text and interpreter‘ and is ‗a consensus over meanings that reveals new 
dimension of die Sache (the matter at hand) and issues in a new stage of the tradition of interpretation.‖) 
Mootz, supra note 49 (―The text is recontextualized to one‘s situation only if one is willing to listen, to 
put all one‘s prejudices in play with the text and to follow the possibilities of meaning.‖) Lawn supra 
note 7, 2. (――Interpretation is sited within the mutual horizon of the interpreter and the thing to be 
interpreted…A text, or anything or event within the world we interpret, has its own horizon of meaning.‖) 
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it is impossible to arrive at an absolutely objective understanding of the 
meaning of a text. To speak of ―objectively valid interpretation‖ is naïve, 




The work of Gadamer has had a determinative influence on examinations 
of law and literature as vehicles of meaning.
752
 Gadamer‘s masterwork, Truth 
and Method, has influenced jurisprudential discussion about the concept and 
task of legal interpretation.
753
 For Gadamer, legal hermeneutics is the model for 
philosophical hermeneutics generally.
754
 The adoption of the philosophical 
hermeneutics urges us to reconsider the attempt to discover the objective and 
univocal meaning in a legal document,
755
 and pay attention to the application of 
meaning to particular circumstances.
756
 It reminds us in the context of law that 
                                                        
751 Fish, supra note 485.  
752 Patterson, supra note 26, at 448. (―The study of law as literature has become the study of legal 
hermeneutics, in particular the study of similarities between law and literature with regard to the role of 
author, reader, and institutional context.‖) See also, Robin L. West, Are There Nothing but Texts in This 
Class? Interpreting the Interpretive Turns in Legal Thought, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1125, 1126–27 (2000). 
(―Whatever may be true of Gadamer‘s influence in other disciplines, his influence in law has been 
unambiguously both broad and deep.‖) 
753 Mootz, supra note 49, 30. (―Legal hermeneutics is the exploration of this interpretive reality, which is 
always anterior to the conceptual formulations used in making any legal argument or rendering any legal 
judgment.‖) See also, Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek, Methods of Legal Reasoning 173 (2006). The 
authors presented the influence of a variety of hermeneutics on jurisprudence, such as Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey‘s universalistic account of hermeneutics and Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur‘s 
ontological and methodologically oriented hermeneutics. For an intellectually accessible introduction to 
this literature, see also, David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Constitution: Hermeneutical and 
Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 135 (1985); Drucillar Cornell et al., Hermeneutics and 
the Rule of Law, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992); Gregory Leyh, Legal Hermeneutics: 
History, Theory, and Practice (1992). 
754 Costas Douzinas & Ronnie Warrington, Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text in The Text of 
Law 30 (1991). See also, Peter Goodrich, Historical Aspects of Legal Interpretation, 61 IND. L.J. 331, 347 
(1986). (―Gadamer, however, develops this process of transmission into a principle of interpretation as 
translation in which essential oppositions are constituted between the divine and the human, the foreign 
and the familiar, the written and the spoken, and lastly and most broadly, the past and the present. The 
notion of translation is pivotal and has a peculiar relevance to legal hermeneutics.‖) 
755 Mootz, supra note 49, 32(―…any attempt to discover the meaning of a text is a misguided project that 
ignores both the dynamic interaction of the reader and the text, and the implications of the reader's finite 
and temporal nature.‖)  
756 George H. Taylor, The Distinctiveness of Legal Hermeneutics, in Ricoeur Across the Disciplines, Scott 
Davidson ed. 84 (2010). See also, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Man and Language, in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics 59, 68 (David E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976).Gadamer describes the translator‘s aim ―must 
never be to copy what is said, but to place himself in the direction of what is said (i.e., in its meaning) in 
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objective, bias-free or detached interpretation never exists, and ―legal 
interpretation is always a response out of the present, in light of future 
possibilities for the purpose of reaching a satisfaction in the present.‖757 The 
following section will introduce the dynamic approach in legal interpretation, 
which focuses on the move from an original meaning to a contemporary 
application. 
Section 2 Dynamic legal interpretation practice 
Dynamic interpretation is so-called because judges adapted the legal text to 
present-day circumstances.
758
 The proponents of dynamic interpretation of 
constitutions, statutes and treaties advocate that meaning changes over time.
759
 
For example, in statutory interpretation, American theorist William Eskridge 
developed the well-known dynamic statutory interpretation based on his 
analysis of the hermeneutics of Gadamer.
760
 ―Practical reason‖ 761  plays a 
                                                                                                                                                 
order to carry over what is to be said into the direction of his own saying.‖ 
757 Howard J. Vogel, The Possibilities of American Constitutional Law in a Fractured World: A Relational 
Approach to Legal Hermeneutics, 83 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 789 (2006). See also, Daniel A. Farber, 
Statutory Interpretation and the Idea of Progress, 94 U. Mich. L. Rev. 1546 (1996) (―Dynamic 
interpretation‘s distinctive feature is the view that statutory meaning changes over time.‖) Jarkko Tontti, 
Right and Prejudice: Prolegomena to Hermeneutical Philosophy of Law 34 (2004) (Even if the letters of a 
text remain the same, the meaning of the text is necessarily new and different for each new interpreter….A 
new interpreter who begins to interpret the text has a different situation and pre-understanding of the object 
than the historically earlier interpreters.) 
758 Frank Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 110 (2008). (―Updating meaning to 
accommodate changed circumstances…‖) 
759 Nerlich Brigitt, Change in Language: Whitney, Bréal, and Wegener 132 (1990). (―Words ….only have 
meaning in so far as they are interpreted as meaningful, in so far as the hearer attributes meaning to them in 
context. According to this view of language, change of meaning is not unexpected. As there are no 
invariants, variation is the norm, meaning changes all the time. ‖) See also, Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 2467, 2478 (1990) (―The Constitution is replete with clauses that call on the courts to apply norms 
to ever changing political and social circumstances. Consistent with the notion of the Constitution as a 
living document, definitions and applications of terms like ‗due process,‘ . . . evolve over time.‖) 
760 Paul Michell, Just Do it! Eskridge‘s Critical Pragmatic Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 41 McGill 
L.J. 711  (1996). See also Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Literary criticisms of law 188 (2000) 
(―Lieber, Cardozo, Radin, Llewellyn, Bickel, Hart and Sacks, and Dworkin all figure in Eskridge‘s work. 
But perhaps the most important influence is Gadamer. ‖) Professor Eskridge identified Gadamer with four 
ideas: first, interpretation of a text can be neither simply ―originalist‖ nor ―present-oriented,‖ second, it 
must be traditional, third, it should be tolerant of heteronomy, and fourth, it is practical rather than 
theoretical, a craft rather than a science. 
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crucial role in the dynamic approach to bring the past text into the present 
situation.
762
 Rather than rely on the ordinary meaning or the authorial intent at a 
point of time in the past,
763
 practical reasoning requires the interpreter to 
strengthen the views of the text as much as possible in order to check his 
horizon with respect to the text.
764
 Professor Eskridge found hermeneutics an 
appealing approach to statutory interpretation, because a judge can give a legal 
norm, created in the past, a modern interpretation to suit modern needs:
765
  
Interpretation is required for those issues that were either unanticipated or 
politically sidestepped. Where such gaps or ambiguities exist, a legislator voting 
for the statute might have a different interpretation than would contemporary 
administrators or judges (or, indeed, other legislators). Over time, the gaps and 
ambiguities proliferate as society changes, adapts to the statute, and generates 
new variations on the problem initially targeted by the statute.
 766
 
                                                                                                                                                 
761 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. 
L. Rev. 321 (1990) Practical reason is defined as an approach that eschews objectivist theories in favor of 
a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to the practice of the common law), seeking 
contextual justification for the best legal answer among the potential alternatives. 
762 Tatar, supra note 736, 116 (1998) (―The task of the interpretation is to bring the past (written) text to 
its original function in the living conversation. In other words, interpretation is the living conversation 
itself between the past and the present.‖) 
763 Eskridge, supra note 50. The author acknowledged the value of originalist sources such as statutory 
text and structure, legislative history and purpose – and found some useful insights in originalist theories. 
However, the author concluded that originalist approaches to statutory interpretation were undesirable in 
theory and unworkable in practice. For critical analysis of the dynamic approach, see generally John 
Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2209 (1995). 
764 Gadamer, supra note 46, at 350. Central to Gadamer‘s theory is the concept of pre-understandings or 
prejudices of the interpreter, which originates from his linguistic, historical, social and cultural 
background; See also, Tatar, supra note 736, 112, 116 (1998) (―Every genuine interpretation starts with the 
dialectic of the question and answer…The task of the interpretation is to bring the past text to its original 
function in the living conversation.‖) Mootz, supra note 49,110. (―A valid model of legal hermeneutics 
must take the preeminent status of the text into account. The central feature of such a model, therefore, is 
the attitude of listening. Listening is an attitude in a negative sense rather than a positive sense. It is not a 
methodological program for extracting meaning from the text but rather a willingness to lower one‘s 
defenses and to meet the text in play.‖) 
765 Barak, supra note 474, at 41. 
766 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 5 (1994). (―Interpretation is not static, but 
dynamic. Interpretation is not an archeological discovery, but a dialectical creation. Interpretation is not 
mere exegesis to pinpoint historical meaning, but hermeneutics to apply that meaning to current problems 
and circumstances.‖) In his book Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Eskridge also applied the new theory 
to illustrate that statutory interpretation is a battleground for broader political and legal struggles. See e.g. 
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In light of the development of concepts and principles by new scientific 
insights and the change of political paradigms, legal scholars have also 
developed ―dynamic interpretation‖ in treaty interpretation. The treaty is 
considered as ―a living instrument‖ which can change its meaning in 
accordance with developments in State and society:
767
 
Treaties, particularly if they have been negotiated a long time ago, might be more 
viable if an interpretation of their term is not static but adaptable and expressive 
of the understanding of terms at the time of their interpretation. To serve this 
purpose, treaty interpretation can and should consider new international rules as 
expressed by modern, subsequently enacted treaties, on similar issues.
 768
 
According to Professor Herman Philipse, Gadamer‘s theory of ―fusion of 
horizons‖ is considered as the philosophical counterpart to the conception of the 
―living‖ or ―evolving‖ Constitution,769 i.e. the meaning of the Constitution may 
                                                                                                                                                 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1990); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365 (1990); Eskridge& Frickey, supra 
note 761. 
767 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties and the Eurpean Court of 
Human Rights, in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed.), 40 Years of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 55 (2010); see also, Oliver Dörr et.al, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 
568 (2012); Sir Ian McTaggart Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 131 (1984) (―An 
even more dynamic variant of teleological approach is the so-called theory of ―emergent purpose‖ 
whereby the object and the purpose itself is not regarded as fixed and static but as variable, so that at any 
given moment, the convention is to be interpreted not so much, or not merely, with reference to what its 
object was when entered into, but with reference to what that object has since become and now appears to 
be.‖) 
768 Rudiger Wolfrum et.al, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, 145 (2003). 
769Herman Philipse, Antonin Scalia‘s Textualism in philosophy, theology, and judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution, 3 Utrecht Law Review 169-192 (2007). (―Let me therefore turn to my own field and discuss 
briefly how Textualism fares in philosophy. Its main opponent is still Gadamer‘s theory of interpretation. It 
is illuminating to dissect this theory because it is the paradigmatic philosophical counterpart of Justice 
Scalia‘s main scapegoat, the doctrine of The Living Constitution.‖) Adam Winkler et al. (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Vol. 6, 2712 (2000) (―Over the past two hundred years, 
American constitutional interpretation has undergone a transformation from its early static and 
TEXTUALIST tradition to a modern, dynamic approach wherein a ‗living constitution‘ changes to 
accommodate the needs of the times.‖) Louis J. Virelli III, Constitutional Traditionalism in the Roberts 
Court, 73 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (―Living constitutionalism advocates a dynamic approach to 
constitutional interpretation, where contemporary notions of justice and societal needs drive constitutional 
meaning.‖) Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts about State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 Penn St. L. Rev. 
837 (2011) (―A third approach to constitutional interpretation is one that advocates for a ―living‖ 
constitution. According to proponents, the meaning of a constitution is not static or fixed in time, as the 
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evolve in light of current circumstances.
770
 Such ―living-force‖ 771 vision has 
also been implemented by Australian courts.
772
 Judges distinguish between the 
meaning of the words (connotation) and their intended applications (denotation) 
in constitutional interpretation.
773
 McHugh J preferred to express the same 
basic idea by reference to the distinction, introduced to the legal canon by 
Ronald Dworkin, between a fixed ―concept‖ (more abstract) and variable 
―conceptions‖ (less abstract) of that concept.774  Gadamer‘s and Dworkin‘s 
theories share an interest in mediating between the past and the present.
775
 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
originalists contend. Rather, the meaning of the constitution is dynamic, capable of changing in response 
to changing conditions in society.‖) 
770 Schor, supra note 52. 
771 Kirby, supra note 53. (approving of Andrew Inglis Clark's argument that the Australian Constitution 
must be "made a living force" and arguing that present understandings of the Constitution's meaning 
should control interpretation today). Robert Shenton French et. al. (ed.) Reflections on the Australian 
Constitution 20 (2003) (―A constitution is sometimes described as a ‗living instrument‘ or as having ‗living 
force.‘ Whatever these metaphorical expression may be intended to mean, they at least covey the idea that 
a constitution develops over time and that as new questions are decided, the provisions of the constitution 
come to have an operation which was previously not authoritatively established.) 
772 Craven, supra note 54; See also, Robert Shenton French et.al (ed.), Reflections on the Australian 
Constitution 20 (2003). (―A constitution is sometimes described as a ‗living instrument‘ or as having 
‗living force‘.) 
773 Ginsburg & Dixon, supra note 55, 602. 
774 Lim, supra note 61. See also, Ginsburg & Dixon, supra note 55, 602. (―This Australian distinction 
between two kinds of meaning has parallels with Ronald Dworkin‘s well-known distinction between legal 
concepts and legal conceptions.‖) Michael Stokes, Contested Concepts, General Terms and Constitutional 
Evolution, 29 Syd. LR 683 (2007) (―At least one major advocate of the concept-conception distinction, 
Prof Ronald Dworkin, relies on the distinction, to some extent at least, in his defence of the claim that there 
are right answers to such questions, often arguing that the court can reach the right answer by applying the 
best conception of a contested concept.‖) J. Neville Turner & Pamela Williams, The happy couple: law 
and literature 320 (1994) (―This builds on the court‘s connotation/denotation distinction, and is consistent 
with Dworkin‘s distinction between ‗concepts‘ and ‗conceptions.‘‖) Dworkin in his discussion of 
constitutional interpretation—the distinction between concepts and conceptions, see Ronald Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously 134-36 (1978). 
775Kathleen Wright, Festivals of interpretation: essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's work 114 (1990) 
(―They both acknowledge that interpretation of texts must be aware of the origin of the text in a particular 
time and place. Yet, they both think that texts address us from within the present context and note merely 
from a dead past.‖) See also, Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller, The Challenge of Originalism Theories 
of Constitutional Interpretation, in Huscroft & Miller (eds.), supra note 490 (―He urges the new 
originalists to engage more fully with those legal philosophers, such as Dworkin and Gadamer, who 
maintain that the interpretation of a text and its application in any particular instance are not separate 
actions but a single unitary process.‖) Ronald K. Rowe (II.), Contemporary Legal Theory and 
Philosophical Hermeneutics: Originalism's Failed Reliance on Intentionalist Theories of Meaning 100, 
101 (2008) (―In describing the nature of law and how it operates in practice, Ronald Dworkin commits 
himself to a picture of the activity of legal interpretation and adjudication most consistent with Gadamer‘ 
philosophical hermeneutics…Gregory Leyh, in his essay ‗Dworkin‘s Hermeneutics,‘ acknowledges 
similar features of Dworkin‘s view that align with Gadamer‘s project.‖) Ian Ward, An Introduction to 
Critical Legal Theory 44 (2004) (―It is Gadamer‘s theory of hermeneutics, and more particularly of 
―fidelity‖ to the text, which Dworkin employs in Law‘s Empire as a complement to his theory of law as 
―principle‖) 
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meaning of a constitutional term is its connotation,
776
 and connotations have 
usually been understood to consist of ―the essential qualities or characteristics 
of the concept referred to‖.777 Toohey J explained this principle concisely: 
―whist the connotation of the words in the Australian Constitution remains fixed, 
their denotation may vary over time.‖778 Five key propositions involved in the 
connotation-denotation model have been succinctly summarized as follows:
779
 
1. The meaning of a term (its connotation) is distinct from its application (its 
denotation). 
2. The connotation of a term was fixed at the time the Constitution was 
enacted. 
3. The connotation of a term is determined by the essential features 
(‗attributes‘ for Dawson J) of the term. 
4. The denotation of a term can change. 
5. The denotation of a term at any time after the Constitution was enacted is 
determined by the range of things that at that later time possess the essential 
features or attributes specified in the connotation of the term. 
                                                        
776 Zines, supra note 56. (―All the judges accepted that one had to look to the meaning … and that 
―meaning‖ referred to the connotation rather than the denotation of the expression.‖) 
777H. P. Lee &Peter A. Gerangelos (ed.),Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen Continent: Essays in 
Honour of George Winterton 266(2009) 
778 McGinty v The State of Western Australia. ((1996) 186 CLR 140); See also, Anne Twomey, Rowe v 
Electoral Commissioner – Evolution or Creationism? University of Queensland Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 
2, pp. 181-202 (2012). (―Her Honour then noted that ‗[w]hat is sufficient to constitute democratic 
representative government has changed over time, as conceptions of democracy have changed to require a 
fully inclusive franchise – that is, a franchise free of arbitrary exclusions based on class, gender or race.‘ 
Thus the denotation has changed, while the connotation has remained the same.‖) 
779Simon Evans, supra note 59, Citing Dawson J‘s description in Street v. Queensland Bar Association 
(1989) 168 CLR 461: ―The essential meaning of the Constitution must remain the same, although with the 
passage of time its words must be applied to situations which were not envisaged at federation. Expressed 
in the technical language of the logician, the words have a fixed connotation but their denotation may 
differ from time to time. That is to say, the attributes which the words signify will not vary, but as time 
passes new and different things may be seen to possess those attributes sufficiently to justify the 
application of the words to them.‖ 
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To adapt legal texts to new circumstances or respond to new political 
preferences, the dynamic interpretation must avoid going against the original 
meaning, otherwise it amounts to unconstitutional ex post facto legislation and 
is unfair to litigants whose transactions arose in the past.
780
 That is, to be 
faithful to the legal text is to interpret its words in ways that sustain their vitality 
over time.
781
 In consistency with the modern trends towards reconciling fixed 
meaning with the reality of changing facts in legal interpretation, which will be 
further discussed in the next Section, the connotation-denotation model reflects 
an attempt to strike a balance between legal certainty and flexibility.
782
    
Section 3 Trends of reconciling fixed meaning and evolving facts  
Whether the meaning of the legal text can ever change has been long debated.
783
 
Some assert that the meanings may change over time. For example, Justice 
Holmes wrote: ―A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin 
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used.‖784 The main problem of the 
evolutionary version of meaning, as Justice Scalia contended, is that ―there is 
no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding 
principle of the evolution.‖785 Some assume that meaning was fixed at the time 
                                                        
780 Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 911 (1996). 
781 Goodwin Liu et al., Keeping Faith with the Constitution 103 (2010). 
782 Valauri, supra note 721 (―The grand issue in legal and constitutional interpretation is always how to go 
forward and apply the law or constitution to the next case in a manner that demonstrates fidelity to text and 
tradition while, at the same time, paying sufficient attention to both larger values and the particular facts 
and circumstances of the case….bridge the temporal and other distances between framers and current 
interpreters.‖) 
783 Huscroft & Miller (ed.), supra note 490, at 4. 
784 Frank Cross, The Failed Promise of Originalism 6 (2013). Quoting Justice Holmes‘ dissenting opinion 
in Town v. Eisner 1918, 425. 
785 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts 
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 44-45 (Amy Gutmann 




 Although the inquiry of the static version of meaning is often 
hypothetical (from the standpoint of a neutral, unbiased observer), it is narrow 
in the sense of attempting to determine how the observers would have 
expected the drafters to resolve the issue, if they had contemplated it.
787
  
Recently, scholars in the field of constitutional interpretation have 
realized that it would be worthwhile to explore whether the two versions are 
compatible.
788
 The goal is to strike a compromise between the desire to 
preserve the original meaning of the texts and the desire to accommodate the 
effect that changing context may have on meaning.
789
 The basic theme is that 
―the past and present are no longer so sharply differentiated.‖790 Both this new 
trend of legal interpretation theory and philosophical hermeneutics share the 
similarities of seeking to apply past historical texts in contemporary contexts.
791
 
Professor Lawrence Solum also applied Gadamer‘s insights to the practice, 
                                                                                                                                                 
ed., 1998). 
786 Solum, supra 723 . 
787 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Geo. L.J. 713 (2011). 
788 Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in 
Huscroft & Miller (eds.), supra note 490 (―Compatibilism could be the view that originalism and living 
constitutionalism have separate domains. Originalism has constitutional interpretation as its domain: the 
linguistic meaning of the Constitution is fixed. Living constitutionalism has constitutional construction as 
its domain: the vague provisions of the constitution can be given constructions that change over time in 
order to adapt to changing values and circumstances.‖) See also, Dawn Johnsen, The Progressive Political 
Power of Balkin‘s ―Original Meaning,‖ 24 Const. Comment. 417, 417–21 (2007); Jamal Greene, On the 
Origins of Originalism , 88 TEX. L. Rev. 1 (2009); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 
(2009); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 703 (2009); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good 
Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010); Peter J. Smith, How Different are Originalism and 
Non-Originalism? 62 Hastings Law Journal, 707 (2011); David A. Strauss, Can Originalism be Saved?, 92 
B.U. L. Rev.1161, 1163-67 (2012)  
789 Schweda Nicholson, Linguistic and Extralinguistic Aspects of Simultaneous Interpretation, 8 (2) 
Applied Linguistics, 194-205 (1987). See also, Goodwin Liu et al., Keeping Faith with the Constitution 
103 (2010). (―Constitutional interpretation must be informed by contemporary norms and circumstances, 
not simply by its original meaning.‖) 
790 Reva B. Siegel, Heller and Originalism's Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1399,. 1414 (2009). (―Claims about the past express contemporary identities, relationships, and concerns, 
an d express deep normative convictions.‖) 
791  John T. Valauri, Interpretation, Critique, and Adjudication: The Search for Constitutional 
Hermeneutics, 76 CHI.-. KENT L. REV. 1083, 1087-90 (2000). (―legal hermeneutics has an exemplary 
status within the study of interpretation, n37 and historical investigation and [*1092] adjudication are not 
so different at all - they both seek, out of current concerns, to apply past historical texts in contemporary 
contexts‖) 
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―[o]ur understanding of the Constitution… is enabled by our participation in a 
tradition that links us to (but also separates us from) the concerns of the framers 
and ratifiers… [T]radition both conditions and enables understanding.‖792 
One significant and also widely debated proposal is dubbed as ―living 
originalism‖,793 which clearly distinguishes between the non-binding ―original 
expected application‖ and the binding ―original meaning.‖ 794  Living 
originalism is so called because ―we understand our present situation and the 
possibilities and needs of the future through the trajectory of our interpretation 
of the meaning of the past.‖795 As its proponent Professor Jack M. Balkin 
pointed out, ―when people use the term ‗original understanding‘ and sometimes 
even ‗original meaning‘ … they are actually talking about original expected 
application.
796
 Professors John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport further 
refined this theory, and argued that the original meaning ―is informed by, but not 
exhausted by‖ 797  its original expected applications. The rationale is that, 
although the general meaning is fixed (e.g., by legislative action) and remains 
constant, ―the set of factual applications of that fixed general meaning may 
                                                        
792 Lawrence Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599 (1988-1989). 
793  James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the 
American Constitution, 92 B.U.L. Rev.1171 (2012). 
794 Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291 (2007).  
795 Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 63 (2011). See also, Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 
CONST.COMMENT. 405 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Welcome to the New Originalism: A Comment on. 
Jack Balkin's Living Originalism, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 1-7 (2013). There are numerous 
varieties of originalism, the general introduction can be found in James E. Fleming, Living Originalism 
and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the American Constitution, 92 Boston University 
Law Review 1187 (2012)  (―Some of the varieties include the following. It all began with conventional 
―intention of the Framers‖ originalism. Then it became ―intention of the ratifiers‖ originalism. Of course, 
we also have original expectations and applications‖ originalism (what I elsewhere have called ―narrow‖ 
or ―concrete‖ originalism). Then came ―original meaning‖ originalism, which was refined as ―original 
public meaning‖ originalism (officially, this is now the position of Scalia and Barnett).‖) 
796 Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning , 24 CONST.COMMENT. 291, 296 (2007) 
797 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 723 (―Balkin presents a false dichotomy — either embrace abstract 
principles whose meaning is almost infinitely malleable or confine the Constitution to the applications the 
Framers imagined. We believe there is [a] middle way that is also a better way. In our view, the 
Constitution's original meaning is informed by, but not exhausted by, its original expected applications. In 
particular, the expected applications can be strong evidence of the original meaning.‖) 
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expand or contract with the application of the fixed general meaning to changed 
circumstances.‖798 Living originalism is dynamic as it does not simply apply 
the original meaning in the context of application ―as if any differences between 
the context of writing and the context of reading just did not matter.‖799 Instead, 
it pays serious attention to the contemporary knowledge of facts which may 
change the outcome of the meaning‘s application.800   
An alternative moderate form
801
 of expressing the distinction between 
meaning and application is the sense/reference (or connotation/denotation) 
model.
802
 ―The sense of [an] expression is fixed at the time of the framing, but 
the reference is not, because it depends on the facts about the world, which can 
change.‖803 This model centers on the connotation imputed to ―meaning.‖804 
The connotation of the terms is fixed but their denotation may change from time 
to time. ―That is to say, the attributes which the words signify will not vary, but 
as time passes new and different things may be seen to possess those attributes 
sufficiently to justify the application of the words to them.‖ 805  The 
connotation/denotation model attempts to establish the link between the past 
                                                        
798 Patrick J. Kelley, An Alternative Originalist Opinion for Brown v. Board of Education, 20 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 75, 76 (1995) 
799 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L Rev. 1165 (1993) (―While the approach here is 
certainly ‗dynamic,‘ it is dynamic in its effort to preserve meaning rather than evolve.‖) 
800 As for the criticisms on living originalism, see, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living 
Constitution, 24 Const. Commentary 353 (2007) (―But my main thesis here is that Balkin should no longer 
be welcomed by the living constitutionalists, despite his claim to be meeting their fundamental needs.‖) 
Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 Harv. L.Rev, Vol. 125, 2011, (2012) (―…because in 
branding his theory as a new twist on an old idea, Balkin undersells his real accomplishment: his subtle 
account of how social and political movements contribute to legitimate  constitutional change.‖) 
801 Lim, supra note 61. 
802 Christopher R.Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 St. Louis L.J. 555 (2006). 
803 Id. (―The Theory of Original Sinn could equivalently be explained as holding to a fixed constitutional 
connotation, but evolving constitutional denotation, or as holding to a fixed constitutional intension, but 
evolving constitutional extension.‖) 
804 Toler, Lorianne Updike et.al., Pre-'Originalism', 36 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 278 
(2012). 
805 Grant R. Darwin, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and 
Social Change, vol. 17.1 (Forthcoming 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239782 
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and present context, and interprets and adapts the legal texts to changing times.   
A dynamic interpretation is necessary for patent claim texts due to their 
inherently dynamic nature.
806
 There is often a distance between the time of 
filing patent application and the time of patent litigation. Over time, the usage 
of claim terms can ―take on an increasingly broad scope‖807 as science and 
technology evolve and improve. It has been pointed out that ―the process of 
assigning terms to describe those new ideas is not static.‖808 Patent law 
balances between protecting original inventors on the one hand and 
encouraging competition and follow-on innovation on the other.
809
 Since 
patent claim construction also involves understanding past thought and 
addressing present concerns,
810
 it would be helpful to study the relationship 
between understandings of original meaning and application of the claim text 
to modern circumstances. The following section will discuss the implications 
of the philosophical hermeneutics and the dynamic approach for claim 
construction. 
                                                        
806 William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Importance of Ex 
Post Delineation, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. (2009) (―discoveries and inventions often 
involve changing, cutting-edge technology. However, both the future state of that technology and its 
terminology may be unsettled, and infringement claims may not be brought until years after the patent was 
issued. In addition, the lack of widely accepted terminology may prompt a patent applicant to use a word 
unconventionally, thereby placing the use of the word well outside of familiar prototypes. The meanings of 
words may also fluctuate over time as new terminology becomes standardized.‖) 
807 John M. Romary & Arie M. Michelsohn, Patent Claim. Interpretation After Markman: How the 
Federal Circuit. Interprets Claims, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1887, 1889 (1997).(―…technical terms used 
conventionally by a patentee can take on an increasingly broad scope over time as the relevant art 
gradually recognizes that term as conventionally encompassing a concomitantly wider scope of 
embodiments.‖) See also, Collins, supra note 40(stating that a claim‘s breadth describes the range of 
products encompassed by the claim at the time of filing, while the claim‘s depth describes the expansion of 
the claim set over time as claim scope reaches an increasing array of newly discovered after-arising 
technologies). 
808 Lemley, supra note 7. (―Indeed, the risk of change in the meaning of terms over time is particularly 
great in patent law, because patents necessarily involve new ideas…‖) 
809 Ronald A. Cass & Keith N Hylton, Laws of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas 60 (2013). 
810  H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalist, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659 (1987).(calling attention to the 
subjectivity involved in historical interpretation) 
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Section 4 Implications for patent claim interpretation 
The existing theories of meaning are correct in pointing out that to know what a 
word means is to know how it is being used in a given context.
811
 The 
philosophical hermeneutics and the dynamic legal interpretation may provide 
new insights for refining patent claim construction. In this section, the 
following three implications will be discussed: (1) a new pair of concepts 
―meaning‖ and ―application‖ is needed to justify the interpretive choice in a 
changing context. (2) The thing construction and the meaning interpretation 
are not necessarily independent of each other. In the connotation-denotation 
model, meaning refers to the essential attributes that a thing must have in order 
to come within the term.
812
 (3) With a caveat that constitutions are often to be 
read broadly to adapt themselves as far as possible to the changing conditions, 
the determination of the connotation, i.e., the essential attributes, in claim 
construction is of critical importance. 
A. ―Meaning‖ and ―application‖ in patent claim construction 
One often cited case in the debate ―whether meaning has changed or not‖ is 
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc..813 The disputed technical term is 
―a regularly received television signal.‖814 Some would agree that there is a 
                                                        
811Vyvyan Evans, How Words Mean: Lexical Concepts, Cognitive models, and Meaning Construction 153 
(2009). 
812 Geraldine Chin, Technological Change and the Australian Constitution, 24 Melb U L Rev 609, 640 
(2000). (―The 'connotation' refers to the essential meaning of the constitutional language as at 1900, and 
comprises all the essential attributes that a thing must have in order to come within the term. The 
'denotation' includes new and different items with that essential meaning; this the Court determines by 
assessing whether the new item possesses all the essential attributes.‖) 
813 SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
814SuperGuide Corporation v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Federal Circuit 
found that the district court erred in construing the claim ―regularly received television signal‖. The 
majority adopted a broad meaning of "regularly received television signal" as encompassing digital 
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change in the technological context which should justify a changed reading: 
the claim term in mid-1990s (e.g., the digital signals) might well be different 
from what a PHOSITA expected in 1985 (e.g. the analogy signals). Based on 
this argument, the claimed invention would be limited to analog television 
signals at the time of filing. But some would argue that the change of context 
could not justify a changed reading: ―The claim language does not limit the 
disputed phrases to any particular type of technology or specify a particular type 
of signal format, such as analog or digital.‖815 Therefore, the term ―regularly 
received television signals‖ would be broad enough to encompass both formats. 
As science and technology evolves over time, a theory that applies 
meaning only in the old context has difficulty in explaining the effect of 
context changes on interpreters‘ understandings. On the other hand, a theory 
that asks interpreters to reconstruct meaning in the new context fails to explain 
how to enhance certainty in claim construction.
 816
 ―Context‖ is defined as 
―the set of circumstances or facts that surround a particular event, situation, 
etc.‖817 A proper interpretation is not to simply rely on the original context, but 
                                                                                                                                                 
television signals based on the ―plain meaning of claim language.‖ 
815 SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit 
reversed, concluding that the fixation of meaning-scope on the date of filing did not prevent the claim from 
reading on the after-arising technology. See also, Leland Standford v. Roche, 528 F.Supp.2d 967 (2007). 
The court noted that ―[t]he term in question may be a category, the contents of which expand over time… 
Here, there is no evidence that the patentee intended to limit the patent ‗antiretroviral agents‘ to known and 
available technologies, nor is there evidence that the categorical term, antiretroviral agents, was ever used 
to refer only to agents that inhibit reverse transcription.‖ Kahrl, supra note 1, at 4-42. (―The meaning of a 
claim term is fixed at the time that the application for patent is filed. Thus, in fast-moving technologies 
when the meaning of a term change with new discoveries, the court will discard more recent definitions of 
a claim term in favour of the definition in use when the inventor wrote the specification of the patent.‖) 
816 Lemley, supra note 7. (―This was the fate of Schrödinger‘s unfortunate (and mercifully apocryphal) 
cat, quoting John Gribbin, In Search of Schrödinger's Cat: Quantum Physics and Reality (1984). 
Regardless whether the cat would truly be both alive and dead, a question upon which physicists disagree, 
the claim construction would exist in an ambiguous state until we knew the context of the lawsuit in which 
the claim would be construed.‖) The author discussed which point in time we shall fix the meaning of the 
claims, and proposed that the logical way to unify the meaning of patent claim terms is to fix that 
meaning at the time of filing. 
817 Webster‘s Dictionary 439 (2d ed. 2001). 
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to strike a compromise between the desire to preserve the original meaning of 
the texts and the desire to accommodate the effect that changing context may 
have on meaning.
818
 In the theories of constitutional interpretation, Professor 
Lessig and Professor Balkin have made a contribution to reconciling 
constitutional change with fidelity to original meaning.
819
 It is useful to 
examine a pair of concepts: ―meaning‖ and ―application‖. The meaning of the 
legal texts does not change through time, even though its applications may 
change.
820
 The rapidly changing social conditions over time may generate 
tension between the ―original expected application of the text‖,821 i.e., how 
people living at the time the text was adopted would have expected it would be 
applied, and the ―contemporary application of the text‖, i.e. how the 
interpreter understand it in the present-day context. It is not original expected 
application but original meaning that controls.
822
 The original meaning is not 
exhausted by its original expected applications.
823
 
In claim construction, there is often a gap between the time of patent 
                                                        
818Schweda Nicholson, Linguistic and Extralinguistic Aspects of Simultaneous Interpretation, 8 (2) 
Applied Linguistics, 194-205 (1987).. See also, Goodwin Liu et al., Keeping Faith with the Constitution 
103 (2010). (―Constitutional interpretation must be informed by contemporary norms and circumstances, 
not simply by its original meaning.‖) See also, Lessig, supra note 799. Understanding Changed Readings: 
Fidelity and Theory (Whether conceived broadly or narrowly, all "facts" are background to the particular 
text read, and a change in any could in principle constitute a change in the context of the text read.) 
819 James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1523 
(2011). (―originalism, properly understood, is not really in tension with the idea of a ―living‖ Constitution, 
insofar as fidelity to original meaning still allows for changed applications.‖) 
820 Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory,47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 
(1994-1995). (―…the legal texts remain the same across contexts. What changes across contexts is the 
application, or as I will call it, the reading of the legal text in context.‖) 
821 Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998). The 
authors are the first to articulate a similar distinction between ―original meaning‖ and ―original practices‖. 
Greenberg and Litman saw their point primarily as a criticism of originalism; Balkin sees the same issue, 
but concludes that originalism is strengthened by excluding ―original expected applications. See also, 
Solum, supra note 723; Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Geo. L.J. 713 (2011). 
822 Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 668–70 (2009). 
823 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 723. Balkin, supra note 42. (―But fidelity to original meaning does 
not require fidelity to original expected application. Original expected application is merely evidence of 
how to apply text and principle.‖) 
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filing and the time of interpretation.
824
 According to the concept of fusion of 
horizons, it is improper to privilege either the perspective of the patentee or the 
interpreter and marginalize another.
825
 It is necessary to maintain the relation of 
the present content on its internal continuity with the previous historical 
context.
826
 According to the meaning-application distinction in the 
constitutional theory, it is not enough to look at the ―non-binding, 
partly-fact-based applications‖ 827  of the words at the time of filing. The 
originally-intended or originally-understood application is not conclusive for 
meaning. The next paragraph will discuss the payoff of this theory. 
B. ―Connotation‖ and ―denotation‖ in patent claim construction 
We now understand that in SuperGuide Corp. case, it is the application rather 
than meaning that has changed. By saying that the application has changed, one 
is arguing that the category of potential referents of the technical content 
expand over time
828 —they have changed from analog signals to digital 
signals.
829
 More examples can be found in scientific and technological 
development. For example, the term ―autism‖ was once defined as a single 
disorder in 1968 (―original expected application‖). As a result of new medical 
                                                        
824 Lemley, supra note 7 (―Indeed, the risk of change in the meaning of terms over time is particularly 
great in patent law, because patents necessarily involve new ideas, and the process of assigning terms to 
describe those new ideas is not static.‖) 
825  Menell et.al, Supra note 5. The evidence of ordinary meaning, the patentee‘s intent and the 
interpreter‘s own perception of fairness may all be a helpful reference point, but not an end point. 
826 Burhanettin Tatar, Interpretation and the Problem of the Intention of the Author 111 (1998). 
827 Christopher R. Green, McDonald v. Chicago, the Meaning-Application. Distinction, and 'Of' in the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 11 Engage 26 (2010) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523920 
828 Sonja Sickert, What is meaning? 6 (2006). (―According to Lobner ‗the denotation of a content word is 
the category, or set of all its potential referencts.‘‖) 
829 Chiang & Solum, supra note 38. (―it is important to see that the linguistic meaning of ―regularly 
received television signal‖ was constant… What changed was the set of real-world objects that fit within 
the description.‖) 
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advancements and more effective methods of diagnosing, now the term refers to 
the spectrum of autism disorders, including Asperger‘s syndrome and five 
different forms of pervasive developmental disorder (―contemporary 
application‖). 830 Another example is the term ―textbook‖. With the 
technological developments such as 4G wireless, open source and massive 
computing power, new policy has changed the definition to include digital 
content (―contemporary application‖).831 
The Australian High Court has long employed a connotation-denotation 
model, ―whereby a constitutional expression includes not only the specific 
instances which fell within that expression in 1900 (denotation), but also any 
further instances which have come into being since that time but which are 
nevertheless within the idea represented by the expression in question 
(connotation).‖ 832  Importantly, this model has traditionally been applied 
―where there have been technological advances‖ 833  in constitutional 
interpretation.  
In claim construction, the distinction between connotation and denotation 
has been noticed by Kevin Emerson Collins in his article The Reach of Literal 
Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the 
Meaning of Meaning.
834
 Collins aims to offer a descriptive explanation for the 
fixation-growth paradox in determining claim scope. He points out that judges 
                                                        
830 Louise Cummings, Clinical Linguistics 234 (2008). American Psychiatric Association (APA) used to 
define ―autism‖ as a single disorder. 
831 Blair Levin & J. Erik Garr, A New America through Broadband, Washington Post (July 16, 2010). The 
Texas legislature passed a bill in 2009 creating a commissioner's list for digital content technology. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071504175.html.   
832 Craven, supra note 54. 
833 (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 200. 
834 Collins, supra note 40.(―courts can sanction play between thing-scope and meaning- scope‖) 
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resolve this paradox either by constructing things or defining meaning.
835
 
Collins considers things and meanings as ―independent‖ and ―separate‖ 
doctrinal policy levers that courts manipulate to tailor the claim scope: 
―[Different judges] had different theories of construction and different policy 
judgments about the desirability of allowing patentees to cover subsequently 
developed technology.‖ 836 Such sharp distinction837 generates the dichotomy 
of form and substance, which has been proven unhelpful for patent claim 
construction.  
This thesis differs in adopting a dynamic framework for using the 
―connotation-denotation analysis‖ coherently and consistently in claim 
construction. As taught by Gadamer, the separated goals of interpreting 
meaning and applying meaning are ―different aspects of the same activity.‖838 
The main theoretical basis is: ―the expected applications of a general term do 
not exhaust the sources for understanding its essential characteristics.‖  
Denotation of a term (the class of objects to which it refers) is dependent on its 
connotation (the class of properties by which the referred objects can be 
identified), and ―the more properties that make up the connotation of a term, 
                                                        
835 Id. (―courts can sanction play between thing-scope and meaning- scope‖) 
836 Id.(―There are two independent mechanisms, each of which implicates a different category of AAT. 
One mechanism focuses on the nature of things and the way in which thing-scope can be fixed in one sense 
and yet expand in another to encompass AAT. The other addresses an ambiguity in the meaning of 
meaning.) 
837Vyvyan Evans & Melanie C. Green, Cognitive linguistics 293 (2006) (―The traditional position, both in 
philosophy and in linguistics—and indeed the everyday view—is that (1) there is a stable and 
unambiguous notion of literality, and (2) that there is a sharp distinction to be made between literal 
language, on the one hand, and non-literal or figurative language on the other. According to this view, 
while literal language is precise and lucid, figurative language is imprecise, and is largely the domain of 
poets and novelists….In particular, it seems that it is difficult to establish a neat dividing line between 
literal and figurative meaning…linguistic metonymy is referential in nature: it relates to the use of 
expression to ―pin-point‖ entities in order to talk about them. Defining feature of metonymy: ‗X stands 
for Y‘.‖) 
838 Ronald K. Rowe, Contemporary Legal Theory and Philosophical Hermeneutics: Originalism's Failed 
Reliance on Intentionalist Theories of Meaning 95 (2008) (―one cannot do the former without applying it 
to one‘s own situation because interpretation simply is the fusion of one‘s own horizon with that of the 
text.‖) 
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the narrower will be the class of objects denoted by the term.‖839  The 
connotation-denotation model adopted by Australian High Court is normative 
in that it clearly defines meaning as the connotation rather than the denotation 
of the expression.
840
 Therefore, the model does not draw a clear-cut division 
between linguistic meaning scope and thing scope, it is the essential 
characteristics or attributes of the words used that need to be ascertained.
841
 
The next paragraph will discuss the role of essential characteristics in the 
context of patent claim construction. 
C. Determination of essential attributes in patent claim construction 
There are both desirability and limitation to the application of the 
connotation-denotation model in patent claim construction. On one hand, 
patent law fosters both private and public interest,
842
 and a patent is an 
outcome of a bargain between society and the inventor. From a societal 
perspective, both the constitution and patent can share the same common 
theoretical root: social contract theories. Social contract theories provide that 
rational individuals will agree by contract, compact, or covenant to give up the 
condition of unregulated freedom in exchange for the security of a civil 
                                                        
839 Massimo La Torre, Law As Institution 174 (2010) (―the class denoted is inversely proportional to the 
extension of the class connoted.‖) (2010) 
840 Zines, supra note 56.  
841 Suzanne Corcoran & Stephen Bottomley, Interpreting Statutes 68 (2005)(―The most successful and 
least controversial of these theories is the connotation-denotation distinction. It claims that the connotation 
or essential meaning of a general term, which provides the list of features which an object must have to fall 
within the term, may remain the same while its denotation or extension, that is the class of objects or 
phenomena which have all the features necessary to fall within the term, may expand...‖) 
842 Alexander James Stack, International Patent Law: Cooperation, Harmonization, and an Institutional 
Analysis of WIPO and the WTO 46 (2011) (―Patent law is a private means for fulfilling a public 
function… it is also about public law: it is enacted to further a public purpose of increasing innovation, 
patent rights are against everyone.‖) See also, Markman, 52 F.3d 967, 32 USPQ 2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(―patents…are enforceable against the public…unlike private agreements between contracting parties.‖)  
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society governed by a just, binding rule of law.
843
 Accordingly, patents can be 
viewed as a type of social contract
844
 because ―the state gives the inventor a 
monopoly in return for an immediate disclosure of all the information 
necessary to enable performance of the invention.‖845 With such a common 
basis, the dynamic interpretive methods of patent claim construction are able 
to ―closely track‖ 846the cannons of dynamic constitution interpretation, which 
adapt legal texts to contemporary societal needs and values.  
On the other hand, a constitution is a fundamental legal text, which 
provides the basic structure of the political and legal systems, and the 
connotation-denotation model must be applied with caution and further 
refinements are necessary. The constitutions are often to be read more broadly 
than other statutes to adapt themselves as far as possible to the changing 
conditions:
847
 ―For that reason where the question is whether the Constitution 
has used an expression in the wider or in the narrower sense, the Court should, 
in my opinion, always lean to the broader interpretation unless there is 
something in the context or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the 
                                                        
843 Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 Florida Law Review 1 (1999) 
844 Jean O. Lanjouw, Comment on ―Of Patents and Genes: Flows of knowledge and Intellectual Property 
Rights‖ by Claude Henry, in François Bourguignon et al. (ed.) Economic Integration and Social 
Responsibility,135 (2007) (―Through the patent system, consumers effectively agree to pay inventors 
prices above marginal costs for a limited period of time in order to give inventors reason to invest in the 
discovery and development of useful products.‖) See also, P. Drahos, The Global Governance of 
Knowledge: Patent Offices and their Clients 30 (2010) (The author has argued that the ideal that should 
guide patent offices is the patent social contract. ―society offers a monopoly in exchange for the release of 
an invention of social value.‖ ) 
845 Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and others [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 
RPC 169.   
846 Burk, supra note 37. (―given the close parallels between patent claims and statutes, it should not be 
surprising to find interpretive strategies common to both.‖) This thesis does not compare dynamic claim 
interpretation to dynamic contract interpretation, because dynamic contract interpretation often consists 
of principles that are individualized and sometimes subjective, and the inventor‘s subjective intent plays 
no role when construing claim terms in patent cases. See, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of 
Dynamic Contract Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1743 (2000). See also, Moore, supra note 5. (―whereas in contract 
cases, the subjective intent of the parties is the primary focus.‖) 
847 Craven, supra note 54. 
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narrower interpretation will best carry out its object and purpose.‖848 In patent 
claim construction, the broader the claim, the higher the likelihood that 
products will infringe, the claim.
849
 ―[I]t is only fair (and statutorily required) 
that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the 
patentee's right to exclude‖850 others from the invention.  
The need for certainty and predictability in claim construction has long 
been recognized by courts.
851
 Therefore, to apply the model in patent claim 
construction, the way of determining connotation, i.e., the essential attributes, 
must be more specific and clearer than that in constitutional interpretation. In 
patent law, there is an existing concept of ―essential features‖ (or ―essential 
integers‖, ―essential elements‖)852 of claims. An independent claim must 
indicate all the essential features. ―All features which are necessary for solving 
the technical problem with which the application is concerned have to be 
                                                        
848 Zines, supra note 56. 
849 Edward F. O'Connor, Intellectual Property Law and Litigation: Practical and Irreverent Insights 90 
(2009). 
850 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc ). 
851 See, e.g. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997) (noting need 
―to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability‖ in patent law); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (expressing a need for certainty in claim construction); Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting a need for ―reasonable certainty and 
predictability‖ in claim construction), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).. Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst 
Marion Roussel. 2002 RPC 2. [2002] EWCA Civ 1096. [2004] UKHL 46. (―in determining the extent of 
protection according to the content of the claims but avoiding literalism, the courts of the Contracting 
States should combine "a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third 
parties.") Free World Trust v. Electro Santé Inc. et al. (2000) 2 S.C.R. 1024, (2001) 9 C.P.R. (4th) 168 
(S.C.C. per Binnie J.) (―The appeal thus raises important questions about the scope and ambit of a patent 
owner's monopoly. Too much elasticity in the interpretation of the scope of the claims creates uncertainty 
and stifles competition.‖)  
852 Manual of Patent Practice UK Intellectual Property Office, ―a. One independent claim defining all the 
technical features essential to the invention or inventive concept. Inessential or optional features should 
not be included in this claim; b.Dependent claims incorporating all the features of the independent claim 
and characterised by additional non- essential features.‖ http://www.ipo.gov.uk/practice-sec-014.pdf (Last 
visited 01/08/2013); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure USPTO, Chapter 2100 Section 2163  ―Each 
claim must include all elements which applicant has described as essential.‖ See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide 
Associates Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d at 993; Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d at 1479; 
Tronzo v. Biomet, 156 F.3d at 1159. http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2163.html (last visited 
01/08/2013) 
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regarded as essential features.‖853  
Particularly, in the ―pith and marrow‖ approach, the court would read the 
specification and determine the substance of the invention by identifying what 
it considered to be the essential elements of the invention.
854
 The ―pith and 
marrow‖ approach is a doctrine of infringement inquiring about the substance 
of an invention, which is different from the rules of interpretation relating to 
the meaning of claims.
855
 The former requires a factual comparison of the 
allegedly infringing technology to the construed claims, while the latter 
determines what the claim terms mean. After Catnic, the purposive 
interpretation abandons the ―pith and marrow‖ approach and emphasizes that 
claim wording deliberately chosen by the patentee cannot be disregarded.
856
 
However, it still involves separating the essential from the non-essential: the 
interpretive question expressly inquires into whether a PHOSITA ―would 
understand that strict compliance with the particular descriptive word or 
                                                        
853 Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office (sixth edition 2010) B. Claims1.1.4 
Indication of all essential features, 
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/caselaw/2010/e/clr_ii_b_1_1_4.htm (last visited 
01/08/2013) 
854 Clark v. Adie (1877) 2 App Cas 315(HL). Lord Cairns LC coined the phrase ―pith and marrow‖ to refer 
to the infringement by the taking of the substance of a patent claim. Prior to Catnic the English law 
influence regarding the use of the doctrine of pith and marrow to determine liability for the non-textual 
infringement of patents had spread to many countries. Such countries included South Africa and Canada. 
See, e.g., Electrolier Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Dominion Manufacturing Ltd., [1934] S.C.R. 436 (Rinfret 
J. of the Supreme Court of Canada) (―according to any fair interpretation of the language of the 
specification, he has taken, in substance, the pith and marrow of the invention, with all its essential and 
characteristic features, except in details which could be varied without detriment to the successful working 
of it. There is no difference in the main elements of the two structures. There is no difference in the 
operation. Both perform the same function in the same way. Above all, ―the spirit of the invention‖ was 
infringed.‖) 
855 Raymond Mnyamezeli Mlungisi Zondo, The Replacement of the Doctrine of Pith and Marrow by the 
Catnic Test in English Patent Law: A Historical Evaluation (2012) 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/5697/thesis_zondo_r.pdf?sequence=1 
856 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. (198)] RPC 183, 242 (Lord Diplock) (―Both parties to this 
appeal have tended to treat 'textual infringement' and infringement of the 'pith and marrow' of an invention 
as if they were separate causes of action, the existence of the former to be determined as a matter of 
construction only and of the latter upon some broader principle of colourable evasion. There is, in my 
view, no such dichotomy; there is but a single cause of action and to treat it otherwise…is liable to lead to 
confusion.") Kirin-Amgen Inc v. Hoechst Marion. Roussel Ltd [2004] UKHL 46 (―It seems to me that 
both the doctrine of equivalents in the United States and the pith and marrow doctrine in the United 
Kingdom were born of despair.‖) 
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phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an essential 
requirement of the invention with the result that any variant would fall outside 
the monopoly claimed ...‖857 
The determination of the connotation, i.e., the essential attributes under 
the connotation-denotation model, is different from identifying the essential 
elements under the purposive approach in that: (1) According to the purposive 
approach, a superfluous limitation may be held inessential if ―a particular 
word or phrase used in a claim cannot have been intended by a patentee‖ from 
the perspective of a PHOSITA. 
858
 However, under the proposed model, 
every technical feature described in the independent claim is to be regarded as 
essential and subject to interpretation. (2) The connotation-denotation model 
focuses at a more micro-level examination. As instructed by philosophical 
hermeneutics, an initial way of grasping a Sache is to conceive of it as technical 
content that a claim term is concerned with.
859
 In patent claim interpretation, 
interpreters want to grasp what is said and what it refers to, and meaning of a 
claim term consists of technical properties perceived by a PHOSITA. For 
example, a patent claim was directed to fuel oil composition.
860
 The use of 
                                                        
857 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. (1982) R.P.C. 183. Improver Corporation v Remington 
Consumer Products Limited [1990] FSR 181 (―(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have 
understood from the language of the claim that the patentee intended that strict  ccompliance with the 
primary meaning was an essential requirement of the invention. If yes, the variant is outside the claim.‖) 
858 ―It [the question of essentiality] is to be answered in the negative only when it would be apparent to any 
reader skilled in the art that a particular descriptive word or phrase used in a claim cannot have been 
intended by the patentee, who was also skilled in the art, to exclude minor variants which, to the 
knowledge of both him and the readers to whom the patent was addressed, could have no material effect 
upon the way in which the invention worked." ) Michael Pendleton, The Purposive Approach to Patent 
Construction: A Divergence in Anglo-Australian Judicial Interpretation, 14 Melb. U. L. Rev. 75 
(1983-1984) (―Hence it appears that for the first time the Court will protect what the patentee might have 
claimed, provided that both the patentee and his readers would recognize, had they directed their minds to 
it, that a minor variant was incapable of having any material effect on the way the invention work.‖) 
859 Davey, supra note 737. 
860 T 0409/91 (Fuel oils) of 18.3.1993. (―this part of the description of the invention is of a fuel oil 
composition which must contain, as an essential constituent, "certain additives". It is precisely this feature 
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―certain additives‖ could be identified as an essential element of the invention. 
The essential attributes of the technical content, i.e., ―certain additives‖, were 
a set of unique technical properties used to describe such element. In this 
context, the essential attributes of ―certain additives‖ could be described as the 
capability of producing the desired small wax crystals---particle sizes below 
1000 nanometers.
861
 Other physical and chemical properties of the additives 
could be considered as accidental (or non-essential) attributes. 
The next question is finding the most useful properties for identifying the 
technical content in the claims. The traditional parameters of ―function‖, 
―way‖, ―result‖ or ―material effect‖ might be fit for the mechanical inventions, 
but are much too simplistic to deal with the more complex technologies such 
as chemistry, biotechnology, software engineering and nanotechnology.
862
 The 
U.S. Supreme Court explained that the function-way-result test arose in an era 
characterized by relatively simple mechanical technology.
863
 ―As technology 
becomes more sophisticated, and the innovative process more complex, the 
function-way-result test may not invariably suffice to show the substantiality 
of the differences.‖864 For example, in the field of chemistry, it is often 
                                                                                                                                                 
that is missing from the present claims, which, therefore, do not meet the requirement of Art. 84 EPC‖) 
861 Id. 
862 Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 The Yale L. J., 777 (1992); 
J. Jason Lang, The German Resolution: A Proposed Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis and a Flexible Rule 
of Prosecution History Estoppel for Biotechnology, 52 Emory L.J. 427(2003); Megan E. Lyman, Judicial 
fitness for review of complex biotechnology issues in patent litigation: technical claim interpretation, 23 J. 
Nat‘l A. Admin. L. Judges 503 (2003); Andrew Wasson, Protecting the Next Small Thing: 
Nanotechnology and the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 10 (2004); John C. 
Miller, The Handbook of Nanotechnology: Business, Policy, and Intellectual Property Law 68 (2005); 
Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 601(2005); Georgios I. Zekos, 
Nanotechnology and Biotechnology Patents, 14 Int'l J.L. & Info. Tech. 310 (2006); Dan L. Burk & Mark 
A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It 58(2009). 
863 Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. at 609, 70 S.Ct (1950), at 
856-57. 
864 Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. 62 F.3d 1512 (1995). (Lourie, J., dissenting) 
(―One can also consider the example of the well-known analgesics aspirin and ibuprofen. These 
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difficult to determine the precise way in which a chemical ingredient performs 
a given function, or accomplishes a certain result.
865
  
Technical knowledge is generated largely with the intention to have 
something working in practice or to achieve some level of technical 
performance.
866
 Inventions have been regarded as distinct technological 
capabilities combined to accomplish a specific outcome:
867
 
The laser presupposes the ability to construct highly reflective optical cavities, 
create light intensification mediums of sufficient purity, and supply light of 
specific wavelengths; the polymerase chain reaction results from (among 
various other capabilities) the ability to finely control thermal cycling (which 
requires the use of computers), and isolate short DNA fragments and a DNA 
polymerase (both of which require techniques from chemical engineering). The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in effect follows this approach and 
defines inventions as bundles of technological capabilities.
868
 
Therefore, this thesis proposes ―performance parameter‖869 as the most 
                                                                                                                                                 
compounds have the same function (to provide analgesia, anti-inflammatory activity, and lower 
temperature), do so in the same way (by inhibiting prostaglandin synthesis), and give the same results (kill 
pain, relieve inflammation, and lower fever). Yet, they have a different structure, which makes them 
different compounds, and no knowledgeable person would consider that a claim to aspirin would be 
infringed by the sale of ibuprofen.‖) 
865 Chemistry is one of the so called ―unpredictable‖ arts, where the relationship between structure and 
function is not as completely understood as in the mechanical or electrical arts. In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating ―The principle applies most often to the less predictable fields, such as chemistry, 
where minor changes in a product or process may yield substantially different results.‖). 
866 Ove Granstrand, The Economics and Management of Intellectual Property: Towards Intellectual 
Capitalism 119 (2000). 
867 Deborah Strumsky, Using Patent Technology Codes to Study Technological Change, 
http://www.santafe.edu/media/workingpapers/10-11-028.pdf, quoting Nathan Rosenberg, Exploring the 
Black box: Technology, Economics, and History 18 (1994) (―it is inherited, path-dependent technological 
capabilities that have dominated the eventual commercial exploitation of new technologies whose 
underlying technological feasibility has been made by the advancement of science.‖)See also, Frederick 
Betz,Managing Technological Innovation: Competitive Advantage from Change 231 (3rd ed., 2011) (―The 
capability of a technology identifies the functional transformation of the technology that transforms inputs 
to the technology system into outputs.‖) 
868 Id. 
869 Frederick Betz, Managing Technological Innovation: Competitive Advantage from Change 230 (2011) 
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useful properties for identifying the technical content, because it is the most 
common and familiar parameter in technology assessment, which will be best 
suitable for describing various types of inventions in various industries. The 
next Chapter will set forth the principle and the implementation guides for 
dynamic claim construction.   
                                                                                                                                                 
(―Technical progress can be measured in the improvements of its performance— technology performance 
parameters.‖) 
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CHAPTER 7 THE PROPOSED DYNAMIC CLAIM 
INTERPRETATION 
Patent claim interpretation would be improved by making greater use of 
hermeneutical perspectives. This Chapter outlines a dynamic claim 
construction framework based on the existing claim construction approaches. 
At the beginning, the general principle of dynamic claim construction is 
proposed. Under the dynamic construction, the meaning of a claim term is its 
connotation: what a PHOSITA would have understood the essential attributes of 
the technical solution referred to by the term to be at the time of filing. The 
theoretical and practical similarities and differences between ―connotation‖, 
―intention‖ and ―ordinary meaning‖ will be compared in detail. This Chapter 
further shows how the implementation of the dynamic claim construction can 
produce interpretive results that may become dispositive of the infringement 
issue. The two-step dynamic construction method first ascertains the essential 
attributes of the technical solution referred to by the term at the time of filing, 
then decides whether the variant falls within that connotative meaning when 
circumstance changes. In the second step, the interpreter will assess whether the 
variant possess all the essential attributes as so defined. This thesis keeps in 
mind that there is no one-size-fits-all formula that will result in effectively 
generating the essential attributes in all inventions, thus, it provides only a 
modest method for achieving the dynamic principle. The dynamic interpretation 
is context-sensitive and explanatory, which will hopefully offer a more 
persuasive justification of claim interpretation. It is both important to preserve 
certainty of the scope of patent claim and adapt the claim to modern 
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scientific-technological context. 
Section 1 The general principle of dynamic claim construction  
This thesis proposes the dynamic claim construction principle: the meaning of a 
claim term is its connotation—what a PHOSITA would have understood the 
essential attributes of the technical solution referred to by the term to be at the 
time of filing. Here a ―term‖ (or a word) is a symbol used to identify 870 a 
technical solution. Under patent law, the patentable subject matter has to 
provide a technical solution to a technical problem based on technical 
considerations.
871
 As summarized before, the connotation of a term is defined 
as the generally unchanging bundle of attributes that is central to the term‘s 
meaning;
872
 and the denotation refers to the actual usage relevant of a term at a 
particular circumstance, and it ―includes new and different items with that 
essential meaning.‖ 873  The dynamic approach recognizes the difference 
between essential and accidental attributes: 
―As to Essential and Accidental, these terms are derived from the doctrine of 
Realism. Realists maintain that the essence of a thing, or that which makes a 
                                                        
 
871 Alexander Harguth,Patents in Germany and Europe:Procurement, Enforcement and Defense : an 
International Handbook 57 (2011) (―Whether the subject matter is patentable first depends upon the 
question whether the requirement of technicality is fulfilled--i.e. on whether the subject matter provides a 
technical solution to a technical problem based on technical considerations.‖) Annette Kur Max Planck & 
Thomas Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials 107 (2013) (―Patentable 
Subject Matter Art. 52 (1) EPC describes patentable subject matter as "any inventions, in all fields of 
technology provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial 
application. " This language of the revised EPC reflects both the language of Article 27 (1) TRIPS and the 
established practice of the EPO to examine applications for their "technical character" or for the "technical 
solution" they provide for "technical problems.") Rohan Kariyawasam, Chinese Intellectual Property and 
Technology Laws 248 (2011) (―In accordance with Rule 2.1 Patent Examination Guidelines (2010), 
'invention' under Article 2.2 Patent Law means 'any new technical solution relating to a product, a process 
or improvement thereof.‖) 
872 Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, The Text Through Time, 31(3) Statute Law Review 217–237 (2010)   
873Geraldine Chin, Technological Change and the Australian Constitution, 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 609 2000. 
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thing to be what (or of what kind) it is, also makes everything else of the same 
kind to be what it is. The essence, they say, is not proper to each thing or 
separately inherent in it, but is a ‗Universal‘ common to all things of that kind.‖
874 
The meaning of a term (its connotation) is determined by a set of necessary 
and sufficient features.
 875
 An object falls within the meaning of the term if, and 
only if, it possesses all these features.
876
 Under the dynamic claim construction, 
to find a characterization of the class of properties becomes crucial to 
determining the scope of a patent claim, because ―the more properties or 
characteristics the claim recites, the smaller the scope of the subject matter thus 
defined.‖ 877  As discussed before, the essential attributes of the technical 
solution referred to by the claim term can be considered a limited and specific 
set of performance properties. ―The performance of a technology expressed 
how well the technology performs its capability of functional 
transformation.‖ 878  For example, the claim term ―biocompatible‖ can be 
described as ―low variability, high purity, and no detectable biological 
reactivity as determined by biocompatibility tests.‖ 879  This 
connotation-denotation model has permitted a continuous extension of claim 
meaning over time. However, its application is restricted by virtue of the fact 
                                                        
874 Carveth Read, Logic 240 (2007). 
875 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008). (―In metaphysical terms, the patent claim is thereby synonymous with the 
extension of the properties, or class. ―A class is often thought of as the extension of a property (or concept), 
the collection of all those things. . . which have that property or fall under that concept.‖) 
876 Evans, supra note 59. 
877 Lefstin, supra note 875. (―This structure corresponds to the concepts of intension and extension 
prevalent in classical logic and deriving ultimately from Aristotle; as the intension (meaning) of a 
definition grows richer, the extension (the number of objects to which it applies) becomes smaller.‖) 
878 Frederick Betz,Managing Technological Innovation: Competitive Advantage from Change 231 (3rd 
ed., 2011). 
879 Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. vs. Hem Con, Inc., No. 10-1548 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2012) (en 
banc). 
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that the connotation is determined in the past context.
880
 
It is the connotation of a claim term that is the ―meaning‖. There is a 
similar concept ―figurative meaning‖881 in the Protocol questions formulated 
by Mr. Justice Hoffmann (as he then was). For the completeness and accuracy 
of explanation, the Protocol questions are again cited as a whole as the 
following: 
―If the issue was whether a feature embodied in an alleged infringement which 
fell outside the primary, literal or acontextual meaning of a descriptive word or 
phrase in the claim (‗a variant‘) was nevertheless within its language as 
properly interpreted, the court should ask itself the following three questions: 
(1)  Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? 
If yes, the variant is outside the claim. If no? 
(2)  Would this (ie that the variant had no material effect) have been obvious 
at the date of publication of the patent to a reader skilled in the art? If no, the 
variant is outside the claim. If yes?  
(3)  Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the 
language of the claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the 
                                                        
880 Craven, supra note 54. (―As noted above, this technique indisputably has permitted the continuous 
extension of the Commonwealth legislative power to moderately novel factual situations. On the other 
hand, its application is, at least in theory, strictly limited by virtue of the fact that the central idea of the 
provision in question—the connotation—is set by reference to the meaning of the relevant terms in1900, 
and thus by reference to the historic intentions of the Founders.‖) 
881 Joanna Thornborrow, Shân Wareing, Patterns in Language: An Introduction to Language and Literary 
Style 111 (1998) (―Figurative language use is one way in which the phenomenon of language change takes 
place, as words acquire metaphorical or metonymic meanings different from their original literal ones, and 
the new usages become absorbed into the language as commonplace.‖) Literal versus figurative meaning, 
denotation versus connotation are two overlapping dichotomies. However, there is still difference between 
the two. ―While the distinction between literal and figurative language operates at the level of the signifier, 
that between denotation and connotation operates at the level of the signified.‖ Daniel Chandler, 
Semiotics: The Basics 137 (2007).(―Contemporary commentors tend to describe the signifier as the form 
that the sign takes, and the signified as the concept to which it refers.‖) 
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primary meaning was an essential requirement of the invention? If yes, the 
variant is outside the claim. 
On the other hand, a negative answer to the last question would lead to the 
conclusion that the patentee was intending the word or phrase to have not a 
literal but a figurative meaning (the figure being a form of synecdoche or 
metonymy) denoting a class of things which include the variant and the literal 
meaning, the latter being perhaps the most perfect, best-known or striking 
example of the class.‖
882
 
The finding of figurative meaning under the Protocol questions is not the 
direct goal of purposive claim construction. Whether a variant falls outside a 
scope is determined by considering its material effect and non-obviousness, as 
well as the patentee‘s intended strict compliance with literal meaning. By 
comparison, under the dynamic approach, the first and primary step is to 
ascertain the connotation of the term, i.e., the essential qualities of the concept 
referred to. ―The denotation of a term clearly depends upon its 
connotation….From the point of view of knowledge already achieved, the 
understanding of the connotation of a term is prior to its denotative use.‖883 
Therefore, the dynamic approach adopts a pre hoc rather than post hoc 
reasoning, that is, whether a variant falls within or outside the scope is only 
determined after the connotation (or figurative meaning) has been established.  
A more detailed comparison between the dynamic approach and the Protocol 
questions will be conducted in next Section. 
                                                        
882 Improver Corporation v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [1990] FSR 181, 189. 
883 Morris F. Cohen, et.al., An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method 32(2008). (―Whether we may 
apply the word ‗ellipse‘ to some geometric figure is determined by the attributes included in the 
connotation of the term…We must know the connotation of ‗amoeba‘ before we can apply it.‖) 
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Moreover, the Protocol questions are a rigid checklist. It is one of many 
ways to finally ascertain the figurative meaning of a claim term. For example, 
having ―material effect on the way the invention works‖ may be one essential 
attribute of the concept, but this is not conclusive and has been proved 
inadequate in some cases.
884
 The House of Lords recognize the difficulties of 
the Protocol questions and move to a more general question: what a person 
skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to be using the language 
of the claim to mean.
885
 The House of Lords distinguished between the 
purposive construction principle and the guidelines for applying that 
principle.
886
 The purposive construction attempts to capture the more general 
concept of ―a practical idea which the patentee has had for a new product or 
process.‖887 According to this compulsory question, claims are construed 
from a perspective controlled by the intentions or purposes of the patentee at 
the time of filing (using PHOSITA as a reference point, as every approach 
does).  
It would be useful to gain a deeper understanding of the relationships 
among the concepts of ―ordinary meaning‖, ―patentee‘s intent‖ and 
                                                        
884 Kirin Amgen v Hoechst Marrion Roussel [2004] UKHL 46 (―On the whole, the judges appear to have 
been comfortable with the results, although some of the cases have exposed the limitations of the 
method.‖); Merck v Generics (UK) Ltd [2003] EWHC 2842 (Pat), at para 50 ( "How does this approach 
marry up with the Improver questions? As the Court of Appeal said in Pharmacia, the Improver questions 
are "normally useful tools" but they may not be easy or appropriate to apply in every case. In the end one 
must return to look at the Protocol itself. There is nothing to suggest that Hoffmann J intended to put the 
three questions forward as a rigid checklist with three boxes, each of which needs to be ticked 
appropriately for there to be infringement.) 
885 Kirin-Amgen Inc v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2005] RPC 9. 
886 Id. The House of Lords indicated that it was important to distinguish the Protocol questions from the 
Catnic principle. Lord Hoffman stated that while the former are ―the bedrock of claim construction, 
universally applicable,‖ the latter are only guidelines for applying that principle that are more useful in 
some cases than others, and were not a substitute for trying to understand what a person skilled in the art 
would have understood the patentee to mean at the time of the claims. 
887 Id. (―And he reads the specification on the assumption that its purpose is both to describe and to 
demarcate an invention - a practical idea which the patentee has had for a new product or process - and not 
to be a textbook in mathematics or chemistry or a shopping list of chemicals or hardware. It is this insight 
which lies at the heart of ‗purposive construction‘. ...‖) 
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―connotation,‖ which focuses respectively on the text, the author and the 
subject matter of the text. Under the purposive approach, claim terms are to be 
given the meaning intended by the patentee as understood by a PHOSITA at 
the time of filing. Under the ordinary meaning approach, claim terms are to be 
given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a PHOSITA at 
the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent 
application. Under the proposed dynamic approach, claim terms may connote 
a particular meaning, ―which theoretically remains constant, but denotes 
things that were not contemplated‖888at the time of filing.  
In many cases, the ―ordinary meaning‖, ―patentee‘s intent‖ and 
―connotation‖ may converge,889 but when the language is relatively abstract, 
they ―tend to come apart‖.890 The former two concepts are more concrete and 
narrow. The ―ordinary meaning‖ (how a PHOSITA would have commonly 
understood the word at the time of filing)
 891
 or ―patentee‘s intent‖ (how a 
PHOSITA would have understood the patentee intended to mean at the time of 
filing)
 892
 may be clues for ―connotation‖, but they are not conclusive 
                                                        
888Malbon, Justin, The Race Power Under the Australian Constitution: Altered Meanings,  21(1) Sydney 
Law Review 80 (1999) See also, Romary & Michelson, supra note 807 (―Indeed, claims reciting such 
technical terms may become enforceable by the patentee against unforeseen embodiments never even 
contemplated by the patentee in the specification.‖) 
889 Peter J. Smith, ―How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism‖ 62 Hastings L. J., 707 (2011). 
890 Huscroft & Miller, supra note 490. (―In many contexts, original meaning, original intention, and 
original application converge. However, where the words used in a constitution are relatively abstract, 
these three ideas tend to come apart.‖) 
891Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussell[2005] R.P.C. 9.(―‗Purposive construction‘ does not mean that 
one is extending or going beyond the definition of the technical matter for which the patentee seeks 
protection in the claims. The question is always what the person skilled in the art would have understood 
the patentee to be using the language of the claim to mean.‖) Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussell 
[2004] UKHL at47.(―And what principle would provide a reasonable degree of protection for third 
parties? Surely again, a principle which would not give the patentee more than the full extent of the 
monopoly which the person skilled in the art would think that he was intending to claim.‖)See also, 
Catherine Colston& Jonathan Galloway, Modern Intellectual Property Law (2010). 
892Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 




 As Jack Balkin points out, ―we are not necessarily bound by 
either the intentions of the persons who framed the words, or by the general 
public expectation of how those words would be applied.‖894 To fix claim 
meaning in the original context is believed to result in greater certainty. 
However, as taught by philosophical hermeneutics, the task of interpretation is 
never finished with the original expected application of meaning. 
Even reading it broadly, the compulsory question under the purposive 
approach conflates both ―semantic intention‖ (connotation) and ―application 
intention‖ (denotation),895 while it is only the former that controls meaning.896 
As a result of this conflation, the patentee‘s intent might side with 
―denotation‖ or with ―connotation‖ on different occasions. 897  To avoid 
inconsistency, the dynamic approach takes one step further, clarifying and 
specifying the need for the identification of the ―connotation‖ rather than 
―denotation‖ of language used in patent claims.  
                                                        
893 Fallon, Jr., supra note 722. (―Whether—and, if so, when—originally intended or expected applications 
of constitutional language conclusively establish its original meaning is obviously a crucially important 
question with implications for how myriad constitutional questions ought to be resolved‖) Paul Brest, 
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 918 (2006) (―Evidence of how people 
used words at a certain point in time is evidence of their original public meaning, but it is not conclusive 
evidence, because original public use conflates both the content of a concept and its expected 
application.‖) 
894 Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Original Application 
http://lsolum.blogspot.sg/2005_06_01_archive.html 
895 Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L. J. 657 (2009). (―it is not original expected application 
but original meaning-what Dworkin calls ‗semantic intention‘—that controls.‖); see also, Huscroft & 
Miller (ed), supra note 490, at 51 (―It has become widely agreed that ‗expectation‘ or ‗application‘ 
intentions are only indirectly relevant to constitutional interpretation, as evidence of semantic intentions.‖) 
896  Id. See also, George H. Taylor, Critical Hermeneutics: The Intertwining of Explanation and. 
Understanding As Exemplified in Legal Analysis, 76 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1101 (2000) (―Scalia indicates that 
his approach holds in common with Ronald Dworkin‘s that both follow the ‗semantic intention‘ of a text 
rather than ‗the concrete expectations of lawgivers.‘ Scalia differ with Dworkin in adhering to an 
‗originalist‘ understanding of textual meaning while Dworkin permits meaning to evolve…‖) 
897 Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in 
Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy 357,369 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (― Because the 
authorities‘ exemplars may be inconsistent . . . with the true nature of the terms‘ referents, the question is 
which did they intend to dominate in cases of such inconsistency. In some cases, perhaps, referents will 
dominate definitions and exemplars. In other cases, definitions or exemplars will dominate.‖) 
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The dynamic approach distinguishes the recovery of claim meaning at the 
time of filing from the actual application of such meaning to current disputes. 
―A ‗meaning‘ is not an idea that somebody has in mind. It is not a psychic 
content, but an ideal object which can be identified and re-identified by 
different individuals at different times as being one and the same.‖ 898  As 
Professor Dan L. Burk advocates in his article Dynamic Claim Interpretation 
in 2012: ―a dynamic interpreter might consider whether a particular 
construction of the claim will grant broad or narrow coverage to the patentee, 
and what such coverage might mean to competitors and to the industry in 
which the patent is situated.‖899 Both Professor Burk‘s dynamic approach 
(―Burk‘s approach‖) and the dynamic approach proposed by this thesis 
recognize the capacity of the claim text to accommodate technological 
change
900– ―with some potential for evolution.‖901 However, there are two 
main differences between them. Firstly, Professor Burk sees the value of 
dynamic interpretation in ―repairing the biases of the governmental institution‖ 
and ―curing dysfunctions of the Patent Office‖902 in light of technological 
change. By comparison, the proposed dynamic approach attempts to provide a 
normative framework on how particular claim terms ought to be read, by 
assessing whether the new item possesses all the essential attributes 
determined at the time of filing.  
                                                        
898 Kevin J. Vanhoozer et. al, Hermeneutics at the Crossroads 41 (2006). 
899 Burk, supra note 37. 
900 Id. (―Dynamic interpretation is tailored to the circumstance, rather than insisting every circumstance 
conform to a single approach.‖) See also, Kirby, supra note 53. (―the meaning and content of the words 
take color from the circumstances in which the words must be understood and to which they must be 
applied.‖) 
901 Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Interpretation and Evolutionary Originalism 27 Fed L. Rev. 323 (1999) 
902 Id. (―for example, countering statutory trends originally intended to benefit politically favored 
industries that have since reached obsolescence in the ferment of technological change.‖) 
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Secondly, Professor Burk criticizes the reliance on traditional 
―originalism‖ to find a fixed and determined correct meaning to a claim 
term.
903
 However, he does not perform deeper research on contemporary 
originalist theory. Indeed, the contemporary originalist theory is grounded in 
the view that originalism is compatible with the non-originalist metaphor of 
legal text as ―living trees‖ that grow and change in response to social 
developments.
904
 As a result, Burk‘s approach still cannot answer the question 
how a ―subjective, ad hoc decision making‖905 could achieve certainty to the 
public. In contrast, the proposed dynamic approach is constructed based on a 
moderate version of originalism, with the aim of mitigating the tension 
between certainty and flexibility in claim interpretation. Importantly, the 
proposed dynamic approach ensures that judges interpret ―within the 
constraints of the text in addressing the problems of their time‖.906 The next 
section proposes a modest guideline for carrying out the dynamic claim 
construction principle. 
Section 2 Implementation guide for dynamic claim construction under 
infringement analysis  
By definition, infringement is the violation of a right or privilege: 
The main rule is that the infringing product or process includes all essential 
                                                        
903 (―While there is some superficial appeal to the certainty promised by originalism, reliance on the 
―plain‖ or ―ordinary‖ or otherwise purportedly self-evident meanings of claims is more apt to deter 
innovation than is transparent, dynamic interpretation.‖) 
904 Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional 
Interpretation 65 (2011) 
905 Burk, supra note 37. 
906 Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin's Originalism, 103NW. U. L. REV. 
663,669 (2009). 
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elements of the claims. The omission of an inessential element or the inclusion 
of an inessential element will not avoid a finding of infringement. However, the 
omission of an essential element will defeat a case for infringement.
907
 
Patent claim interpretation is closely related to the determination of 
infringement in patent cases. As US Circuit Judge Moore expounded, ―Claim 
construction is the single most important event in the course of a patent 
litigation. It defines the scope of the property right being enforced, and is often 
the difference between infringement and non-infringement, or validity and 
invalidity.‖ 908  Professor Christopher Cotropia pointed out that claim 
interpretation had a strong impact on the substantive scope of protection that 
an invention should be afforded.
909
 Where the litigating parties do not dispute 
any relevant facts regarding the accused product, the claim construction and 
infringement inquiries may collapse into one.
910
 It is a well-known principle 
that very often, ―once the judge had construed the claims as he did, he had 
answered the question of infringement.‖911  
This thesis proposes dynamic claim construction guidelines for 
infringement decisions. The previous Section has summarized the general 
principle of dynamic claim construction: patent claim meaning is connotation 
of a term, which is defined by the essential attributes of the technical contents 
                                                        
907 Christine Rossini, English As a Legal Language 251, 214(1998). 
908 Retractable Technologies v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 2010-1402, 2011 WL 2652448 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
909 Cotropia, supra note 5. 
910 See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt–Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (―Where the parties do 
not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused product . . . but disagree over possible claim 
interpretations, the question of literal infringement collapses into claim construction and is amenable to 
summary judgment.‖). 
911 Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and Others [2004] UKHL 46. See e.g. 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., I, 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (―Deciding the meaning of the words used in the patent is often dispositive of the question of 
infringement.‖) 
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referred to by the term at the time of filing. Having ascertained the essential 
attributes of the technical contents referred to by the term at the time of filing, 
the infringement analysis is to decide whether a variant (i.e., a modified feature 
of the claimed invention)
912
  falls within that connotative meaning.
 913
 Hence, 
the interpreter needs to explain whether the variant can be described as having 
those characteristics and belonging to the class (whether it falls in the 
denotation range of a given term). The following guidelines are a set of five 
propositions, which outline a framework for how to apply the general principle 
in practice. Subsequent paragraphs will explain in more detail each 
proposition. The dynamic claim construction approach can produce interpretive 
results that may become dispositive of the infringement issue.
914
 It attempts to 
bridge the possible gaps between understandings of meaning between the 
earlier time of filing and the later time of interpretation, and to offer sufficient 
reasoning to justify the choice of meaning. 
A. To preserve certainty, patent claim meaning, i.e. the connotation, remains 
constant from the time of filing, while the application of such meaning, i.e. the 
denotation, may change over time. 
B. What a PHOSITA at the time of filing would have interpreted and applied the 
                                                        
912 Richard J. Hacon & Jochen Pagenberg, Concise European Patent Law 78 (2007) (―…a ‗variant‘, that 
is, a product or process that differs from the embodiment conforming to that strict primary meaning of the 
claim (the variant being a potential ‗equivalent‘).‖) 
913 Lee, supra note 872. (―In applying a connotation–denotation analysis to determine whether a term 
should be given a dynamic interpretation, the first step is to establish the connotation of the term in 
question…Having identified the attributes and thus the essential meaning of the term, the court‘s task is 
then to determine whether a particular scenario raised by a dispute falls within the essential meaning.‖) See 
also, Zines, supra note 56. (―Logically, it requires two steps: first, determining the meaning of the subject 
matter…and secondly, whether the law can be described as one with respect to that subject matter as so 
defined.‖) 
914 Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials, 906-907 
(3d ed. 2002). See also Burk & Lemley, supra note 20(―And whether the interpretation is done with or 
without knowledge of the effect on the outcome, the judge‘s decision will likely predetermine the jury 
determination, or effectively take the decision away from the jury together, by selecting a claim 
interpretation so constrained that it leaves no room for more than a single outcome.‖) 
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claim terms to mean, i.e. the original expected application of meaning, provides 
strong evidence of the meaning of patent claims. 
C. In ascertaining the original expected application of claim meaning, one takes 
account of whether a PHOSITA could foresee probability of the claim term 
acquiring new denotation. 
D. When original expected application conflicts with contemporary application 
of patent claim meaning, one has to decide which application is to be adopted. 
E. Following Proposition D, when new denotations represent significant 
improvement over the original expected application, they fall outside the scope 
of the patent claim; if no significant improvement is found, then the claim term 
would be read broadly to encompass new denotations. 
Determining connotation and denotation is not a straightforward task. 
Flexibility, rather than rigid formulation is required to assess the essential 
properties.
915
 This thesis keeps in mind that there is no one-size-fits-all formula 
that will result in effectively generating meaning, thus, it provides only a 
modest method for achieving the dynamic principle. 
A. To preserve certainty, patent claim meaning, i.e. the connotation, remains 
constant from the time of filing, while the application of such meaning, i.e. the 
denotation, may change over time. 
                                                        
915 Lee, supra note 872(―It is probably futile to try and lay down rigid guidelines for determining when the 
attributes or characteristics of a term are essential to its meaning.‖) Clarence Irving Lewis, Collected 
Papers 107 (1970). (―It will be noted that, for any term, its connotation determines its comprehension; 
and conversely, any determination of its comprehension would determine its connotation, by determining 
what characters alone are common to all the things comprehended. In point of fact, however, there is no 
way in which the comprehension can be precisely specified except by reference to the connotation, since 
exhaustive enumeration of all the thinkable things comprehended is never possible.‖) 
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Meaning is first and foremost ―about‖ something. 916  For Gadamer, 
interpretation is always a matter of ―coming to an understanding about 
something‖.917 The dynamic approach looks beyond the claim text‘s literal 
meaning, and delves into the Sache or the subject matter itself,
918
 i.e., the 
essential attributes
919
 of the technical solution referred to by the term at the 
time of filing. The dynamic approach recognizes the highly dynamic and 
complex nature of high-tech industry and adopts a more flexible method of 
technological evaluation, and it finds the technical performance properties to 
be more applicable parameters.  
Under the dynamic approach, a claim term is construed as including 
within its content a denotation
920
 which it has acquired since the time of filing. 
The connotation of a word is the set of properties inherently associated with 
the word, and the denotation of a word is the object it refers to.
921
 The 
denotation of ―fastener‖, for example, is the class of fasteners, such as a bolt, a 
                                                        
916 Nini Prætorius, Principles of Cognition, Language and Action 124 (2000). A linguistic expression has 
implications or meaning on in virtue of being about or referring to something else; that is to say, it has a 
meaning for someone, about something, in some particular situation or context, and the meaning of a 
linguistic expression is understood by a language user in virtue of his knowledge of what it refers to, and 
thus knowledge about that to which it refers. 
917 Gadamer, supra note 46, 180 
918  Davey, supra note 737, at 84.(―Though Sachen are more than their particular renditions, they 
nevertheless ground such renditions and allow them to point beyond themselves…interpretation enriches 
the Sache…‖) Lorraine Code, Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer 173 (2003). 
(―Interpretations are valid insofar as they succeed in bringing out the Sache, the meaning, of the interpreted 
text.‖) 
919 Lee, supra note 872(―Australian judges have used a multiplicity of phrases, speaking about identifying 
a term‘s ‗really essential characteristics‘, ‗fundamental conception‘, ‗essential particulars‘, ‗essential 
differentia‘, ‗essential feature‘ and ‗essential meaning.‖) Citing Brewery Employés Union (n 22) 560 
(Isaacs J), and 535 (O‘Connor J): ‗[T]he true line of inquiry is first to ascertain what were the essential 
characteristics of a ―trade mark‖ in Australia, the time when the Constitution was passed, disregarding all 
conditions, qualifications, and attributes, which were not of its very nature and essence...‘. See also Grain 
Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479 (HC, Aust) 528, [123] (‗really essential 
characteristics‘); Re Patterson, ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 (HC, Aust) 495, [312] (‗essential 
characteristics‘); and Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28 (HC, 
Aust) 61, [94] (‗essential character‘). 
920Charles J. G. Sampford & Kim Preston (ed.), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and 
Institutions 14 (1996). (―…it is clear that a constitutional term is read as including within its embrace a 
new exemplication which falls within its overall meaning.‖) 
921 Joseph Grcic, Facing Reality: An Introduction to Philosophy Revised Edition 15 (2009). 
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nail, a clip, etc.. Its connotations are the qualities that something must possess 
in order properly to be called a fastener.
922
 The denotation of a term is 
determined by the range of things that possess the essential features or 
attributes specified in the connotation of the term:
923
 
―A term may typically denote X which has qualities A, B, C, and D; Y has 
qualities A, B and C but lacks quality D. Does Y come within the term? Put in 
other ways: Is D part of the essence of the term? Is it within the connotation or 
definition of the term? If the answer is yes, then the term does denote Y. If, on 
the other hand, D is regarded as merely an ―accidental‖ as distinct from an 
―essential‖ quality of the term it will denote Y.‖ 
The distinction between an essential attribute and an accidental attribute 
is as follows: the essential attributes of a term are ―those it has necessarily, 
those it could not have lacked. Its accidental attributes are those it has only 
contingently, those it might not have had.‖924 For instance, in interpreting the 
meaning of ―banking‖, the method of transferring funds (such as electronic 
transfer) is merely an ―accidental‖ as distinct from an ―essential‖ feature (such 
as dealing in money).
925
 
                                                        
922 John Reichert, Making Sense of Literature 38 (1977). (―Logicians define a word‘s denotation as the 
class of all the things to which the word is correctly or regularly used to refer. And its connotation is the set 
of qualities that defines membership in that class.‖) 
923 Zines, supra note 56. 
924 Richard L. Cartwright, Some Remarks on Essentialism, 65 The Journal of Philosophy 615-626 (1968). 
See also, Evans, supra note 59. (―The essential features are inherent in the thing. They are what makes it a 
thing of that kind – a member of a particular category. The accidental features are incidental to making it a 
thing of that kind.‖) 
925 Corcoran & Bottomley, supra note 841, at 68. See also, H. P. Lee & George Winterton, Australian 
Constitutional Landmarks 94 (2003) (―Thus in exploring the concept of ―banking‖ in s.51 (xii) of the 
Constitution he comments: ―The connotation does not change, the denotation may extend.‖ He amplifies 
this by observing: ―Banking may take different forms in the course of time, but nothing which has not the 
essential attributes as understood in 1900 can fall within the power.‖) 
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―Unlike connotation, denotation can expand or shrink over time.‖ 926  
Changes in denotation of patent claim term are often determined by 
technological factors. ―What has caused the change of meaning is arguably not 
anything to do with language, but simply a change in the word‘s 
denotation.‖927 Patents are a direct outcome of the inventive process.928 One 
important goal of the patent system is to promote technological development 
by granting monopoly rights.
929
 Technological change brings explosive 
growth in information and technical knowledge unprecedented in human 
history,
930
 especially in the areas of micro-electronics, biotechnology and 
communication technologies. Technological change is believed to increasingly 
become the future norm.
931
 Hence, claim interpretation needs to have the 
ability to respond to effects of technological change.
932
 The dynamic approach 
fixes the connotation (―a definition of the term which elucidates its essential 
characteristics‖933) at the time of filing; on the other hand, it seeks denotations 
(―the actual usage relevant to a term in the new context‖934) at the time of 
                                                        
926 Lee, supra note 872; See also, Sonja Sickert, What is Meaning? 6 (2006). (―The denotation of a content 
word is the category, or set, of all its potential referents.‖) 
927 Nick Riemer, Introducing Semantics 373 (2010) (―For instance, since the advent of modern air 
transport, the verb fly can refer to travelling as a passenger in an aeroplane. This is a meaning that was 
obviously unavailable before the twentieth century. But it does not correspond to any change in the sense 
of fly itself: this is still arguably ‗travel through the air‘.‖) 
928 Archibugu, D. & M. Pianta, Measuring Technological Change Through Patents and Innovation 
Surveys, Technovation, 16, 451-68. 
929 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl 8. ("promote the Progress of...useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to...Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries.) 
930 Irfan-ul-Haque et.al, Trade, Technology, and International Competiveness, Vol. 22, 163 (1995)  
931 Patent System and Modern Technology Needs: Meeting the Challenge of the 21th Century 35, Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Technology of the Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, 
140th Congress, Second Session, Vol. 4 (1996). 
932 Under the dynamic approach, such ability to respond to effects of technological change is subject to the 
foreseeability test in proposition C. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 493 F.3d 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (―Hindsight is not foreseeability... Foreseeability is determined as of the time of the 
application. The unforeseen does not become foreseeable after someone later discovers it.‖) 
933 G Griffith, Same-sex marriage, Briefing Paper, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, No 
3/2011, p. 20, viewed 17 January 2012 
934 Id. (―For example, from a denotation perspective the word "vehicle" in 1900 would not have included 
"aircraft"; whereas from the perspective of connotation, if "vehicle" is defined as a means of conveying 
persons and goods then it could include "aircraft‖, in 1900 and in 2011. Thus, as Zines concludes, "an 
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interpretation, which brings out fresh possibilities of meaning that had lain 
hidden in the past.
935
 
B. What a PHOSITA at the time of filing would have interpreted and applied the 
claim terms to mean, i.e. the original expected application of meaning, offers 
strong evidence of the meaning of patent claims. 
Patents provide notice of their boundaries, and inform future inventors of what 
is within the boundaries and what is not. Patent rights confer on inventors a 
limited monopoly in exchange for public disclosure and knowledge of their 
inventions. Therefore, it is important that the patent claim construction is fair 
as well as predictable,
936
 ―on the one hand, some modicum of uncertainty is 
the ‗price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation,‘ …at the same 
time, a patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is 
claimed.‖ 937  While claim texts remain constant, developments in 
technological knowledge might change the application of that fixed meaning 
to particular situations over time. Under the dynamic approach, the patent 
claim meaning is informed by, but not exhausted by, its original expected 
applications (how a PHOSITA would have understood its words and thought 
they should be applied) at the time of filing.
938
 Patent claim text cannot be 
read in isolation, the recovery of technological context can be greatly 
                                                                                                                                                 
aircraft although not within the denotation of the term 'vehicle' in 1900 was within its connotation because 
it is a means of conveyance even though that particular means did not exist in 1900".‖) 
935 Tatar, supra note 736, 106.(―Sache remains always as transcendental ground which asserts its truth in 
the dialogical process between the language of the text and that of the interpreter.‖) 
936 Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 Cardozo Law Review 1359 (2014)(― extremely broad 
claims offend our notions of fairness because they reward inventors for something that they did not 
invent.‖) 
937 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (S. Ct. No. 2013-0369) (2014). See also, Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 
(1891) (noting that a patent must ―apprise the public of what is still open to them.‖). 
938 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 723. 
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enhanced by considering how the claim terms would have been applied at the 
time of filing (―the old denotation‖). 
 Connotation of a term is more abstract and descriptive as it involves 
association with essential attributes of the term that is found in the content. On 
the other hand, denotations are different ways of explicating the content. 
Connotation can be better understood on the basis of existing denotations, 
which are very useful because ―they caution modern interpreters against 
substituting their own preferred glosses on meaning for those that would have 
been widely held‖939at the time of filing. The existing denotations of a claim 
term at the time of filing include the following three forms: 
(1) Exemplary, prototypes or best mode of the invention. Interpreters can 
extract essential attributes from the exemplary, prototypes or best modes of the 
invention provided in specification and drawings. An interpreter may not have 
an explicit notion of what defining characteristics of the term are at the first 
glance, yet still be able to recognize instances. By analyzing the existing 
instances at the time of filing, interpreters can capture the characteristics that 
are common and distinctive of the prototypes, exemplary or best modes.  
(2) Prior art. Interpreters can determine the defining characteristics by 
assessing the objectives and purposes of the invention. The overall objective of 
an invention is to address and overcome specific scientific and technological 
hurdles. In general, prior art refers to ―all the relevant technical knowledge 
available to the public anywhere in the world prior to the first filing date of the 
                                                        
939 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 723. 
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relevant patent application.‖940 Prior art often reflects historical data and past 
performance trends. For example, in the field of chemistry, when the prior art 
has enabled methods of preparing the compound, a PHOSITA would therefore 
have understood that the patented invention is capable of achieving the same or 
greater effectiveness or potency than the prior art under certain conditions.
941
 
From the specification, interpreter will learn how the invention achieves a 
technical advantage over the prior art, and decide the essential properties of the 
technical concept referred to by the claim term. 
(3) Technological limitation. It would also be helpful to analyze the 
inherent limits of technologies at a particular point of time,
942
 ―The appraisal 
of technology depends upon what is expected of it. A clear appraisal 
presupposes clarity concerning the limits of technology.‖ 943 In recognition of 
the limitations, e.g. speed, memory capacity, density or storage limits, a 
PHOSITA can have a realistic understanding of what he can and cannot expect 
from the invention. A PHOSITA will not overestimate or underestimate the 
technical properties in the past context, which can reduce the distorting effects 
of hindsight bias.   
C. In ascertaining the original expected application of claim meaning, one 
takes account of whether a PHOSITA could foresee probability of the claim 
                                                        
940World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Inventing the Future: An Introduction to Patents for 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 47 (2006). 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/sme/917/wipo_pub_917.pdf (last visited Jan 1, 2012). 
941Chris P. Miller&Mark J. Evans, The Chemist's Companion Guide to Patent Law 246 (2010). 
942 Richard R. Nelson, The Source of Economic Growth 239 (2000).( ―At any given point, progress was 
constrained by a particular bottle-neck known mainly by those experiencing it, yet each new solution 
shifted the focus to another technical constraint or phase of production.‖) 
943Peter-Paul Verbeek, What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, And Design 39 
(2005),quoting Karl Jasper, The Origin and Goal of History98 (1953)(―The limits of technology lie in 
those presuppositions of all technological realizations which can never be overcome‖ and which are not 
susceptible to technological control.‖) 
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term acquiring new denotation. 
Expect means ―to look forward to and rely on,‖ 944  and technological 
expectations can more specifically be defined as ―real-time representations of 
future technological situations and capabilities.‖945  The original expected 
application of meaning not only reflects the then current conceptions of 
technology, but also the ―tendency for every age to read the future as a fancier 
version of the present‖,946 that is, the foreseeable range of applications at the 
time of filing. The rationale is to allow the patentee to cover his or her 
―general, yet clear, appreciation of industry and technology trends‖947 and 
preserve original incentives. When a patentee foresees a probability of change 
of denotation, he or she expected such technological development to occur. 
The U.S. courts adopt the concept of foreseeability in determining whether 
patentees have surrendered coverage by amending their patent claims.
948
 
There are critical differences between the foreseeability test under the dynamic 
approach and the principle of foreseeability adopted in the U.S. courts as a 
basis for rebutting the presumption of prosecution history estoppel.  
The principle of foreseeability remains an important component of the 
prosecution history estoppel analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court described three 
grounds for rebutting a presumption of estoppel for amendments submitted 
during patent prosecution: 1) that the equivalent was unforeseeable, 2) that the 
                                                        
944  Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 340 (2001). 
945 Mads Borup et al., Sociology of Expectations in Science and Technology, Vol. 18 Technology Analysis 
& Strategic Management 285–298(2006). 
946 Id. 
947 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. . L. Rev. 1569, 1573 
(2009) 
948 Matthew J. Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg, & Mark A. Lemley, Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1045 (2001). 
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amendment had only a tangential relation to the equivalent, or 3) that there 
was "some other reason" that suggested the patentee would not have 
reasonably been expected to describe the equivalent.
949
 The court recognized 
the vagueness of this inquiry, but stressed that it is a narrow avenue, made 
available only ―not to totally foreclose a patentee from relying on reasons‖ 
other than the two discussed above. For example, shortcomings of language 
may be cited for why the patentee was prevented from describing the alleged 
infringing element during claim amendment. Notably, the principle of 
foreseeability is not a limitation on the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents. ―There is not, nor has there ever been, a foreseeability limitation 
on the application of the doctrine of equivalents. It has long been clear that 
known interchangeability weighs in favor of finding infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.‖950 
By comparison, the dynamic approach uses foreseeability test as a part of 
formation of expectation at the time of filing, and not an analysis for 
prosecution history estoppel. The timeframes of the foreseeability inquiries are 
therefore different. While the foreseeability test under the dynamic approach is 
                                                        
949 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U. S. 722 (2002).In using the words "some 
other reason," the Supreme Court indicated that the first two methods are merely specific ways to rebut the 
same broad presumption. Thus, the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court's language is that the first 
two methods are included within the broad, over-arching standard and the third is that Court's way of 
recognizing that other circumstances may also suffice to rebut the Festo II "presumption." This reading 
finds further support in the concluding sentence of this section of the opinion, wherein the Supreme Court 
summarizes the standard: "[t]he patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art 
could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged 
equivalent." 
950 Ring & Pinion Service, Inc. v. ARB Corp. LTD., Case No. 13-1238 (Fed. Cir., Feb. 19, 2014) (Moore, 
J.). there was no dispute that all limitations were literally met in R&P‘s ―Ziplocker‖ product except for the 
―cylinder means formed‖ element. The parties agreed, however, that the ―Ziplocker‖ had an equivalent to 
the cylinder, albeit one that would have been foreseeable to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the 
time the patent application was filed. Accordingly, the parties entered a formal stipulation that the 
infringement analysis hinged on a discrete question of law: whether an equivalent is barred under the DOE 
because it was foreseeable at the time of the patent application. 
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assessed as of the time of filing, the principle of foreseeability is assessed as of 
the time of the amendment—references that are not prior art can be relevant. 
More importantly, under the principle of foreseeability, ―an alternative is 
foreseeable if it is disclosed in the pertinent prior art in the field of the 
invention.‖951 For example, in Festo, while aluminum alloy piston sleeves 
were known in the prior art, the shielding nature of an aluminum alloy sleeve 
was not known at the time of the amendment. 952 The Federal Circuit held that 
aluminum sleeve was a foreseeable alternative to magnetizable sleeve and that 
prosecution history estoppel applies. In contrast, the dynamic approach is a 
feature analysis of the technical solution referred to by the claim term, as it 
investigates the essential features of the technical content, i.e. the capability to 
shield against magnetic field leakage. As a result, the then-existing knowledge 
in the field of the invention would not have deemed an aluminum alloy sleeve 
foreseeable at the time of filing, and therefore the variant did not fall within 
the original expected application. 
The foreseeability test in the dynamic approach also differs from the 
second step of the Protocol Questions. The second step asks whether it would 
have been obvious to the person skilled in the art that the variant ―worked in the 
same way as the invention.‖953 The second step is not a question of whether the 
                                                        
951Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2007) ―Usually, if 
the alleged equivalent represents later-developed technology (e.g., transistors in relation to vacuum tubes, 
or Velcro® in relation to fasteners) or technology that was not known in the relevant art, then it would not 
have been foreseeable.  In contrast, old technology, while not always foreseeable, would more likely have 
been foreseeable.  Indeed, if the alleged equivalent were known in the prior art in the field of the 
invention, it certainly should have been foreseeable at the time of the amendment.‖ 
952 Id. 
953 Improver Corporation v. Remington Consumer Product Limited [1990] F.S.R. 181. 
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variant is an obvious alternative to the thing denoted by the literal meaning.
954
 
The Courts require that it be clear or apparent, just by looking at the variant, that 
it will work in the same way as the invention. It is not enough even for it to be 
highly likely that it will work if the variant needs to be tested to make sure.
955
 
The difficulty of the second step lies in that ―it is very seldom that it will be 
immediately apparent simply by looking at, say, a chemical or biological 
material, that it will work. There will always be a chance that even a slight 
change will result in a loss of activity.‖956 It becomes more problematic when 
applied to cases of later-developed technologies, because a patentee could not 
have envisaged how the completely new technologies would work sometime in 
the future. Many important emerging technologies (such as genetic, cellular, or 
nano scale technologies) work at a level that cannot be seen.
957
 The courts 
have realized that the second step did not help in such cases.
958
 Comparatively 
speaking, the dynamic approach asks the question whether the new denotation 
is a foreseeable alternative: the patentee needs to demonstrate that it was 
possible for a PHOSITA to foresee or contemplate a new denotation at the 
time of filing. Foreseeability is the ability to see or know in advance,
959
which 
is determined based on prior art rather than future art. The dynamic approach 
takes a more comprehensive approach to ascertain what is foreseeable and 
                                                        
954 Geoffrey Bayliss et. al, The Role of Equivalents and Prosecution History in Defining the Scope of 
Patent Protection, APPI UK Group Report Q175,  
retrieved from http://www.aippi.org.uk/docs/Q175%5B1%5D.Report.doc (last visited 13/1/2014) 
955 American Home Products v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd [2002] RPC 8 
956 Bayliss et. el, supra note 954. 
957 William K. Hallman, GM Foods In hindsight, in Edna F. Einsiedel (ed.), Emerging Technologies: 
From Hindsight to Foresight 15 (2009).  
958 See, Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and others [2004] UKHL 46, 
[2005] RPC 169. See also, David Bainbridge & Claire Howell, Law Express: Intellectual Property Law 
(4th ed.)113 (2014) (― It could not have been obvious to the skilled person as they had no concept of its 
existence and so the second Improver question is not appropriate in this sort of circumstance.‖‖) 
959 Dirk Meissner et. al., Science, Technology and Innovation Policy for the Future: Potentials and Limits 
of Foresight Studies 32 (2013) (―future oriented instrument‖) 
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what is not can be readily anticipated.
960
A person skilled in the art should be 
held to a standard of foresight indexed to the scientific community rather than 
the general public. 
D. When contemporary application of patent claim meaning conflicts with that 
expected by the PHOSITA at the time of filing, one has to decide which 
application to be adopted. 
Patent claims are read across the dimension of time, as there is often long 
temporal distance between the time of filing and the time of interpretation. 
―Patents necessarily involve new ideas, and the process of assigning terms to 
describe those new ideas is not static.‖961Although the patent claim term 
remains the same, the passing years often will have changed the denotations 
covered by that term, so that the contemporary application of the term may 
differs from the original application of the term earlier. As the dynamic 
principle states, meaning of a claim term is its connotation at the time of filing. 
An overbroad interpretation risks ―conferring on the patentee the benefit of 
inventions that he had not in fact made.‖962 From time to time, continuous 
technology change and development may in some circumstances extend the 
denotations of the claim term without altering its connotation. Therefore, the 
denotation of the term, which is the class of objects to which the term can be 
applied, must always be examined at a particular point in time.
963
 An 
interpreter‘s current understanding of the denotation may be different from 
                                                        
960 Alan L. Porter et. al., Technology Future Analysiss: Toward Integration of the Field and New Methods, 
71 Technological Forecasting & Social Change 287–303 (2004).  
961 Lemley, supra note 7.  
962 Free World Trust c. Électro Santé Inc., 2 R.C.S. 1024 [2000]. 
963 Stokes, supra note 774. 
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that in the past, i.e. the range of possible objects that a term refers to may 
change over time. Hence, when the original expected application is the same 
as what a PHOSITA would have interpreted and applied the claim terms in 
light of present technological context, the original expected application shall 
be followed. 
However, while the original expected application guides and constrains 
interpretation, it is a concrete application of meaning rather than meaning 
itself, therefore it is not conclusive and not always to be followed. ―The 
linguistic meaning of a text is one thing, and expectations about the 
application of that meaning to future cases are a different thing.‖ 964 
Interpreters shall keep in mind that the expected applications are not 
exhaustive, but rather, they could fluctuate, depending on the changing 
technological context.  
 ―The connotation being given, the denotation is thereby limited but not fixed. 
Things which lack any essential attribute, specified or implied in the 
connotation, are excluded from the denotation; but what is included in the 
denotation, and what not, depends also on what happens to exist; since the class 




Figure 2 Possible differences between the original and contemporary application of 
claims 
                                                        
964 Solum, supra note 788, 25. 
965 Clarence Irving Lewis, The Modes of Meaning, in Leonard Linsky (ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy 
of Language: A Collection of Readings 54(1952). 
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Unforeseeable technological changes can be accommodated by the 
proposed connotation–denotation framework. The denotations include new 
and different items with that essential meaning. Interpreters determine 
infringement by assessing whether the variant possesses all the essential 
attributes. Interpreters are bound to the connotation, that is, the essential 
meaning of a term, but are not confined to the denotation that a term had at the 
time of filing. The connotation-denotation framework introduces flexibility 
into patent claim interpretation. It suggests that a patentee (from the eyes of a 
PHOSITA) may not always envision all denotations which fall within the 
scope of a claim term,
966
 thus allowing the claim term to refer to variants not 
contemplated by the patentee at the time of filing. When the contemporary 
application of a claim term is different from that expected by the PHOSITA at 
the time of filing, one has to decide which denotation should be adopted. 
E. Following Proposition D, when new denotations represent significant 
improvement over the original expected application, they fall outside the 
scope of the patent claim; if no significant improvement is found, then the 
claim term would be read broadly to encompass new denotations. 
                                                        
966 Chao, supra note 936(―…claims may also cover after-arising technology that could not be envisioned 
at the time the patent was filed. This happens in two ways. First, claims may cover unforeseen variations of 
the invention. For example, photographs are now routinely sent via e-mail. The ‗647 patent might cover a 
computer that automatically recognizes the faces in a photo and indexes the photos accordingly. Second, 
claims can cover competitors that add something unforeseen to the invention, like the many features of 
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Differences  
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As concluded in previous paragraphs, a connotation is the set of attributes or 
properties shared by all and only the objects within the term‘s extension, and 
denotations of the term is the thing or set of things to which the term refers.
 
Due to technological changes, a variant may possess in common the essential 
qualities, i.e. the performance properties in the context of dynamic 
interpretation; however, its level of performance can be different from the 
claimed invention. For example, a contemporary denotation contains the same 
performance properties such as elasticity and temperature resistance as the 
claimed invention, but they can achieve greater efficiency or enhanced 
functionality.
 967
 Patentee is not required to predict all future developments 
which enable the practice of his invention,
968
 and patent claim may 
encompass unanticipated applications. Therefore, when the improvement is 
minor, the new denotation still falls within the scope of claim protection. 
However, when the new denotation represents significant improvement
969
 
over the original expected application, that is, it has proven its value in 
achieving a higher level of performance, it will fall outside the scope of claim 
protection. The rationale behind this proposition is that when ―the improver's 
contribution dominates the value of the improved technology,‖ patent law 
should maintain incentives for inventors to significantly improve on existing 
                                                        
967 Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175 (2011) 
(―improving ‖ a patented invention entails creating a technology that serves a similar technical objective as 
the existing invention, but does so with greater efficiency or enhanced functionality.) 
968 Hughes Aircraft Company vs. The United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (1983).   
969 Lee, supra note 967. (―Substantial improvement‖ is, of course, a difficult concept to define and would 
generally arise where the value of the improvement clearly dominates the value of the underlying patent in 
some new technology. Such improvement is most likely to arise where an improved invention 
―transforms‖ an existing patented technology rather than simply incrementally modifying it 





Under the first Protocol question in the UK purposive approach, if the 
court finds that the variant does not have a material effect on the way in which 
the invention works, this is the end of matter; there is no infringement.
971
 
However, this first step has been criticized as unnecessary and not useful 
because it rather begs the question what the invention described in the patent 
claims is.
972
 For example, in Australia mud company case,
973
 the claims of 
the innovation patent referred to ―An orientation device‖. The controversy was 
whether the term ―device‖ as used in the patent claims could encompass a core 
orientation tool in two or more separate and separated parts or whether it was 
limited to a unitary tool comprised of a single piece. The Australian Federal 
Court reasoned that ―It may be argued, however, that the benefits provide 
examples of why a two part device is a material variation on a one part device. 
But this question rather begs the question whether the invention described in 
the Patent is constituted of one part or two parts. Once it is determined that the 
invention described in the Patent does not include a two part device, then no 
question of material variation arises.‖ 974 Under the dynamic approach, the 
focus of claim construction is on what a PHOSITA at the time of filing would 
have interpreted and applied the claim terms to mean, i.e. the original expected 
application. However, since connotations are not exhausted by its denotations, 
                                                        
970 See, e.g., Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 31, at 1012-13; Robert Merges, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) 
Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537 (1898). 
971 Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 644 (2014). 
972 Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v. Coretell Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1169. This case is a good reminder 
that the Improver question of ‗material variation‘ is not a substitute for construction. 
973 Id. 
974 Id. 
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the original expected application is not to be followed when circumstances 
provide a strong reason (such as the case of substantial improvement) for the 
interpreter to adopt the new denotation. The evaluation of the performance 
properties is not the first step, and it only comes in when contemporary 
application of the claim term conflicts with that expected by the PHOSITA at 
the time of filing, such as when after-arising technology is present. 
The dynamic claim construction has some similarities with the ―reverse 
doctrine of equivalents.‖975 The reverse doctrine of equivalents asks the 
following question: is the allegedly infringing product or process so far 
changed in principle that, despite literal readability, it performs the function of 
the claimed invention in a substantially different way?
976
 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has ruled that: 
―[A] charge of infringement is sometimes made out, though the letter of the 
claims be avoided. The converse is equally true. The patentee may bring the 
defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the latter has so far changed the 
principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally construed, have 
ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to be adjudged an 
infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute has to be convicted, 
                                                        
975 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). (―[W]here a device is so far 
changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a 
substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of 
equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for infringement.‖) 
976 Peter Gabor Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In this case, 
Appellant argued that ―despite literal readability of the asserted claim language on the Berlyn filter process 
and device,‖ there can be no infringement under the law because ―there is no infringement of the true spirit 
and scope of the invention made by Kalman.‖ The Federal Circuit disagreed and pointed out that Berlyn 
had not ―so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally construed, have 
ceased to represent [Kalman's] actual invention.‖ 
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when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent.‖
977
  
However, in practice the courts rarely apply the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents,
978
 because ―[i]f a court finds that an accused product is literally 
described by a patent claim, it is difficult to convince that court that the 
accused product is still ‗changed in principle‘ compared to the patentee‘s 
invention.‖979 As a result, the genuine improvers can rarely be exempt from 
liability of infringement. By comparison, the dynamic construction does not 
have the rigid word/thing (literal/figural) dichotomy, and does not need to first 
decide whether the claim text to be taken literally or not. There is only the 
subject matter, i.e., the concept referred to by the term, which is waiting to be 
interpreted. In determining infringement, the interpreters not only assess 
whether the variant possesses a particular set of essential attributes connoted 
by the claim text, but also consider its value and significance in relation to the 
original invention, which encourages the valuable improvements on a patented 
product or process. 
Take the Hughes case
980
 for example. The Hughes invention claims 
―means disposed on said body for providing an indication to a location 
                                                        
977 Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898) (citations omitted). 
978 Tate Access Floors Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., 270 9F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2002).(―Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine 
of equivalents. And with good reason: when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, after the decision in 
Graver Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description, enablement, definiteness, and 
means-plus-function claims that are coextensive with the broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents. Even were this court likely ever to affirm a defense to literal infringement based on the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents, the presence of one anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely applied, is 
hardly reason to create another.‖  
979 Alan L. Durham, Patent Law Essentials: A Concise Guide 149 (2004) (―…in practice the ‗reverse 
doctrine‘ has proven to be far less potent than its counterpart. Cases won on the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents are exceedingly rare.‖) Andrew Wasson, Protecting the Next Small Thing: Nanotechnology 
and the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, 2004 Duke L. and Tech. Rev.10 (2004) (―Even so, it cannot be 
overlooked that the overwhelming majority of courts acknowledge the existence of the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents but find it inapplicable to the cases before them‖) 
980 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir.1983). 
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external to said body of the instantaneous spin angle position of said body 
about said axis and the orientation of said axis with reference to a fixed 
external coordinate system‖. The Hughes invention taught an on-board sun 
sensor that transmitted sun pulses back to earth so that the ground crew could 
simulated the rotation of the satellite and calculate spin rate, sun angle and ISA 
position. The accused infringing satellites do not provide any indication of ISA 
to the earth, and the calculations are wholly done by an on-board computer. 
The Federal Circuit found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Under the dynamic approach, the connotation of ―means disposed on said 
body for providing an indication‖, i.e., the calculation capacity, remains 
constant, while its denotations can change over time. The use of on-board 
computer which is contemporarily accepted as a new denotation of the claim 
term, was not feasible at the time patentee filed his applications and therefore 
unforeseeable and unexpected to a PHOSTA at the time of filing. The original 
expected application is then inconsistent with the contemporary application, 
and the interpreter needs to decide which application to be adopted. Under 
such circumstance, the interpreter has to move on to evaluate the contribution 
of the new denotation, i.e., ―on-board computer‖ in relation to the original 
invention. The interpreter would probably find that the former performs the 
function of a significant calculation unrelated to ground personnel,
981
which is 
more advanced and efficient than the original invention, therefore 
non-infringement would be found. 
                                                        
981 Id.( Davis, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.) 
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Section 3 The distinguishing features of the dynamic approach 
Three theories of meaning underlying the existing approaches have been 
discussed in this thesis, namely, the ordinary use-based theory, the 
intention-based theory and the content-based theory. These interpretive 
theories have different focuses: 
i. The ordinary use-based interpretation: The ordinary use-based theory 
holds that the meaning of the words corresponds to the ordinary meaning used 
in the given community of speakers in a specific context. Interpretations of 
patent claim are to be guided by the commonly accepted meaning of the terms 
used by a PHOSITA at the time of the invention or filing. 
ii. The intention-based interpretation: meaning is dependent on the 
patentee‘s objective intent, which was seen through the objective eyes of the 
hypothetical skilled person. Thus, in order to understand the claim text, the 
interpreter has to make his best estimate of the skilled person‘s best estimate of 
what the patentee intended at the time of filing.
982
 
iii. The content-based interpretation: meanings are constructed rather than 
fixed. An interpreter will structure his own understanding of the subject matter, 
combining the textual information with the new information in light of the 
present context. 
These interpretive theories provide bases on how meanings could be 
assigned to the claim texts. Some existing claim interpretation approaches 
                                                        
982 Turner, supra note 245. 
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focus on the realm of the past in ascertaining what meaning is: they speculate 
what a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood the term 
at the time of invention, or what the person skilled in the art would have 
understood the patentee to be using the language of the claim to mean. 
However, the pursuit of meaning within a past context in patent claim 
interpretation is often unfruitful, as it is not satisfactory for resolving disputes 
that arise in the changing context. The content-base approach pays attention to 
the interpreter‘s construction of subject-matter in the modern context, but the 
frequent invoking of the doctrine of equivalents may undermine certainty and 
predictability of patent law. Therefore, the existing approaches have not 
provided sufficient reasons to explain the differences between original and 
contemporary application of the claim text.  
A. The dynamic construction is highly context-sensitive. 
According to Gadamer, the ―potentialities of meaning‖ are held within a Sache, 
i.e., the content or the subject matter, which makes understanding possible 
across different time periods. 983 Therefore, interplay between the past and the 
present is demanded.
984 
The dynamic approach is not a one-time test that 
                                                        
983 Davey, supra note 737, 71, 72. (―Both past and forgotten determinations of meaning as well as 
unrealized future potentialities of meaning are held within a Sache. Following Heidegger, Gadamer 
describes these aspects of meaning as ―the withheld‖. It is, in part, the withheld dimension of a Sache's 
meaning that lends it its weight and depth. Furthermore, it is because we experience the nature of a Sache 
against the backdrop of previously experienced or expected aspects of a subject matter that ―permits (us) to 
recognize its independent otherness.‖) See also, George H. Taylor et al., Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical 
Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics 82 (2011) (―A hermeneutics focused solely on defining 
meaning as a static phenomenon…without paying attention to what hinders understanding, is also one that 
remains indifferent to the concrete conditions of communication…‖) 
984 Gadamer, supra note 46, at 293. (―The circle of understanding…is neither subjective nor objective, but 
describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the 
interpreter.‖) Allan C. Hutchinson, Work· in-Progress: Gadamer, Tradition, and the Common Law, 76 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1015 (2001). See also Philippe Eberhard, The Middle Voice in Gadamer's 
Hermeneutics: A Basic Interpretation with Some Theological Implications 80 (2004)(―although we are 
limited in our own perspective, the limits can be transcended — to the extent that we can open ourselves up 
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focuses on either the past or the present context. It pays attention not only to 
the original technological background at the time of filing, but also the 
changed context in a particular scientific or technological field at the time of 
infringement. These are the two worlds that philosophical hermeneutics 
requires to look at: the world in which the text was written and the world in 
which the text is engaged.
985
  
The evolving context is vital to the understanding of technical terms.
986
 
For instance, there are rapid technological changes in some of the industries 
such as information technology, biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industry.
987
 The necessity of analyzing the contextual information depends on 
the nature of patents:  
Patent litigation is different. It is more complicated, more time-consuming and 
more mentally taxing because typically the patent being litigated is a successful 
advancement of some science or technology. So, the judge has to understand that 
background just to get the factual basis of the problem and then deal with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
to various perspectives, and in this way better understanding can be achieved…Horizons are many, and 
they interact with each other.‖) R. Lanier Anderson, Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism, 115 Synthese 
1-32 (1998) (―Whether full theoretical unification is ultimately possible or not, a ‗variety of perspectives‘ 
is necessary for objectivity…the information made available through a ‗variety of perspectives‘ outside the 
one to which we are currently more or less beholden, can reveal the limitations of our own perspective, and 
point our way along the incremental road toward better ones.‖) See also, Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, 
Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. Rev. 1389, 1404. (2005). 
985  Amy Voida, Exploring a Technological Hermeneutic: Understanding the Interpretation of 
Computer-mediated Messaging Systems 35 (2008). 
986 Lyle Campbell, Historical Linguistics: An Introduction 268 (2004) (―In the wake of automobiles and 
aeroplanes, fly and drive have taken on new meanings. There are countless such examples, of words whose 
meanings have changed due to sociocultural and technological changes in the world around us.‖) 
987
Federal Trade Commission, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
Competition 83 (2011) (―For example, software patents often cover ―very abstract conceptual innovations‖ 
that can‘t be simply described given our current understanding of the area, and can be claimed in ―unique 
ways.‖)http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/patentreport.shtm (last visited Sept 26, 2012). See also, Dan L. 
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific? 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1185-96 
(2002)  





The results of a recent empirical study show that the United States Federal 
Circuit uses non-technical analysis 
989
 for the majority of claim construction 
issues on appeal. The basic criterion for the non-technical analysis is that the 
issues are connected to the asserted patents but do not require any technical 
understanding of the patent claims or how the invention works. The court 
―focused on grammatical issues, turned to dictionaries or specifications for 
definitions, or performed superficial comparisons of the prior art or 
drawings.‖990 However, linguistic interpretation alone often cannot resolve the 
issues of construction. 
991
 It has been noticed that ―a textualist, inward-looking 
approach to claim construction deprioritizes contextual factors such as expert 
testimony and industry dynamics that speak to an invention‘s substantive 
technological contribution.‖992  
By comparison, the dynamic approach does not merely rely on the 
linguistic arguments, but focuses on describing precisely the technological 
features and properties of the subject matter. The admission and use of extrinsic 
                                                        
988Rachel M. Zahorsky, Patent Pending, 96 ABA J. 15(2010) (statement of Judge James F. Holderman). 
989Holly Lance, Not So Technical: An Analysis of Federal Circuit Patent Decisions Appealed from the ITC, 
17 Mich. Telecomm.Tech. L. Rev. 243 (2010). The results of this empirical study indicate that the majority 
of the issues on appeal at the Federal Circuit are not technical in nature (or are not analyzed in a technical 
manner). The author pointed out that while identifying claim construction issues was relatively easy, 
determining a clear division between ―technical‖ and ―non-technical‖ claim construction issues was 
considerably more difficult. To some extent, all claim construction analyses are arguably technical, 
because they involve a close reading of the patent and at least a cursory understanding of the invention. 
What differentiates ―technical analysis‖ of claim constructions from the ―non-technical‖ analysis is the 
level of depth of the analysis.   
990Id. 
991 Chiang & Solum, supra note 38. 
992 Lee, supra note 35. (―Phillips and its literalist approach to claim construction have also been widely 
criticized. Commenting on earlier cases that ultimately culminated in Phillips, Craig Allen Nard has 
characterized this inward-looking claim construction methodology as ―hypertextualist.‖) 
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evidence such as expert testimony
993
 is important for assessing performance 
properties. The dynamic approach is fact intensive
994
 and provides an empirical 
guidance. Patent claim construction must somehow balance the need to adapt 
the claim text to the rapidly evolving technological environment while 
maintaining the stability of boundaries of monopoly.
995
 The end goal is to 
preserve original meaning despite changes in context.
996
   
B. The dynamic construction is explanatory. 
The dynamic approach frankly presents the possible gaps between 
understandings of meaning in different time frames. Such gaps signal the need 
for interpreters to offer sufficient reasoning to justify the application of 
meaning to new context. To fill this gap, the interpreter has to ―neutralize or 
accommodate the effect that changing context may have on meaning‖.997 
Patent claim construction must provide practical reasoning
998
 to explain 
whether a term should be accorded its modern meaning or the meaning as it 
                                                        
993 Markman, 52 F.3d 980. (―Extrinsic evidence may demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of the 
invention. It is useful ‗to show what was then old, to distinguish what was new, and to aid the court in the 
construction of the patent.‘‖) See also, Laura K. Mullendore, Patent Claim Construction: A Sliding-Scale 
Standard of Review, 28 REV. LITIG. 241, 252-53 (2008) (―The more fact-dominated the claim 
construction is, the more deferential the review should be; the more law-dominated the construction is, the 
more independent the review should be.‖) 
994 Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the En Banc Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong Claim 
Construction, 80 The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue 43 (2013). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2264876 (―A holding that claim construction, in full or part, is entitled to the 
deferential review given to fact questions may then be used as evidence that the proper claim construction 
methodology should emphasize factual inquiries, like the abstract meaning to a skilled person in the field. 
But the substantive legal doctrine should decide the standard of re-view, not the other way around.‖) 
995 Casey, supra note 20. 
996 Lessig, supra note 799. (―For if contextualism is correct, and a change in context is ignored, the reader 
may rewrite the writer‘s original meaning.‖) 
997 Dennis J. Goldford, The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism 82 (2005). 
998 Twining & Miers, supra note 15. (―…practical reasoning is concerned with giving and evaluating 
reasons for and against acting or deciding in a certain way.‖); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of 
Jurisprudence 71 (1993)(―Practical reason involves setting a goal… and choosing the means best suited to 
reaching it‖). For discussions of practical reasoning, see Nicholas Rescher, Practical Reasoning and 
Values, 16 Philosophical Quarterly 121-136 (1966); Eskridge& Frickey, supra note 761; Farber, supra 
note 757; Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. 
L. REv. 1717 (1995). 
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might have been understood at the time of framing. The dynamic construction 
opens up the possibility of legitimately considering later-developed 
technologies by means of the distinction between the fixed connotations and the 
variable denotations: the claim terms not only denote the objects of the 
respective classes, but also connote their essential attributes. The advantage is 
that the connotation of a word ―circumscribes all the possibilities within a 
subject‘s past and future understanding‖, 999 so the meaning is not tied to the 
original expected application of the text, ―but is permitted to evolve in 
response to both linguistic and social change‖.1000  
Claim interpretation is not reducible to a single means (either patentee‘s 
intent or ordinary usage) to achieve the goal—courts may too quickly abandon 
other possible argumentations without explanation. When there is a range of 
potential answers that may be thought of as lying along a spectrum, and 
interpreters may weigh competing meanings tacitly and unreflectively. The 
dynamic approach requires giving substantive reasons and overt articulations 
in the claim construction process, ―as opposed to disengagement and dismissal 
of competing interpretations without explanation.‖1001 At the foundation of the 
dynamic approach is the pragmatic notion that no single source is adequate for 
                                                        
999 Davey, supra note 737, at 78. (―…some traits of a thing lie outside our explicit awareness, either 
because we have not experienced them or because we are not attending to them These ―unattended to‖ or 
unknown traits constitute a penumbra that may be called a unifying background, which is always present 
in and gives our experience the quality of being of a specific object or subject matter.‖) 
1000 Ruth Sullivan & Elmer Driedger, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed., 
105(Toronto: Butterworths, 2002). See also, Randal N.M. Graham, Right Theory, Wrong Reasons: 
Dynamic Interpretation, the Charter, and Fundamental Laws, 34 SCLR (2d) 169. 107 (2006). 
1001 John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law 115 (2012). (―There is … a better chance to 
uncover biases and blind spots when a variety of alternative narratives are competing to tell the story … as 
opposed to a narrow range of official stories which are received without questioning and perceived as 
authoritative doctrine… Interpretation essentially becomes an act of persuasion, the effectiveness of which 
is influenced by the depth and rigor of its analysis.‖) 




 An essence of the dynamic approach, as described by 
Professor Daniel Farber, is an ―eclectic mix‖ of sources of evidence such as the 
text, purpose, public policy, and history of an instrument.
1003
 It requires an 
interpretive methodology that will enhance the persuasiveness and transparency 
of the interpretation to be offered.
1004
 
Some might object that the proposed dynamic approach overstates the 
need for revealing the hidden discretion behind the rhetoric. One view is that 
―every court regularly uses formalistic rhetoric‖, and ―everyone knows that 
patent scope is actually discretionary‖, but ―that is something practiced by 
virtually every court and every judge.‖1005 This criticism has disregarded the 
important realities about the nature of the patent rights.
1006
 The essential 
nature of the patent right is the power to exclude others from the invention.
1007
 
―The patent applicant, in drafting claims, is trying to walk a thin line of 
fashioning a claim sufficiently narrow that it is not invalid over the prior art, 
but at the same time trying to obtain a sufficiently wide scope of protection 
                                                        
1002 Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 142 (2008) Section 3 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties: ―a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the term of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖ 
1003 Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and the Idea of Progress, 94 MICII. L. Rev. 1547. (1996). 
See also, Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of Law, 
45 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 534 (1992) (criticizing formalism and advocating an approach to statutory 
interpretation based on "practical reason"). Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 142 (2008). (―all 
various elements, as they were present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their 
interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation.‖) 
1004 Tobin, supra note 1001, at 100. (―Interpretation essentially becomes an act of persuasion, the 
effectiveness of which is influenced by the depth and rigor of its analysis.‖) 
1005 Tun-Jen Chiang, Formalism, Realism, and Patent Scope,1 IP Theory 88(2010) (―Moreover, like many 
other areas of law, the formalist rhetoric cloaks what in actuality is a great deal of pragmatic discretion. 
Rumors of Federal Circuit exceptionalism in this regard, it would appear, have been greatly exaggerated.‖) 
1006See, e.g., Smith Int‘l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (―The very nature of 
the patent right is the right to exclude others. Once the patentee‘s patents have been held to be valid and 
infringed, he should be entitled to the full enjoyment and protection of his patent rights. The infringer 
should not be allowed to continue his infringement in the face of such a holding.‖) 
1007Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the Presumptive Illegality Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes 
Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1789 
(2002). (―For better or worse, patents exist, and they reflect a legislative judgment that their benefits 
exceed their costs.‖) 
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that may include coverage of future devices.‖1008 It is crucial to strike a 
balance between the monopoly granted to the inventor and the public 
interest,
1009




Therefore, the need for transparency in claim construction is great in 
order to ensure that the scopes of monopoly are appropriately given for correct 
reasons and to the correct parties.
1011
 Since there is no such thing as pure 
objectivity, legal certainty is best achieved through more structured, open and 
transparent reasoning and argumentation of meaning.
1012
 This is also true in 
the context of claim construction, the best way to achieve accuracy and 
predictability in selecting a level of abstraction for patent scope is to make the 
process more transparent, and increase the amount of available 
                                                        
1008 Osenga, supra note 81. See also, Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. 
Cir. (2001). (―The jurisprudence of claim construction reflects the difficult balance between a patentee‘s 
exhortation that courts should read the claims broadly and unlimited to the specific embodiments shown in 
the specification, and the rule that claims should be construed sufficiently narrowly to preserve their 
validity.‖) 
1009 William R. Hubbard,  Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Importance of 
Ex Post Delineation, 25. Santa Clara Computer& High Tech. L.J. 327, 371–372 (2009) (―a certain amount 
of uncertainty is often unavoidable, or even desirable.‖) The author gave three reasons for his conclusion: 
First, uncertainty regarding patent scope often stems from the indeterminacy inherent in any effort to 
describe, with words, the full scope the patentee‘s inventive contribution. Second, for a variety of good 
reasons, patents must be broadened beyond the specific details of the discovery of the inventions covered 
by the patents. Third, even if some uncertainty could be removed by requiring patent applicants to provide 
more robust information regarding patent scope, it is often inefficient to do so. 
1010 Id.    
1011 Golden, supra note 127. (―More predictable, coherent, and transparent claiming rules and practices 
may provide the best hope for those of limited means to establish clear patent rights through the patent 
application process itself, a far cheaper process than patent litigation‖) 
1012 Elina Paunio& Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic 
Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law, 16 European Law Journal395-416 (2010).(―The theoretical 
starting-point is that of open-endedness of language: no means exists to definitely pin down the meaning of 
words. Defining the meaning of words in a legal context is necessarily a matter of choice involving 
evaluative considerations.‖) See also,Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 Harv. J. On Legis. 329, 353-95 (1995) 
(―When a court is forced to articulate the real reasons behind its decisions, it must wrestle with those 
reasons…if the ‗real‘ reasons for a decision are candidly stated, the author faces the challenge of 
articulating those reasons in a way that will be persuasive to others and to herself.‖) 






                                                        
1013 Chiang, supra note 129 
  242 
 
PART IV: APPLYING THE DYNAMIC CLAIM CONSTRUCTION TO 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES 
CHAPTER 8 IN DEFENSE OF THE DYNAMIC APPROACH 
The dynamic approach focuses on the interrelation between meaning and 
application, and pays attention to the application of patent claim texts in both 
the original and the current scientific-technological context. The proposed 
approach is not without its difficulties. This Chapter appraises possible 
criticisms that such a connotation-denotation model would face, and gives 
responses in defense of the proposed dynamic approach. One possible criticism 
is that there is great difficulty in determining what the essential attributes of a 
general term are, which introduces a great deal of subjectivity and uncertainty 
into claim interpretation. A second possible criticism is that it is impossible for 
the dynamic approach to both remain stable and change over time, just like ―one 
can‘t have one‘s cake and eat it too.‖ It may be argued that ascertaining claim 
meaning is unworkable and the determination of claim scope would be better 
resorted to policy judgments of fairness. Despite the above criticisms, the 
distinction between connotation and denotation is still a useful tool for adjusting 
the meaning of claim terms to changed circumstances. This Chapter further 
discusses the relationship between the specification and claims under the 
dynamic approach. By assessing the subject matter of claims, dynamic 
approach pays more attention to the correspondence between the claims and 
the specification.  
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Section 1 Possible criticisms of the dynamic approach 
A. The dynamic approach lacks of ex ante certainty and predictability. 
Because patent claims define the exact scope of the exclusive rights granted 
for an invention, the boundaries of patentable subject matter have been 
delineated before anyone can take any action with regard to the associated 
patent rights.
1014
 The dynamic approach pays less attention to the semantic 
aspects of a word, but focuses on identifying the ―implied‖ or ―hidden‖ 
meaning of the patent claims. ―The connotation is the general idea or attribute 
of which the denotation is the set of instances.‖1015 The first challenge for 
dynamic claim construction is to distinguish between connotation and 
denotation. It has been criticized that such distinction can be ―highly 




Moreover, as the level of abstraction for the claim terms is hard to 
identify, there may be concerns that the determination of connotation or 
denotation is closely tied to subjectivity and becomes result-driven 
                                                        
1014 Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719 (2009). 
1015 Morris Lazerowitz & Alice Loman Ambrose, Philosophical Theories 147 (1976). 
1016 Stephen A James, Originalism and Constitutional Interpretation in Australia: The Way Backwards, J. 
Neville Turner, Pamela Williams (ed.), The Happy Couple: Law and Literature 310 (1994). (―The 
connotation is fixed, the denotation changing. Of course, this distinction can, at times, be highly 
artificial.‖)See also, R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte WA National Football League [1979] HCA 
6; (1979) 143 CLR 190, 234 (Mason J) (‗Adamson ‘s Case‘) in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally [1999] HCA 
27; (1999) 198 CLR 511, 552 (McHugh J). Justice McHugh noted ‗[t]he distinction between meaning and 
denotation is not without its difficulties‘: at 552. See also Zines, supra note 56, at 19; Eastman v The 
Queen [2000] HCA 29; (2000) 203 CLR 1, 80–1 (Kirby J). Justice Kirby doubted the coherence of the 
distinction. 
1017 Michael Losonsky, Linguistic Turns in Modern Philosophy 161 (2006) (―One can denote only an 
object and nothing else, or one can also denote along with it other things, such as its properties.‖) See also, 
S. Eng, Analysis of Dis/agreement - with Particular Reference to Law and Legal Theory 180 (2003). 
(―Defining through specification will always (by definition) at the same time say something about the 
denotation, namely that the concept criteria are to a greater or lesser degree found again in the individual 
things that the concept covers.—The things thus have definitional properties.‖) 




 Due to the complex traits of the subject matter, sometimes we 
recognize it by this and sometimes by that characteristic, or group of 
characteristics.
1019
 The dynamic approach is not a straightforward method 
since there are no explicit or rigid formulas to decide whether an attribute is 
essential or accidental.
1020
 The proponents of traditional approaches will most 
likely criticize the dynamic approach for its lack of ex ante certainty.
 1021
 
They may have concerns about the public notice function of patent claims: 
under the dynamic interpretation, the public will never be sure exactly what 
the claim will be deemed to protect.
1022
 The connotation-denotation model 
seems to want to have its cake and eat it—a claim term ―is changeless yet 
changing.‖1023  
In response to the criticism, it should be first noted that although 
reasonable ex ante certainty is necessary to give confidence to the public about 
                                                        
1018 Geraldine Chin, Technological Change and the Australian Constitution, 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 609 
(2000). 
1019 Otto Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, 68 (2006) (―What qualities are connoted by the word 
"dog"? In this and in a great many other cases we apply class-names without hesitation, though very often 
we should be embarrassed if asked what we "mean" by this or that name or why we apply it  in particular 
instances.‖) 
1020 Lee, supra note 872. (―This is by no means always a straightforward task, and it is probably unrealistic 
to try and articulate rigid rules for determining whether a particular attribute is an essential characteristic of 
a term.‖) See also, Corcoran & Bottomley, supra note 841. (―does not provide a method for determining 
what was an essential feature as opposed to a merely accidental feature of a term in 1900 or at any other 
time.‖) 
1021 John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their ―Interpretive Community‖: A Call for 
an Attorney-plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 321, 369-70 (2008) (―Relative certainty 
regarding a patent‘s scope can promote the development and dissemination of related technology by 
providing a sense of security both to investors in patent rights and to investors in activities that might be 
vulnerable to charges of patent infringement. Greater certainty may also facilitate licensing that promotes 
efficient levels of inventive and productive activity. Parties may be more likely to avoid expensive 
litigation and agree to licensing terms if they can first agree on a patent‘s scope.‖) 
1022  Vermeule, supra note 91. (―Inflexible, rule-bound behavior can be the best response to a 
decision-making problem, or to a setting for institutional design, in which the decision-maker has very 
poor information or a very low capacity to process the information that is received. The absence or 
unreliability of information, or the decision-maker‘s poor processing capacity, makes a wide and flexible 
repertoire of behavior a bad bet…in the face of severe uncertainty, interpretive doctrine should at least be 
manageable, stable, and cheap.‖) 
1023 Henry Alan Finlay, To Have But Not to Hold: A History of Attitudes to Marriage and Divorce in 
Australia 1858-1975, 291 (2005). Citing P H Lane in The Australian Federal System (2nd Ed.) 1107-20 
(1979). 
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what is protected and to what extent, a perfect ex ante certainty is difficult to 
attain, especially when it is in conflict with the ex post emergence of 
technological developments.
1024
 It has been pointed out that the familiar 
―metes and bounds‖ analogy to patent claims is a legal fiction, which is ―at 
best, unhelpful and, at worst, misleading.‖ 1025  The intangible object of 
intellectual property rights cannot be determined with clear-cut physical 
boundaries in the manner of real property.
1026
 The boundaries remain fuzzy 
even if the literal meanings are relatively precise and clear with low-tech 
inventions.
1027
 For example, in construing the terms such as a baffle,
1028
 a 
channel assembly and bolt
1029
 or a flagpole,
1030
 courts might be still in dispute 
over the understanding of common words used.  
                                                        
1024 Schwartz, supra note 130. (―What seems worse, as recently shown in an empirical study, the data does 
not reveal any evidence that judges with more claim interpretation experience fare better on subsequent 
appeals. It does not appear that the more patent cases handled by a district court judge, the less often his or 
her decision is reversed.‖) 
1025 Saulsbury, supra note 205. See also, Lee, supra note 35. (―critic might object that substantive claim 
construction would undermine certainty, predictability, and the public function of claims. However, the 
simple response is that the current system does not provide much certainty anyway.‖) 
1026 Burk & Lemley, supra note 5. Jay Dratler, Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative, and 
Industrial property 9(1991). The U.S. Copyright Act delineates the subject matter of copyright as ―original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
1027 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put 
Innovators at Risk 201 (2008). 
1028 Phillips v. AWH Corp., (Phillips II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). when the same 
case was reviewed en banc in Phillips II,  the Federal Circuit reviewed the same factual evidence and used 
a very similar claim interpretation methodology, but determined that the district court and the Federal 
Circuit panel had misconstrued the claim. 
1029Ancon Ltd v. ACS Stainless Steel Fixings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 498. The accused infringing product 
has all the features of claim 1 other than that the head of the fixing ―has a generally elliptical cone shape.‖ 
Justice Patten of the High Court found that the phrase ―generally elliptical cone shape‖ was used by the 
patentee as a description for all three embodiments of the patent, and he went on to reason that ―it can have 
no other meaning.‖ Ancon Ltd v. ACS Stainless Steel Fixings Ltd [2008] EWHC 2489 (Pat).On appeal, 
Lord Justice Jacob gave a completely different interpretation of the patentee‘s intent on the same phrase. 
Lord Jacob found that a skilled man would see that the purpose of the shape is to achieve the camming 
action into the corners of the channel. Therefore, the shape of the top of the bolt, which did not come into 
contact with the channel, was immaterial to this. Because of the redefinition of the patentee‘s intent of 
using that phrase, the appeal was allowed. 
1030 Vari-Deals 101 (Pty) Ltd v. Sunsmart Products (Pty) Ltd [2007] SCA 123. The patent at issue was 
related to a method (and to its resultant product) of keeping the material of the flag extended in any type of 
weather conditions by using a flexible pole to apply tension to the material. One main dispute focused on 
the word ―engage‖ used in claim 1 of the patent: ―… (iii) Being adapted to engage at least a portion of the 
upper periphery of a piece of material…‖ Judge Southwood and Judge Claassen gave different 
construction of the term ―engage‖. The SCA agreed with the latter, inter alia having regard to the 
circumstance that the word ―engage‖ has a special technical meaning of ―to interlock with or to fit into a 
corresponding part.‖See also, Dario F. Tanziani, South Africa: Patents - Validity and Infringement – 
Purposive Construction, 30 E.I.P. R. 16-21 (2008). 
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―We really can‘t come up with any objective meaning of patent claim 
terms, perhaps we should begin rethink the whole enterprise of peripheral 
claiming and the process of claim construction that accompanies it.‖1031 Legal 




 and it is 
best achieved through more structured, open and transparent reasoning and 
argumentation of meaning.
1034
 Rapid technological changes create new 
opportunities and challenges, which may not be contemplated by the patentee 
at the time of filing. To provide a convincing conclusion of meaning, claim 
construction needs sufficient reasoning to mediate between the original and 
modern context.
 1035
 The connotation and denotation model has important 
analytic value. It clearly points out that the connotation, i.e., the associative or 
suggestive meaning of a claim term, is fixed at the time of filing, yet it is open 
to new circumstances, since the denotation, i.e. the subjects which possess 
these attributes,
1036
 can change over time. Ensuring a balance between ex ante 
certainty and ex post adaptability is more important than addressing merely 
one aspect of the two. Given the complexity of the claim construction in 
promoting the goals of both certainty and fairness, it is critical that a claim 
                                                        
1031 Burk & Lemley, supra note 5. 
1032 Jerzy Wróblewski & Aulis Aarnio, Meaning and Truth in Judicial Decision 103 (1979) (―The 
stability of meaning is conceived as an essential element in assuring legal security, stability and certainty 
in the application of law.‖) 
1033 Elina Paunio, Beyond Predictability - Reflections on Legal Certainty and the Discourse Theory of 
Law in the EU Legal Order, 10 German Law Journal 11, 1469 (2009).  
1034  Elina Paunio& Lindroos Hovinheimo, Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic 
Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law, 16 European Law Journal 395-416 (2010). (―The theoretical 
starting-point is that of open-endedness of language: no means exists to definitely pin down the meaning of 
words. Defining the meaning of words in a legal context is necessarily a matter of choice involving 
evaluative considerations.‖) See also, Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 Harv. J. On Legis. 329, 353-95 (1995) 
(―When a court is forced to articulate the real reasons behind its decisions, it must wrestle with those 
reasons…if the ‗real‘ reasons for a decision are candidly stated, the author faces the challenge of 
articulating those reasons in a way that will be persuasive to others and to herself.‖) 
1035 Eskridge, supra note 50,at 9.(―the meaning of a statute is not fixed until it is applied to concrete 
circumstances, and it is neither uncommon or illegitimate for the meaning of a provision to change over 
time.‖) 
1036 John Lyons, Semantics: Introduction: Some Basic Terms and Concepts 176 (1977). 
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construction is substantively justified and carried out within a consistent 
framework. 
B. The dynamic approach is conservative and claim construction should be a 
policy lever  
There may also be criticism of the dynamic approach from another angle. 
Some believe that linguistic ambiguity is not the major concern for patent 
claim construction, and the disputes over the claim scope arise due to policy 
disagreements among judges.
1037
 A more moderate approach proposes that 
―where traditional interpretative methodologies do not yield a clear answer, 
courts should consider the technological contributions of a patented invention 
and the competitive dynamics of a particular industry when construing 
claims.‖1038That is, in certain circumstances, policy considerations weigh in 
favor of objective inquiry into the linguistic meaning of a text, such as 
providing public notice of what is covered by the patent or encouraging 
competitors to innovate.
1039
 The proponents of such approach will probably 
criticize the dynamic approach for discarding policy judgment and trying to 
fix connotation at the time of filing, which points in a rather conservative 
direction.  
                                                        
1037 Chiang & Solum, supra note 38. (―The final take-away is that the uncertainty will persist until judges 
reach normative agreement about claim analysis policy (or such normative agreement is imposed from 
above, such as by Congress). We do not have any suggestions about how to force life-tenured judges to 
reach policy consensus. But understanding the nature of the problem is a predicate to finding a solution.‖) 
1038 Lee, supra note 35.( ―considering substantive and policy factors as claim construction ‗tiebreakers,‘ 
courts can conscientiously construe claims broadly or narrowly so as to best promote technological 
progress‖) 
1039 Jessica C. Kaiser, What's that Mean? A proposed claim construction methodology for Phillips v. AWH 
. Corp., 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1009 ( 2005). See also, Lee, supra note 35 (―…this Essay argues that policy 
considerations should guide this discretion in productive directions.‖) 
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There is no dispute that there are public policy issues behind claim 
construction, such as balancing ―interests in certainty with fairness and 
preservation of the expectations of the inventive community.‖1040 However, 
judges do not have policy-making power during patent claim construction. 
Patent claim construction principles or rules should provide consistent 
theoretical and practical guidance for choosing among competing meanings, 
rather than leaving the ―choice‖ to interpreters‘ unfettered discretion. By 
comparison, the dynamic approach is of the view that language itself has the 
capability to ―absorb and generate endless novelty and changes.‖ 1041 
According to philosophical hermeneutics, the past and present horizons are 
firmly integrated rather than separated: 
―As in legal hermeneutics, the work that an interpreter seeks to understand is a 
work that has already been understood from within particular social cultural and 
historical contexts and has been conceived of in terms of particular concerns 
and issues. The work the interpreter confronts is, to this extent, a work as it has 
been handed down to the interpreter within a cultural and literal tradition, just 
as a law has been interpreted and reinterpreted within a legal tradition. At the 
same time, interpreters must understand the meaning of the text handed down to 
them and they do so from within their own historical situation and the issues or 
situations it involves. To this extent, they are oriented from within a present, 
historically constituted set of circumstances toward a text that has already been 
interpreted within the tradition to which they belong and which they are now to 
interpret in light of their own situation.‖
1042
  
                                                        
1040 Holbrook, supra note 457. 
1041 Chris Lawn, Wittgenstein and Gadamer 30 (2004). 
1042 Bruce Krajewski, Gadamer's Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics 90 (2004). 
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Within the connotation-denotation framework, the dynamic approach 
confers discretion to the interpreter by granting the power to determine 
whether the variant can be classified as a denotation. To understand the 
essential attributes of the technical content, the interpreters need to consider 
evidence outside the four corners of the claim, such as the scientific and 
technological constraints and development in the real-world context. 
Interpreters apply particular words and phrases to facts and circumstances that 
were or may have been outside the contemplation of the inventors. ―[M]eaning 
is not determined once and for all at the moment of origin but must be 
reassessed as the meaning is applied to new circumstances.‖1043  
However, under the dynamic approach, a word‘s range of connotation is 
fixed at the time of filing to enhance certainty and predictability. This is 
because any properties added to the connotation may diminish the denotation, 
conversely, if there is a decrease in the connotation (an elimination of some of 
the properties), the denotation of a term may increase.
1044
 If the claim is to be 
construed at the time of infringement, the meaning of a term would ―exist in a 
sort of quantum superposition, collapsing to a particular meaning fixed at a 
particular point in time only when the interpreter makes the decision to 
look.‖1045 Distinction between denotation and connotation is a technique by 
                                                        
1043 George H. Taylor, Law and Creativity, in Philosophy and American Law, Francis J. Mootz, III (ed.) 81 
(2009). 
1044 Robert Baum, Logic, 534 (3rd ed.) (1989). (―An increase in the intension of a definition (the adding of 
properties) will either diminish the denotation (extension) or leave it unchanged. Conversely, if there is a 
decrease in the connotation (intension) — that is, an elimination of some of the properties named by the 
definiens — the denotation of a term can only increase or remain unchanged; it cannot thereby be 
diminished.‖) 
1045 Lemley, supra note 7. 
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which the court adjusts the meaning of terms to changed circumstances,
1046
 
which enables us to overcome the difficulties involved in combining certainty 
with the capacity for growth. 
C. The dynamic approach incurs cost and time in claim interpretation. 
Under the dynamic approach, the interpreter is expected to provide sufficient 
justification for the choice of meaning in response to the changing 
technological context. To understand the properties of the technical content, 
the interpreters need to consider evidence outside the four corners of the claim 
in order to better ascertain its meaning, such as the scientific and technological 
development. One possible criticism is that there are considerable obstacles to 
applying the dynamic approach in real-world contexts, because such 
information is costly to produce, collect, and comprehend.
1047
 The 
conventional approaches prefer reading the claim text at a fixed point of time 
in the past to simplify ―information inputs‖.1048 For a long time, it is believed 
that formalistic jurisprudence is more efficient in patent adjudication by 




                                                        
1046 H. P. Lee & Peter A. Gerangelos, Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen Continent: Essays in 
Honour of George Winterton 287 (2009). 
1047 Cotropia, supra note 397. 
1048 Peter Lee, Patent Law and The Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2 (2010). (―Given the inherent complexity 
of technology, the limitations of language, and the doctrinal standard for evaluating patents, simplifying 
informational inputs is not a promising solution.‖) See also, Cotropia, supra note 5. (―The discussion will 
focus on how changes in interpretation methodology affect patent scope… Interpretation methodologies 
can be highly effective levers, having the ability to inject patent policy at the most basic level of the patent 
process.‖) 
1049  See, e.g., Mullally, supra note 32. (―conventional wisdom that formalism‘s chief virtue is its 
production of certain results‖); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am. U. L. REV. 771 
(2003); Holbrook, supra note 457; Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-institutional Approach 
to Patent System Reform, 103. Colum. L. Rev. 1035, 1040 (2003); Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and 
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In fact, the method of retrieving technical and legal information is in 
accordance with practice—because this is the way how patent documents are 
read by a person having ordinary skill in the art.
1050
 Patent documents are 
―truthful demonstration of scientific and technical achievements.‖ 1051  The 
structure and the language of the patent documents are specific and tailored to 
suit the legal and technical purposes of the patent. ―The amount of information 
contained in patent documents is immense. They contain practically everything 
that represents contribution to the knowledge of mankind in the field of 
technology back to the end of the nineteenth century and can, properly used, 
serve as a very valuable source of technical information.‖1052 The executive 
management of companies, researchers, scientists, product designers, 
economists, university students, inventors and patent agents
1053
 will read the 
detailed and complete information to find out the scope of patent protection. 
Therefore, an appropriate judicial claim interpretation must represent the most 
comprehensive way of understanding the complex nature of patent documents.  
At first glance, the dynamic approach is more information consuming 
because it requires analysis of scientific and technological development rather 
than semantic parsing. Interpreters not only explore the original expected 
meaning of application and current meaning of application from the eyes of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 321, 374 (2009) (suggesting that conceiving of patents 
as a right to exclude contributes to enforcing them by rules rather than standards). 
1050 Breton A. Bocchieri, When is Extrinsic Evidence Really ―Extrinsic‖? 48 IDEA 523(2008). Patents 
embody ―a plethora of scientific principles that may be beyond the express record of the patent 
documents‖. 
1051 Thomas T . Gordon & Arthur S . Cookfair, Patent Fundamentals for Scientists and Engineers 51 
(2000). 
1052 Ulf Jansson, Patent Documents as a Source of Technological Information, WIPO/IP/ET/00/9 8 
(2000), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/wipo_ip_et_00/wipo_ip_et_00_9.pdf (last visited 
August 10, 2011) 
1053 Id. 
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PHOSITA, but also use reason to explain and justify the equivalent meaning. 
However, with sufficient reasoning, a proper claim construction is 
substantively justified and carried out in a fair and efficient manner. Claim 
construction that lacks explanation may lead to costly appeals. For example, 
the statistical evidence indicates that in the United States, from the date of 
Markman until June 30, 2007, 32.4% of the terms were ―wrongly‖ construed by 
the lower court. Also, 38.2% of cases had at least one term ―wrongly‖ 
construed. Moreover, 30.0% of the cases had to be reversed, vacated or 
remanded because of an erroneous claim construction.
1054
 Here ―wrongly 
construed‖ was defined as ―Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
claim construction was wrong (even if it did not actually result in reversal of the 
judgment) on a term-by-term basis.‖1055  
 In her celebrated article Crystals and Mud in Property Law,
 1056
 Carol M. 
Rose found that while ―crystal rules‖ are often believed to give confidence at 
the outset of transactions in preventing the members of a society from 
encroaching on one another‘s property, the ―muddy rules‖ such as the post hoc 
discretionary judgments have great advantages in facilitating an efficient and 
fluid transaction. Because the dynamic approach directly integrates new 
information nowadays into interpretation, the sufficient reasoning of the choice 
of a claim meaning will effectively resolve the disputes in patent litigations. 
                                                        
1054 Schwartz, supra note 130. 
1055 Moore, supra note 5. 
1056 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577(1988); See also, Dan L. Burk, 
Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 121(1999); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as 
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 87 (2007). 
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Section 2 Correspondence between the specification and claims under the 
dynamic approach    
Very often, claim language is broader than the specification,
1057
 as the 
specification depicts particular embodiments of the invention.
1058
 It is a 
well-established rule of patent law that the claims of a patent must always be 
interpreted by reference to the description and drawings in the body of the 
specification.
1059
This Section will show that the dynamic approach is also 
consistent with this rule. 
Under the U.S. jurisdiction, correspondence between the specification 
and claims is required by 37 CFR1.75(d)(1), which provides that claim terms 
must find clear support or antecedent basis in the specification so that the 
meaning of the terms may be ascertainable by reference to the 
specification.
1060
 Section 14 (3) Patents Act 1977 UK provides that ―the 
specification of an application shall disclose the invention in a manner which 
is clear enough and complete enough for the invention to be performed by a 
person skilled in the art.‖1061  
                                                        
1057 Chiang, supra note 129. (―…claim language is inherently generalized compared to the specification.‖) 
1058 Kahrl, supra note 1, 5-21. (―the most important function of the specification is to provide a detailed 
description of the invention so as to permit a person skilled in the art to practice the invention, and in 
performing that function, to set forth the best mode known by the inventor for carrying out his invention.‖) 
1059 Article 69, EPC (―The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a European patent 
application shall be determined by the terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings 
shall be used to interpret the claims.‖) 
1060 2173. Claims Must Particularly Point Out and Distinctly Claim the Invention [R-9], 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2173.html 
1061 Patents Act 1977 (UK) s 14 (3). Manual of Patent Practice, Section14, 14.58 ―S.14(3) is one of the 
provisions which is intended to have, as nearly as practicable, the same effect as the corresponding 
provisions of the EPC, PCT and CPC. A.83 EPC and a.5 PCT require the invention to be disclosed "in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art".‖) 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/practice-sec-014.pdf  
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The requirement of disclosure is a basic tenet of modern patent law,
1062
 
but its application has subtle distinction in different jurisdictions.
1063
 For 
example, the U.S. law requires inventors to provide a complete and adequate 
written description of the invention (written description), sufficient to enable 
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains to make and use that invention 
(enablement),
 1064
 and the best mode by which to practice the invention 
known to the inventor at the time of the application filing (best mode).
1065
 But 
some patent systems such as Europe do not require disclosure of the inventor‘s 
best mode,
1066
 and the U.K. 1977 Act eliminated the best mode disclosure 
requirement but left the patent system with a sufficiency doctrine.
1067
 
The correspondence between the claims and the specification requires 
                                                        
1062 Sivaramjani Thambisetty, The Evolution of Sufficiency in. Common Law. LSE Legal Studies Working 
Paper No. 6/2013 (2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212064 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2212064 
1063 Aniruddha Sen, Clear and Complete Disclosure in Biotechnology Patent Applications – A 
Comparison of the Laws in the USA, Europe and India, 2 Hanse L. Rev. 91 (2006). 
1064 Article 83 of the European Patent Convention states that an application must disclose the invention in 
a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. Sufficiency is 
considered by the examiner during examination of a patent application and the requirement of Article 83 
must be complied with in order for a patent to be granted. Under the patent law in the United States, the 
patent specification must be complete enough so that a person of "ordinary skill in the art" of the invention 
can make and use the invention without ―undue experimentation". Mineral Separation v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 
261, 270 (1916) postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or 
unreasonable? AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d. 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit has explained that the enablement requirement is met ―when one skilled in the art, after 
reading the specification, could practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation.‖ 
1065 35 U.S.C. § 112. ―The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.‖ 
1066 TRIPS, art. 29, ¶ 1 (―Members shall require that an applicant for a patent disclose the invention in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out be a person skilled in the art . . 
.‖); see also Mark Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written Description" Requirement 
(and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 55-56 (2000) (―It is 
equally unsurprising that enablement is one of the international minimum standards for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs")- compliant patent systems.‖). Article 83 requires that a 
patent application ―disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried 
out by a person skilled in the art.‖ While Article 83 does have this enablement requirement, it does not 
require that the patent applicant disclose the best mode of producing the patented invention. Holbrook, 
supra note 176. 
1067 Lucas V. Greder, Note: What Do We Do Now? How the Elimination of the Best Mode Requirement 
Minimizes Adequate Disclosure and Creates A Potentially Unenforceable Fact Pattern 3 CYBARIS 104 
(2012). Lord Hoffman articulated Biogen ― that the specification must enable the invention to be 
performed to the full extent of the monopoly claimed.‖ Biogen v. Medeva, [1997] RPC 1, ¶ 63. 
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determining ―what degree of scope is requested‖ and ―whether it should be 
permitted‖.1068 In patent litigation, if a patentee had successfully sought a 
wide claim meaning to encompass the allegedly infringing technology, he may 
still lose the case due to the failure to show that the scope of the claims was 
enabled,
1069
 or the disclosure was sufficient and adequate,
 1070
 etc.:  
―In summary, where the claims literally read on embodiments that are not 
described in specification, the Federal Circuit sometimes imports the limitation 
directly into the claim during the claim construction exercise, despite vehement 
denials that it is doing such a thing. The court sometimes holds that the written 
description is inadequate to support the claim, thus resulting in invalidity, either 
directly under paragraph one of § 112 or indirectly due to intervening prior art. 
The court sometimes holds that the scope of enablement is too narrow, likewise 
resulting in an invalid patent under paragraph one of § 112. The court may also 
hold that the claim does not set forth that which the inventor regards as his or her 
                                                        
1068 Chiang, supra note 129.   
1069 See Wang Labs., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F. 3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (―Claim should be 
construed, when feasible, to sustain their validity.‖) Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d. 993 (Feb. 1, 
2008) The defendants urged the district court to adopt the narrow construction that the patent claims only 
covered video games (and therefore, their use of ReVoice with movies alone would not be infringement). 
Instead, the court construed the claims broadly, as Sitrick requested, covering both video games and 
movies. The court found that because the district court had construed the claims to cover both video games 
and movies (as the plaintiff had argued), the patents had to enable both embodiments. 
1070 ―The requirement of sufficiency under U.K. patent law essentially parallels the U.S. requirements of 
enablement, written description, and best mode.‖ Irah H. Donner, Book Review, 27 Geo. Wash. J. Int‘L L. 
& Econ. 565 (1993-94) (reviewing Brian C. Reid, A Practical Guide To Patent LAW (1993)). Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 2008-1248 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Federal Circuit has confirmed 
in an en banc decision that patents must meet both written description and enablement requirements under 
35 U.S.C. §112 (1975). The Court stated that ―the level of detail required to satisfy the written description 
requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and 
predictability of the relevant technology.‖ Section 72(1)(c) of the Patents Act 1977. According to that 
section, a patent may be revoked on the ground that its specification ―does not disclose the invention 
clearly enough and completely enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art‖. Biogen vs. 
Medeva [1997] R.P.C. 1. Biogen‘s patent for recombinant DNA coding for a polypeptide having hepatitis 
B virus (HBV) antigen specificity was held by the House of Lords in 1996 to be insufficiently enabled by 
its specification, not because of any inability for the described invention to deliver all the promised results, 
but because the same claimed results could be produced by different means which owe nothing to the 
teaching of the patent or any principle it disclosed. Generics Ltd v Lundbeck A/S (2009) UKHL 12. The 
House of Lords affirmed the validity of a patent for a chemical product – an isolated stereoisomer – 
supported by a method of producing the product, but protecting the chemical product as such independent 
of the method by which it was made. 
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invention, thus invalidating it under paragraph two of § 112.‖
 1071
 
The defendants to any broadly drafted claims will not only raise the 
enablement defense in hope of finding some technology that is covered by the 
claims but not enabled, but also use the enablement defense to show that the 
plaintiff failed to enable the defendant‘s particular variation of the 
technology,
1072
 especially where the involved field of technology is relatively 
new and unpredictable. For example, in ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, 
LLC.,
1073
 the patent is directed to a method for treating Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (―ADHD‖) through a methylphenidate (―MPH‖) drug 
dosage form that has an ascending release rate over an extended period of time. 
Plaintiff successful sought and obtained a broad claim construction so that two 
types of extended release tablets were covered, i.e., osmotic form and 
non-osmotic form. However, the asserted claims of the patent were found 
invalid for lack of enablement because the specification only enabled osmotic 
dosage forms. The U.S. Federal Circuit noted that the field of ascending 
release dosage forms was not mature at the time of the patent filing and was 
thus a ―breakaway‖ from the prior art.1074  
It has been pointed out that enablement analysis, ―while conceptually 
                                                        
1071 Robert Harmon, When a Patent Claim is Broader Than the Disclosure: The Federal Circuit's Game 
Has No Rules, 1 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 21 (2001)  
1072 Bernard Chao, The Shifting Battleground: Focusing on Enablement, 34 New Matter 2 (2009). 
1073 ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC, Case No. 09-1350 (Fed. Cir., Apr. 26, 2010) (Prost, J.). 
1074 ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC, No. 09-1350 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2010). See also, MagSil 
Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Technologies, Inc., No. 11-1221 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2012) The Federal 
Circuit determined that the open ended claim language of ―at least 10%‖ covered all changes from 10% to 
infinity and that the specification could not enable such broad claim language. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court‘s 
finding that two patents asserted by Liebel-Flarsheim Company and Mallinckrodt, Inc. are invalid for lack 
of enablement.  Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, et al., 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit 
granted summary judgment of invalidity on the grounds that the asserted patent claims covered both video 
games and movies but were enabled only as to video games. 
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simple, is legally and factually complex,‖1075 because ―whether a disclosure is 
enabling can shift over time; as the knowledge of the PHOSITA shifts, an 
identical disclosure may shift from not being enabled to being enabled.‖1076 
The judicial practice in enablement analysis is not consistent and provides no 
guidelines for identifying such situations. 
1077
 In other cases, the courts 
warned that the possible invalidity should not be used by the district court to 
construe the claims narrowly.
1078
  
The correspondence between the specification and the claim is critical 
under the dynamic approach. Firstly, the dynamic approach follows the theme 
that ―the interpretation of patent claims depends more upon the advance made 
by the inventor than upon the words used.‖1079 It always looks at the properties 
or attributes of the technical content in a claim, and is less bounded by the broad, 
plain meaning. It is particularly necessary for interpreters to fully articulate the 
technological properties of the concept behind the claim term manifested by 
description on the preferred embodiments. Because of its functional view, the 
dynamic approach can pay more attention to the relationship and relative 
breadth between the claims and the specification.  
                                                        
1075 Holbrook, supra note 176. 
1076 Id. 
1077 Robert Harmon, When a Patent Claim is Broader Than the Disclosure: The Federal Circuit's Game 
Has No Rules, 1 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 21 (2001)  
1078 The Saunders Group, Inc. v. Comfortrac, Inc., Case No. 06-1576 (Fed. Cir., June 27, 2007) the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the maxim that claims should be construed to preserve 
their validity and also erred in concluding that if claims 1 and 16 were construed broadly, they would not 
be enabled because the specification only described a pneumatic cylinder having at least one pressure 
activated seal. 
1079 Cole v. Malleable Iron Fittings Co., 70 F.2d 686 (1934) (Judge Learned Hand). See also, Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) According to the Federal Circuit, the 
purpose of claim construction is to ―determin[e] the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be 
infringed.‖ U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (―Claim construction 
is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain 
what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement. It is not an 
obligatory exercise in redundancy.‖). 
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Secondly, the dynamic approach has a dynamic value, for it not only 
investigates the meaning of application in the original text but also exploits the 
potentials of the claim language in the new context. The emphasis has shifted 
from the claim text and the patentee‘s intent at the time of filing to the 
interpreter‘s understandings in a contemporary scientific-technological context. 
By ascertaining the technical properties of the subject matter, the dynamic 
construction leaves a greater extent of discretion to the interpreter to define 
claim scope by matching such scope to the ―invention‖ contributed, ―without 
extending those benefits for an invention that the applicant may not have 
conceived and certainly has not enabled.‖1080 To strike a balance between 
protecting original and subsequent innovations in the present context is a 
fundamental key for determining an optimal patent scope.
1081
 This is to avoid 
giving interpreters ―unfettered power to err twice — both in construing claims 
so broad as to exceed the scope of the rest of the specification and then to 
invalidate those claims because it reads the specification as failing to ‗support‘ 
this court‘s own broad conception of the claimed subject matter.‖1082 Although 
―enablement analysis is distinct from claim construction, and is not normally 
                                                        
1080 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., Nos. 03-1158, 03-1159, 2004 WL 612854 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2004). 
at 214 414 514 614 (J. Bryson, concurring). (―I think that the proper approach, suggested in the concurring 
opinion in Hogan and in Plant Genetic Systems, is to address cases of new technology by construing 
claims, where possible, as they would have been understood by one of skill in the art at the time of the 
invention, and not construing them to reach the as-yet-undeveloped technology that the applicant did not 
enable. That approach preserves the benefits of patent protection for the invention that the applicant has 
actually conceived and enabled…‖) 
1081 Saulsbury, supra note 205. (―a patent system entails an unavoidable tradeoff between incentivizing 
pioneering inventions and subsequent improvements; though the prospect of a broad patent may provide 
stronger incentives for creation and commercialization of new developments, its scope reduces incentives 
for other inventors to improve upon that work‖) Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 Texas Law Review 989-1084 (1997) (―Improvers are free to use material 
that is in the public domain because the copyright or patent has expired. They are free to skirt the edges of 
existing intellectual property rights, for example by … "designing around" the claims of a patent.) 
1082 Ariad Pharms. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (J. Radar, dissenting). 
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addressed at the claim construction stage,‖ 1083  it will be helpful for 
interpreters to take into consideration of the breadth of the claims and compare 
that against what the specification enabled.  
                                                        
1083 Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303, 1227. 
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CHAPTER 9 SOME TESTING CASES 
In this Chapter, three selected cases will be tested under the dynamic claim 
interpretation, including the Dealertrack case
1084
, the Napp Pharmaceutical 
case, 
1085
and the Renda case.
1086
 The first case includes numerous appeals and 
cross-appeals in the US Federal Circuit, and one of the issues was whether the 
term ―communication medium‖ written in 1995 encompassed Internet in the 
context of computer-related inventions. The narrow claim construction of the 
term in the district court was reversed and an ordinary meaning was adopted by 
the appellate court. The second case involves the purposive construction of 
claim terms ――spheroids‖ and ―a spheronising agent‖‖ in the UK courts. The 
question was whether the PHOSITA at the time of filing had intended to restrict 
―spheroids‖ to ―granules‖ only, and ―a spheronising agent‖ to ―non-water 
soluble materials‖. In the third case, the Supreme People‘s Court of China 
construed the claim term ―at least two layers of glass fiber cloth‖, holding that 
the Higher People‘s Court had wrongly applied the law of patent claim 
construction and the doctrine of equivalents. The deficiencies of the existing 
approaches are discussed respectively, and the dynamic claim construction 
approach is applied to the above three cases to fully articulate reasons for the 
determination of the claim scope.  Notably, the dynamic claim construction of 
the three cases happens to reach the same outcomes as the final decisions issued 
by the appellate courts, but it does not necessarily imply that every final ruling 
                                                        
1084Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1330 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
1085 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Ratiopharm GmbH [2009] EWCA Civ 252. 
1086Da Lian Xin Yi Jian Cai You Xian Gong Si yu Da Lian Ren Da Xin Xing Qiang Ti Jian Cai Chang 
[Dalian Xinyi Building Materials Limited Company v. Renda Building Materials Factory], No. 1 (2005) of 
the No. 3 Civil Tribunal, the Supreme People‘s Court. The English translation is based on, 
http://www1.lawinfochina.com/case/display.asp?db=2&id=250&keyword= (last visited on Oct 30, 2010). 
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is correct and every decisions of the first instance courts is wrong. These case 
studies are just a way of showing how dynamic claim construction operates, and 
because of the author‘s limit of technological knowledge, the analyses do not 
guarantee the accuracy of the outcomes. 
Section 1The Dealertrack Case 
A. Confusions with ordinary meaning in claim construction  
The ‗841 patent is directed to a computer-aided method and system for 
processing credit applications over electronic networks. Dealertrack sued David 
L. Huber and Finance Express, LLC for infringement of the ‗841 patent by their 
FEX system, and sued Route One for infringement by its Credit Aggregation 
System (―CAS‖) and its Messenger system. Because each of the asserted claims 
included ―a communications medium‖ and the allegedly infringing products all 
pass communications through the ―Internet‖, the claim construction was crucial 
to the infringement decision. Bolded below are the terms at issue in the claim 
construction discussion from the ‗841 patent: 
―7. A computer based method of operating a credit application and routing 
system, the system including a central processor coupled to a communications 
medium for communicating with remote application entry and display devices, 
remote credit bureau terminal devices, and remote funding source terminal 
devices, the method comprising: selectively receiving credit application data 
from a remote application entry and display device; selectively obtaining credit 
report data from at least one remote credit bureau terminal device;…‖ 
―The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that 
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the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the 
time of the invention.‖1087 To construe meaning of a claim term, a court ―must 
look at the ordinary meaning of the words in the context of the written 
description and the prosecution history.‖1088 The rationale behind this approach 
is that words have a generally known and commonly accepted meaning in a 
given field. In this case, under the ordinary meaning approach, the interpretive 
question is: what the skilled person would have commonly understood the 
claim ―a communications medium‖ to mean at the time of the invention.  
A patent claim construction is often outcome determinative for the 
infringement decision. The district court granted summary judgment of 
non-infringement based on its construction of the term ―communications 
medium‖ as excluding the Internet.1089 The district court based this narrow 
construction on the specification‘s explicit description of a communications 
medium with several examples–a wide area network, local area network, 
satellite communications network, commercial value added network (VAN), 
ordinary telephone lines, and private leased lines – that were perhaps not 
recognized as the ―Internet‖ when the ‘841 patent was filed. Moreover, there 
was a post-allowance examiner‘s amendment deleting the phrase ―the Internet‖ 
from the list of examples in the specification and cancelling the claims 
specifically directed to the Internet. The examiner did not provide reasons for 
the amendment. The district court reasoned that where a specification set out 
several examples like this, it was reasonable to assume that the list is exhaustive 
                                                        
1087Phillips v. AWH Corp.,363 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(citing Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water 
Filtration System, Inc., 381 F.3d. 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
1088Id. (citing Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
1089DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (―Dealertrack I‖). 
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and thus the non-listed Internet was excluded.
1090
 On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit disagreed with such narrow interpretation and went with Dealertrack‘s 
broader construction. The Federal Circuit decided that the examples listed in 
specification were merely ―preferred embodiment(s) . . . presented by way of 
example and should not be construed as limiting the inventive concept to any 
particular physical configuration.‖1091 
The difficulty is that when technologies evolve, the understanding of the 
claim term at the time of interpretation may be different from the original 
understanding at the time of the invention or the time of filing. Where there 
are a number of plausible meanings for a claim term, due to a lack of sufficient 
explanation or reasoning for choice of meaning, a judge may construe the 
disputed claim term in either narrow or broad terms depending on his own 
choice of two canons, i.e., avoiding importing claim limitations from the 
specification versus construing patent claims in light of the specification.
1092
 
While the specification supports each claim and drawing in detail description 
and illustrates exemplary embodiments of the invention,
1093
 it does not 
                                                        
1090Id. (―Although illustrated as a wide area network, it should be appreciated that the communications 
medium could take a variety of other forms, for example, a local area network, a satellite communications 
network, a commercial value added net-work (VAN) ordinary telephone lines, or private leased lines. . . . 
The communications medium used need only provide fast reliable data communication between its 
users.‖) The district court noted that though "it is improper for a court to limit a patent to its preferred 
embodiment, it is reasonable to assume that when a patent supplies a long list of examples like here, the list 
is exhaustive." 
1091Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1330 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012). (―The specification stated that a 
―communications medium‖ need only provide fast reliable data communication between its users;…‖) 
1092 The Federal Circuit has long acknowledged that "there is sometimes a fine line between reading a 
claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification." 
ComarkCommuns., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998); See 
alsoSpectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
363 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (―To avoid importing limitations from the specification into the claims, it is 
important to keep in mind that the purposes of the specification are to teach and enable those of skill in the 
art to make and use the invention and to provide a best mode for doing so.‖) 
1093SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(―Though understanding the 
claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to 
import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment 
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necessarily encompass every conceivable and possible future embodiment of 
his invention.
1094
 On one hand, reading everything expressed in the 
specification into the claims would impose unnecessary restrictions on 
interpretation of meaning;
1095
 on the other hand, a broad interpretation does not 
explain why an invention should not be limited to only that which the inventor 
actually contemplated at the time of filing. 
1096
 Judge Plager has identified this 
problem in Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. that, ―the claims 
cannot go beyond the actual invention that entitles the inventor to a patent‖ and 
that ―the [patentee‘s] obligation [was] to make full disclosure of what is actually 
invented, and to claim that and nothing more.‖1097 The search for the ordinary 
                                                                                                                                                 
appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than 
the embodiment.‖)E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(―Interpretation of descriptive statements in a patent's written description is a difficult task, as an inherent 
tension exists as to whether a statement is a clear lexicographic definition or a description of a preferred 
embodiment.‖) 
1094S.R.I. Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121, 227 USPQ 577, 586 (Fed.Cir.1985).The law 
―does not require that an applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and possible future 
embodiment of his invention.‖ 
1095Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1983); See also, SRI International v. 
Matsushita Electric Corp.775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985).(―If everything in the specification were required 
to be read into the claims, or if structural claims were to be limited to devices operated precisely as a 
specification-described embodiment is operated, there would be no need for claims.‖); Superguide Corp. v. 
DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, (Fed. Cir. 2004). ("Though understanding the claim 
language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import 
into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in 
the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the 
embodiment." ); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004).(―Even when the 
specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively 
unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‗words or expressions 
of manifest exclusion or restriction.‘‖); Intervet Inc. v. Merial Limited,No. 2009-1568 (Fed. Cir., 
2010)(―Construing the claims in light of the specification does not, however, imply that limitations 
discussed in the specification may be read into the claims.‖) 
1096Arlington Indus, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings,. Inc., 632 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Judge Rader, writing 
for the majority, held that the district court erred by importing a "split" limitation into its constructions of 
"spring steel adaptor." In his dissent, Judge Lourie writes: "the basic mandate is for claims to be interpreted 
in light of the specification of which they are a part because the specification describes what the inventors 
invented….The specification is the heart of the patent.  In colloquial terms, you should get what you 
disclose."  The majority answers that ―[t]he … dissent-in-part characterizes the specification as the ‗heart 
of the patent‘ and, using ‗colloquial terms,‘ states that ‗you should get what you disclose.‘ This devalues 
the importance of claim language in delimiting the scope of legal protection. ‗Claims define and 
circumscribe, the written description discloses and teaches.‘ Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 
F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2010) (en banc). 
1097
 Retractable Technologies, Inc. vs. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 10-1402 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2011). 
Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. vs. HemCon, Inc., No. 10-1548 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2012) (en banc). 
The majority opinion upheld the District Court's claim construction as being supported by intrinsic 
evidence. Accordingly, the District Court was correct in interrogating the specification to ascertain the 
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meaning at the time of the invention has not provided us with sufficient reason 
to accept a meaning among plausible alternatives. 
B. Application of the dynamic construction to the term ―communications 
medium‖ 
Under the dynamic approach, the meaning of a claim term is its connotation, 
which can be identified by a set of essential features. The approach is dynamic 
in the sense that over time, a claim term is read as including within its scope a 
new exemplication which falls within its overall meaning.
1098
 At the time of 
infringement, a variant based on after-arising technology falls within the 
meaning of the term if, and only if, it possesses all of the essential attributes that 
define that term.
1099
 The goal is to accommodate technological change to 
provide guidelines for determining the claim meaning. 
In this case, although the ―Internet‖ was in existence as of the priority date 
of the ‘841 Patent, both parties admitted that ―achieving appropriate levels and 
qualities of service through the Internet for the credit application and routing 
system of the ‘403 Patent would have been problematic.‖1100 When reading the 
disputed term ―communications medium‖ literally rather than functionally, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
proper meaning of the term in the claim. The dissenting judges disagreed with District Court's claim 
construction, being more convinced by the claim differentiation argument that the meaning of the term 
―biocompatible‖ was broader than it was interpreted by the District Court's claim construction. Once 
again, this case illustrates one of the consequences of the difficulties inherent in applying the Federal 
Circuit's rubrics regarding whether the claims are being construed in light of the specification or the 
majority is importing limitations from the specification into the claims. 
1098  Sir Anthony Mason, The Interpretation of A Constitution in a Modern Liberal Democracy, in 
Sampford &Kim Preston (ed.) supra note 920,14. 
1099 Evans, supra note 59. (―the meaning of a constitutional term (its connotation) is determined by a set of 
necessary and sufficient features. A person, purpose or activity falls within the meaning of the term if, and 
only if, it possesses all of the ‗essential features‘ or ‗essential characteristics‘ that define that term.‖) 
1100 The ‘841 Patent claims priority to and incorporates by reference U.S. Patent No. 5,878,403 (―‘403 
Patent‖). 
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reliability or the security of the data transferring network would not be 
considered as a limit on what constituted a ―communications medium.‖1101 The 
so-called ―ordinary meaning‖ is very easily interpreted broadly to cover the 
internet technology. However, there is no such rigid word/thing dichotomy 
under the dynamic approach. It directly focuses on the subject matter itself to 
ascertain the essential attributes of the technical solution referred to by the term 
at the time of filing, and then decide whether the variant can be described as one 
with respect to that subject matter as so defined. The analysis will follow the 
propositions under the framework of dynamic claim interpretation.
1102
 
A. To preserve certainty, patent claim meaning, i.e. the connotation, 
remains constant from the time of filing, while the application of such meaning, 
i.e. the denotation, may change over time. The essential attributes can be 
measured by the performance properties of the technical content. The 
denotation is the class of objects which have these essential features. According 
to the independent claim 7, the technical content, i.e. ―a communications 
medium‖ was designed to couple to the system for ―communicating with 
remote application entry and display devices, remote credit bureau terminal 
devices, and remote funding source terminal devices.‖ The specification 
requires that the communications medium be both reliable and secure, ―[t]he 
communications medium used need only provide fast reliable data 
communication between its users,‖ ‗817 Patent col.18 ll.8-9. Therefore, the 
                                                        
1101Dealertrack, Inc. vs. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1330 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (As for security, that aspect of the 
Internet is addressed merely as an object of the invention, and there is no indication in the patent that the 
security of the data transferring network was understood by ordinary artisans to be a limit on what 
constituted a "communications medium.") 
1102 The propositions under the dynamic approach are stated in the pages from 194 to 195. 
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patentee uses the term ―communications medium‖ to connote a meaning that 
implies a minimum performance level of reliability and security of data 
communication. While the connotation remains the same, the denotation may 
expand as new examples are discovered or invented, or as existing 
technological capabilities become more fully exploited over time.
1103
 
B. What a PHOSITA at the time of filing would have interpreted and 
applied the claim terms to mean, i.e. the original expected application of 
meaning, provides strong evidence of the meaning of patent claims. The 
performance properties including the capabilities in the reliability and 
complexity of the data transfer.
1104
 It is undisputable that although the Internet 
was a fairly well known data-transferring network in 1995, it was somewhat 
problematic, i.e., neither reliable nor secure, as of the 1995 filing date. ―Things 
which lack any essential attribute, specified or implied in the connotation are 
excluded from the denotation.‖1105 Since the specification required that the 
―communications medium‖ be both reliable and secure, and the Internet was 
neither of these as of 1995, a PHOSITA at the time of the invention or filing 
would not include ―Internet‖ within the claim scope. The application of the term 
(its denotation) as understood at the time of filing, i.e., a narrow meaning 
excluding the Internet, represents the ―prima facie meaning,‖1106 but it is not 
conclusive.  
                                                        
1103 Stokes, supra note 774. 
1104 P. V. S. Rao, Perspectives In Computer Architecture 419 (2004) . 
1105 L. Linsky, Semantics and the Philosophy of Language: A Collection of Readings 54 (1952). 
1106 Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism, 27 FED. L. 
REV. 323 (1999) (―When context-dependent criteria are involved, an element of the essential meaning 
requires reference to the particular circumstances of when and where the question is considered to 
ascertain what is encompassed.‖) 
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C. In forming the original expected application of claim meaning, one 
takes account of whether a PHOSITA could foresee probability of the claim 
term acquiring new denotation. Although the Internet at the time of filing did 
possess the essential properties such as reliability and security, in order to 
ascertain the expected application of claim meaning at the time of filing, the 
dynamic approach will also ask at the time of filing, whether a PHOSITA could 
foresee the probability of the claim term ―communications medium‖ acquiring a 
new denotation as the Internet. There is undisputed evidence in the record that 
in 1995 the Internet was a network for transferring data. According to expert 
testimony, in 1995 the Internet was the world‘s largest wide area network. 
Moreover, the 841‘ patent in dispute claims priority to and incorporates by 
reference 403‘ patent, which includes ―the Internet‖ as an example of a 
―communications medium‖. From the above evidence, a PHOSITA could 
foresee the Internet becoming more reliable and secured and qualified as a 
denotation of the claim term.  
To ignore the changing context will increase the likelihood of hindsight 
bias: a tendency to consistently exaggerate what could have been expected in 
retrospect.
1107
The dynamic approach counterbalanced the undesirable hindsight 
bias effect by providing a justification in reality: the interpreter would consider 
that the development of internet technology as relevant. According to The 
Internet Encyclopedia, web portal technology was novel in the mid-1990s, but 
by 2001 several vendors were offering stable solutions.
1108
 The interpreter will 
                                                        
1107 Thomas Gilovich et al., Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, 113 (2002). 
1108 HosseinBidgoli (ed.). The Internet Encyclopedia, vol.3, 219 (2003). 
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find out that there is a change of context that may allow for a new application of 
meaning.  
In the new context where Internet has matured in most of the markets 
across the world and online commerce, it possesses all the essential attributes 
of ―communications medium‖. Therefore, the original expected application is 
consistent with the contemporary application of patent claim meaning, the 
claim term will encompass the Internet. One does not need to move on to 
evaluating technological contribution.  
There may be concern that an alleged infringer would not be infringing 
the patent in the mid-1990s but that after around 2001 the patent owner could 
now sue successfully for infringement. In fact, in the real world of technology, 
when the variant has not met the required performance level, it can hardly be 
applied in industry and hence here is a low probability of litigation. Under the 
dynamic approach, the connotation delineates its ―potential referents‖1109 by 
providing a finite list of features that captures all relevant properties. The 
scope of potential referents depends on whether the claim term embodies 
abstract concepts or not.
1110
In this case, a broad meaning will be the proper 
construction and the ―internet‖ can be captured within the connotation of the 
claim term. 
Where there is no genuine dispute over any relevant facts regarding the 
accused infringing product, the broad construction is outcome-determinative 
                                                        
1109 Sebastian Löbner, Understanding Semantics (2nd ed.) 24 (2013). 
1110 Lee, supra note 872. 
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for question of validity or infringement in the litigation. It is important that a 
patent claim construction strikes an appropriate balance between certainty and 
fairness. The reason for the broad interpretation is not because of the ordinary 
meaning of the text. In fact, given the limitation of internet technology, a 
PHOSITA at the time of filing would have a narrower understanding of the 
ordinary and customary meaning of the term ―communications medium‖. The 
reason of meaning expansion is to give protection and recognition of 
contribution made by the inventor to the art. The dynamic approach justifies 
the adoption of a broader meaning by explaining the performance properties in 
different time frames. Although the dynamic approach arrives at the same 
outcome as the ordinary meaning approach in the Federal Circuit 
(―communications medium‖ is a ―network for transferring data, including the 
Internet‖),1111 the former gives substantive reasons why the chosen meaning is 
more proper and thereby reduce discretion and opacity.  
Section 2 The Napp Pharmaceutical Case 
A. Indeterminacy of patentee‘s intent under purposive construction 
The two patents in suit, the European Patent (UK) Nos. 722730 (―730‖) and 
1258246 (―246‖)1112 in the name of Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited 
(―Napp‖), were concerned with a 12-hour controlled release form of 
oxycodone. The controlled release formulations were the subject of 
                                                        
1111Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1330 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012).(―vacate the district court‘s 
summary judgment of non-infringement and remand to the district court to determine infringement in the 
first instance applying these constructions.‖) 
1112 Ratiopharm GMBH v. NAPP Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd [2008] EWHC 3070 (Pat) (―With certain 
exceptions to which I will have to return in the context of the objection of added matter, the disclosure of 
730 and 246 is substantially the same. That is because 246 was divided out of 730. For the purposes of 
introducing the case it is sufficient to review the contents of 730.‖) 
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independent claim 6 and claims dependent thereon. Claim 6 of 730 is cited as 
follows: 
―A controlled release oxycodone formulation for administration to human 
patients, comprising: 
(a) an analgesically effective amount of spheroids comprising oxycodone or a 
salt thereof and a spheronising agent; 
(b) each spheroid being coated with a film coating which controls the release of 
the oxycodone or oxycodone salt at a controlled rate in an aqueous medium.‖ 
Ratiopharm GmbH and Sandoz Limited (―Ratiopharm/Sandoz‖) were the 
generic medicine parties who made the alleged infringing product the Cimex 
tablets, which was ―a tablet which contains, embedded in excipients, small 
particles made up of a number of layers.‖1113 One of the disputed issues was 
whether the Cimex tablets comprised ―spheroids‖ or a ―spheronising 
agent‖.1114 How the terms ―spheroids‖ and ―a spheronising agent‖ would be 
interpreted became dispositive to the outcome of the infringement litigation. In 
a broad sense, the term ―spheroid‖ simply meant a generally spherical particle, 
and ―a spheronising agent‖ was anything that would assist in the process of 
making a spheroid. In a narrow sense, the term ―spheroid‖ in the claim could 
be limited to ―granules‖, and ―a spheronising agent‖ referred only to 
                                                        
1113 Id. 
1114 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Ratiopharm GmbH [2009] EWCA Civ 252 (The Court noted 
that ―there were a surprisingly large number of issues raised on the appeal‖: A. ―Spheroid‖ and 
―spheronising agent‖ (Claim 6 of 730, claim 4 of 246); B. ―Film coating which controls the release‖ (claim 
6 of 730) and ―coating on said matrix controlling the release of said oxycodone salt‖ (claim 1 of 246); C. 
The in vitro dissolution parameters of claim 1 of 246)) 
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non-water soluble materials (such as microcrystalline cellulose).
1115
 
Ratiopharm/Sandoz contended that the Cimex particles were not granules, and 
therefore were not spheroids within the definition in the patents, and the 
water-soluble HPMC in the Inner Layer served as a binder and was not ―a 
spheronising agent.‖ 
Obviously there was disagreement over intent and purpose in claim 
construction in this case. Both the Patents Court and the Court of Appeal 
expressly relied on the purposive construction. As for the term ―spheroid‖, it 
was easier to come to an agreement on a broad interpretation because the 
patentee acknowledged in the specification that different processes of 
spheronisation exist. ―He would have no reason to suppose that the patentee 
wanted to exclude any of them.‖1116 However, while Mr. Justice Floyd in the 
Patents Court applied a narrow definition to the term ―a spheronising agent‖ 
and found non-infringement, the U.K. Court of Appeal determined that it was 
wrong for him to find that HPMC as used in the Cimex product was not ―a 
spheronising agent‖ within the meaning of the claims, and finally ruled that 
generic-drug makers had infringed the patents.  
Mr. Justice Floyd adopted a narrow interpretation because in discussing 
―a spheronising agent‖, the specification dealt expressly only with the 
                                                        
1115 Ratiopharm GMBH v. NAPP Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd [2008] EWHC 3070 (Pat). 
1116 Id. (―In my judgment the skilled reader would have no reason to think that the term "granule" was 
being used in any particularly limited sense. He would know that a wide range of processes exist for 
arriving at a spheroidal particle by agglomerating smaller particles.‖) See, Hong Wen & Kinam Park, Oral 
Controlled Release Formulation Design and Drug Delivery: Theory to Practice 328 (2011) 
(―Multiparticulate unites may be beads or pellets formed by the extrusion spheronisation process, by direct 
pelletization in rotor fluid bed, or by coating drug onto nonpareil sugar or microcrystalline cellulose 
beads.‖) 




 For example, in the specification 
―[0041] … In particularly preferred embodiments of this aspect of the 
invention, the present dosage form comprises film coated spheroids containing 
active ingredient and a non-water soluble spheronising agent …‖ Hence, 
Justice Floyd agreed that the term was limited to materials (such as 
microcrystalline cellulose) which were incorporated to give the material the 
correct degree of plasticity in an extrusion/spheronisation process.
1118
 By 
comparison, a water soluble polymer such as HPMC
1119
 is known as an agent 
for producing spheroids in, for example, the rotorgranulation process. Justice 
Floyd shared his concerned that some of the claims were apparently ―very 
poorly drafted‖:1120 
The difficulty of construction arises because this is a product, not a process 
claim. In that connection it is somewhat odd that the claim to spheroids includes 
a requirement for a spheronising agent – it is rather like saying that a pot of tea 
includes a tea-making agent. Whatever role is inherent in the definition of that 
term, it will have been fully performed by the time that one has a product. To 
put it bluntly: if you have succeeded in obtaining spheroids, why should it 
matter how you got there? 
Regarding the intent of the patentee, he went on to reason that ―[t]he 
problem for Napp is that some meaning has to be given to the term. It cannot 
be the case that one can assume that a spheronising agent is present just 
                                                        
1117 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Ratiopharm GmbH [2009] EWCA Civ 252. 
1118  Ratiopharm GMBH v. NAPP Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd [2008] EWHC 3070 (Pat). (―The 
Examples in the patents are all of controlled release matrix formulations: there is no example of a coated 
spheroid.‖) 
1119 Id. (―active ingredient together with binder sprayed on to pre-manufactured sugar core‖) 
1120 Id. For example, in construing claim 4 of the invention, Justice Floyd commented that ―Claim 4 is very 
poorly drafted‖. 
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because a spheroid has been made. Something more must be meant.‖1121 
Therefore, the term should be construed to be limited to agents ―which have 
assisted in making a sphere out of something that is not a sphere.‖1122 
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal decided that Justice Floyd erred in 
excluding HPMC, as ―there is no purposive reason to limit‖ the meaning of the 
terms. The Court of Appeal reasoned that because HPMC was suitable for four 
out of the five spheronisation processes
1123
 known at the priority date for 
producing spheroids for a controlled release formulation, it fell within the 
definition of the claim and infringement was found.  
As discussed before, one of the problems of the purposive approach is 
that when the patentee‘s intent is absent, unclear or incomplete, the way of 
ascertaining the hypothetical intent (from the perspective of a PHOSITA) is 
deployed in a rather ambiguous manner,
1124
 especially in the context of 
complex high technologies. Moreover, the meaning of the claim text is not 
always exclusively determined by the patentee‘s intention alone, 1125  for 
example, the interpreters may also conduct a balance analysis between 
                                                        
1121 Id. (―If the process has started with a sphere, it makes no sense to speak of any ingredients which are 
used after that point as spheronising agents. Just about anything you choose after that point will fit Napp's 
definition.‖) 
1122 Id. 
1123  Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Ratiopharm GmbH [2009] EWCA Civ 252. 
Extrusion/spheronisation is but one way in which to make a spheroid. The other four processes are: (1) 
fluidised-bed granulation; (2) rotor granulation; (3) extended wet granulation; and (4) non-pareil beads 
(the Cimex process). 
1124 Carlos Spoerhase, Hypothetischer Intentionalismus: Rekonstruktion und Kritik, Journal of Literary 
Theory 1.1 (2007) (―the concept of the hypothetical is contrasted with that of the actual… the relationship 
between hypothetical intentionalism and actual intentionalism is unspecified‖) 
1125  Goldsworthy, supra note 486. (―Intention alone is not sufficient for a text to be meaningful - 
something else is needed as well.‖) See also, Jorge J. E. Gracia, A Theory of Textuality: The Logic and 
Epistemology 115 (1995) (―there is no determinate intended meaning of which an author is fully aware 
prior to the production of a text except in cases where the author intends to translate one text into a another 
and thus to express the meaning of one text through some other text. But the situation cannot be applied to 
all cases and therefore cannot substantiate the view that the author‘s intention always determines the 
meaning of a text;… it is a well-known fact that often authors use signs in their texts that do not express the 
meaning they are supposed to have intended.‖)  
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innovator and generic drug companies during patent claim construction. A 
more consistent and justifiable framework is needed for patent claim 
construction. 
B. Application of the dynamic construction to the disputed term 
The following paragraphs will illustrate how the disputed term ―a spheronising 
agent‖ would be interpreted under the dynamic claim construction. Due to the 
limitations of the author‘s technological knowledge, the analysis is just an 
example of showing how the term may be interpreted in an alternative way from 
the purposive approach, and does not warrant a perfectly correct result. In the 
context of complex technologies such as pharmaceutical technology, 
biotechnology and information technology etc., it is of particular importance to 
carefully differentiate the essential attributes of the disputed term and its 
accidental attributes, i.e. to characterize the subject matter of ―a spheronising 
agent‖, which has not been sufficiently specified in detail by the courts under 
the purposive approach. Justice Floyd generally concluded that the term was 
intended to be used in the sense of ―agents which have assisted in making a 
sphere out of something that is not a sphere‖,1126 but the Court of Appeal 
thought he erred in construing on such basis. 
The dynamic approach focuses on the essential properties of the subject 
matter itself at the time of filing. Spheronisation is a form of pelletization,
1127
 
which is the technique of converting plastic extrudates or particles that were 
                                                        
1126 Ratiopharm GMBH v. NAPP Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd [2008] EWHC 3070 (Pat). 
1127 David B. Troy & Paul Beringer (ed.), Remington: The Science and Practice of Pharmacy 903 (2006). 
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formed otherwise into a rounded spherical or spheroidal shape.
1128
 There are 
two ways of incorporating drugs into pellets: either as drug layers or as matrix 
systems.
 1129
 As for the former, active ingredients can be layered onto inert 
cores such as sugar spheres (non-pareil), and as for the latter, active ingredients 
and other excipients are mixed via direct pelletization in rotary fluid bed 




To characterize ―a spheronising agent‖ specifically, proper parameters 




The ability of an agglomerated material to be spheronized depends mainly on its 
rheology. Extrudates must break into shorter pieces and those as well as other 
agglomerates must have the right amount of plasticity to deform by impact and 
during rolling. The rheology can be adjusted by the addition of binders and 
lubricants or more wetting agent (usually water)…perfectly spherical particles 
are often not required… the function of the spheronizer equipment is to reduce 
the size of long extrudates into short cylinders with rounded edges. 
Therefore, during extrusion-spheronization, ―a spheronising agent‖ is to 
provide flexibility so as to ensure all tablets made from the same formulation 
are of the same shape and size because they also represent the dosage form.
 1132
 
                                                        
1128 Wolfgang Pietsch, Agglomeration Processes 245 (2008) 
1129 Hong Wen & Kinam Park, Oral Controlled Release Formulation Design and Drug Delivery: Theory 
to Practice 118 (2011). In the specification at issue, the two processes were called ―a controlled release 
matrix‖ and ―film coated spheroids‖. 
1130 Id. 
1131 Pietsch, supra note 1128, at 245. 
1132 Id, at 251. 
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The specification of the 730 patent describes that: ―The spheronising agent 
may be any pharmaceutically acceptable material that together with the active 
ingredient can be spheronised to form spheroids. Microcrystalline cellulose is 
preferred.‖ Microcrystalline cellulose (MCC) is one of the most widely used 
pelletization agents in the pharmaceutical industry.
1133
 It has particular 
characteristics such as ―less water-holding capacity, narrow liquid range 
providing the correct rheology for extrusion-spheronization, addition of binder 
required to obtain efficient mechanical strength.‖1134 Therefore, the term ―a 
spheronising agent‖ connotes an essential attribute of giving the mass of 
material the right degree of plasticity or viscosity. The plasticity or viscosity 
expresses the resistance of the material against flow or permanent 
deformation.
1135
 It may denote a range of effective alternative spheronising 
aids such as Crospovidone, carrageenan, chitosan, pectinic acid, glycerides, 
β-CD, and cellulose derivatives.1136 
The allegedly infringing product Cimex is made from sugar crystals, that 
is, by coating so called non-pareil sugar beads with the drug, and adding the 
barrier on top. The sugar spheres (non-pareil) are the inert cores, and active 
ingredients can be layered onto inert cores in two ways: (1) Spray a solution or 
suspension containing both drugs a binding agent onto inert cores; (2) Layer 
drug powders onto inert cores directly.
1137
 Under the dynamic approach, the 
                                                        
1133 Toma Mihai Chitu et al, Rheology, Granule Growth and Granule Strength: Application to the Wet 
Granulation of Lactose–MCC Mixtures, 208 Powder Technology 2, 441-453(2011). 
1134 SP Jain et al., Alternative Extrusion-spheronization Aids, in Issues in Pharmacology, Pharmacy, Drug 
Research, and Drug Innovation: 2011 Edition 1170 (2012) 
1135 Roelof Houwink & Roelof Houwink, H. K. De Decker, Elasticity, Plasticity and Structure of Matter 
59, 61 (1971) (―The general term used for such type of flow in older literature is ‗plastic flow‘.‖) 
1136 Jain, supra note 1134. 
1137 Hong Wen & Kinam Park, Oral Controlled Release Formulation Design and Drug Delivery: Theory 
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question is whether ―hydroxypropylmethyl cellulose (HPMC)‖ can be 
identified as a denotation having the essential attributes as defined, i.e., whether 
HPMC has the properties of giving the mass of material the right degree of 
plasticity or viscosity.  
Without defining the essential attributes of ―a spheronising agent‖, Justice 
Floyd focused on other functional properties of HPMC. He recognized that the 
hydration and gel forming abilities of HPMC can be used to prolong the drug 
release of the active ingredient.
1138
 The parameter for assessing such 
properties is the diffusional release rates of HPMC.
1139
 However, at the same 
time, HPMC is, like several other types of cellulose derivatives— ―cellulose 
derivatives in general add plasticity‖1140—well known for its technological 
application as a viscosity, and rheology-regulating agent and can be obtained 
in various viscosity degrees.
1141
 HPMC polymers offer different solubility and 
gelling properties, ―which are critically dependent on the degree of 
substitution, hydroxypropyl content, molecular weight, and temperature.‖1142 
Since HPMC possesses the essential attributes as defined, it can be identified as 
a denotation of ―a spheronising agent‖ by a PHOSITA at the time of filing. As 
the original expected application provides strong evidence for claim meaning, 
without changes of denotations over time, a PHOSITA will determine that the 
variant falls within the connotative meaning of the disputed term. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Practice 118 (2011). 
1138 Veeran Gowda Kadajji & Guru V. Betageri, Water Soluble Polymers for Pharmaceutical Applications, 
3 Polymers, 1972-2009 (2011). (―…two mechanisms, drug diffusion through the swelling gel layer and 
release by matrix erosion of the swollen layer.‖) 
1139 S. Kamel et al., Pharmaceutical significance of cellulose: A review, eXPRESS Polymer Letters Vol.2, 
No.11 (2008) 758–778, Available online at www.expresspolymlett.com 
1140  Michael J. Rathbone et.al., Modified-Release Drug Delivery Technology, Volume 1, 265(2003) 
1141 Ziad El-Rassi, Carbohydrate Analysis by Modern Chromatography and Electrophoresis 587 (2002) 
1142 Jèurgen Siepmann, Fundamentals and Applications of Controlled Release Drug Delivery 86 (2012). 
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One thing to be noted under the dynamic construction is that the 
connotation is determined at the time of filing. Pharmaceutical patents may be 
categorized as claiming (1) drug substances or active ingredients; (2) 
pharmaceutical formulations or compositions; and (3) methods of use.
1143
 
―Claim for the formulation‖ means a claim for a substance that is a mixture of 
medicinal and non-medicinal ingredients in a drug and that is administered to a 
patient in a particular dosage form.
1144
 For example, formulation scientists 
investigate controlled release, bio-availability improvement, and different 
modes of administration such as capsules, tablets, gel etc.. Unlike 
chemical-compound patents that usually claim a new active, formulation 
patents typically apply a known formulation technology to an already-patented 
substance.
1145
 The patents at issue in this case are directed to a formulation that 
enables delivery of a known drug. 
1146
 Therefore, from the perspective of a 
PHOSITA at the time of the invention, the properties of spheronising agents in 
assisting in the process of making a spheroid were well-known. It is justifiable 
to apply a broad construction to the disputed term. As HPMC as used in the 
generic Cimex product was a type of ―spheronising agent‖ within the meaning 
of the claims, infringement would be found.  
Interestingly, Napp also filed a patent infringement suit as regards the 
                                                        
1143 1 C.F.R. 314.53(b) requires NDA holders to list these categories of patents in the FDA‘s Orange Book. 
1144 Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133, S 2, 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-93-133/page-1.html#docCont  
1145 Hao Yin, A New Formula for Analyzing Formulation-Patent Obviousness, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 829 
(2011) (―formulation patents can be categorized as combination patents, which are more susceptible to 
validity challenges.‖) 
1146 Ratiopharm GMBH v. NAPP Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd [2008] EWHC 3070 (Pat). Mr Justice 
Floyd acknowledged that he had initially approached the case with an expectation of surprise if a 
controlled release version of a known drug, such as oxycodone, turned out to be inventive; "After all," he 
said, "controlled release technology is a technology of potentially universal application... Unless there is 
some specific technical difficulty to overcome (and none is suggested here), why does making a controlled 
release version of a known analgesic warrant a patent?" 
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German counterpart of patent 730 and 246 in Germany, and a final decision 
holding non-infringement was reached by the Landgericht in Mannheim on 
August 2008 (Judges Kircher, Lehmeyer and Lembach).
1147
 Different 
approaches may ultimately lead to very different results. This reminds us of 
the difficulty of interpretative task in Epilady case. ―Both the German and 
English courts interpreted the same patent, operated under an approximately 
identical set of facts, utilized a uniform standard of interpretation—Protocol 
on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the EPC—and still managed to come up 
with two polar decisions.‖1148 If the proposed dynamic approach is applied to 
the Epilady case, first, the interpreter must delineate the properties that make 
up the connotation of the term ―helical spring‖. Second, the interpreter must 
decide whether the elastic rubber rod used in the Remington depilatory device 
falls within the connotation of the term ―helical spring‖ described in the claim. 
The interpreter will not be bound by the literal meaning of ―helical spring‖, i.e. 
its conventional use as mechanical energy buffer.
1149
 Instead, he will 
investigate the essential properties possessed by the term, such as having an 
arcuate form, defining a convex side whereat the windings are spread apart and 
defining a concave side whereat the windings are pressed together.
1150
 He will 
decide that the essential performance properties of the term are a certain level of 
                                                        
1147 Id. The Court of Appeal‘s finding of infringement contrasts with decisions in Germany where the 
German designation of the patents were found to be not infringed. The Court of Appeal briefly explained 
two reasons, first, ―As regards the Dusseldorf decision it appears to have overlooked the fact that claim 1 
of 246 is not limited to the four elements (a) to (d).‖ Second, ―as regards the Mannheim decision, the claim 
of 730 is rather different from that we have considered.‖ The Court of Appeal concluded that ―We are not 
persuaded by either of these decisions, even though we give great respect to the decisions of the German 
courts.‖ 
1148 John P. Jr. Hatter, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Legislation: An Analysis of the Epilady 
Controversy, 5 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 461 (1994-1995). 
1149 Id. (―atypical use of the spring… seeming justified the broad interpretation of the words ‗helical 
spring‘ used in claim one of the Improver patent.‖) 
1150 EP0101656, European publication server, 
https://data.epo.org/publication-server/document?iDocId=5452861&iFormat=3 




 Accordingly, the interpreter will very likely tend to 
give a broad interpretation of the term, which may result in patent infringement. 
Section 3 The Renda Case 
A. Lack of limit on the expansion of patent rights through the doctrine of 
equivalents 
Renda Building Materials Factory v. Dalian Xinyi Building Materials Limited 
Company was selected as one of the 100 typical intellectual property cases that 
had a great influence on China in the last three decades.
1152
 The patent in 
dispute is a utility model patent granted on the ―concrete thin-walled tubular 
member‖. Renda Factory was the licensee under the contract on the exclusive 
license of the patent in question and granted an exclusive use. The independent 
claim of the patent was as follows:  
A concrete thin-walled tubular article, which was composed of a tube and the 
bottoms at both ends of the closed tube, and whose features lie in that each 
bottom of the tube was overlaid with at least two layers of glass fiber cloth, and 
every two layers of glass fiber cloth were stuck together with a layer of 
sulphoaluminate cement inorganic cementing (hereinafter referred to as SCIC) 
material or ferrialuminate cement inorganic cementing (hereinafter referred to as 
FCIC) material; the surface on either side of a bottom of the tube was also 
covered with a layer of SCIC material or FCIC material. Likewise, the said tube 
                                                        
1151 Epilady Germany II ,Düsseldorf Court of Appeals, November 21, 1991,23 IIC 838 (1993). 
1152 TianLipu (ed.), Ying Xiang Zhong Guo De Yi Bai Ge Zhi Shi Chan QuanAn Li [One Hundred 
Intellectual Property Cases That Have Influenced China] (2009). Patent Case 002: Da LianXin Yi JianCai 
You Xian Gong Si yu Da LianRen Da Xin Xing Qiang Ti JianCai Chang [Renda Building Materials 
Factory v. Dalian Xinyi Building Materials Limited Company], No. 1 (2005) of the No. 3 Civil Tribunal, 
the Supreme People‘s Court. The English translation is based on, 
http://www1.lawinfochina.com/case/display.asp?db=2&id=250&keyword= (last visited on Oct 30, 2010). 
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was overlaid with at least two layers of glass fiber cloth, and every two layers of 
glass fiber cloth were stuck together with a layer of SCIC or FCIC material; both 
the interior and exterior surfaces of the tube were also covered with a layer of 
SCIC material or FCIC material.
1153
 
The allegedly infringing product had the following features: in the tube, a 
layer of glass fiber cloth was embedded between two layers of CIC materials, 
and the bottoms at both ends of the closed tube were also composed of CIC 
materials, without any glass fiber cloth. The allegedly infringing product was 
different from the claimed invention in mainly two aspects: first, there was one 
less layer of glass fiber cloth in the tube, and second, there was no glass fiber 
cloth at the bottom of the tube. Therefore, the construction of the claim term ―at 
least two layers of glass fiber cloth‖ is crucial.1154  
As previously discussed, under the constructionist approach, and the 
―content‖ (the technical solution) not only includes explicitly described 
technical content at the time of filing, but also embraces equivalents at the time 
of infringement. As a result, this approach has a greater tendency to expand the 
scope of patent protection by invoking the doctrine of equivalents. In this case, 
the Intermediate People‘s Court of Dalian Municipality (hereinafter referred to 
as ―Intermediate Court‖) found that the technical content, i.e., ―at least two 
layers of glass fiber cloth,‖ had the properties of reinforcing intensity and 
reducing weight. The ―one layer of glass fiber cloth‖ and ―no layer of glass fiber 
                                                        
1153 Da Lian Xin Yi Jian Cai You Xian Gong Si yu Da Lian Ren Da Xin Xing Qiang Ti Jian Cai Chang 
[Dalian Xinyi Building Materials Limited Company v. Renda Building Materials Factory], No. 1 (2005) of 
the No. 3 Civil Tribunal, the Supreme People‘s Court. The English translation is based on, 
http://www1.lawinfochina.com/case/display.asp?db=2&id=250&keyword= (last visited on Oct 30, 2010). 
1154 Id. 
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cloth‖ performed the substantially same function in substantially the same way 
with substantially the same result as the technical content, and therefore, it was 
considered as an equivalent to the claim term at the time of infringement. On 
appeal, the Higher People‘s Court of Liaoning Province (hereinafter referred to 




However, Xinyi Company insisted that the judgment was wrong and 
submitted the case to the Supreme People‘s Court (hereinafter referred to as 
―Supreme Court‖) for re-examination. In 2005, the Supreme Court delivered the 
final decision holding that the Higher Court had wrongly applied the law of 
patent claim construction, and the original judgment was reversed: 
…there is no layer of glass fiber cloth in the bottom of allegedly infringing 
product. Obviously, the allegedly infringing product is not the same as the 
technical features recorded in the claims. Because the accused product has no 
layer of glass fiber cloth in the bottom, but the invention claimed more than two 
layers of glass fiber cloth, their means are not equivalent, too.
1156
 
In the final decision, the Supreme Court particularly warned against the 
abuse of the rule against surplusage and the doctrine of equivalents. The strong 
opposing opinions from the defendant‘s legal counsel and the reversing 
judgment from the Supreme People‘s Court have shown the dubiousness of the 
claim interpretation. It is interesting to compare it with the 2001 Ningbo 
                                                        
1155Da LianXin Yi JianCai You Xian Gong Si yu Da LianRen Da Xin Xing Qiang Ti JianCai Chang [Dalian 
Xinyi Construction Materials Co. Ltd. v. Dalian Renda Wall Materials Factory],No. 67, Final Decision, 
Intellectual Property Tribunal, Higher People‘s Court of Liaoning Province (2004)  
1156Da LianXin Yi Jian Cai You Xian Gong Si yu Da Lian Ren Da Xin Xing Qiang Ti JianCai Chang 
[Dalian Xinyi Construction Materials Co. Ltd. v. Dalian Renda Wall Materials Factory], No. 1 of the No. 
3 Civil Tribunal, the Supreme People‘s Court(2005). 
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Oriental Movement Factory v. Jiangyin Jinling Hardware Co. Ltd case,
1157
 
where the Supreme People‘s Court overturned both the infringement decisions 
from the High People‘s Court and the Intermediate People‘s Court, and first 
applied the doctrine of equivalents. Some scholars found that while the 2001 
Ningbo Oriental Movement Factory case encouraged the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents in lower courts, the 2005 Renda case turned to warn 
against abuse of the application of the doctrine. The Chief Justice in the latter 
case also sat in the panel of three in the previous case.
1158
 Patent claim 
construction needs to balance fair protection policy against legal certainty 
policy. It is wise for the Supreme People‘s Court to critically re-examine the 
evolvement of the doctrine of equivalents to prevent improper use, but the 
change of policies will significantly reduce the predictability of individual 
patent cases and increase the reversal rate.
1159
 Without restrictions and 
conditions for ascertaining the meaning of the claim term, the expansion of 
claim scope by embracing equivalents is inevitable.  
B. The application of dynamic construction to the disputed terms 
The disputed terms of this case are as follows: (1) ―each bottom of the tube was 
                                                        
1157Ning Bo Shi Dong Fang JiXinZong Chang su Jiang Yin Jin Ling Wu Jin Zhi Pin You Xian Gong Si 
[Ningbo Oriental Movement Factory v. Jiangyin Jinling Hardware Co. Ltd], No. 1, 3rd Civil Tribunal, The 
Supreme People‘s Court (2001) relevant case discussions in Part I Chapter 3. 
1158 Wu Yuhe & Wang Gang, Deng Tong Yuan Ze Zai Zhong Guo[The Doctrine of Equivalents in China], 
2007:1 ZhongGuoZhuan Li Yu Shang Biao[China Patents & Trademarks], 26.  
1159 Zhang Jian Hua yu Shen Yang Zhi Lian Gao Ceng Gong Nuan Ji Shu You Xian Gong Si [Zhang 
Jianhua vs. Shenyang Direct Connected Heating System Co Ltd], No.83, Civil Tribunal, Supreme People‘s 
Court. (2009), revoking No.10, Civil Tribunal 4, Final Decision, Higher People‘s Court of Liao Ning 
Province (2003), and No.85, Civil Tribunal 4, 1st Instance, Intermediate People‘s Court of Shen Yang 
(2002)；Cheng Du You Ta Zhi Yao You Xian Gong Si su Jiang Su Wan Gao Yao Ye You Xian Ze Ren Gong 
Si [Chengdu Youta Pharmaceutical Company Ltd vs. Jiangsu Wangao Pharmaceutical Company ltd] 
No.158, Civil Tribunal, Supreme People‘s Court (2010), revoking No.63, Civil Tribunal, Final Decision, 
Higher People‘s Court of Si Chuan Province (2010), and No.249, Civil Tribunal, 1st Instance, Intermediate 
People‘s Court of Shen Yang (2007). 
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overlaid with at least two layers of glass fiber cloth.‖ (2) ―Likewise, the said 
tube was overlaid with at least two layers of glass fiber cloth.‖ While the 
constructionist approach devotes much attention to comparing and evaluating 
the technological properties of the allegedly infringing product at the time of 
infringement (such as whether it performs substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result), the dynamic approach 
insists that connotation of words employed in the patent claims does not 
change. The adaptation of claim meaning to the new scientific-technological 
context is important, however, it is equally important to preserve the meaning of 
the claim text in the original context. Nothing which has not the essential 
attributes as understood at the time of filing can fall within the connotation. The 
dynamic approach helps to enhance certainty of patent claim construction, and 
is able to avoid arbitrary expansion of the scope of patent rights 
A. To preserve certainty, patent claim meaning, i.e. the connotation, 
remains constant from the time of filing, while the application of such meaning, 
i.e. the denotation, may change over time. Under the dynamic approach, the 
interpreter seeks the connotation of the words (the essential attribute of the 
concept referred to) as understood at the time of filing. It was clear that in the 
original scientific-technological context before the filing date, there was already 
a five-layer structure for the tubular wall consisting of three layers of cement 
embedded with two layers of glass fiber cloth. The claimed invention was 
advantaged at using at least two layers of the tubular wall to achieve the effect 
of expanding cavity, reducing weight and reinforcing the tensile strength. The 
interpreter will carefully identify the essential attributes of the disputed terms in 
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the claim. (1) The term ―at least two layers of glass fiber cloth‖ in the tubular 
wall refers to glass fiber cloth in the tubular wall with a specific performance 
level of expanding cavity, reducing weight and reinforcing the tensile strength 
of the concrete tube. (2) The term ―at least two layers of glass fiber cloth‖ at the 
bottoms of both ends refers to glass fiber cloth having a specific performance 
level of reinforcing the tensile strength, sound insulation and cement-slush 
prevention. While the connotation of a word remains unchanged, flexibility is 
introduced into claim construction by way of its denotation which may enlarge 
or shrink with development of science and technology. 
B. What a PHOSITA at the time of filing would have interpreted and 
applied the claim terms to mean, i.e. the original expected application of 
meaning, provides strong evidence of the meaning of patent claims. The 
doctrine of equivalents is expansive in nature by stretching beyond the literal 
wording of the patent claim. Interpreters ask whether the allegedly infringing 
product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way 
to achieve substantially the same result. Whereas the first instance and the 
High People‘s Court were obviously persuaded by the plaintiff‘s argument that 
there was equivalency between the two, the Supreme People‘s Court found 
that they differed in the substance. The disconnection between the rulings 
provides another example of the difficulties inherent in applying the doctrine 
of equivalents even to cases involving simple cases of mechanics.  
By comparison, the dynamic approach adopts a more cautious and 
conservative stances by paying heavy attention to the original expected 
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application of meaning at the time of filing. The denotation of a term is the 
class of all actual things to which the term applies, and the members of this 
class have certain common attributes.
1160
 In this case, Variant 1 is ―one less 
layer of glass fiber cloth in the tube‖, and Variant 2 is ―no glass fiber cloth at the 
bottom of the tube.‖ Variant 1 could not fulfill the technological purpose of 
expanding cavity, reducing weight or reinforcing the tensile strength of the 
concrete tube; and Variant 2 could not achieve the technological effect of 
reinforcing the tensile strength, sound insulation and cement-slush prevention. 
1161
They hence did not possess the essential attributes as so defined, and would 
not be identified by a PHOSITA as a denotation of the disputed claim term at 
the time of filing. 
C. In forming the original expected application of claim meaning, one 
takes account of whether a PHOSITA could foresee probability of the claim 
term acquiring new denotation. While the connotation remains fixed, the 
denotation may expand with the development of fiber glass fabric technology, 
for example, an enhancement in strength, weight or flexibility such as a new 
reinforcement medium. However, in the present case, there is no such 
technological change or development. Renda Building Materials Factory 
argued that at the time of filing, there existed only the non-alkali-proof glass 
fiber, and the use of alkali-proof glass fiber having anti-corrosive quality was 
not adopted until 1999. But there was evidence that alkali-resistant glass fiber 
                                                        
1160 Michael Losonsky, Linguistic Turns in Modern Philosophy 129 (2006). (―First, when a term has a 
connotation, the connotation determines its denotation.‖) 
1161 Da LianXin Yi Jian Cai You Xian Gong Si yu Da Lian Ren Da Xin Xing Qiang Ti JianCai Chang 
[Dalian Xinyi Construction Materials Co. Ltd. v. Dalian Renda Wall Materials Factory], No. 1 of the No. 
3 Civil Tribunal, the Supreme People‘s Court(2005). 
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cloth had been widely applied in industry as prior art before the filing date. 
Hence there is no change of denotation of the disputed term. Since the original 
expected application is consistent with current application of patent claim 
meaning, one does not need to evaluate the contribution of the variants.  The 
variants cannot be classified as denotations of the claim term, and therefore 
fall outside the scope of patent protection, then no infringement will be found. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has examined patent claim interpretation from a new perspective of 
theories of meaning. The overall goals of this thesis are as follows: first, to 
critically evaluate the existing theories adopted by different approaches; 
second, to introduce a new theory and propose a proper interpretation of claims 
in the context of patent infringement. In order to fulfill the goals stated above, 
the thesis addresses the following research questions: (a) what are the current 
claim interpretation approaches? (b) What are the interpretive theories 
underpinning these approaches? (c) Are these theories helpful in describing and 
guiding the claim interpretation practice? (d) What is the alternative interpretive 
theory and how can it improve claim interpretation? 
This thesis devotes attention to the dynamic nature of claim construction 
and assesses the tension between the past and present in understanding 
knowledge of science and technology. To mediate the debate over fixed versus 
evolving claim meaning, it is necessary to explore the relationship between the 
concept of ―meaning‖ (what the words mean in that context) and the concept 
of ―application‖ (how this meaning will be applied in a particular situation). 
Philosophical hermeneutics‘ major contribution to patent claim interpretation is 
its dynamic view of meaning. According to Gadamer, legal interpretation must 
be faithful to the original meaning of the text, but it must also take account of 
the changes in different contexts. ―Analogously, interpretation attempts to 
grasp the original meaning of a text but always from within a present horizon 
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of meanings. Interpretation ‗applies‘ the original text within a tradition which 
has, in the meantime, moved on.‖ 1162  From the modern philosophical 
literature, one proposed legal interpretation model is to draw the distinction 
between the meaning of a term (its connotation) and its application (its 
denotation):
1163
 ―The application, denotation, reference, or extension of a term 
is comprised of all the things in the world (or all possible worlds) that it 
denotes or refers to; its meaning, connotation, sense, or intension consists of 
the criteria or the function that determine its denotation.‖ 1164  
This thesis proposes the dynamic claim interpretation to uncover the 
connotation of the claim terms, i.e. a claim term is defined by a particular set 
of properties. To interpret is to conduct a feature analysis of these properties. 
When science and technology develop, the denotation of the technical contents 
may change over time. There are possible gaps between the application of the 
claim text at the time of filing and the application at the time of infringement. 
Claim interpretation is neither bound by the original expected meaning of 
application, nor necessarily extended to the current meaning of application. 
The dynamic approach requires interpreters to overtly and consistently provide 
sufficient explanation and justification in applying the claim text to changing 
circumstances. In order to preserve certainty in claim interpretation, a 
contemporary interpreter need not restrict the denotation of a claim term to the 
things they denoted at the time of filing, but rather fix its connotation. The 
                                                        
1162 David West, Continental Philosophy: An Introduction 121 (2010). (―Application is such a significant 
model of hermeneutics because it entrenches Gadamer‘s view of understanding as a creative, productive 
and yet highly disciplined activity.‖) 
1163 Evans, supra note 59.   
1164 Huscroft & Miller, supra note 490, at 63. (―The distinction can explain quite dramatic changes in the 
operation of a constitution.‖) 
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dynamic approach stresses the need for both legal certainty and flexibility in 
patent claim construction. 
Patent claim construction is often outcome-determinative of the 
infringement and validity issues. The core issue is often whether there is a 
narrow or broad interpretation of the patent claim. Thus, the first step of 
determination of essential properties is critical for ascertaining the scope of 
protection. The second step is to decide whether a modified feature of the 
claimed invention possesses all the essential qualities as so defined. The 
dynamic claim interpretation is highly context-sensitive and explanation-based. 
It will hopefully promote open articulation and elaboration of the choice of 
meaning among several plausible competing interpretations, and thereby 
enhances the consistency and persuasiveness of judicial decisions. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Although this thesis has provided an alternative solution to patent claim 
interpretation, there is a variety of open issues and future challenges that 
require further research.  
First, the perspective of philosophical theories of meaning is becoming 
increasingly important in analyzing ―meaning‖ in the patent context. This is 
due to the need for justification and legitimacy in legal judgments.
1165
 
Philosophical theories of meaning provide us with ―an account of the forms of 
inference which we generally employ in our linguistic practices‖, through 
                                                        
1165 Patterson, supra note 26, at 14. 
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―semantic completeness and soundness proofs‖. 1166  It has long been 
recognized that conceptual studies and rational justification can be closely 
related in particular cases.
1167
 The absence of a firm theoretical basis for 
patent claim construction approaches may result in ongoing uncertainty 
throughout the patent litigation process. Application of these theories to patent 
claim construction is an invaluable aid to a clearer and more comprehensive 
understanding of the claim interpretation enterprise.   
Second, the contemporary debates between originalism and living 
constitution
1168
 deserve continued attention as they provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the possible mediation between the past and the present. The 
practical payoffs of the debate give us a better understanding of the use of 
language as evolving, changing and adapting in patent claim construction. The 
legal theories and approaches will help to explain the choice of claim meaning 
in light of changed circumstances and conditions. They will also help the 
interpreters to reason and justify their decisions in a coherent and integrated 
framework. 
Third, a holistic consideration of text, purpose, policy and fairness is 
necessary with further research in interpretive legal theories in other areas of 
law. For example, the modern trend towards a ―crucible‖ approach in 
interpreting legal texts such as constitutions, statutes, contracts and treaties 
                                                        
1166 Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice 73 (1996). 
1167 Robert S. Summers, Legal Philosophy Today—An Introduction, in Robert S. Summers (ed.), Essays in 
Legal Philosophy 6 (1968). 
1168 For general discussion, see e.g., Dennis J. Goldford, The American Constitution and the Debate Over 
Originalism (2005); Robert Robert William Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Originalism: 
A Debate (2011). Huscroft & Miller, supra note 490. Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011). 
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could be followed. The crucible approach has been described as follows: ―All 
various elements, as they were present in any given case, would be thrown 
into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant 
interpretation.‖1169 It would be helpful to study how interpreters actually 
resolve the conflicts among different components (text, intent, context and 
policy etc.) during the legal interpretation process. It would be also helpful to 
clarify the uniqueness of the patent claim interpretation in the substantive 
inquiry of the technological context. 
Finally, the assessments and comparisons of the patent claim 
interpretation principles should be continually undertaken in a global 
perspective. The world is getting smaller, and international, multinational, 
transnational, and multi-domestic businesses rapidly expand. Patents, although 
territorial in nature, play an important role in promoting a company‘s business 
interests in the worldwide marketplace. Therefore, in order to reduce costs and 
remove obstacles to business operations, it is necessary to move towards a 
consistent interpretation for the same patent in different jurisdictions, which 
can strengthen the public confidence in the patent systems. Patent claim 
interpretation is a fundamental issue in global patent litigations.  
                                                        
1169 Gardiner, supra note 1002, at 9. 
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